Washington Historical Law Guide

Contents

Legal Ages at a Glance

General Principles

An English foundation with a Spanish graft

Washington’s law came from England. The first section of the territorial code made the common law of England the rule of decision in all the courts of the territory, so far as it was not inconsistent with federal law or with the organic act and laws of the Territory¹. That sentence has survived every recodification since.

Onto that English base the legislature grafted a Spanish idea. Community property — the rule that what a husband and wife acquire during a marriage belongs to the two of them together — reached Washington from Spain by way of Mexico and California. The Territory passed its first community property act in 1869, copied largely from a California statute of 1850². It was replaced in 1871, repealed in 1873, re-enacted nine days later, modified in 1879, and settled into the Code of 1881³.

Whose law applied before Washington Territory

American settlers reached the Puget Sound country in 1845, and for the next eight years their law came from the south:

• 1845–1849 — the Oregon provisional government, whose code was borrowed largely from the statutes of Iowa. Congress created Oregon Territory in 1848, but the territorial government did not take over until March 1849.
• 1849–1853 — Oregon Territory.
• 1853–1889 — Washington Territory, organized 2 March 1853, with its first code adopted at Olympia in 1854.
• 1889 onward — the State of Washington, admitted 11 November 1889.

For a record made before 1853, read Oregon law. Probate belonged to the county probate court through the territorial period and passed to the Superior Court at statehood, so wills and estate files sit with county government throughout.

The dates that changed the law

Each of these marks a change visible in the records:

• 1869–1879 — the community property acts.
• 1871 and 1875 — dower and curtesy stopped accruing, briefly returned, and were abolished for good. Dower was a widow’s right to use a third of her husband’s land for life; curtesy was a widower’s matching right in his late wife’s land. In their place the surviving spouse inherited outright⁴.
• 1881 — the consolidated territorial Code, the volume most of this guide rests on.
• 1923 — the age of majority for women raised from 18 to 21.

To find the rule for any given year, look for a statute passed on or before that year. Where the legislature had not yet passed one, English common law filled the gap.

Legal Age of Adulthood

Twenty-one for men and eighteen for women

Washington split the age of majority by sex. Males were of full age for all purposes at 21; females were of full age at 18⁵. The first territorial legislature set the rule in April 1854, and it ran through the Code of 1881 and on into the twentieth century.

A woman of 18 was therefore an adult in every legal sense. She could make a will, sell land, sue, contract, and be appointed to settle a dead person’s estate, at an age when her brother was still a minor. Marriage advanced her further: any female married to a person of full age was herself of full age⁶, and a guardian’s charge over a girl ended at 18, or earlier if she married with consent⁷.

The change in 1923

In 1923 the legislature raised women to 21⁸. The act saved those already 18 when it took effect, at midnight on 6 June 1923. A woman who had turned 18 by that date kept the adulthood she had; one who had not waited for her twenty-first birthday. The age dropped to 18 for both sexes in 1970–71⁹.

A minor’s legal capacity

A minor could own property; what the law limited was the power to dispose of it. A minor was bound by contracts for necessaries, and by other contracts unless he disaffirmed them — went to court to undo them — within a reasonable time after coming of age, restoring what he still held¹⁰. A minor who misrepresented his age, or who traded as an adult, was held to the bargain¹¹.

A minor sued and was sued through a guardian¹², and a minor’s land could be sold only by the guardian on an order of the probate court, followed by a report of the sale and its confirmation¹³. A minor’s land sale therefore leaves a court file rather than a simple deed.

Marriage

Who was old enough to marry

The marrying age arrived in stages, and for the first twelve years there was none.

The territorial code of 1854 declared marriage a civil contract and set no minimum age whatever¹⁴. It voided two kinds of marriage: where a party already had a living husband or wife, and where the parties were nearer of kin than first cousins. Kinship was counted by the rules of the civil law, the Roman method of reckoning, which Washington used throughout. Even those marriages stood if the couple went on living together as man and wife after the obstacle was removed¹⁵.

The act of 20 January 1866 supplied ages for the first time: males of 21 and females of 16 who were otherwise capable¹⁶. The same act moved the kinship bar out to second cousins, so that first cousins could no longer marry.

The Code of 1881 raised the female age to 18, giving the familiar pairing of 21 and 18¹⁷. Those two figures then held through 1950, and the same sentence was still the law in the 1930s¹⁸. They are not the ages of majority after 1923: from that year a woman came of age at 21, while she could still marry at 18.

A marriage below those ages was voidable rather than void: it stood unless the party who was under age went to court to undo it, and only that party could sue¹⁹. In practice an ancestor’s underage marriage was valid and stayed valid.

Parental consent

The consent ages are older than the capacity ages and held steady. From 1854, males under 21 and females under 18 could not be joined in marriage without the consent of the parents, guardian, or other person under whose government the minor was²⁰. Under the license system, a license issued only on the written consent of the father, mother, or guardian of a female under 18 or a male under 21. Before issuing a license without consent, the officer had to satisfy himself that both parties were over those ages²¹. An applicant also filed the sworn statement of a credible person other than the couple, showing the facts²².

So a younger party could marry in Washington, on a parent’s written consent. From 1909 that route had a minimum age: no consent could be given and no license issued unless the female was over 15²³.

Before handing over the license, the county auditor entered a memorandum in his marriage record. It gave the names of the parties, the consent of the parents or guardian, the substance of the sworn statement, and the date of the license²⁴. Where a consent appears, one party was under 21 or under 18, which brackets a birth year and usually names a parent.

A ceremony was required

A valid marriage required a license and a ceremony. The couple first procured a license from a county auditor²⁵. The marriage was then solemnized by a minister or priest of any religious denomination, by a justice or judge of a district or probate court, or by a justice of the peace within his county²⁶. Before the officiant and at least two attending witnesses, the parties declared that they took each other as husband and wife²⁷.

Marriage came from that ceremony, and the courts held to that rule from 1892²⁸ and held to it as late as 1950²⁹. Washington did honor a marriage valid where it was contracted³⁰, so a couple who married in a state that recognized informal marriage were married in Washington too.

Two rules were forgiving. A marriage before someone who merely professed to be a minister stood if at least one party believed it lawful³¹. A marriage solemnized within a religious congregation according to its own form was equally valid, and whoever presided filed the certificate³².

The officiant delivered a certificate to the judge of the probate court within three months, and the judge recorded it³³. A territorial marriage therefore leaves two records in two offices: the license and memorandum with the county auditor, and the return with the probate court. County auditors later became sole custodian and held marriage records until 1968.

Marriages that could be undone

A marriage was voidable where either party lacked legal age or sufficient understanding, or where consent was obtained by force or fraud, and then only at the suit of the party wronged¹⁹. Two marriages were prohibited outright: where either party already had a wife or husband living, and where the parties were nearer of kin than second cousins, whether of the whole or the half blood. A table of relations by blood and by marriage carried the same bar and made the union incest³⁴.

In 1909 the state added health grounds, and they reached only marriages that might produce children. Where the woman was under 45, neither party could marry if either fell into one of the categories the act listed: a common drunkard, habitual criminal, epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded, an idiot, insane, previously afflicted with hereditary insanity, or suffering from advanced tuberculosis or a contagious venereal disease. A woman over 45, and a man marrying such a woman, stood outside the bar³⁵. The courts read the restriction narrowly, so these marriages generally stood.

The same acts put a doctor into the licensing process. Before a license issued, the auditor required an affidavit showing the applicants free of the listed conditions, and another from a disinterested person as to age and criminal history³⁶. A license file from 1909 on can therefore hold two or three sworn statements naming the couple, their ages, and the people who vouched for them.

Race restrictions from 1855 to 1868

Washington’s ban on interracial marriage was unusually short. In 1855 the territorial legislature declared void every marriage already solemnized in which one party was white and the other fell within the racial categories the act set out, which it defined by fractions of Black or Native ancestry³⁷. It fined anyone who solemnized such a marriage afterwards between $50 and $500, and saved any couple already living together at its passage³⁸. The act of 20 January 1866 prohibited such marriages outright, its third forbidden case being a marriage between a white person and someone the act classed as Black or Native, or as having one-half or more Black or Native ancestry³⁹. The penalty fell on the officiant rather than the couple.

The legislature struck that clause out on 23 January 1868, in a one-sentence act deleting the third clause of section two of the marriage act⁴⁰. From then on the statute books carried no racial bar: the Code of 1881 lists only bigamy and close kinship among the prohibited marriages³⁴, and the Constitution of 1889 added none. Mixed marriages appear openly in Washington county records.

Marriage by tribal custom

Marriages between settlers and Native women were common in the early decades, and were usually contracted by tribal custom rather than by license.

The Supreme Court ruled on those marriages in 1896. A Skagit County settler had married a Swinomish woman and lived with her as his wife for eight years. The court held that a marriage by tribal custom, followed by living together, was not a legal marriage, because Washington required the statutory ceremony⁴¹. The widow took nothing.

The children were another matter. The same court held the two surviving sons legitimate and entitled to inherit from their father, because he had publicly acknowledged them and brought them up as his own⁴². So where a couple married only by tribal custom, expect no license and no return, expect the surviving partner to be treated as unmarried, and look for the children in the estate anyway.

Property Ownership

Which men could own land

Land in Washington was acquired first from the federal government. The Donation Land Act of 1850 granted 320 acres to a single settler and 640 acres to a married couple, one half of it to the husband and the other half to the wife in her own right⁴³. The act reached white settlers and those it called American half-breed Indians; it excluded Black settlers and Native Americans generally. The claim files name both spouses, give the date of the marriage, and record arrival and naturalization.

Under territorial law, ownership did not depend on citizenship. Any alien could acquire and hold land by purchase, by will, or by inheritance, could convey, mortgage, and leave it by will, and on dying without a will had it descend to his heirs, all with like effect as if he were a citizen⁴⁴. An unnaturalized immigrant therefore appears in Washington deed books on the same footing as anyone else.

Women and land ownership

Washington gave married women more power over property, earlier, than most states. Every married person had the same right to acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of every species of property, and to sue and be sued, as if unmarried⁴⁵, and all laws imposing civil disabilities on a wife that were not imposed on a husband were abolished⁴⁶.

The particulars followed. A wife’s separate property was what she owned at marriage, or afterwards acquired by gift, by will, or by inheritance, together with the rents and profits. Her husband’s creditors could not reach it, and she could manage, lease, sell, convey, mortgage, or leave it by will as fully as he could his own⁴⁷. She held the wages of her own labor⁴⁸, made contracts and was sued on them as if unmarried⁴⁹, and recovered damages for wrongs done to her in her own name⁵⁰. Where she lived apart from her husband, her earnings and those of the minor children in her custody were her separate property⁵¹.

A single woman or widow dealt with property exactly as a man did, and so, in Washington, did a married woman. The one large exception was the community property her husband managed, described below.

Separate property and community property

Property owned by either spouse before marriage, or acquired afterwards by gift, by will, or by inheritance, with its rents and profits, was that spouse’s separate property⁵². Everything else acquired after marriage by either or both was community property⁵³. From 1869, then, a married couple’s property sat in three pots — his separate estate, hers, and the community — and nearly every deed, will, and estate file turns on which pot a given asset was in.

The husband managed the community. He controlled community personal property with the same power of disposition he had over his own, except that he could not give away more than half of it by will⁵³. His own separate land he could sell, convey, mortgage, or leave by will without his wife joining at all⁵².

The system generated a record of its own. A wife was to sign a full inventory of her separate property, acknowledged as a deed would be — that is, she appeared before an official and confirmed the signature as her own — and record it with the auditor of the county where the couple lived⁵⁴. The 1879 act narrowed this to her separate personal property, required her to swear to it, and made the filing public notice of her ownership and proof of it unless someone disproved it⁵⁵. A recorded inventory is direct evidence of what a wife brought to a marriage or inherited during it. Couples could also contract out of the system altogether, by a marriage contract executed and acknowledged like a deed⁵⁶.

When a wife had to sign her husband’s deed

The answer changes three times.

From 1854 the driver was dower. A married woman was not bound by any deed affecting her own real estate, or releasing dower, unless her husband joined in the conveyance. She also had to be examined by the officer taking the acknowledgment, separately and apart from her husband, and state that she signed it voluntarily and free of his coercion. The officer explained the deed to her and certified that he had done so⁵⁷. That wording was still the law in the code of 1873. On a Washington deed between 1854 and 1881, then, there is a separate-examination certificate to look for.

Dower here was the full common-law right: the widow could use one-third of her husband’s land for the rest of her life. It covered every piece of land he had owned at any point during the marriage, not just what he still owned when he died⁵⁸. It was assigned by the judge of probate on the widow’s application, by a warrant to three disinterested men who marked out her third on the ground and put their findings in writing. The return was recorded in the probate court, and an attested copy filed with the register of deeds⁵⁹. A dower assignment therefore leaves a paper trail in two offices, and it names the widow.

Dower then went out twice. The act of 1871 provided that neither dower nor curtesy should thereafter accrue⁴. The act of 1873 repealed the 1871 act and restored the earlier scheme, and the codes of that year went on legislating as though dower were alive — protecting a wife’s future dower claim when land was split up and sold, and providing for deeds in which she gave that claim up⁶⁰. The act of 1875 abolished dower and curtesy again, and this time it held⁴. For deeds between 1871 and 1875, treat dower as unsettled and read the instrument itself.

Community land is a different matter again, and the rule on it turned over four times. Under the act of 1869 the husband had the entire management and control of the common property, with the same absolute power of disposition as over his own separate estate⁶¹, so he could convey it alone. The act of 1871 took that power away: he kept the management, but had no right to sell or encumber community real estate unless the wife joined in the sale⁶². The act of 1873 handed it back, restoring his entire management and control with the like absolute power of disposition as of his own separate estate⁶³. The act of 14 November 1879 then settled the question the other way for good: he could not sell, convey, or mortgage community real estate unless the wife joined with him in executing the deed, and the deed had to be acknowledged by both⁶⁴. The Code of 1881 carried that section forward word for word⁶⁵, and it ran on through the twentieth century. The 1879 act protected her property in the other direction too: he managed her separate real estate but could not sell or mortgage it without her joining, and her separate personal property could not be transferred unless both joined⁶⁶.

From 1881 a married woman was still not bound by a deed affecting her own real estate unless her husband joined and she acknowledged that she executed it of her own free will — but the separate examination had gone out of the general rule⁶⁷. It survived in one place: no mortgage of an occupied homestead was valid against the wife unless she signed and acknowledged it separate and apart from her husband, with the officer obliged to apprise her fully of her rights⁶⁸.

From 1879 onward, a wife’s signature on her husband’s deed is evidence that the land was community property, and therefore that it was acquired during the marriage — which dates the acquisition and confirms the marriage existed.

One further document belongs here. Husband and wife could jointly agree in writing, witnessed and acknowledged like a deed, concerning the disposition of the whole or any part of their community property, to take effect on the death of either⁶⁹. These community property agreements are recorded with the county auditor, name both spouses, and frequently pass an entire estate without a will.

Which children could own land

A child could own land at any age, taking it by inheritance, gift, or purchase just as an adult did. Selling it was the constraint: the guardian handled the sale, on an order of the probate court¹³. Own at any age; convey at 21 for a boy and 18 for a girl.

Witnessing a deed

Every deed had to be in writing, signed and sealed by the party bound, witnessed by two witnesses, and acknowledged before an authorized officer⁷⁰. The two-witness rule ran from 1854 unchanged. No statute ever set a minimum age for a deed witness. The conveyances act asked only for two witnesses and said nothing about how old they had to be, and the nearest rule on the books is the one governing who could testify in court, which turned on understanding rather than age⁷¹. In practice deed witnesses were adults, since a witness might have to prove the deed in court years later.

Deeds and mortgages were recorded with the county auditor of the county where the land lay, and were good against later purchasers from the date of filing⁷³. The county auditor is the land-record office in Washington throughout the period.

Asian immigrants and Native land

The open rule for aliens closed at statehood. The Constitution of 1889 restricted the ownership of land by aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens⁷⁴. In 1921 the legislature barred aliens ineligible to citizenship — which under federal naturalization law meant Asian immigrants — from owning or holding long leases of land⁷⁵. A 1923 amendment presumed that land held in the name of the minor child of an ineligible alien was held in trust for the parent, and set up proceedings to take it for the state⁷⁶. The laws were upheld and enforced⁷⁷, and were not cleared away until the 1960s. Japanese and Chinese families therefore farmed land under titles held by American-born children, by citizen spouses, or by corporations, and where a family’s land was taken the case file in the Superior Court names the family.

Native American land followed federal law. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887 an allotment was held in trust by the United States, and the allottee could not sell it during the trust period⁷⁸. Allotted land therefore does not appear in county deed books; those records sit with the federal agency. Land held outright by a Native owner appears in the county records like anyone else’s.

Inheritance

Two kinds of property at death

When a person died without a will (intestate), Washington divided the estate along the line between community and separate property, and then divided the separate property again between land and goods. Three sets of rules run at once, and they give different answers. One word recurs in all of them: issue means a person’s children and their descendants — the line running down from the deceased, as opposed to parents, brothers, and cousins.

The community half

The community rule at death changed twice, and the middle period is easy to miss.

So for an estate settled between 1875 and 1879 the widow or widower took the entire community estate, and no share passed to the children. Reading the later rule back into those four years will invent heirs who took nothing. The 1871–73 window matters for a different reason: it is the first time a Washington widow’s half was declared her own outright, and the first time she could elect against her husband’s will⁸⁰.

Under the rule that settled in 1879, where the deceased left no will disposing of that half, it descended in equal shares to their children and to the children of any child who had died. If no descendants were living, the whole passed to the survivor rather than to more distant relatives, subject to the community debts, the family allowance, and the expenses of administration⁸².

The survivor’s half was already hers or his, held from the moment the property was acquired; the estate file only confirms it. This is why a Washington widow so often appears in full ownership of the family farm with no probate distribution to explain it.

Separate property: land

Separate real estate descended by its own rules⁸³:

Kindred were counted by the rules of the civil law, and relatives of the half blood — sharing one parent rather than two — inherited equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree⁸⁴. Property given to a child during the parent’s lifetime as an advancement counted against that child’s share; a child advanced beyond a full share took nothing more but refunded nothing⁸⁵.

Separate property: goods and money

Separate personal property followed a different rule, and the difference is worth pinning down. After the widow’s allowance and the payment of debts and funeral charges, what was left went to the same people who took the real estate and in the same proportions, with one change: the surviving spouse, husband or wife, took one half of it, however many children there were⁸⁶. Where there was no issue, the survivor took the whole.

So a widow with five children took one third of her husband’s separate land, but one half of his separate goods and money. Carrying the land fraction across to the personal estate will produce a wrong family reconstruction.

These separate-property rules were what replaced dower and curtesy. The statute says so directly: the husband’s and wife’s inheritance from each other applies only to separate property, and takes the place of tenancy in dower and tenancy by curtesy⁸⁷. From 1871 a surviving spouse in Washington took ownership rather than a life interest.

The family’s allowance

A widow and minor children could remain in the homestead and keep the family’s wearing apparel and household furniture, and a homestead was set aside for them on petition where the deceased had not claimed one⁸⁸. On the return of the inventory the court set apart for their use all property beyond the reach of creditors, and where that fell short it allowed a further sum out of the estate⁸⁹. That allowance was paid ahead of every charge except funeral expenses and the costs of administration⁹⁰.

The property so set apart belonged to the widow outright where there were no minor children; where there were, she took half and the children the remainder; and where there was no widow, the minor children took the whole⁹¹. The petition and the order are separate documents in the estate file, and they usually name the widow and every minor child.

Guardianship and the age of fourteen

The probate court of each county appointed guardians for minors resident in the county who had no guardian appointed by will, and for non-resident minors owning property in the county⁹². A guardian was appointed chiefly because a minor owned property, so where a child inherited nothing, often no guardianship record exists.

Fourteen is the age that dates a record. If the minor was under fourteen, the judge nominated and appointed the guardian; if over fourteen, he or she nominated the guardian and the court appointed that person if it approved⁹³. A guardianship file in which the child does the choosing therefore shows the child had reached 14, which brackets a birth year. Where the nominee was rejected, or the minor neglected for ten days after being called on to name anyone, the court appointed as though the child were under fourteen⁹⁴.

Parents came first. The father while living, and on his death the mother, was entitled to the guardianship⁹⁵. The rights of parents were equal: the mother was as fully entitled to the custody, control, and earnings of the children as the father⁹⁶.

The guardian gave a bond with security, payable to the territory, in double the amount of the minor’s estate, conditioned to account to the probate court and to pay over everything when the minor became entitled⁹⁷. That final accounting, filed when the minor turned 21 or 18, is one of the most valuable documents in Washington genealogy: it dates the minor’s majority and so approximates a birth year, and it frequently gives a female minor’s married surname.

Children born outside marriage

Washington’s rule for a child born outside marriage was generous by the standards of its day, and it turned on a document. Every illegitimate child was an heir of his mother in all cases, and inherited her estate as if born in lawful wedlock. He was also an heir of the man who, in writing signed before a competent witness, acknowledged himself to be the father⁹⁸. That signed acknowledgment is the record to look for; it is what carried the inheritance from the father. The child could claim in the estates of a parent’s relatives in one case only: where the parents afterwards married, and the father then acknowledged the child and took him into his family. He and the legitimate children were then brothers and sisters for all purposes of inheritance⁹⁸.

Running the other way, if an illegitimate child died without a will and without lawful issue, the estate descended to his mother, or if she were dead, to her heirs at law⁹⁹.

Marriage cured the status. Illegitimate children became legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents with each other, automatically and without any court proceeding³¹. The territorial code went further still for its first decade: the 1854 act declared legitimate, for all purposes, the children of void marriages and the children of persons living and cohabiting together as man and wife¹⁰⁰. A marriage record can therefore be the only document explaining why an older child appears as an heir.

For six years there was a route that needed no document at all. Under the adoption act of 12 November 1875, a father who publicly acknowledged an illegitimate child as his own, received it into his family, and otherwise treated it as legitimate thereby adopted it. The child was legitimate for all purposes from the time of its birth. The Code of 1881 repealed that section while preserving every right already established under it⁴². A child born between 1875 and 1881 can therefore be a lawful heir on nothing but reputation and household evidence, and the proof in such a case is the census, the neighbors, and the father’s own conduct rather than a paper on file.

Wills and executors and witnesses

Under the 1854 code the will age ran on two tracks. A person of 21 and upwards, of sound mind, could leave all his estate by will, real and personal, saving to the widow her dower. A person over 18 could leave goods and chattels — movable property such as money, livestock, and furniture. A married woman could leave real estate held in her own right, subject to her husband’s curtesy¹⁰¹.

The code of 1862 replaced both tracks with one: every person who had attained the age of majority, of sound mind, could by will dispose of all his estate, real and personal, saving the widow’s dower and the husband’s curtesy¹⁰². The Code of 1881 carried the sentence forward, and it survived the probate revisions of 1917 and 1929 unchanged, so the same rule governed will-making through 1950¹⁰³. Because majority was 21 for men and 18 for women, the will age carried that split from 1862 onward, and a Washington woman could make a valid will of land at 18.

A will had to be in writing, signed by the testator — the person making the will — or by another under his direction and in his presence, and attested by two or more competent witnesses signing their names in the presence of the testator¹⁰⁴. Where another person signed for the testator, that person also signed as a witness and stated that he had signed at the testator’s request¹⁰⁵. Two witnesses were required of every Washington will, including one written entirely in the testator’s own hand¹⁰⁶. A spoken will was good only for personal property worth $200 or less, made during the last sickness at the deceased’s dwelling, proved by two witnesses present, and offered within six months¹⁰⁷.

No statute set a minimum age for a will witness either; the wills act asked only that the two witnesses be competent¹⁰⁸. What did disqualify a witness was standing to gain. Every gift by will to a witness who signed was void unless there were two other competent witnesses; where the witness would have inherited had there been no will, he kept so much of that inheritance as did not exceed the gift¹⁰⁹.

Two revocation rules generate records. A man’s will was revoked by a later marriage if his wife survived him. It stood where she was provided for by a marriage settlement — an agreement made before the wedding — or by the will itself, or where the will mentioned her in a way that showed he meant to leave her nothing¹¹⁰. And a child born after the will was made, or otherwise left unnamed and unprovided for, took the share he would have taken had there been no will, with the other beneficiaries refunding their proportions¹¹¹. A late child appearing in a distribution is often the explanation.

Who could serve carries a large genealogical consequence. Six classes were disqualified from acting as executor or administrator: non-residents, minors, judicial officers other than justices of the peace, persons of unsound mind, persons convicted of a felony or serious moral offense, and married women. Where a woman holding that appointment ceased to be single, the probate court revoked her authority¹¹². If an executrix married, her husband took no interest in the estate and did not replace her, but the marriage ended her authority¹¹³. So a woman serving as executrix in Washington was single or widowed, and a change of administrator shortly after a wedding is usually explained by her marriage. Where a named executor was a minor, letters went to someone else during the minority, and the minor was admitted as joint executor at full age¹¹⁴.

Taxation

What was taxed

Three taxes on individuals leave usable records: the property tax on land and goods; the poll tax, a flat tax on a person rather than on property; and the road tax, payable in money or in labor on the public roads. For genealogy the poll and road taxes are the prize, because they list men who owned nothing, which turns early tax rolls into census substitutes.

All three go back to the first territorial legislature, and the early rules are not the ones the Code of 1881 later settled on. The revenue act of 1854 taxed polls and property together. It set the poll tax at one dollar on every white male inhabitant over 21, payable to the county, and laid the levy on polls of white males between 21 and 50. On property it charged one mill for territorial purposes, two mills for schools, and up to four mills for the county¹¹⁵. The word white is doing real work there: for the first fifteen years the poll tax reached white men only, so a Black or Chinese resident of the 1850s or 1860s will not appear on a poll list at all.

That changed with the revenue act of 1869, which assessed the poll tax on every male inhabitant between 21 and 50 and dropped the racial limit. The same act exempted from the property tax the property of Native people who were not citizens, except land they had bought¹¹⁶. The road law of the same year assessed two days’ labor on every male between 21 and 50, excusing public charges and men too infirm to work, and let a man pay three dollars a day instead¹¹⁷. So the shape of the system was fixed by 1869; what the Code of 1881 changed were the figures, raising the poll tax to two dollars and the road tax to four.

The poll tax

Every male inhabitant of the territory over twenty-one and under fifty years of age was assessed and annually paid a poll tax of two dollars, except paupers, idiotic and insane persons, and active firemen who had served a year in a fire company¹¹⁸. The tax fell on inhabitants, so immigrants who could not vote still appear on the rolls, and paying it was purely a revenue matter that had nothing to do with the right to vote.

The collection machinery produced the records. The assessor demanded the poll tax at his annual assessment; where the man refused and was employed by another, the assessor demanded it from the employer, who became liable and could withhold two dollars from the man’s wages¹¹⁹. The assessor was supplied with blank poll tax receipts, entered the names of those who paid, accounted for every receipt, and returned a list of the persons who had paid¹²⁰. The poll tax was carried as a separate column on the assessment roll¹²¹.

The tax outlived the Territory. The first state legislature re-enacted it in the revenue act of 1889–90 as a county poll tax of two dollars on every male inhabitant over 21 and under 50, with the same demand-on-the-employer machinery behind it¹²². It ended with the revenue act of 1897, which carries no poll tax and leaves only a road poll column on the assessor’s form¹²³.

The road tax

The county commissioners levied a road tax of four dollars on every male liable to work on the public roads, between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. Exempt were public charges, those too infirm to labor, idiotic and insane persons, and active firemen of a year’s standing. It was payable in money or in labor at two dollars a day, so a man could work it off in two days¹²⁴. The road supervisor notified every person in his district and kept the list¹²⁵. Road district lists are consequently a near-complete roll of the adult men of a neighborhood, arranged by where they lived, and they survive for many counties where nothing else of the kind does.

The road poll ended in 1907, when the legislature struck it out of the road and bridge act and put a county property levy of not more than four mills in its place¹²⁶.

Taxes at a glance

The poll tax and the road tax both carried exemptions for infirmity and for being a public charge. When a man drops off a list while still alive elsewhere in the record, an exemption or his fiftieth birthday is usually the explanation.

Twentieth-century taxes

The Constitution of 1889 required taxes on property to be uniform¹²⁷, and that requirement shaped everything after. Voters approved a graduated income tax by initiative in 1932; the Supreme Court struck it down the next year, holding that income was property and so had to be taxed uniformly¹²⁸. The legislature answered in 1935 with the retail sales tax and the business and occupation tax¹²⁹, which is why Washington has no income-tax records for the period.

Courts

Jury service

Through the territorial period the qualification was the vote. All qualified electors were competent as petit jurors — the twelve who try a case — and electors who were also householders were competent as grand jurors, the body that decides whether to bring a charge¹³⁰. By the Code of 1881 electors were American male citizens over 21; men the statute called American half-breeds, over that age, who had adopted the habits of the whites; and other male inhabitants over that age who had sworn their intention to become citizens six months before the election¹³¹. So an immigrant who had filed his first citizenship papers could sit on a Washington jury without being naturalized. The property-flavored test was being a householder — the head of a household, whether he owned or rented — and it reached grand juries only.

For the first twenty years the rule was narrower, and because jury service followed the vote the narrowing reached juries too. The Organic Act of 1853 gave the first vote to white male inhabitants over 21, and the election law of 1854 kept that wording: white male inhabitants over 21, resident three months, who were citizens or had sworn their intention to become citizens. The one opening was a proviso letting men of mixed white and Native parentage vote where the election judges found that they had adopted settled habits¹³². Since all qualified electors were competent as petit jurors, Black and Chinese men were excluded from Washington juries by the elector statute rather than by any jury statute. The Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 ended the racial limit for citizens, and the Code of 1881 prints the qualification without the word white. Chinese immigrants stayed outside it anyway, because federal law barred them from naturalizing and so from ever becoming citizens or declarants.

A long list of occupations was excused, among them public officers, attorneys, teachers, physicians, ministers, sheriffs, millers, ferrymen, and all persons over sixty; a verdict stood if such a man served anyway¹³³. Each board of county commissioners prepared two jury lists a year and kept them with the county auditor¹³⁴, and where a panel ran short the sheriff summoned bystanders of the county to complete it¹³⁵.

The 1881 qualification outlasted statehood: it governed until the legislature rewrote the jury law in 1909, and that act in turn gave way two years later. From 1911 a juror had to be an elector and a taxpayer of the state, a resident of the county for more than a year, over 21, of sound mind, and able to read and write English¹³⁶. From the same act the county clerk made up the jury list each July from the latest tax rolls and poll books, so a state-era jury list is drawn from a different source than a territorial one.

On race, the governing rule was federal, and it was printed in the territorial code itself. No citizen who met the other qualifications could be disqualified as a grand or petit juror on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. An officer who excluded or failed to summon a citizen for that reason was guilty of a misdemeanor¹³⁷.

Women as jurors

Because the jury qualification was tied to the vote, Washington women reached the jury box early and lost the place twice before keeping it.

The territorial legislature granted women the vote in 1883¹³¹, and women became qualified electors and so competent jurors. The Supreme Court of the Territory upheld this in 1884, rejecting the argument that married women were not householders and so could not sit on a grand jury¹³⁸. Washington women served on juries for four years, before almost any other American women did.

In 1887 the same court struck down the suffrage act on a defect in its title¹³⁹, and women lost both the vote and the jury. The legislature re-enacted suffrage on 18 January 1888, male and female alike, but added a proviso that nothing in it should make it lawful for women to serve as jurors¹⁴⁰; the court voided that act too¹⁴¹. Suffrage returned by constitutional amendment in 1910, and the jury act of 1911 admitted women again on their own terms: a woman could claim exemption by reason of sex by signing a notice to the sheriff, and one who wished to serve was fully competent¹³⁶.

So a Washington jury list may include women for 1883 to 1887, will not for 1887 to 1911, and may again from 1911.

Criminal responsibility

Through the territorial period the common law governed, the territorial code setting no age of its own:

• Under 7 — a child was legally incapable of committing a crime.
• 7 to 14 — presumed incapable, a presumption the prosecution could rebut by proving the child knew right from wrong.
• 14 and over — full criminal responsibility, tried and punished as an adult.

The criminal code of 1909 replaced this with a statutory rule. Children under eight were incapable of committing crime; children of eight and under twelve were presumed incapable, and the presumption could be removed by proof that they understood the act and knew it was wrong. The same section let a court settle a child’s age by producing the child for inspection and by directing an examination by physicians¹⁴² — so a criminal file may hold a formal finding of age for a child whose birth was never registered.

Separately, the juvenile court took children out of the criminal courts altogether. Washington created juvenile courts in 1905 and re-enacted the system comprehensively in 1913, giving the court jurisdiction over dependent and delinquent children under eighteen¹⁴³. From 1913 a child under 18 generates a juvenile court file rather than a criminal case file, and the two are indexed separately.

Witnesses

A witness of any age could testify. Only two classes were incompetent: those of unsound mind or intoxicated at the time they were produced for examination, and children under ten years of age who appeared incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts they were examined about, or of relating them truly⁷². A child under ten was therefore examined by the judge first, and testified if he passed.

Certain witnesses were protected rather than incompetent. Neither husband nor wife could be examined for or against the other without consent, nor about anything said between them during the marriage. The exceptions were a suit between the two of them, and a criminal case for a crime by one against the other. Attorneys, clergy, physicians, and public officers held similar protections¹⁴⁴. A separate rule barred a party from testifying for himself where the other side sued or defended as executor, administrator, or representative of a deceased or insane person, or as guardian of a minor under fourteen¹⁴⁵. That is why estate contests often turn on documents rather than testimony.

On race, the rule changed twice. The 1854 code barred a third class of witness outright: Indians, and persons having more than one half Indian blood, in any action or proceeding to which a white person was a party¹⁴⁶. In criminal prosecutions they were competent whatever the civil rule, in any prosecution in which an Indian was a defendant¹⁴⁷.

The legislature removed the color bar on 18 January 1866, enacting that no person otherwise qualified should be barred from testifying on the ground of race, and leaving credibility to the jury¹⁴⁸. The Indian bar went with the recodification of civil practice: by the amendatory act of 1875 the list of persons not admissible had shrunk to two classes, those of unsound mind or intoxicated and children of tender years who appeared incapable¹⁴⁹. The Code of 1881 restored the figure of ten years⁷².

So from 1866 for Black residents, and from the mid-1870s for Native residents, anyone competent could give evidence in a Washington court, and their testimony appears in the case files.

Sources & Where to Verify

Constitutions

• Washington Constitution of 1889. Art. II, § 33 (alien land ownership, repealed 1966); art. IV (superior court jurisdiction, including probate); art. VII (uniform taxation). Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/state-laws-and-rules/washington-state-constitution/ (accessed 30 July 2026).

Codes and Compilations

• Ballinger, Richard A., ed. Ballinger’s Annotated Codes and Statutes of Washington. Seattle: Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1897. 2 vols. The first full annotated compilation after statehood.
• Code of Washington, Containing All Acts of a General Nature, Revised and Amended by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, During the Eighth Biennial Session. Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1881. The essential volume for this guide (common law, conveyances, descent, distribution, guardian and ward, jurors, marriage, prohibited marriages, property rights of married persons, revenue, roads, wills, witnesses). Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1881Code.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Hill, William Lair, ed. The General Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1891. 2 vols. Commonly called Hill’s Code. Digital images. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/walaw-code-hill-1891-1-e59203 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• McLaughlin, Edward D., ed. The Revised Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington. Seattle, Wash.: Review Printing Company, 1896. Digital images. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/walaw-code-mclaughlin-1896-d1ca54 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Remington, Arthur, ed. Remington’s Codes and Statutes of Washington. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1916. 2 vols. Commonly called Remington’s 1915 Code. Digital images. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/walaw-code-remington-1916-1-dd0bfc (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Remington, Arthur, ed. Remington’s Compiled Statutes of Washington Annotated. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1922. 3 vols. Cited in the 1923 act as Rem. Comp. Stat. Digital images. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/walaw-code-remington-1922-1-fe437f (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Remington, Arthur, ed. Remington’s Revised Statutes of Washington, Annotated, Showing All Statutes in Force to and Including the Session Laws of 1931. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1932. 12 vols., issued 1932–37. The code in force in the last decades covered here, cited in the notes as Rem. Rev. Stat.
• Revised Code of Washington (current). Each section printed with its full citation chain back to the territorial session laws and the Code of 1881. Washington State Legislature. https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington: Being the Code Passed by the Legislative Assembly at their First Session. Olympia: Geo. B. Goudy, Public Printer, 1855. The first territorial code; listed in full under Session Laws below.

Session Laws

The Code Reviser posts the whole territorial and state run as scanned volumes with a searchable text layer, one file per session, named by year; the same run is mirrored on the Internet Archive under identifiers of the form walaw-session-laws-YEAR, which is the easier place to search across sessions. Several volumes carry an imprint a year later than the session they contain, the code of the 1854 session having been printed in 1855, and some cover two sessions at once. In the citations these volumes are given in short form by year after their first full appearance — Laws of 1854, Laws of 1866, Laws of 1869, and so on — whatever title the particular volume carries on its own title page, since the titles changed from session to session while the series did not.

• Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, Passed at the Second Regular Session, Begun and Held at Olympia, December 4, 1854. Olympia: J. W. Wiley, Public Printer, 1855. The act of 29 January 1855 at p. 33, voiding interracial marriages. A full title page image is on Google Books, https://books.google.com/books?id=aklOAAAAYAAJ. Note that the printer is not the Geo. B. Goudy of the volumes on either side. A separate 1855 volume covers the third regular session, which met from 3 December 1855 and was printed in 1856; it is a different book and does not contain this act. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1855pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1873. Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1873. "An Act to Repeal an Act Entitled an Act Defining the Rights of Persons and Property as Affected by Marriage," p. 486, approved 5 November 1873; "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 450–455, approved nine days later, restoring the scheme of the 1869 act, with § 9 at p. 452 returning the whole management of the common property to the husband; the civil practice act, § 537, and the conveyances act, § 3, both of which still treat dower as subsisting. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1873pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1875. Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1875. Section 2, p. 55, giving the whole of the community property to the survivor; § 3, repeating the abolition of dower and curtesy; "An Act Relative to Adoption," pp. 110–12, whose § 10 legitimates a child by the father’s public acknowledgment; and the amendatory act rewriting the witness sections of the civil practice act of 1873, pp. 16–17. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1875pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1883. Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1883. "An Act to Amend Section 3050, Chapter 238 of the Code of Washington," pp. 39–40, the woman suffrage act. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1883pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Laws of Washington Territory, 1879. Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1879. "An Act Relating to and Defining the Property Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 77–81: the term "community property," the wife’s inventory, and § 8, the requirement that she join in conveying community real estate. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1879pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Laws of Washington Territory, Enacted by the Legislative Assembly, at its Eleventh Biennial Session, 1887–8. Olympia, W.T.: Thos. H. Cavanaugh, Public Printer, 1888. "An Act Prescribing the Qualifications of Electors," pp. 93–94, re-enacting suffrage while barring women from juries. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1887pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1889–90. Olympia, Wash.: O. C. White, State Printer, 1890. The first state legislature; the revenue act at §§ 64–66 continues the $2 county poll tax on males 21 to 50. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1889pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1897. Olympia, Wash.: O. C. White, State Printer, 1897. Ch. 71, the revenue act, which drops the poll tax. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1897pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1907. Olympia, Wash.: C. W. Gorham, Public Printer, 1907. Ch. 76, replacing the road poll levy with a property levy. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1907pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1909. Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1909. Ch. 174, pp. 633–35, the marriage restrictions and the licensing affidavits; ch. 249, the Criminal Code, whose § 5 at p. 891 introduces the eight and twelve year rules of criminal capacity. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1909pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, Extraordinary Session, 1909. Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1909. Ch. 16, pp. 53–54, re-enacting the marriage restrictions with amendments. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1909pam2.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1911. Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1911. Ch. 57, pp. 814–15, the jury act: the five qualifications, the exemption a woman could claim by reason of sex, and the county clerk’s annual July jury list. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1911pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1913. Olympia, Wash.: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1913. Ch. 160, the Juvenile Court Law, at pp. 520–36; § 1 gives the juvenile court all children under eighteen. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1913pam1.pdf (accessed 6 August 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1921. Olympia: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1921. Ch. 50, the Alien Land Law. The linked file opens with the extraordinary session of 1920 and its 1920 title page; the 1921 title page follows within the same file. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1921pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1923. Olympia: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1923. Ch. 72, pp. 92–93, raising the age of majority for women to 21; ch. 70, the alien land amendment. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1923pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1935. Olympia: State Printing Plant, 1935. Ch. 180, the Revenue Act of 1935, creating the retail sales tax and the business and occupation tax. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1935pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1865–66. Olympia: T. F. McElroy, Printer, 1866. "An Act to Regulate Marriages," pp. 80–84, setting the marrying ages at 21 and 16, moving the kinship bar to second cousins, and prohibiting interracial marriage at § 2, cl. 3; "An Act Relating to Witnesses and Evidence," pp. 91–92, removing the color bar on testimony; "An Act Concerning Minors, Their Rights and Liabilities," pp. 92–93. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1865pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1867–68. Olympia: Chas. Prosch, Printer, 1868. The act of 23 January 1868, pp. 47–48, striking the racial clause out of the marriage act. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1867pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1869. Olympia: James Rodgers, Printer, 1869. "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 318–321, the first community property act. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1869pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1871. Olympia: Prosch & McElroy, Printers, 1871. "An Act Defining the Rights of Persons and Property as Affected by Marriage," pp. 67–74; § 12 requires the wife to join in any sale or encumbrance of community real estate, and § 23 ends the accrual of dower and curtesy. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1871pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington, Made and Passed at a Session of the Legislative Assembly Begun and Held at Olympia on the Seventh Day of December, 1863. Olympia: T. F. McElroy, Printer, 1864. The dower act at pp. 6–11: the extent of dower, the jointure and election rules, the assignment procedure before the judge of probate, and the release of dower in a husband’s deed. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1863pam1.pdf (accessed 2 August 2026).
• Statutes of the Territory of Washington: Being the Code Passed by the Legislative Assembly at their First Session. Olympia: Geo. B. Goudy, Public Printer, 1855. The first territorial code, covering the session of 1854: the marriage act at pp. 404–05, with no marrying age and the consent ages of 21 and 18; the conveyances act at p. 402, with the two-witness rule and the separate examination of a married woman; the descent act at p. 305, preserving dower and curtesy at § 242; the wills act at p. 313; the age of majority at p. 407; and § 293 on witnesses at pp. 130–31. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1854pam1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Statutes of Washington Territory, Tenth Annual Session; Held at Olympia, December First, 1862. Olympia: George A. Barnes, Territorial Printer, 1863. The probate practice act at pp. 206–07 sets the will age at the age of majority, replacing the two tracks of 1854, and § 361 at p. 261 ends guardianship at majority. "An Act to Fix the Age of Majority" is at p. 434. Digital images. Washington State Legislature. https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1862pam1.pdf (accessed 2 August 2026).

Court Cases

• Bloomer v. Todd. 3 Wash. Terr. 599 (1888). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4928912/bloomer-v-todd/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Culliton v. Chase. 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4220355/culliton-v-chase/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Harland v. Territory. 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 P. 453 (1887). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4928828/harland-v-territory/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• In re Estate of Brown. 101 Wash. 314 (1918). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4912568/in-re-the-estate-of-brown/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• In re Estate of Gallagher. 35 Wn.2d 512, 213 P.2d 621 (1950). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1162845/in-re-estate-of-gallagher/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• In re McLaughlin’s Estate. 4 Wash. 570, 30 P. 651 (1892). Cited by the names of the parties as Hesseltine v. McLaughlin. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4920167/hesseltine-v-mclaughlin/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• In re Wilbur’s Estate. 14 Wash. 242, 44 P. 262 (1896). Cited by the names of the parties as Follansbee v. Wilbur. Digital images. Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/reportscasesdet00kreigoog (accessed 2 August 2026).
• Kelley v. Kitsap County. 5 Wash. 521, 32 P. 554 (1893). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4921734/kelley-v-county-of-kitsap/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Rosencrantz v. Territory. 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 P. 305 (1884). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4928762/rosencrantz-v-territory/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• State v. Fenn. 47 Wash. 561 (1907). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4921289/state-v-fenn/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• State v. Hirabayashi. 133 Wash. 462 (1925). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4217725/state-v-hirabayashi/ (accessed 12 August 2026).
• Terrace v. Thompson. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). Digital images. GovInfo. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-263/pdf/USREPORTS-263-197.pdf (accessed 12 August 2026).
• Warburton v. White. 176 U.S. 484 (1900). The 1875 and 1879 community property rules are set out at p. 485. Digital images. GovInfo. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-176/pdf/USREPORTS-176-484.pdf (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Wilbur v. Bingham. 8 Wash. 35, 35 P. 407 (1894). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4926028/wilbur-v-bingham/ (accessed 30 July 2026).

Secondary and Reference Works

• "Anti-Miscegenation Laws in Washington Territory." HistoryLink.org. File 23378. Quotes the 1855 and 1866 acts and the repealing act of 1868. https://www.historylink.org/File/23378 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• "An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws." Washington Law Review 12 (1937): 129. Quotes the marriage-age statute as it then stood. https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/ (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Hill, Cyril. "Early Washington Marital Property Statutes." Washington Law Review and State Bar Journal 14 (1939): 118. The fullest account of the 1869–1879 community property acts and the abolition of dower and curtesy. https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/4 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Kunsch, Kelly. "Statutory Compilations of Washington." University of Puget Sound Law Review 12 (1989): 285. The authoritative account of Washington’s codification history.
• Laws of Washington; a Publication of the Session Laws of Washington Territory, Including the General Laws and Resolutions of the Years 1854 to 1888 Inclusive. Directed by Frank Pierce. Seattle: Tribune Printing Co., 1895–96. 5 vols. A reprint of the whole territorial run from the original rolls, useful where an original session volume is hard to find. Vol. 1 (1854–1862), digital images, HathiTrust. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.33433007183480 (accessed 2 August 2026).
• University of Washington Gallagher Law Library. "Washington State Statutes & Session Laws: Early Codes." The finding aid for every compilation listed above. https://lib.law.uw.edu/c.php?g=1238151&p=9060485 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• U.S. Women’s Bureau. The Legal Status of Women in the United States of America: Report for Washington. Bulletin of the Women’s Bureau, No. 157-46. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Cites the then-current code section by section; a revised edition states the law as of 1 January 1948. FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/5430 (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Washington Secretary of State, State Archives. "Common Research Subjects." Confirms that marriage records were filed with county auditors from county formation to 1968, and describes the territorial censuses of 1857–1892, probate and naturalization holdings, and the regional branch system. https://www.sos.wa.gov/archives/explore-our-collection/common-research-subjects (accessed 30 July 2026).
• Washington State Digital Archives. County auditor, county clerk, and superior court records, searchable by name. https://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov (accessed 30 July 2026).

Citations

1. Code of Washington, Containing All Acts of a General Nature (Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1881), § 1; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1881Code.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026); carried from the territorial laws of 1862, p. 83, § 1, and 1877, p. 3, § 1, through the act of 1891, ch. 17, § 1, and Rem. Rev. Stat. § 143, now RCW 4.04.010 ↩
2. Statutes of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: James Rodgers, Printer, 1869), "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 318–321 (approved 2 December 1869), the first community property act; § 2 makes all property acquired after marriage, except by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, "common property"; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1869pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
3. Statutes of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: Prosch & McElroy, Printers, 1871), "An Act Defining the Rights of Persons and Property as Affected by Marriage," pp. 67–74 (approved 29 November 1871); digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1871pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026); Laws of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1873), "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 450–455 (approved 14 November 1873), which restores the scheme of the 1869 act almost word for word; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1873pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026); Laws of Washington Territory (Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1879), "An Act Relating to and Defining the Property Rights of Husband and Wife," pp. 77–81, which introduces the term "community property" at § 2; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1879pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026); consolidated as Code of 1881, ch. CLXXXIII, §§ 2396–2418. The sequence of enactment, repeal, and re-enactment is set out in Cyril Hill, "Early Washington Marital Property Statutes," Washington Law Review and State Bar Journal 14 (1939): 118 (https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/4 : accessed 30 July 2026), which also establishes that the 1869 act was copied largely from a California statute of 1850. Note that these volumes carry the running head "General Laws," which is the form under which they are often cataloged ↩
4. Laws of 1871, § 23, "Neither dower or coturtesy shall hereafter accrue"; and, after the repeal of that act in 1873, Laws of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1875), § 3, p. 55, abolishing them again, confirmed by Code of 1881, § 2414, "No estate is allowed the husband as tenant by curtesy, upon the death of his wife, nor is any estate in dower allotted to the wife, upon the death of her husband"; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1875pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). The word in 1871 is accrue: rights that had already attached were still being measured out afterwards, and the probate act of 1873 keeps the procedure for setting off a widow’s share ↩ ↩ ↩
5. Code of 1881, ch. CLXXVII, § 2363, headed "Age of Majority"; carried from the territorial laws of 1854, p. 407, § 1 (passed 28 April 1854), 1863, p. 434, § 1, and 1866, p. 92, § 1, and later Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10548 ↩
6. Code of 1881, § 2364; carried from the laws of 1854, p. 407, § 2, and 1863, p. 434, § 2. The 1881 text applies to females; the corresponding modern section applies to all minors ↩
7. Code of 1881, § 1610 ↩
8. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1923 (Olympia: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1923), ch. 72 (H.B. 35), "Minors and Legal Age," pp. 92–93 (approved 10 March 1923): § 2 amends Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10548 so that all persons are of full age at 21; § 1 amends § 1572 to the same effect for guardianship, preserving full age for a female under 21 who has been legally married with consent; § 3 provides that the act shall not apply to females who had attained the age of eighteen years when it took effect. The session adjourned 8 March 1923 and the act took effect ninety days later, at midnight on 6 June 1923, as the volume’s explanatory note states; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1923pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
9. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1970, 1st ex. sess., ch. 17, § 1; 1971, 1st ex. sess., ch. 292, § 1 ↩
10. Statutes of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: T. F. McElroy, Printer, 1866), "An Act Concerning Minors, Their Rights and Liabilities," § 2, pp. 92–93: a minor is bound not only by contracts for necessaries but by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms within a reasonable time after attaining majority and restores all money and property received under the contract and still within his control. Section 1 of the same act fixes minority at 21 for males and 18 for females, and § 4 makes payment to a minor under a contract for his own personal services a full satisfaction, barring recovery by a parent or guardian; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1865pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). Later Rem. Rev. Stat. § 5829, now RCW 26.28.030 ↩
11. Laws of 1866, "An Act Concerning Minors, Their Rights and Liabilities," § 3, p. 93: no contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor’s own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting; now RCW 26.28.040 ↩
12. Code of 1881, §§ 5, 1611 ↩
13. Code of 1881, §§ 1621–1625 (order of sale, report of sale, confirmation) ↩ ↩
14. Statutes of the Territory of Washington: Being the Code Passed by the Legislative Assembly at their First Session (Olympia: Geo. B. Goudy, Public Printer, 1855), "An Act Regulating Marriages," § 1, p. 404. The volume covers the session of 1854 and was printed in 1855; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1854pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
15. Laws of 1854, "An Act Regulating Marriages," § 2, p. 404 ↩
16. Laws of 1866, "An Act to Regulate Marriages," § 1, p. 81 (approved 20 January 1866), the first Washington statute to set a marrying age; the kinship bar moves to second cousins at § 2, subsec. 2 ↩
17. Code of 1881, ch. CLXXXII, § 2380 ↩
18. Remington’s Revised Statutes of Washington, Annotated, Showing All Statutes in Force to and Including the Session Laws of 1931 (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1932), § 8437; quoted in "An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws," Washington Law Review 12 (1937): 129. The set runs to twelve volumes and was issued 1932–37 ↩
19. Code of 1881, § 2381 ↩ ↩
20. Laws of 1854, "An Act Regulating Marriages," § 5, p. 405 ↩
21. Code of 1881, § 2391 ↩
22. Code of 1881, § 2392 ↩
23. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1909 (Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1909), ch. 174 (H.B. 53), "Regulating Marriages," § 3, pp. 634–35: "Provided, That no consent shall be given, nor license issued, unless such female be over the age of fifteen years"; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1909pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). Re-enacted with the same proviso by Session Laws of the State of Washington, Extraordinary Session, 1909 (Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1909), ch. 16 (H.B. 27), § 3, pp. 53–54 (approved 23 August 1909); digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1909pam2.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
24. Code of 1881, § 2393 ↩
25. Code of 1881, § 2390 ↩
26. Code of 1881, § 2382 ↩
27. Code of 1881, § 2383 ↩
28. In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 30 P. 651 (1892), reported under that name and cited by the names of the parties as Hesseltine v. McLaughlin ↩
29. In re Estate of Gallagher, 35 Wn.2d 512, 213 P.2d 621 (1950) ↩
30. Wilbur v. Bingham, 8 Wash. 35, 35 P. 407 (1894); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561 (1907) ↩
31. Code of 1881, § 2388, which also provides that illegitimate children become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents with each other ↩ ↩
32. Code of 1881, § 2389 ↩
33. Code of 1881, §§ 2384–2386 ↩
34. Code of 1881, § 949, which prohibits marriage where either party has a wife or husband living and where the parties are nearer of kin than second cousins, whole or half blood, computing by the rules of the civil law, and sets out the table of relations by blood and marriage whose union is incest. The section sits in the criminal chapter rather than the marriage chapter, which is why the marriage chapter appears silent on the point ↩ ↩
35. Session Laws, 1909, ch. 174, §§ 1–2, p. 633; and Session Laws, Extraordinary Session, 1909, ch. 16, §§ 1–2, p. 53. Both sections open "No woman under the age of forty-five years, or man of any age, except he marry a woman over the age of forty-five years," so the bar reaches only marriages in which the woman is under 45 ↩
36. Session Laws, 1909, ch. 174, § 3 (an affidavit of at least one licensed physician other than the applicants, plus the affidavit of a disinterested credible person); Session Laws, Extraordinary Session, 1909, ch. 16, § 3, which substitutes the applicant’s own affidavit and adds a two-dollar license fee ↩
37. Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, Passed at the Second Regular Session, Begun and Held at Olympia, December 4, 1854 (Olympia: J. W. Wiley, Public Printer, 1855), "An Act to Amend an Act, Entitled ‘An Act to Regulate Marriage,’ Passed April 20th, 1854," § 1, p. 33 (passed 29 January 1855); digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1855pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). A title page image is at digital images, Google Books (https://books.google.com/books?id=aklOAAAAYAAJ : accessed 2 August 2026). The printer differs from the volumes on either side of it in the run ↩
38. Laws of 1855, "An Act to Amend an Act, Entitled ‘An Act to Regulate Marriage,’" §§ 2–3, p. 33 ↩
39. Laws of 1866, "An Act to Regulate Marriages," § 2, subsec. 3, p. 81. The section prohibits three cases: bigamy; kinship nearer than second cousins, whole or half blood, by the civil law; and a marriage where one party is white and the other is classed by the act as Black or Native, or as a person of one-half or more Black or Native ancestry ↩
40. Statutes of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: Chas. Prosch, Printer, 1868), "An Act to Amend an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Marriages," § 1, pp. 47–48: "That the third clause of section second of the act entitled ‘an act to regulate marriages, approved January 20th, 1866,’ be stricken out." Passed the Council 14 January 1868 and the House 15 January 1868; approved 23 January 1868. The volume is the first biennial session, begun at Olympia 2 December 1867; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1867pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
41. In re Wilbur’s Estate, 14 Wash. 242, 245–46, 44 P. 262 (1896), also cited by the names of the parties as Follansbee v. Wilbur; digital images, Reports of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, vol. 14, Internet Archive (https://archive.org/details/reportscasesdet00kreigoog : accessed 2 August 2026). The court found the marriage took place in 1867, while the racial bar was in force, and added that even conceding a date of June 1868 with no such act then in force the marriage would still fail, following In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 4 Wash. 570 (1892), and Kelley v. Kitsap County, 5 Wash. 521, 32 P. 554 (1893). It expressly declined to decide whether the earlier acts had been repealed. The former appeal in the same estate is Wilbur v. Bingham, 8 Wash. 35, 35 P. 407 (1894) ↩
42. Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1875, "An Act Relative to Adoption," § 10, pp. 111–12 (approved 12 November 1875): a father who publicly acknowledges an illegitimate child as his own, receives it as such into his family, and otherwise treats it as legitimate "thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." Repealed by Code of 1881, § 1671, with a proviso that no right or privilege established under the act should be impaired. Applied to make the sons heirs in In re Wilbur’s Estate, 14 Wash. at 246 ↩ ↩
43. Donation Land Act, Act of 27 September 1850, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496, 497 ↩
44. Code of 1881, ch. CLXXXIV, § 2419 ↩
45. Code of 1881, § 2396 ↩
46. Code of 1881, § 2398, with a proviso that nothing in the chapter confers on the wife any right to vote or hold office ↩
47. Code of 1881, § 2400 ↩
48. Code of 1881, § 2404 ↩
49. Code of 1881, § 2406 ↩
50. Code of 1881, § 2402 ↩
51. Code of 1881, § 2413 ↩
52. Code of 1881, § 2408 ↩ ↩
53. Code of 1881, § 2409 ↩ ↩
54. Laws of 1869, "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," § 3, pp. 318–19 ↩
55. Laws of 1879, "An Act Relating to and Defining the Property Rights of Husband and Wife," §§ 3–4, p. 77 ↩
56. Laws of 1869, "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," § 13, p. 321; the recording requirements are at §§ 14–16 ↩
57. Laws of 1854, "An Act Relating to Conveyances of Real Estate," § 3, p. 402, headed "Release of married woman of dower, and requisites of acknowledgment"; § 2 of the same act requires two witnesses to every deed. Dower and curtesy are preserved by the descent act of the same code, § 242, p. 308 ("Nothing contained in this act shall effect the title of a husband as tenant by courtesy, nor that of a widow as tenant in dower"), and by the wills act, § 1, which permits a devise of the whole estate "saving to the widow her dower" ↩
58. Statutes of the Territory of Washington, Made and Passed at a Session of the Legislative Assembly Begun and Held at Olympia on the Seventh Day of December, 1863 (Olympia: T. F. McElroy, Printer, 1864), the dower act, § 1, p. 6: the widow of every deceased person is entitled to dower, for the use during her natural life, of one third of all the lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, unless lawfully barred; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1863pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
59. Laws of 1863–64, the dower act, §§ 8–13, pp. 8–9: assignment by the judge of probate on application; a warrant to three discreet and disinterested persons to set the dower off by metes and bounds; their sworn return in writing to the probate court, recorded there with an attested copy filed with the register of deeds; the widow meanwhile free to occupy with the heirs or take a third of the rents; and § 13, the release of dower by joining in her husband’s deed. Sections 14–20 govern jointure, and the widow’s election between a provision made for her by will and her dower, which she was deemed to take unless she began proceedings within a year of her husband’s death ↩
60. Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1873, the civil practice act, § 537, p. 135 (in a partition sale the court must work out and protect the dower claim a wife would have if she outlived her husband), and the conveyances act, § 3, p. 465, which repeats the 1854 language on releasing dower word for word. The 1871 act was repealed by a separate act, “An Act to Repeal an Act Entitled an Act Defining the Rights of Persons and Property as Affected by Marriage,” approved 5 November 1873, p. 486; the replacement act followed nine days later, on 14 November ↩
61. Laws of 1869, "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife," § 9, p. 320 ↩
62. Laws of 1871, “An Act Defining the Rights of Persons and Property as Affected by Marriage,” § 12, p. 70: the husband shall have the management of all the common property, “but shall have no right to sell or encumber real estate except he shall be joined in the sale or encumbrance by the wife,” though he may sell or encumber personal common property without her. The requirement fell with the repeal of the act on 5 November 1873 ↩
63. Laws of 1873, “An Act Defining the Rights of Husband and Wife,” § 9, p. 452, restoring the husband’s entire management and control of the common property, “with the like absolute power of disposition as of his own separate estate,” in the same words as § 9 of the act of 1869 ↩
64. Laws of 1879, "An Act Relating to and Defining the Property Rights of Husband and Wife," § 8, pp. 77–78 ↩
65. Code of 1881, § 2410. Note that the joinder requirement is § 2410, not § 2409; the modern successor, RCW 26.16.030, combines the two sections and carries a history line citing only § 2409 ↩
66. Laws of 1879, "An Act Relating to and Defining the Property Rights of Husband and Wife," §§ 5–6, pp. 77–78 ↩
67. Code of 1881, ch. CLXXI, § 2313. The section still speaks of releasing dower, a survival from before 1871, and it drops the words "separate and apart from her husband" that the 1854 section carried ↩
68. Code of 1881, § 344 ↩
69. Code of 1881, § 2416 ↩
70. Code of 1881, §§ 2311–2312; carried from Laws of 1854, "An Act Relating to Conveyances of Real Estate," §§ 1–2, p. 402 ↩
71. Code of 1881, §§ 2311–2312, carried from Laws of 1854, "An Act Relating to Conveyances of Real Estate," §§ 1–2, p. 402, require two witnesses to every deed but fix no age for them, and no later act of the period supplies one. The nearest rule is the competency section governing testimony in court, Code of 1881, § 391, which excludes only children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts or of relating them truly ↩
72. Code of 1881, § 391; carried from Laws of 1854, "An Act to Regulate the Practice and Proceedings in Civil Actions," § 293, pp. 130–31. The words "children under ten years of age" remained in the statute until they were struck out in 1986 ↩ ↩
73. Code of 1881, § 2314 ↩
74. Washington Constitution of 1889, art. II, § 33 (repealed 1966); Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/state-laws-and-rules/washington-state-constitution/ : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
75. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1921 (Olympia: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1921), ch. 50, "An Act relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens with respect to land," §§ 2, 4, repealed 1967; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1921pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). The linked file opens with the extraordinary session of 1920 and carries that volume’s 1920 title page first; the title page of the 1921 seventeenth regular session, with the imprint given above, follows within it ↩
76. Session Laws, 1923, ch. 70, §§ 1–2 (approved 10 March 1923), repealed 1967; further amended by the act of 1937, ch. 220, § 1 ↩
77. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); State v. Hirabayashi, 133 Wash. 462 (1925) ↩
78. General Allotment Act, Act of 8 February 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 ↩
79. Laws of 1869, §§ 1–23, and Laws of 1873, §§ 1–25, read in full: neither act provides for the descent of the common property at death, so the general rules of descent governed, subject to the husband’s entire management and control under § 9 of each. Laws of 1869, § 19, forbids a marriage contract altering the legal order of descent, which assumes those general rules ↩ ↩
80. Laws of 1871, §§ 22, 26, pp. 73–74: the common property being partnership property, the wife’s share is one half "and shall be hers and her heirs forever"; and the husband shall not by will deprive the widow of any right under the act, she being entitled to elect between a provision made by his will and her rights under the act. Approved 29 November 1871 and repealed with the rest of the act in November 1873 ↩ ↩
81. Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1875, § 2, p. 55: "Upon the death of husband or wife, the whole of the community property, subject to the community debts, shall go to the survivor," saving the homestead and the family allowance ↩
82. Code of 1881, § 3303, repeating §§ 2411–2412 of the married persons chapter and carried from Laws of 1879, p. 77; the change from the 1875 rule is set out in Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 485 (1900), digital images, GovInfo (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-176/pdf/USREPORTS-176-484.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩ ↩
83. Code of 1881, § 3302, clauses First through Eighth; carried from the laws of 1854, p. 305, § 231, 1860, p. 221, § 306, 1863, p. 261, § 340, and 1875, p. 53, § 1, and later Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1341 ↩
84. Code of 1881, § 3307 ↩
85. Code of 1881, §§ 3308–3310 ↩
86. Code of 1881, § 3316, subsecs. 3–7; carried from the laws of 1854, p. 308, § 244, 1860, p. 224, § 319, 1863, p. 264, § 353, and 1875, p. 57, § 15, and later Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1364. Advancements are not counted in computing the widow’s half, § 3317 ↩
87. Code of 1881, § 3304; and see § 2414, which states the abolition directly ↩
88. Code of 1881, ch. CIII, § 1460 ↩
89. Code of 1881, § 1461 ↩
90. Code of 1881, § 1462 ↩
91. Code of 1881, § 1463 ↩
92. Code of 1881, § 1604 ↩
93. Code of 1881, § 1605, which also disqualifies judicial officers other than justices of the peace, persons of unsound mind, and persons convicted of felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude ↩
94. Code of 1881, §§ 1606–1607 ↩
95. Code of 1881, §§ 1608–1609 ↩
96. Code of 1881, § 2399 ↩
97. Code of 1881, §§ 1612–1613 ↩
98. Code of 1881, § 3305 ↩ ↩
99. Code of 1881, § 3306 ↩
100. Laws of 1854, "An Act Regulating Marriages," § 3, p. 404 ↩
101. Laws of 1854, "An Act Relating to Wills," §§ 1–3, p. 313: § 1, every person of twenty-one years and upwards may devise all his estate, real and personal, saving to the widow her dower; § 2, every person over eighteen may dispose of goods and chattels; § 3, a married woman may will real estate held in her own right, subject to curtesy. The two tracks ran until the code of 1862, below ↩
102. Statutes of Washington Territory, Tenth Annual Session; Held at Olympia, December First, 1862 (Olympia: George A. Barnes, Territorial Printer, 1863), the probate practice act, § 51, p. 207, headed under "Wills, and Rules Applicable to and Governing their Construction"; the section also saves the widow’s dower and the husband’s curtesy. Sections 53–54 carry the execution and attestation rules that the Code of 1881 repeats at §§ 1319–1320; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1862pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
103. Code of 1881, ch. XCVII, § 1318, headed "Who competent to make wills," repeating the 1862 section without the saving clause for dower and curtesy, which by then had been abolished; carried on through the acts of 1917, ch. 156, § 25, and 1929, ch. 21, § 1, and Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1395 ↩
104. Code of 1881, § 1319 ↩
105. Code of 1881, § 1320 ↩
106. In re Estate of Brown, 101 Wash. 314 (1918) ↩
107. Code of 1881, §§ 1329–1330, with an exception preserving the right of a mariner at sea or a soldier in service to dispose of wages and personal property by spoken will ↩
108. Code of 1881, § 1319, which requires every will to be in writing, signed by the testator or by another at his direction and in his presence, and attested by two or more competent witnesses subscribing their names in the presence of the testator, without fixing any age for a witness ↩
109. Code of 1881, § 1331 ↩
110. Code of 1881, § 1322 ↩
111. Code of 1881, §§ 1325–1326 ↩
112. Code of 1881, § 1442 ↩
113. Code of 1881, § 1377 ↩
114. Code of 1881, § 1374 ↩
115. Statutes of the Territory of Washington: Being the Code Passed by the Legislative Assembly at their First Session (Olympia: Geo. B. Goudy, Public Printer, 1855), "An Act to Provide for the Assessing and Collecting County and Territorial Revenue," § 1, p. 331: all taxes for the support of the territorial government are laid on polls of white male inhabitants between twenty-one and fifty years of age and on property rated in equal proportion, and the poll tax is fixed at one dollar on every white male inhabitant over twenty-one, which goes to the county; the same section levies one mill on the dollar of real and personal property for territorial purposes, two mills for schools, and not more than four mills for the county; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1854pam1.pdf : accessed 12 August 2026) ↩
116. Statutes of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: James Rodgers, Printer, 1869), the revenue act, § 5, p. 177: a poll tax is assessed on every male inhabitant of the Territory between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years, the racial limit of the 1854 act having been dropped. Section 4, subsec. 6, at p. 176, exempts from taxation the property of all Indians who are not citizens, except land held by them by purchase; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1869pam1.pdf : accessed 12 August 2026) ↩
117. Laws of 1869, the road act, § 22, subsec. 2: the supervisor assesses two days’ work on every male between twenty-one and fifty years of age, except persons who are a public charge or too infirm to perform labor, with a proviso allowing a man to pay three dollars to the supervisor in lieu of each day’s work, for the use of the general road fund of the county ↩
118. Code of 1881, § 2863 ↩
119. Code of 1881, §§ 2864–2865 ↩
120. Code of 1881, §§ 2866–2871 ↩
121. Code of 1881, § 2832, subsecs. 9–10, listing the road poll tax and the poll tax as separate columns of the assessment roll ↩
122. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1889–90 (Olympia, Wash.: O. C. White, State Printer, 1890), the revenue act, §§ 64–66, pp. 553–54; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1889pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
123. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1897 (Olympia, Wash.: O. C. White, State Printer, 1897), ch. 71, "An Act to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes." The act carries no poll tax; the only survival in the volume is a road poll column on the assessment form; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1897pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
124. Code of 1881, § 2992 ↩
125. Code of 1881, § 2993 ↩
126. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1907 (Olympia, Wash.: C. W. Gorham, Public Printer, 1907), ch. 76 (S.B. 38), § 1, amending § 8 of ch. 119, Laws of 1903, "An act providing for the levy, collection and manner of payment of road, bridge, poll and property taxes," approved 16 March 1903. The amended section drops the poll levy and substitutes an annual county levy of not more than four mills on taxable property for the general road and bridge fund; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1907pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
127. Washington Constitution of 1889, art. VII, § 2, requiring the legislature to provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the state according to its value in money, so that every person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the value of his or its property. Note that the uniformity language now appears at art. VII, § 1, where it was placed by Amendment 14 (1930) and revised again by Amendment 81 (1988), so the section as printed today is not the rule of 1889; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/state-laws-and-rules/washington-state-constitution/?section=36abc7f0-51d5-4d32-b0ca-c1dd1fa3c27c : accessed 12 August 2026) ↩
128. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933), striking down the graduated income tax approved as Initiative 69 in November 1932 ↩
129. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1935 (Olympia: State Printing Plant, 1935), ch. 180 (H.B. 237), the Revenue Act of 1935, which levies the excise on the privilege of engaging in business activities and the tax on retail sales, together with taxes on use, public utilities, admissions, liquor sales, conveyances, and stock transfers; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1935pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩
130. Code of 1881, ch. CLII, § 2078 ↩
131. Laws of the Territory of Washington (Olympia: C. B. Bagley, Public Printer, 1883), "An Act to Amend Section 3050, Chapter 238 of the Code of Washington," §§ 1–2, pp. 39–40 (approved 23 November 1883). Section 1 restates the qualifications of an elector; suffrage was extended by § 2: "Wherever the word ‘his’ occurs in the chapter aforesaid, it shall be construed to mean ‘his or her,’ as the case may be." That mismatch between the title and the reach of § 2 is what the court seized on in 1887; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1883pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩ ↩
132. Laws of 1854, "An Act Relating to Elections and the Mode of Supplying Vacancies," § 1, p. 64: all white male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years who have resided three months in the Territory may vote, provided they are citizens of the United States or have declared on oath their intention to become such, with a proviso admitting such American half-breed Indians as the judges of election determine have adopted the habits and customs of civilization; § 2 excludes persons under guardianship, non compos mentis, insane, and persons convicted of treason. The jury act of the same code, § 1, p. 431, makes all qualified electors competent as petit jurors and all qualified electors who are householders competent as grand jurors, so the elector rule set the jury rule. The first franchise came from the Organic Act, § 5, printed at p. 35 of the same volume, which gave the vote at the first election to every white male inhabitant above the age of twenty-one years. The word white is absent from the corresponding section of the Code of 1881, § 3050; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1854pam1.pdf : accessed 12 August 2026) ↩
133. Code of 1881, § 2079 ↩
134. Code of 1881, § 2080 ↩
135. Code of 1881, § 206 ↩
136. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1911 (Olympia, Wash.: E. L. Boardman, Public Printer, 1911), ch. 57 (H.B. 118), "Relating to Service of Jurors in Superior Courts," §§ 1–3, pp. 814–15, repealing ch. 73 of the Laws of 1909. Section 1 sets the five qualifications; § 2 excuses a list of occupations and women, provides that the right to be excused is no cause for challenge if the person wishes to serve, and lets a woman claim exemption by signing a notice returned to the sheriff before the date for appearance; § 3 puts the annual July jury list in the hands of the county clerk, made up from the latest tax rolls and poll books; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1911pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026) ↩ ↩
137. Civil Rights Act, Act of 1 March 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, printed among the acts of Congress applicable to the Territory in the Code of 1881 ↩
138. Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 P. 305 (1884) ↩
139. Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 P. 453 (1887) ↩
140. Laws of Washington Territory, Enacted by the Legislative Assembly, at its Eleventh Biennial Session, 1887–8 (Olympia, W.T.: Thos. H. Cavanaugh, Public Printer, 1888), "An Act Prescribing the Qualifications of Electors in the Territory of Washington," § 1, pp. 93–94 (approved 18 January 1888); digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1887pam1.pdf : accessed 30 July 2026). ↩
141. Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599 (1888), on the act of 18 January 1888 ↩
142. Session Laws, 1909, ch. 249 (S.B. 300), the Criminal Code, § 5, headed "Responsibility of Children," p. 891; the marginal note to the chapter records that the code was taken largely from New York and Minnesota. Neither the Code of 1881 nor the code of 1854 contains any provision on the criminal capacity of children, so the common law governed the territorial period. Carried as Rem. Rev. Stat. § 2249 and later former RCW 9.01.114, now RCW 9A.04.050 ↩
143. Session Laws of the State of Washington, 1913 (Olympia, Wash.: Frank M. Lamborn, Public Printer, 1913), ch. 160 (S. B. 298), the Juvenile Court Law, § 1, p. 520: the act applies to all minor children under the age of eighteen years who are delinquent or dependent; digital images, Washington State Legislature (https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1913pam1.pdf : accessed 6 August 2026). The act repeals the juvenile provisions of Remington & Ballinger’s Annotated Codes, §§ 1987–2004, and ch. 56 of the Laws of 1911; the earlier acts are 1905, ch. 18, and 1909, ch. 190 ↩
144. Code of 1881, § 392 ↩
145. Code of 1881, § 389 ↩
146. Laws of 1854, "An Act to Regulate the Practice and Proceedings in Civil Actions," § 293, subsec. 3, pp. 130–31 ↩
147. Laws of 1854, "An Act to Regulate the Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Actions," § 95, p. 117, making Indians competent witnesses in any prosecution in which an Indian may be a defendant; carried into Code of 1881, § 1069, which adds that witnesses competent in civil cases are competent in criminal prosecutions ↩
148. Laws of 1866, "An Act Relating to Witnesses and Evidence," § 1, pp. 91–92 (approved 18 January 1866) ↩
149. Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1875, "An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act to Regulate the Practice and Proceedings in Civil Actions, Approved Nov. 13, 1873’," rewriting § 384, pp. 16–17 ↩

Note: This law guide was created with assistance from multiple AI tools. Though a diligent effort was made to ensure the accuracy of the information provided, there may be unintentional errors. It's important to check the primary sources as needed to ensure accuracy.