The history of Connecticut, from the first settlement of the colony to the adoption of the present constitution, vol. II, Part 21

Author: Hollister, G. H. (Gideon Hiram), 1817-1881. cn
Publication date: 1855
Publisher: New Haven, Durrie and Peck
Number of Pages: 712


USA > Connecticut > The history of Connecticut, from the first settlement of the colony to the adoption of the present constitution, vol. II > Part 21


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59


* See Botta, Gordon, Graham.


239


WOOSTER AND SCHUYLER.


[1775.]


the result of that untoward expedition might have been different.


With two thousand men under his command at that unfortunate season of the year, without the ordinary neces- saries of life, discouraged at the defeat that they had just sustained, and heart-broken at the loss of Montgomery, Wooster was called upon not only to keep possession of Montreal and the other parts of Canada, that had been traversed by the Americans, but also to spare men enough to lay siege to Quebec, "the strongest fortified city on the globe," and hold it against an enemy several times outnum- bering his whole army. All this was to be done, too, without a single artillery company, a battering train, a mortar, or an engineer .* Eight hundred men was more than he ought to have spared in an attempt upon Quebec. It was of course impossible to storm this fortress with such a force, even had they been provided with food, clothing, tents, artillery, and all the other munitions that should have been at their command. It was equally idle to think of besieging the place with scarcely men enough to act as sentries. The best and only thing he could do, was to blockade the garrison, and this he did with a fortitude and faithfulness worthy of a cause which had to contend against difficulties that nature and art had contributed to render insurmountable .; The worst of these obstacles, as I have already said, was the conduct of General Schuyler. It was not only insulting, but it was vascillating and whimsical even to childishness. His orders contained intimations and indirect charges of disobedience of former orders, and abounded in the most insolently despotic com- mands that could well be put upon paper. There was in them a meddling and interfering spirit that was excessively galling to the feelings of a high-toned man like Wooster. He was not allowed to regulate even the most ordinary move- ments of his army, nor to prescribe municipal regulations for the temporary government of the towns that were in his keeping, and for which he was to be held responsible.į


* Deming, p. 40. + Deming's Oration, p. 41. # Deming ; Gordon, &c.


240


HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT.


With all these embarrassments, Wooster maintained his position as faithfully as his superior officer persisted in his abuses, until he was recalled. The opening of the spring filled the St. Lawrence with ships and veteran troops, more in number than those who had occupied Boston under Gen. Gage, previous to the battle of Bunker Hill. In precipita- tion and defeat, the army withdrew from a country that could not have been reduced by Washington and his whole army. Nor did the persecuting spirit of his accuser content itself with private wrongs inflicted through the medium of secret letters. He took every occasion of traducing Woos- ter in the presence of the officers of the army, and associa- ted himself with Benedict Arnold, in representing him as a coward. He even brought the matter home to the notice of Congress, and charged Wooster with writing insolent letters to him. Never did a more wanton and outrageous falsehood pass for truth merely because it came from a respectable source. Wooster's letters have since been given to the world, and exhibit a spirit of kindness and forgiveness worthy of more praise than they would otherwise deserve, were they not contrasted with those that elicited them .*


Wooster now hastened to Philadelphia and insisted that his conduct as leader of the army in Canada should be made the subject of a critical examination by Congress. Then for the first time throwing aside the reserve that had before marked his demeanor, he addressed the President of Congress in the following terms :


" The unjust severity and unmerited abuse with which I have been assailed in the colonies by those who would remove every obstacle to their own advancement, and the harsh treatment I have received from some members of the body over which you preside, renders it necessary that I should vindicate my administration of the army in Canada. The honor of a soldier being the first thing he should defend, and his honesty the last he should give up, his character is always entitled to the protection of the virtuous and the good."


* See Wooster's and Schuyler's letters in Am. Archieves, vol. iv, fourth series.


241


CHARACTER OF WOOSTER VINDICATED.


At his solicitation, a committee was appointed by Congress to investigate the charges that had been made against him by his enemies, who found them to be, as the voice of history has long since declared them, groundless and unjust .*


* See Deming's Oration in which there is a very able examination of the conduct of this officer.


NOTE .- Mr. Deming, has also kindly furnished me with a piece of testimony in relation to the destruction of Rivington's press, of the most interesting character. This evidence comes from the pen of Captain Sears himself, in a letter addressed to Roger Sherman, Eliphalet Dyer, and Silas Deane, Esquires, and is as follows :


" NEWHAVEN, 28 November, 1775.


"Gentlemen,-I have to inform you of an Expedition which I, with about 100 Volunteers from this and the other Towns Westward in this Government, set out upon for New York &c., which was to disarm Tories, and to deprive that Traitor to his Country James Rivington of the means of circulating pison in print, the latter of which we happily effected by taking away his Types, and which may be a great means of puting an end to the Tory Faction there, for his press hath been as it were the very life and Soul of it-and I believe it wou'd not otherwise have been done, as there are not Spirited and Leading men enough in N. York to undertake such a Business, or it wou'd have been done long ago : and as there are many Enemies to the cause of Freedom, in that place, it is most likely I shall meet with many Censures for undertaking such an Enterprise. I shall es- teem it a particular favor to have your opinion upon the matter, and likewise to be inform'd how it is relished by the Members of the Congress in general, and if it meets with their approbation I shall not regard what others may say : I can assure you it is highly approved of by the People of this Colony a few 'Tories excepted, and they are almost all Disarm'd by this time, and what of them remains we expect in a few days to make a finish of ; for which purpose I intend to set out with a party one Day in this Week, for some of the Neighbouring Towns, when I expect we shall make a finish of that in this Colony. And I could wish that a Sistem might be fallen upon to compleat the same in N. York and its Province. The people of Connectt. have gone a great way in Disarming the Tories of N. York Government, but, what has been done was Voluntary and at their own pri- vate expence, which has been considerable, and it will in a measure Stop if a body of Men is not raised for that purpose-the Number of 500 wou'd be sufficent for the undertaking, and should the C. Congress give an Order to this Government to raise that Number, under the Command of a Gen- eral Officer, puting them under pay while in Actual Service, it is my opinion the Regiment might be made up in two days after the commencement of Inlisting, and that of the principal Burgers of the different Towns. I think a due attention to this by the Congress will be of no small Import- ance, for if the matter should not be carried into execution this Winter, it is my opinion that one Half of the People of the City and Province of N. York will be ready to take up Arms against the Country next Spring, and we have little else to do this Winter but to purge the Land of such Vil- lains, which I think almost as necessary as the keeping up Standing Armies.


" In Case the Congress should order a Regimt. raised for the purpose aforesaid, I wou'd recom- mend it to be General throughout the Continent, but the Regiment of 500 Men for N. York, &c., and when we go up on Long Island, it will be necessary to go with 1000 Men as the Tories there are a considerable Majority, and well equipt-not less than 500 Sons of Liberty in N. York wou'd join us were we to go on Long Island-and wou'd it not be expedient to take up and confine a few of the principal Leading Men in the different Towns, who are notoriously Inimical to the Rights of this Country ? for were that to be done it is reasonable to suppose many of the midling and lower Class of People, now under the influence of such persons, wou'd become espousers of their Coun- try's cause. For the particulars of our Expedition to N. York &c., I refer you to the N. Haven Gazettee.


" I am sorry to tell you that the Teaholders in N. York have in general began to make Sale of their Tea. I have not as yet sold one pound of mine, nor shall I do it till the Congress grants Liberty for the Sale of it-but shall think hard of it, especially as I have spent so much money in the com- mon Cause, if the Interest of £3000 in that Article should be sunk to me and my Son in Law, which will be the Case, if I can't obtain leave from the Congress to dispose of it, therefore beg you'll favor me witli laying my Case before the Congress, and with your Influence in backing the same.


" I have heard that the Command of the Ships fiting out at Phila. is to be given to Captain Hop- kins, which I am much surprised at, for I judged that, that department was for me, which I had rea- son to expect from the hints given me by many of the Members of the Congress, but it is too often the case, when a Man has done the most he gets the least reward. It is not for the Lucre of gain that 1 want the Command of a Squadron in the American Navy, but it is because I know myself capable of the Station, and because I think I can do my Country more Service in that department than in any other-the Congress's not thinking proper to fix that Honor upon me, will by no means make me inactive in the Cause we are all engaged in, but cou'd wish nothing had been said about my being appointed to the Command, for it has spread thro' the Country, that whenever a Navy were fited out by the Congress, I should have the Chief Command, but that not being the Case may tend to reflect dishonor on me.


"I am with Esteem, Gentlemen, Your most Hble Servt.,


" Roger Sherman, Esqr., Eliphl. Dyer, Esqr., Silas Deane, Esqr."


"ISAAC SEARS


48


CHAPTER IV.


THE BRITISH EVACUATE BOSTON.


THE difficulties that surrounded General Washington dur- ing the fall of 1775 and in the winter of 1775-'6, can hardly be imagined. More was demanded of him by the Congress than he could possibly perform with the humble resources that he had at his command. Ignorant of the art of war, the members composing that body were totally unfitted to designate what course ought to be pursued, and unable to set a proper estimate upon the obstacles that were to be sur- mounted. Without being aware of the difference between raw militia and British regulars, they urged home upon him in the most pressing terms, the necessity of making an early attempt to drive the British army from Boston. Out of respect to this suggestion, rather than because he supposed it would be practicable to carry it out, he called a council of war on the 18th of October, and laid the matter before the officers of the army. With one voice they pronounced the proposition, in the state of affairs then existing, totally impracticable. The Congress was no less ignorant in regard to the amount of money that would be needed to maintain an army in the field, to say nothing of the necessary outfit and equipments that might in some instances be expected to be supplied by the colonies to the quota of troops that they respectively furnished. Gradually, however, they learned to reason more correctly, and near the close of September they appointed a committee, consisting of three of their own body, to confer with Washington, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, and with the authorities of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and other colonies, to hit upon some well-digested plan of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army.


243


DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.


[1776.]


Under the critical supervision of such men as Washington, Trumbull, and Franklin, who was a member of the congres- sional committee, the aspect of affairs soon changed. Still there was such a want of ammunition, that on the first of January, 1776, Washington wrote, " It is not perhaps in the power of history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy for six months together without [powder,]* and at the same time to disband one army and recruit another within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more than probably was ever attempted."+


The winter set in with severity, but it proved, after a few days of extremely cold weather, to be quite mild, so much so that during this month, Colonel Moylan wrote from the camp at Cambridge, " The bay is open. Everything thaws here except ' Old Put.' He is still as hard as ever, crying out for powder-powder-ye gods, give us powder !"}


The troubles in New York did not end with the destruc- tion of Rivingston's press. The city and neighborhood were not at all congenial to the taste of Captain Sears, who thought it prudent to seek a residence among his friends in Connecticut.§ He had not remained long in his new abode when he began to entertain fears lest General Clinton, who was evidently making preparations to go upon some expedi- tion, might attempt to take possession of New York. He hastened to Cambridge and sought an interview with Wash- ington. He described the exposed situation of the place, the disposition of many of its principal citizens, and entreat- ed that measures might be taken to secure it without delay. Washington felt as keenly as any one could do the impor-


* This word was prudently left out lest the letter might happen to fall into the hands of the enemy.


+ Sparks' Life of Washington. # Frothingham, 295.


§ Captain Sears had now become a resident of New Haven. At the Decem- ber session of the General Assembly of Connecticut, 1775, Colonel David Wa- terbury and Captain Isaac Sears were appointed a committee to inquire after a suitable vessel, to be armed and improved in defense of the colony, and to report as to the cost of purchasing or chartering the same.


244


HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT.


tance of such a step, but was obliged to answer that he had no troops to spare.


Sears then proposed that General Washington should write a letter to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, desir- ing him to raise two regiments for this service .*


About the same time there arrived a letter from General Lee, urging upon General Washington the necessity of this enterprise. "New York," wrote Lee, in his positive manner, " New York must be secured ; but it will never, I am afraid, be secured by direct order of Congress, for obvious reasons. I propose that you should detach me into Connecticut, and lend your name for collecting a body of volunteers. I am assured that I shall find no difficulty in assembling a sufficient number for the purpose wanted. This measure I think abso- lutely necessary to our salvation; and if it meets with your approbation, the sooner it is entered upon the better. Indeed the delay of a single day may be fatal." The advice of John Adams also was to the same effect. It appeared that a large body of tories upon Long Island were intrench- ing themselves for the avowed object of opposing the move- ments of the American army, and that there was a large number of them in the city who only waited to be rein- forced. The Jersey troops had been already ordered to muster there. t


General Washington readily fell in with this measure. As soon as the dispatches were made ready, Captain Sears started with them for Connecticut. Governor Trumbull received him very courteously, and without delay called together the Committee of Safety, and laid the proposition before them. They were all in favor of it, and such was the speed with which the governor hurried forward the expedition, that by the time General Lee had arrived at Stamford, the two regiments, Colonel Waterbury's and Colo- nel Ward's, were ready to march. Lee hastened on to New Haven, and while there wrote another letter to the


* Gordon ii. 14, 15. + Gordon.


245


GENERAL LEE PROCEEDS TO NEW YORK.


[1776.]


commander-in-chief, bearing date the 16th of January. An extract from this letter will serve to show what was the political complexion of New York at that time :


"I shall send immediately an express to Congress inform- ing them of my situation, and at the same time conjuring them not to suffer the accursed Provincial Congress of New York to defeat measures so absolutely necessary to our salva- tion."*


By the 22d of the same month, Lee had collected at Stamford twelve hundred Connecticut troops. Even then the New York Committee of Safety was totally opposed to their being led into the city, and wrote him an urgent letter to that effect.


As Lee was kept at Stamford for awhile by an attack of the gout, and as Colonel Waterbury was already in New York, Lee ordered Captain Sears to conduct Waterbury's regiment to the city without delay. At Kingsbridge Sears was met by a deputation of citizens, who begged him not to advance any further, as the enemy had threatened to burn the city should he enter it with his troops. Sears replied by informing them what orders he had received, and con- tinued his march. As he drew nearer New York, a second company of commissioners met him, and used all the argu- ments that they could command to induce him to keep aloof from the city ; but he kept on as rapidly as he could. When he arrived there he found the citizens in great confusion and alarm.


On the 4th of February, General Lee followed, and reached New York within two hours after General Clinton, in the Mercury, with a single transport brig, arrived at the Hook.


The coming of these two vessels threw the town into such consternation, that, although it was Sunday, the inhabi- tants spent the whole day and the following night in remov- ing their effects to a place of safety. Clinton had touched at the Hook without the least intention of landing at New


* Gordon, ii. 15.


246


HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT.


York. His only object in stopping there at all, was doubt- less to have an interview with Governor Tryon, and see whether anything could be suggested by that worthy that would be likely to strengthen the British interest in New York. Indeed, he had only a handful of grenadiers and light infantry with him ; not enough to make even a respect- able show against the two regiments from Connecticut, who would have given the coats off their backs, inclement as the season was, to have come within musket range of them, or within boarding distance of their ships. To lull the fears of the people, rather than because he apprehended any danger of such an event taking place, General Lee gave the following public notice to whomsoever it might concern : " If the men of war set one house on fire in consequence of my coming, I will chain one hundred of their friends together by the neck and make the house their funeral pile."* Not knowing which of their number would be selected by Gene- ral Lee to swell the roll of martyrdom, and most of them not being stimulated by the desire of becoming historical, the tories were for a long time kept quiet by this manifesto. While Clinton remained at the Hook, several important works were erected for the defense of the city.


Meanwhile the great chief of the American army, labor- ing under every disadvantage, with the fortitude of Fabias and the elevated courage of Hampden, strengthened his position and kept the enemy in Boston, in a state of actual blockade. Without allowing himself to be led into any rash measures, he yet omitted no opportunity to annoy the enemy and cut off their supplies.


It had been observed that there were in Charlestown a number of dwellings used by the British as store-houses. On the 8th of February, Washington ordered Major Knowlton, of Ashford, who had so signally distinguished himself at the Battle of Bunker Hill, to take with him one hundred men from Connecticut, cross over to Charlestown, and destroy those buildings. Knowlton, with one hundred picked men,


* Gordon, ii. 15, 16.


247


A FARCE AND TRAGEDY.


[1776.]


crossed over upon the ice between Cobble Hill and Bunker Hill, stole silently down the street on the westerly side of the hill that must forever be associated with his fame, destroyed the houses and brought off the guns that had been deposited there. The whole enterprise was accomplished in in less than one hour, and the buildings were destroyed in the face of a heavy fire of musketry from the garrison at Bunker Hill, without the loss of a man. Major Knowlton little dreamed what alarm this nocturnal bonfire was to occa- sion in Boston.


Notwithstanding the sickness that prevailed among the British troops, General Howe and his officers resorted to every expedient to while away the sluggish months of winter, and especially to persuade themselves that Washington was mistaken in supposing that he kept them in a state of block- ade. To kill time, and continue this agreeable delusion, they resorted to balls and the attractions of the theatre. On the night of the 8th of February they had witnessed the exhibition of a popular drama called " the Busy Body," and had already shifted the scenes for the introduction of a farce entitled, " The blockade of Boston," said to have been com- posed by General Burgoyne, who added to his accomplish- ments as a soldier and a gentleman, the graceful finish of polite literature. To the infinite delight of the audience, the figure designed to represent General Washington had just appeared upon the boards, adorned with a great wig, armed with a long rusty sword, and attended by way of body guard by a single orderly sergeant with a corroded gun on his shoulder about seven feet in length. Suddenly a new party appeared upon the stage. It was one of the regular British sergeants in uniform. Throwing down his bayonet by way of arresting attention, he called out in a voice that had quite too much of tragedy in its tone to be introduced into a farce, " The Yankees are attacking Bunker Hill !"*


With those who were unacquainted with the piece, this readily passed for a part of the performance. Not so with


* Gordon, ii. 19.


248


HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT.


General Howe. He instantly sprang to his feet and exclaim- ed, "Officers, to your alarm posts." This order, followed by the shrieks and fainting-fits of those fair ladies present, who had still a vivid recollection of the horrors of the 17th of June, dispelled the fascinations even of such a muse as Burgoyne's. Rushing into the streets, they saw the flames of the burning houses, and heard the report of muskets. It was not until morning that harmony was restored to the town. Nor were the British officers unanimous in the opin- ion that Boston was not after all in a state of " blockade."


The incident just related is only one among many that might be named in which the American commander gave General Howe good cause to wish that he had left Boston before winter had set in, as the British admiral had advised him to do. He now found himself in a condition far from comfortable. He could hardly get vegetables and fresh pro- visions enough for the table of the officers, in spite of all the efforts made by the British ministry to forward them from England. Many of the ships laden with those articles, as well as with live stock, porter, and other necessaries and luxuries, never reached their destination. Some were taken by the Americans and others were blown off from the New England coast by the violence of the north-west winds. Of forty transports only eight had arrived. As a natural consequence the common soldiers suffered for want of food, and fell sick and died in great numbers .*


The radical defects in General Howe's management of the army, grew out of the false estimate that he put upon the character of his adversaries. Like many other men of true merit, he was unable to distinguish between the appearances and the realities that surrounded him. He could not be persuaded that men could fight well and keep the field through the tedious months of a New England winter, unless they were dressed in handsome uniform and provided with all the munitions of war. He could call men who fought in home-spun coats and checked shirts nothing but peasants,


* Gordon.


249


PROPOSED ATTACK ON BOSTON.


[1776.]


and he had been bred up to believe that a company of British marines could drive a regiment of peasants from one end of the continent to the other.


Actuated by this belief, at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of February, he sent about five hundred men under command of Colonel Leslie, with orders to cross on the ice to Dorchester neck and burn some houses that were stand- ing there, in the expectation that the American officers would be thrown into a state of confusion at sight of the flames, and that large reinforcements would be sent over from Roxbury to give a check to this nocturnal movement. So confident was he that such would be the result, that he spent the whole night in getting a large body of troops in readiness to make a sudden attack upon the American lines, as soon as they should be thus partially deserted. But at day-break he saw the men as usual at their alarm posts, and did not think it prudent to make the attempt.




Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.