USA > California > Addresses delivered before the California Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, 1913 > Part 6
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12
The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks, if the river is found to be navigable for that distance; and the department commander (who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon) desires you to report to him not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
ED W. SMITH, Captain, Eighteenth Infantry, A. A. A. G. Lieut. Col. G. A. Custer, Seventh Cavalry.
As upon the various constructions given the language of this let- ter hinged the question of Custer's obedience, I have given it in full. Terry, who was friendly to Custer says that the object of Custer's not following the trail but keeping to the south were "in order to intercept the Indians should they attempt to pass around his left, and in order, by a longer march, to give time for Colonel Gibbon's column to come up."
General Gibbon, commanding the co-operating column, and the third party to the conference, also friendly to Custer, said: "So great was my fear that Custer's zeal would carry him forward too rapidly, that the last thing I said to him, when bidding him goodbye after his regiment had filed past when starting on his march, was: 'Now Custer, don't be greedy, but wait for us.' He replied gaily as, with a wave of his hand, he dashed off to follow his regiment, 'No, I will not.' Poor fellow. Knowing what we do now, and what an effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have had on him, perhaps we were ex-
49
SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
pecting too much to anticipate a forbearance upon his part which would have rendered co-operation of the two columns practicable."
The conditions were exactly as anticipated by General Terry, except that the village was supposed to contain only about 400 lodges, about 800 warriors; this number of lodges had been counted by Reno and, of course, Terry did not know that Crook, with 1000 soldiers and 250 Indian auxiliaries, had been fought to a stand still by Crazy Horse, that he had joined the 400 lodges that Reno had counted, and at that mo- ment, a dispatch from Sheridan to Terry was en-route, stating that 1800 lodges had departed from the Agencies.
In any criticism of General Custer it should be understood that he thought 1000 warriors was the very maximum number he would meet, and he would not hesitate to attack this number. General Terry did not think there were as many, and the object of co-operation was not based upon fear for the safety of the attacking force, but fear that the Indians might escape.
General Gibbon offered Custer his four troops of Cavalry or three Gatling guns, but he did not wish them. General Gibbon gave him Mitch Bouyer a half breed guide, Herndon, a white scout and six Crows. The object of the scout and Crows was to keep up com- munication with Gibbon's column, but they were never used for this purpose.
Custer's command was composed of 31 Commissioned Officers, 585 enlisted men, 3 citizens, 4 white scouts, 6 Crow Indians, 25 Arikaree Indians or "Rees," and one half-breed guide, a total of 655.
His command left the Yellowstone, going up the Rosebud, at 2 p. m., Thursday, June 22nd, marched 12 miles and went into bivouac at 4 p. m. That evening the officers were called to Custer's headquarters, and marching instructions given them. Squadron and battalion for- mations were abandoned and each troop commander was to report to Custer in person. No bugle-calls were to be sounded. No strag- gling allowed and every officer was to look carefully to the condition of men and horses. Generally Custer was very uncommunicative; on this occasion he talked freely, he announced that he intended to follow the trail until he found the Indians and then "go for them."
This statement indicates that Custer intended to take full ad- vantage of the liberal suggestion to depart from the order if he saw "sufficient reason for so doing."
On June 23d the command started at 5 a. m. and marched until 5 p. m. making 33 miles over a very rough country; the trail was a large one, but not very fresh. On the 24th they marched 28 miles, still over a rough country, but the trail was getting fresher; they went
50
CALIFORNIA SOCIETY
into camp about 4 p.m. to wait for the return of the scouts. They returned about this time and reported that the Sioux had passed over the divide, and were now on, or near the Little Big Horn. Here was the point where having ascertained that the trail led to the Lit- tle Big Horn, he was not to follow it, but keep still further to the south, and send a scout to Gibbon. After supper all fires were ex- tinguished, and at 9:25 the officers were called to Custer and in- formed that the Indians were doubtless on the Little Big Horn and that the command would move at 11 p. m.
Custer could have remained here Saturday night and most of Sun- day, sent scouts to Gibbon and, marching Sunday night and Mon- day night, been in the Little Big Horn ready to attack Tuesday morn- ing and Gibbon could have reached there Tuesday a. m. And we would have seen the biggest killing of Indians, that needed killing, ever witnessed on the American Continent since the days of Cortez. Saturday evening Gibbon and Custer were each just 40 miles from where Custer's monument now stands, and 45 miles from each other.
The command moved at the designated time and the march con- tinued until 2:30 a. m., when they made some coffee and rested for several hours. While his command was resting Custer went with Mitch Bouyer and the Crows to the summit of Crows Nest, a part of the Rosebud or Wolf mountains, and from there had a view of the Little Big Horn and the upper portion (about one-sixth) of the village and hundreds of horses grazing on the hills to the west of the village.
I visited this Crow's Nest just five years ago, accompanied by White-Man-Runs-Him and Hairy Moccasin, who were with Custer when he was there; with the naked eye I could see a railroad train at Garryowen's, which is at the point of Reno's farthest advance, and by the map just 15 miles from Crow's Nest. White-Man-Runs- Him had a telescope which he had at that time, though he said Cus- ter had a "two-eyed" one. Custer returned to his command and marched for three hours more and halted in a little valley near the divide.
I presume you wish to know something of distances. On the 23rd of June Custer marched 33 miles; on the 24th, before halting, 28 miles, in the night about 10 miles and about 10 in the morning. He halted just 16 miles from the ford, so that between 5 a. m. Sat- urday and about 1 p. m. Sunday he had marched 64 miles, the first 40 miles over very rough ground with very poor feed.
Some claim that it was Custer's intention to remain in hiding here and deliver his attack the next morning. I think this is an absurd.
51
SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
idea, for he had been marching in broad daylight for two and a half hours, over a country visible from a hundred points.
After resting a short time he made that unfortunate division of his command. To Major Marcus A. Reno he gave three troops, Captain Benteen three troops, Capt. Tom McDougall one troop in charge of the pack train ; while he took five troops himself. The average strength of the several troops was 49 enlisted men but as 8 men are detailed from each troop to accompany the pack train McDougall had as many men as Reno or Benteen. Benteen moved off to the south and west, while Reno was to follow down Sundance or Thick Ash Creek. They all got started off at a lively gait, Custer following Reno; when about a mile from the Little Big Horn and at 12:30 p.m. Reno was told that the village was only two miles distant and running away. He was ordered to move forward as rapidly as was prudent, to charge when the time came and that the whole outfit would support him.
The upper end of the valley was held by the Hunkpapas and Blackfeet, the Sans Arcs were about opposite the ford, then came the Minneconjous, next the Ogalalas, then the Brules and last the Cheyennes. The war chiefs in order of prominence were Gall, a Hunkpapa; Crazy Horse, an Ogalala Sioux by birth, a northern Cheyenne by affiliation; Crow King, Hunkpapa; Lame Deer and Hump, Minneconjous, Big Road and He Dog, Ogalalas, Dull Knife and Two Moons, Cheyennes, and black moon, a Hunkpapa.
Reno took up a fast trot, forded the Little Big Horn, halted about ten minutes to re-form and then started down the valley in line, with the Rees on the left, driving the Indians, who soon began to appear, before him.
It should be understood that most of the Indians were watching Custer's movements. Reno's advance was not a headlong charge but at a trot, the Indians increasing in number as he approached a thick growth of timber behind which was the upper end of the village. Here the Indians grew desperate, the advance had not been sharp enough to dismay them, they threw themselves upon Reno's left flank, and in an instant the Rees fled and never stopped running until they reached Powder River, over 100 miles away.
When the Rees gave way the Sioux turned Reno's flank, there was no reserve and the left of the line was swung back like a closing jack knife. They moved into the timber and were ordered to dis- mount.
Of course Custer had expected Reno to charge, to push his attack home. At first it would have been done, now it was too late. The
52
CALIFORNIA SOCIETY
time for audacity, the Cavalryman's ten commandments rolled into one, was gone.
All the Indian accounts agree, and that is the only thing they do agree upon, that Reno's attack was something of a surprise, they were watching Custer's column and there is no doubt but that a determined charge by Reno would have resulted in capturing the up- per third of the village and in discouraging the Indians. Reno had taken a splendid position for defense, an old river bed, considerable cover and water close at hand, and the bluff too far off to be dangerous. Reno's fire struck terror to the women of the Hunkpapas and to Sitting Bull. This man was known as "a man with a big head and a little heart," i. e., an able man but a coward, a medicine man, not a warrior, he was also a charlatan and a liar.
When Reno's shots commenced striking the lodges, Sitting Bull "lit out" with his family and only stopped when couriers overtook him and announced the annihilation of Custer's command. He re- turned late in the afternoon and announced that he had been in the hills engaged in propitiating the evil spirits and invoking the Gods of War. As he had predicted that the soldiers would attack them and all be destroyed, the superstitious believed him.
How long the troops remained in the river bottom is matter of conjecture, some say "a few minutes" others "nearly an hour." I think from 20 minutes to half an hour. Reno was demoralized or "rattled," he ordered his men to mount, then immediately to dis- mount, and at such time hesitation on the part of the commander breeds a panic. The order to mount was again given, and generally not heard, but as the men saw others mounting and leaving, they followed suit, and it became a horse race, with Reno leading. This gave the Indians more courage; it is exciting to hunt men whom you hate, when there is only danger enough to make it interesting. The column had lost all semblance of order, it was a panic-stricken mob of frightened men, though some never lost their nerve. They struck the river where there was a path and plunged in, and all the Indians had to do then was to stand on the bank and "give it to them" in the river and as they straggled out on the far side. At that crossing it was simply hell.
As soon as they got across the coolest men turned and covered the retreat, while the mass struggled to the top of the bluff, where Benteen soon joined them. This was about 2 to 2:30 p. m. (Reno says about 2:30 p. m.), that is, from one hour and a half to two hours had elapsed since Reno started about one mile from the Little Big
53
SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Horn. He had traveled about three and one half miles to the stand in the valley, fought there and retreated to the bluff a mile or more.
But one man was wounded before Reno made his stand at the bottom, and only one soldier and two scouts were killed there, but by the time the command reached the bluffs, 3 officers and 29 men and scouts were killed, and seven badly wounded, and 1 officer and 15 men missing, 14 of these came in soon after Benteen joined. and the officer and other enlisted man joined the night of the 26th. The Indians started fires in the bottom, to drive these men out of the bushes.
Reno and his friends have claimed that he retreated because he did not know what had become of Custer and felt that he must look out for himself.
To understand this fight fairly well it is necessary to follow each command in detail. Leaving Reno where the Sioux have driven him, we will accompany Benteen's column, which we left marching off to the south and west. He struck very rough country, saw no signs of Indians, so turned to the right and struck Sundance creek, just ahead of McDougall and his pack train, and about one hour and a half behind Reno. Here he watered his horses and started on. While he was watering, Sergeant Knipe of Captain Tom Custer's Company, passed on the run with an order for the pack train to hurry up. Benteen continued his march at a slow trot. About a mile further on, Trumpeter Martin, the last man to see Custer galloped up with this message: "Benteen, Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. W. W. Cook. P. S. Bring packs." At this time Benteen was ahead of his command and near where Reno first forded the Little Big Horn. He saw fighting in the valley and on the bluffs. Just then he saw three Crow scouts, who told him that Reno had retreated to the bluffs. These Crows had been with Custer to a point below where Reno had his fight. Benteen sent his orderly for his command to come up at a gallop, and to McDougall to hurry up, and in ten minutes Benteen was with Reno.
Benteen's men divided their ammunition wth Reno's men, efforts were made to get water, and reserve dead bodies, every attempt to get water started fire from the brush on the river bank. Godfrey says, "At this time there was a large number of horsemen, Indians, in the valley"-"at least 1000," says Benteen-"suddenly they all started down the valley, and in a few moments scarcely one was to be seen." Firing was heard to the northward about this time, two volleys were heard, and officers and men speculated upon what it meant, some looked upon it as a signal for Custer, and there was serious mut-
54
CALIFORNIA SOCIETY
terings. Captain Weir finally without orders started with his com- pany. At last McDougall came up with the pack train.
Finally Reno yielded and started towards Weir, but the latter was about this time forced to retreat, the Indians were gathering in his front in great numbers. Custer had been disposed of and they returned to finish Reno, and the whole command moved back looking for a decent place for a stand, and finally finding a little depression, they formed a sort of square and prepared for the worst. It was now half past five and until seven o'clock the contest was severe. Dead mules and horses were used as breastworks, and rifle pits dug with knives, cups and plates. After seven the fire slackened, and by nine it ceased. The night was spent by the troops in strengthening their position and speculations as to what had become of Custer.
The Indians spent the night in a wild carnival of rejoicing. They were drunk with slaughter and held an orgie of dancing, shouting and boasting.
At 6 a. m. on the 26th the firing re-commenced, but no attack was made; from about 7 o'clock to 9 a. m. there was fierce fighting, but the leading chiefs put no heart in it, they knew that victory would be costly, they said: "We will shoot at them occasionally, but not charge. They will fall into our hands when the thirst burns in their throats and makes them mad for drink."
At 11 a. m. 19 men volunteered to get water. Four of the best marksmen took exposed positions and the other 15, taking canteens and camp kettles crawled through the ravines and then made a rush for the river. Several were wounded, but they got the water.
At 3 p. m. the firing ceased entirely. The Indians set fire to the grass, and late in the afternoon the village started southwest for the Big Horn.
Custer and Reno separated about 12:30 three-fourths of a mile from the Little Big Horn. Custer's column marched almost north, just after Reno had forded and halted to close up, Custer and some of his officers and Crow scouts rode to a point of the bluff and waved to them. One of these scouts told me that he only "stopped a lit- tle while, like a big bird that lights and flies on." His command passed right near where Reno had his intrenchments later, and con- tinued on behind the crest of the ridge, just opposite the point where Reno dismounted Custer struck a little "draw" or valley that led down to Medicine Tail Coulee; when he reached this Coulee, Trum- peter Martin was sent back with the message to Benteen. From now on it is speculation, for unless the Crow Curley is truthful, no man who rode from this point, lived to see the sun set.
55
SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Custer started down Medicine Tail Coulee for the ford which was near the middle of the village. I don't think he hastened, he was waiting to see the stampede which Reno would start, and then with his five troops strike right into the midst of it and nothing could stay his advance. But the stampede Reno started was toward the bluff. Finally, and I think tired of waiting, he came out on the flat near the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee, and the Indians commenced to fire upon his command. * The Indians were thick on the far side. He recognized that the Indians were prepared and that it was useless to cross the river, and strike the village. There was some fighting here. Troops obliqued to the right by companies and took possession of the point which was the southern end of the bluff upon which he fell. This point is about 650 yards from the ford. Here some of the troops dismounted, and there was some fighting.
Of all the places passed by Custer along the river, this point was the best for defensive purposes. The south end was about 50 feet high and too steep for horses, and the river side was almost im- passable, so that two sides were protected and water easy of access, but he mounted and started along the ridge, and there was fighting all the time, but at rather long range. Custer was evidently pushing for the high point where the monument now stands. Finally the Indians, who were following, crowded harder and Calhoun's company halted to cover the rear, and here are many monuments. Soon the right flank was hard pressed by Indians who had passed around be- hind the bluff, and here fell Keogh and most of his company. Then, evidently just as the head of the column saw the top of the bluff in their grasp, hundreds of Cheyennes, who had passed around in front, struck them and there were a few moments of fierce fighting; they were surrounded. Hordes of Indians coming up from the river, those who had exterminated Keogh closing in, and those who had fought the rear guard closed in, and it must have been a regular melee. On a space, hardly, if any more than sixty feet square, was Gen- eral Custer, Captains Tom Custer and Yates, Lieutenants Cook, Smith and Riley, and some 58 enlisted men. Part of Captain Custer's troop and part of Smith's evidently tried to strike for the river but only got a quarter of a mile, when they were killed to a man.
*This was the first resistance Custer had encountered, and everything indicated that this was after Benteen had joined Reno or, according to Reno, two hours after he left Custer at 12:30, and the distance his column marched from the point of reporting to the Ford is only about six miles and not a very rough trail. I followed the exact route on horseback with the Crows and drove a two-horse wagon over it.
56
CALIFORNIA SOCIETY
This was Sunday afternoon, probably about 4 o'clock. At that hour the women of the garrison at Fort Abraham Lincoln gathered in one of the quarters and sang "Nearer my God to Thee." Just ten days later they learned that at that hour their loved ones were dying on this bluff.
General Gibson's command, which General Terry accompanied, started up the Yellowstone Wednesday the 21st, and on Saturday were ferried over the river by the steamer Far West, moved up Tullock Fork a few miles and camped. One company was left on the north side of the Yellowstone to guard the train.
The command consisted of 4 troops of Cavalry, 5 companies of Infantry and three Gatling guns, 389 veterans. Sunday morning we expected a scout from Custer. At 4 a. m. our mounted detachment of Crow scouts went up Tullock's Fork, nine miles, then returned. The command started at 5:30 and marched up the Fork two miles, then struck off, expecting to find a table land, leading to the Little Big Horn. As the water was bad, the men were ordered to empty can- teens, good water reported a short distance ahead. Instead of a table land, we struck the worst sort of bad lands. General Terry said :
"The Infantry made a march of 25 miles over the most difficult country which I have ever seen," and they suffered intensely for water. I personally took about 20 canteens and rode my horse rapidly for four miles, filled the canteens and returned. It was with difficulty that the officers were able to keep the men from dragging me from the saddle. Every man got a sup and then the certainty that water was ahead put life into them, and when the beautiful creek was reached, many of the men just wallowed in it.
We got into camp about 5 p. m. The Cavalry and Gatling guns pushed on, for we had seen a big smoke, caused by the Indians try- ing to drive the dismounted men out of the brush in the bottom. It rained half the night, but we started at 4:30 a. m. It was slow marching at first, pretty muddy, and the wet pack ropes dried, stretched and had to be tightened; finally we joined the Cavalry. Our scouts had struck the trail of three Indians, followed it and these Indians threw off much of their clothing and plunged into the Big Horn; our scouts recognized the clothing as belonging to some of the scouts we had loaned to Custer. After much trouble we got them to talk. They told of the awful catastrophe, said all were killed. We could not persuade them to return, we could not, did not believe their story. Our remaining 17 scouts left us, after begging us to turn back, and they actually had tears in their eyes as they bid us goodbye.
57
SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
We pushed on, and just before noon passed down into the valley of the Little Big Horn. As the command was very weary and had practically no breakfast, we rested for an hour and made coffee. Two scouts, white men, were sent out with messages for Custer, the one getting through and returning with an answer was to receive $200. Soon both returned saying that the country was full of In- dians. We went up the beautiful valley prepared for a fight. Col- umns were seen in the distance, dressed in blue, with guidons. They had dressed two or three troops in the uniform stripped from the dead and tried to make us think they were soldiers. We tried to communicate with them but failed. At 9 p. m. we halted just where the Little Big Horn makes a sharp bend, watered our animals in squads, filled our canteens and camp kettles and slept in line of battle, or rather in hollow square, with the animals in the center. At daylight we started, Bradley's mounted detachment in skirmish line pushed through the timber on the banks of the river which he was within 300 yards of when we halted, and found that the timber had been literally filled with Indians the night before. He pushed on, strik- ing for the high hill where Custer's monument now stands. The rest of the command passed around the bend through some rough country and out into the bottom where the Indian village had stood. We saw Bradley's men galloping about in all directions and soon Brad- ley rode up to General Gibbon and said: "I have the honor to re- port that I have counted 194 dead bodies, I think they are soldiers, but all are stripped and some are badly mutilated."
At the upper end of the village two lodges were standing, and in these were 18 dead Indians. On the hill beyond we could see moving figures and some animals, and we met two men from Reno and then we knew what had happened.
Gibbon's command went into camp in the bottom, having to bury men and horses before doing so, and some of us rode up to Reno's intrenchments. It was a trying time.
Reno's men packed up and moved down and camped alongside of us. I had charge of bringing down the wounded, 52 in number, and it was quite a task.
The next day a scouting party was sent out, and followed the main trail ten or twelve miles, returning they struck a large fresh trail down the Little Big Horn, undoubtedly the trail made by the Cheyennes under Crazy Horse when joining Sitting Bull. We buried the dead and made litters, but it was slow work, and we laid over all the next day, making mule litters, skinning the dead horses for thongs to make the beds. About dark we started and at 2 a. m.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.