A genealogical research guide to New Mexico historical statutes from 1598 to 1950.
Historical Law Guides > New Mexico
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Legal Ages at a Glance General Principles Legal Age of Adulthood Marriage Property Ownership |
Inheritance Taxation Courts Sources & Where to Verify |
| Legal milestone | Age | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Full majority | 21 | Both sexes, from the territorial period on; before 1846 a tutor to 14 for boys and 12 for girls, then a curator to 25 |
| Marry | 18 male / 15 female from 1876; 18 / 16 by 1938 | Below those ages the marriage was void; church-law ages of 14 and 12 governed earlier |
| Parental consent for marriage | Under 21 male / under 18 female from 1876 | The earlier rule reached males under 21 |
| Choose own guardian | 14 | Both sexes — helps estimate a birth year |
| Guardianship ends | 21, or on marriage | Both sexes; the final settlement approximates a birth year |
| Apprenticeship ends | 21 male / 18 female | Orphans and poor children bound out by the probate judge |
| Demand a division of an inheritance | 22 | Under the civil-law scheme; younger heirs acted through a guardian or curator |
| Make a will | 14 male / 12 female to 1889; 21 from 1889 | Marriage revoked a will made before it |
| Serve as executor | 14 male / 12 female to 1889; 21 from 1889 | Anyone capable of making a will could be appointed, so the two ages moved together |
| Witness a will | Any age if competent | An heir, or anyone the will left a gift, was barred; 3 witnesses to 1889, 2 after |
| Testify as a witness | Any age if competent | Interest ceased to bar a witness from 1880 |
| Taxable as a poll | 21, from the revenue act of 1882 | Males, citizen or alien; town road tax 21–60; earlier territorial revenue came from license taxes |
| Jury service | 21 and over; those past 60 exempt | White male citizens owning land and heading a family; “white” dropped in 1880, land replaced by tax payment in 1891, and both dropped in 1905; women still ineligible in 1945 |
| Criminal responsibility | 14 at common law, from 1876 | Under 7 none; 7–14 presumed none. Before 1876 no child under 10½ could be accused at all. From 1917 a child under 16 — under 18 from 1929 — was made a ward of the juvenile court instead of convicted, though felony charges stayed with the district court |
New Mexico's law began in the Spanish civil law. From the first Spanish settlement the colony was governed by the law collected in the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias and the older Siete Partidas, and Mexican independence in 1821 continued that system. Two features of it run through every early New Mexico record: property acquired during a marriage belonged to husband and wife together, and a parent had to leave a fixed share to each child.
The United States took the territory in 1846 and Congress organized it in 1850. The military government's Kearny Code kept the existing law in place: all laws then in force which were not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States remained the rule of action and decision1. Spanish and Mexican rules therefore continued to govern, and the territorial legislature re-enacted large parts of them in Spanish and English on facing pages.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) protected the property of people already living there and let them choose United States citizenship.
English common law (judge-made law, handed down through court decisions rather than written by a legislature) became the rule in New Mexico through a single sentence in an act about where civil suits could be brought: in all the courts of the territory the common law as recognized in the United States was to be the rule of practice and decision2. The civil law and territorial statute govern before that date, and a mixture governs after it.
Marital property kept its civil-law shape, though not without a break. Under the Spanish and Mexican law, and the territorial statutes that carried it forward, property acquired during a marriage belonged to husband and wife together, each holding half.
An act of 1901 recast that. All property acquired by either husband or wife, before or during marriage, became his or her separate estate, and the act worked instead through onerous title — everything acquired during the marriage other than by gift, donation, bequest, devise, or descent — which it hedged about with limits on conveying and on willing3.
An act of 1907 restored the community by name. Property owned before marriage, and property acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, was the separate property of the spouse who held it; all other property acquired after marriage by either of them or by both was community property4. Because those rules descend from the civil law of Spain and Mexico, the courts read them against that background5.
Before 1846 the Spanish and Mexican civil law governed, and it divided childhood in two. A boy under 14 and a girl under 12 were under a tutor, a guardian the law gave them whether they asked for one or not. From those ages to 25 the judge gave the young person a curator instead — a guardian of the property rather than of the person, and one a minor of sound mind could decline unless he was suing or being sued. Full capacity came at 256.
7.Full legal age in territorial and state New Mexico was 21, the same for both sexes. Guardianship ran until the minor reached 21, whether male or female8. The limitation act preserved the claims of anyone under 21 until three years after coming of age9. Poll tax liability and jury service both began at 21.
The territorial codification of the civil law set particular ages for particular acts, and one of them sits close enough to majority to mislead. An heir had to be over 22 to demand a division of an inheritance in his own right10. Heirs below that age, and those unable to manage their own property, asked through a guardian or curator (a person the court appointed to manage another's property) whom the probate judge appointed. The probate court was the county court that handled estates, wills, and guardianships11.
Twenty-one held for the rest of the period, for both sexes, married or single, by rule of common law12.
A minor could own property. What the law limited was the power to bind himself. Minors under 21 who were subject to a parent's authority could not make a contract of service; those aged 14 to 20 who were free of parental authority and had no guardian could contract for themselves13.
In court a minor sued through his father, his mother, his curator, or a next friend (an adult who brought the suit on the child’s behalf) approved by the judge, and a minor who was sued had a curator ad litem, "for the lawsuit," appointed before the case could go forward14. An appointment of that kind names the adult standing in for the child.
Two other ages sat near majority and are easy to confuse with it:
Into the 1870s the church-law ages carried over from the Spanish and Mexican period governed — 14 for a boy and 12 for a girl — and the territorial marriage act left the ages there, requiring instead that the officiant satisfy himself the parties were legally capable of marrying16.
An act of 1876 set statutory figures. A marriage of a male under 18 or of a female under 15 was absolutely invalid17. That is the line to apply to any New Mexico marriage from 1876 onward.
The floor for a girl moved up to 16 in 1923. The 1876 section stood unchanged in the compilation of 1897, which still barred marriage below 18 for a male and 15 for a female18, and the Code of 1915 still printed the same figures: no one could knowingly unite in marriage a male under 21 or a female under 18 without the consent of the parents or guardians in whose care the minor was, and every marriage of a male under 18 or a female under 15 was absolutely invalid19. The section was amended in 1923, and the compilers of 1929 print the result under that act: no one could knowingly unite in marriage a male under 21 or a female under 18 without the consent of parents or guardians, nor a male under 18 or a female under 16 with or without it20. By 1938 the rule stood at 18 for a male and 16 for a female, below which no marriage could be made at all, with a parent’s consent required below 21 for a male and 18 for a female21.
An underage marriage stood until a court declared it void, and an act of 1927 set out how that worked. Only the minor could ask for the decree; a party who was over the age could not. The court could allow a girl alimony until she came of age or remarried. The children of a marriage so declared void were legitimate, with the right of inheritance from both parents. And if the couple lived together until they reached the age at which marriage was allowed, the marriage became legal and binding22.
The earlier rule reached males: a male under 21 married with the consent of his parents, his guardian, or the person in whose charge he was, proved by their presence or by an authenticated written certificate23.
The 1876 act extended consent to both sexes at two different ages. An authorized person joined in marriage a male under 21 or a female under 18 only on the consent of the parents or guardians in whose care the minor was24. Between 1876 and the end of this period, then, a bride of 16 married lawfully with consent, while a bride of 14 fell below the age at which a marriage could stand at all.
A valid New Mexico marriage required a ceremony before an authorized officiant, and the courts have held so throughout25. Any ordained clergyman of any denomination, or any civil magistrate, could solemnize it26, and a religious society could celebrate marriage according to its own rites and customs27. Marriage was treated as a civil contract requiring the consent of parties legally capable of contracting28. A marriage valid where it was celebrated was valid in New Mexico29. The rule held to the end of this period: a ceremony before an authorized officiant was still required in the twentieth century30.
The statute placed the record with the county. Officiants kept a register and sent certificates of the marriages they performed to the clerk of the probate court twice a year, and religious societies sent a transcript to the same office31. For the Spanish and Mexican periods the marriage was a church act, and the record is a parish register.
The 1876 act declared void as incestuous all marriages between ancestors and descendants of any degree, between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, and between first cousins, and applied the rule to children born outside marriage as well as within it32. The first-cousin bar was brief: an act of 1880 repealed every provision prohibiting the marriage of cousins of any degree33. A first-cousin marriage is therefore void if celebrated in New Mexico between 1876 and 1880, and good on either side of those dates.
New Mexico's racial restriction on marriage ran for nine years. An act of 1857 made it a penitentiary offense for a negro or mulatto, free or enslaved, to marry or cohabit with a white woman, punished the white woman equally and the officiant by fine, and left marriages contracted before the act untouched34. The same act required free Black residents to post a bond for good behavior and barred new free Black settlers. The whole act was repealed in 186635.
Servitude in New Mexico commonly took the form of debt peonage, worked through registered contracts of service between master and servant. The territory abolished all involuntary servitude within its limits in the 1866–67 session36.
Any person or body politic holding any right or title to real estate in the territory, absolute or limited, could convey it37. The right belonged to free men of every origin, and Hispanic settlers, free people of color, and Anglo newcomers alike appear in the deed books.
Land came from three sources: Spanish and Mexican grants to individuals and to communities, which after 1848 had to be confirmed through the Surveyor General and later the Court of Private Land Claims; federal public land; and ordinary purchase.
A New Mexico conveyance took effect on acknowledgment — the grantor (the person making the deed) appearing before an official and confirming it. He appeared before a court having a seal, a judge, a clerk, or a justice of the peace, and the officer certified the fact38.
A witness of any age could serve, provided he understood an oath and could relate what he saw. Witnesses had a narrow role: where the grantor was unknown to the officer, his identity was proved by the testimony of two reliable witnesses, and the certificate recorded it39. Competency, not age, was the test, and in practice these witnesses were adults.
A single or widowed woman could buy, hold, and convey land on the same terms as a man. For a married woman the rule changed twice.
| Period | Her separate land | Her signature |
|---|---|---|
| To 1884 | She owned it | Conveyed by a deed executed by herself and her husband, acknowledged by her as a married woman40 |
| 1884 – 1901 | Hers, free of her husband's debts, as fully as if unmarried41 | Her husband still joined in any deed, mortgage, or lease of her land42 |
| From 1901 | Hers | She conveyed it herself: married persons were given the same power to convey as single persons43, and the act of 1907 said so directly for a wife’s separate property44 |
Her contracts bound her under the earlier law so far as necessary to complete a conveyance45. The 1884 act made her bound by her contracts and liable for her own torts — wrongs she committed, such as injuring someone or damaging their property, and left each spouse free of the other's debts46.
One route out of these limits matters to researchers. Where a husband deserted his wife for a year, or gave her grounds for divorce, she could obtain a district court decree barring his interest and giving her full power to sell and convey alone, and a certified copy went into the deed records of any county where her land lay47. Such a decree among the deeds is strong evidence that a marriage had collapsed.
This is the most useful dating tool in New Mexico land research, and the rule changed twice in six years.
Through the nineteenth century the husband managed the community property and could sell it alone.
From 1901 both had to sign. Neither husband nor wife could convey, mortgage, encumber, or dispose of real estate acquired during the marriage by onerous title unless both joined in executing the deed48, and the Supreme Court of the United States held a husband's sole deed ineffective even as to land acquired before the act49.
The act of 1907 returned the management to the husband. He had the management and control of the community property, with the same absolute power of disposition, other than by will, that he had over his own separate estate. Three things still needed his wife's written consent: a gift of community property, a conveyance of it without valuable consideration, and any sale, conveyance, or mortgage of the homestead the couple occupied, of the furniture and fittings of the home, or of the clothing of the wife and the minor children50.
An act of 1927 brought joinder back, and went further than the 1901 rule had. The husband kept the management of the community personal property and the sole power to dispose of it, but husband and wife had to join in all deeds and mortgages affecting real estate, and a transfer of community real property attempted by either of them alone was void and of no effect. Two things were excepted: either spouse could convey or mortgage separate property without the other, and either could convey directly to the other without joinder51.
The courts enforced it52. The Code of 1915 still printed the husband’s power in the same words53.
So a deed of community land carries both names from 1901 to 1907 and again from 1927. Between those dates a single name is ordinary, because the husband could sell community land for value alone. A single name after 1927 means the land was that spouse's separate property, or the deed ran from one spouse to the other, or the title is defective.
A child could own land at any age, taking it by inheritance, gift, or purchase. Managing and selling it fell to a guardian under the supervision of the probate court, who gave bond and accounted to the court54. A sale of a minor's land therefore runs through the guardianship file.
Pueblo land was held communally, and Spanish and Mexican law protected it against sale. After 1848 its status turned on two decisions a generation apart. The federal courts first treated the Pueblos as holding ordinary fee simple title — full ownership, free to sell — so that Pueblo land could be sold55. In 1913 the Supreme Court held the Pueblos to be dependent communities like other tribes, holding communal title subject to federal guardianship56. That clouded titles derived from Pueblo sales made in the intervening years, and Congress created a board to settle the resulting claims in 192457.
New Mexico ran a Spanish civil-law scheme of inheritance for its first two and a half centuries and then replaced it. The date of death decides which applied, and an act of 1901 changed the surviving spouse’s share again.
The legitimate children and descendants were herederos forzosos, "forced heirs," entitled to a fixed share. Natural children — those born to parents who were free to marry each other — inherited from their father where there were no legitimate children, and were direct heirs of their mother; children of other unions were direct heirs of their mother58. Children legitimated by their parents' later marriage ranked as direct heirs59. Where there were no children the nearest ancestors took, then collaterals (relatives off the direct line, such as brothers, sisters, uncles, and cousins)60.
The estate was assembled in a fixed order. First the wife's own property, dowry or otherwise, was taken out. What remained of the property acquired during the marriage — the acquests — was divided in half, one half going to the husband's estate and one to the wife's61. From the husband's half a fifth was deducted for funeral expenses and legacies where there were descendants, or a third where the heirs were ascendants — parents or grandparents62; and where the heirs were not descendants a further quarter could go to the widow if the estate reached five thousand dollars63. What was left was divided equally among the children, and each child's share was the legítima, the portion the law reserved to a child64.
The widow took her own half of the acquests, and could demand a division of the estate in order to recover it along with her other rights65. A widow appearing in a division of this period is claiming property she already owned.
An act of 1887 replaced all of that66. Real and personal property of a person dying intestate (without a will) descended to the children in equal shares, posthumous children included, and grandchildren and remoter descendants took by representation — stepping into the share their own parent would have taken67. Where there was no issue — no children or other descendants — half went to the parents and half to the brothers and sisters68. Half-blood kindred inherited equally with the whole blood69. Advancements — gifts made during the parent's life — were charged against the child who received them, valued as of the date of the gift, and an excess stayed with that child70.
The same act abolished dower and curtesy71 — the life interests, meaning the use of the land for life rather than ownership of it, that a widow and a widower held in each other's land. They ran here from the reception of the common law in 1876 until the act of 1887. The territorial statutes gathered down to 1865 provide for neither: a surviving spouse's claim ran instead through the community and the civil-law shares set out above72. In their place the widow took one-third of her husband's real estate in fee simple, free of his creditors, reduced to a quarter and then a fifth as against creditors where the estate was large73. A widow holding under this act owned the land outright.
An act of 1901 replaced the widow's third. On the death of either husband or wife the survivor inherited one-half of that part of the deceased's estate acquired during the marriage by onerous title. Of what was left after that half came out, the survivor took one-fourth if it was not disposed of by will, and the other three-fourths descended in equal shares to the children; where there were no children the survivor took that three-fourths as well74. The same act limited what either of them could give away by will: an undivided half of the onerous-title estate, and all of whatever they had brought to the marriage or received during it by gift or inheritance75.
The act of 1907 put the older doctrines beyond doubt: no estate is allowed the husband as tenant by curtesy on the death of his wife, and no estate in dower to the wife on the death of her husband76.
Community property passed outside all of this. By the middle of the twentieth century the whole of it went to the surviving husband on the wife's death, without administration, apart from any part a court had set aside to her for her support, which went to her own descendants or heirs77. A wife's death often leaves no probate file for that reason.
One trap follows. A widow holding land from a first marriage sold it during a second marriage only where no children of the first marriage survived; otherwise it passed on her death to those children78.
Under the 1887 act an illegitimate child inherited from the mother as if legitimate, and through her if she was dead79. Inheritance from the father was narrow: it ran where the father died intestate leaving no heirs resident in the United States, it required proof that he had acknowledged the child in his lifetime, and the acknowledgment had to be established by evidence other than the mother's own testimony80. A child became legitimate where the father married the mother and acknowledged the child as his own81.
Before the general statute, families sometimes went to the legislature instead, and private acts legitimating named children appear among the session laws of the territory.
The father during his life, and the mother after his death, was the natural guardian of the children and had charge of their persons and education; managing their property required a separate appointment by the court82.
The probate courts appointed guardians in defined circumstances: where one or both parents had died and the minor had property in his own right, or where the court found a guardian necessary for the minor's personal welfare83; and where a minor had no parents living, or the parents were adjudged incompetent or unfit84. A parent could name a guardian by deed or by will, and the person named was appointed unless he refused to give security or there was other sufficient reason85. A person to whom the minor's estate would probably descend was barred, unless a parent86.
At 14 a ward could choose his or her own guardian, and the court appointed the person chosen unless there was just cause against it, superseding the earlier guardianship87. A guardianship record in which the child does the choosing is therefore evidence the child had reached 14, which brackets a birth year.
Guardianship ended at 21 for both sexes88. By the twentieth century it ended at 21 or on the ward's marriage, whichever came first, and marriage released the ward from the guardian's control without making the ward of full legal age89. Guardians gave bond in double the value of the estate and settled their accounts with the court each year until a final settlement90. That final settlement, filed when the ward came of age, dates the ward's majority and so approximates a birth year.
The age to make a will was 14 for a male and 12 for a female. The territorial wills act allowed any person of either sex to make a will except those it barred, and the first class barred was males who had not completed fourteen years and females who had not completed twelve91. The act also barred the insane, a spendthrift whom a court had forbidden to manage his own affairs, and those deaf and dumb from birth who could not express their will in writing.
Those figures governed until 1889. They passed unchanged into the compilation of 1884, whose section 1378 barred males who had not completed fourteen years and females who had not completed twelve92. An act of 26 February 1889 then rewrote that section: any person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, and in sound mind, could dispose by will of all his property, apart from enough to pay his debts and what the law gave as privileged property to his wife or family93. That wording was carried into the compilation of 189794 and stood until the state adopted the Uniform Probate Code in 197595. The courts applied the twenty-one rule from the turn of the century96.
One rule of timing catches families out. Marriage revoked a will made before it, whether or not a child followed97. Where a single person made a will, married, and never made another, that person died intestate.
A written will was signed by the testator (the person making the will), or by another at his request if he could not sign, and attested — signed by witnesses who watched him sign — by three or more able and qualified witnesses having the qualifications required of witnesses giving evidence in court98. The same act of 1889 changed both the number and the form: two witnesses were enough for any will made after it, and they had to see the testator sign, or see another sign for him at his request, and then sign themselves at his request, in his presence and in the presence of each other99. Competency, not age, was the test for them.
A will witness had to be a stranger to the gifts: persons becoming heirs, and those receiving benefits or legacies, were barred from witnessing the will in which they were interested100.
A spoken will was good. A verbal will required the same number of witnesses as a written one, and two more to testify that the testator was of sound mind and entire judgment101. Probate judges took the evidence of the witnesses present when the will was made and passed on its validity102, and a later act directed that a will was to stand despite a want of the formalities103. New Mexico wills of this period are correspondingly informal.
The age to serve as executor matched the age to make a will, and so rose with it in 1889: persons capable of making a will could be appointed executors or administrators104, and a testator was expected to name two or more105. Where the executor named was a minor or absent from the territory, letters of administration (the court’s written authority to settle the estate) went to someone else for the duration106.
Taxes on individuals ran in three phases. From the American occupation to the early 1880s the territory raised its revenue from license taxes on trades and callings. From 1882 a poll tax — a flat tax on a person rather than on property, also called a capitation or head tax — ran alongside the property tax, with a separate school poll tax and, in the towns, a road poll tax. For genealogy the poll taxes matter most, because they list men who owned nothing.
The revenue chapter the territory carried forward came from the Kearny Code of 22 September 1846, and it taxed occupations rather than people. No one could deal as a merchant or a pedlar, keep a grocery or dramshop selling spirits, keep a billiard table, or distill liquor from grain without first taking out a license107. The Code had also laid an ad valorem tax — a tax charged as a percentage of value — of one-quarter of one per cent on merchandise, and that was repealed in 1852108. That chapter taxed no one by the head. For the first decades of the territory the tax record is a record of licenses, naming men in trade rather than every adult male.
The revenue act of 1882 set a poll tax of $1 on every able-bodied male inhabitant over 21, whether a citizen of the United States or an alien, collected like any other tax109. It ran for life from that age, subject to exemption for bodily infirmity, and its reach to aliens means these lists catch immigrants who appear in no naturalization record.
A separate school poll tax of $1 fell on all able-bodied male persons over 21110. Incorporated towns could levy a further poll tax of up to $1 on able-bodied male citizens between 21 and 60, or require a stated amount of labor on the roads instead111 — so one man might appear on three poll lists in a single year.
Payment of the school poll tax was a condition of voting in the territorial period112. An amendment to the state constitution ratified on 20 September 1921 addressed the point for women, providing that payment of the road or school poll tax, and service on juries, could not be made a prerequisite to a woman's right to vote or hold office113.
The statute sent the lists to the county. The assessor made separate lists of every person liable to the poll tax in each school district and delivered them to the probate clerk each year114, and the district clerks posted copies and reported which men had paid and which were delinquent115. Survival varies widely by county.
New Mexico became a state in 1912, and the property tax stayed what it had been through the territorial period, the mainstay of state and local revenue. The constitution gave the legislature power to levy license, franchise, excise, income, inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes, and taxes on the production and output of mines, oil lands, and forests116. The state used that power for a severance tax on mineral production in 1933 and, in 1935, for the emergency school tax, a levy of about two per cent on retail sales and on services117. An income tax also belongs to this period, though its date is unsettled118. The poll taxes ran on beside all of them to the end of this period.
| Levy | Taxation began at | Taxation ended at |
|---|---|---|
| License taxes, 1846 to the early 1880s | No age; the tax fell on the trade, not on the person | — |
| Territorial poll tax, from 1882 | 21 (males, citizen or alien) | For life, subject to exemption for bodily infirmity |
| School poll tax | 21 (able-bodied males) | For life |
| Town road poll tax | 21 (able-bodied male citizens) | 60 |
Jurors had to be 21. Beyond that the qualifications turned first on race and land, then on land alone, then on taxes.
The rule printed in the territorial statutes made a juror a white male person over 21 and under 60, resident six months in the county, a citizen of the United States, an owner of real estate in the territory, and the head of a family; men answering that description were liable to be chosen and to serve on both the grand and the petit jury119. The same chapter excused federal, territorial, and county officers, lawyers, priests and ministers, teachers, practicing physicians, one miller to each public grist mill, everyone over 60, and anyone of unsound mind or disabling infirmity; and a conviction for larceny or any other infamous crime — a serious offense that cost a man his standing in court — barred him outright120.
An act of 1880 opened the panel to all male citizens of the United States aged 21 who had lived a year in the territory and six months in the county, and who were heads of families and owners of real estate121. From 1880 the qualification reached male citizens of any race, on the same terms. The freehold requirement still applied to the whole panel.
An act of 1891 replaced ownership with payment. A juror had to be a male citizen over 21, of sound mind, resident a year in the territory and six months in the county, an owner of property subject to territorial taxation who had paid the tax on it, free of any conviction for an infamous crime, sober, and living in neither bigamy nor polygamy122. Any male citizen with all the qualifications of a voter was also qualified. Living in a bigamous or polygamous state had been made a separate disqualification in 1882123. That tax-payment requirement was the mechanism by which poor men were kept off New Mexico juries for the next fourteen years.
An act of 1905 dropped property and taxes together. A juror was then any male citizen of the United States over 21, of sound mind, resident a year in the state and six months in the county, who had not been convicted of an infamous crime124. The exemptions ran to officers of the United States, the state, and the counties, practicing physicians, dentists and prescription druggists, attorneys, ministers of the gospel, professors and teachers, and everyone over 60125.
An act of 1917 re-enacted that qualification for petit jurors in the district court, adding a disqualification for anyone convicted of bribery126.
The grand jury was a body of not fewer than 16 nor more than 21 men127; the petit jury was 12128. Where too few jurors appeared, the court ordered the sheriff to summon bystanders — talesmen, people summoned on the spot to fill out a short jury — who had to hold the same qualifications as jurors drawn in the ordinary way129.
That an individual grand juror was a minor was a listed ground of challenge, which is how the age requirement was enforced130.
Speakers of either language could serve. The state constitution guarantees that the right to sit on juries shall never be restricted on account of inability to speak, read, or write English or Spanish131.
Citizenship was required, and the territory addressed it early. Residents who had kept Mexican citizenship under the treaty and then declared their intention to become United States citizens were made qualified to serve as jurors in all the courts of the territory132. A juror's alienage was otherwise a ground of challenge133. That requirement reached Native residents as well. Native people born in the tribes became citizens of the United States by federal act in 1924134.
A second barrier stood at the polls and bore on the jury box, because the act of 1891 let a man qualify by holding all the qualifications of a voter. The state constitution withheld the vote from Indians not taxed, alongside those judged insane and those convicted of a felonious or infamous crime and not restored to political rights135. A three-judge federal court held that exclusion void under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on 3 August 1948136.
Jury service was open to men only through the whole of this period137. Women were serving on the same terms as men by October 1962138; the act that admitted them falls between those dates, outside the years covered here139.
Before 1876 the Spanish and Mexican criminal law governed, and it set its line at ten and a half. A child under ten and a half could not be accused of any offense at all. From ten and a half to 14 a child could be accused of striking, killing, stealing, and the like, but on conviction the punishment had to be far lighter than an adult's. No one under 14 could be accused of a sexual offense, the law reasoning that a child of that age could not understand what he was doing. The same protection covered anyone out of his mind140.
Once the common law was received in 1876 the common-law ages governed: a child under 7 was incapable of committing a crime; between 7 and 14 the child was presumed incapable, and the prosecution had to overcome the presumption; from 14 the child bore full responsibility.
New Mexico created a juvenile court in 1917 with jurisdiction over children under 16, and provided that a child found delinquent was adjudged a ward of that court, an adjudication that counted as wardship rather than as a conviction of crime141. An act of 1929 raised the ceiling to 18: a juvenile delinquent was then anyone under 18 who broke a state law or a city, town, or village ordinance, or who was incorrigible, kept company with thieves or immoral persons, was growing up in idleness or crime, frequented a house of prostitution, a saloon, or a public pool hall, or wandered the streets at night with no lawful business142143, and the scheme stood substantially unchanged for the rest of this period144. Felony charges stayed with the district courts, which hold sole jurisdiction over them145. A juvenile file sits with the district court and is likely to be closed.
A witness of any age could testify, if he or she understood the obligation of an oath and could give an account of what was seen. The wills act assumed as much when it required will witnesses to hold the qualifications of witnesses giving evidence in court, without setting any age98, and the trial judge decided competency case by case.
An act of 1880, cited as the Evidence Act, settled the rest and governed for the remainder of this period146. Interest in the outcome ceased to exclude anyone, so a person could testify however much he stood to gain by it147. The parties themselves became competent and compellable, and so did their husbands and wives148. Two limits held: each spouse could decline to disclose what the other had said during the marriage149, and in a suit by or against the representatives of a dead person, an interested party needed corroboration for testimony about events before the death150.
The Evidence Act drew its lines by interest and by marriage and set no bar by race or color, so a witness of any race could testify in any case. The one race-based statute the territory enacted, the act of 1857, reached residence and marriage rather than testimony, and it was repealed in 186635.
(Guide compiled by Jeniann Nielsen with AI assistance from Claude Opus 4.8 and Gemini Pro 3.1. Check primary sources as needed.)
Every rule above is tagged with the law it rests on. The lists below show where to read those laws in full, and the reference works consulted, so anything here can be checked against the original sources.