USA > Georgia > A history of Georgia : from its first discovery by Europeans to the adoption of the present constitution in MDCCXCVIII. Vol. I > Part 14
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AVIEW of the TOWN and CASTLE of STAUGUSTINE, and the ENGLISH CAMP before it June 20, 1740, by THOS SILVER.
The Town
The Castle
1
2
Col.Vander Dusen's
-
-
1ª Camp
B
١٠
-
=
----
-
-
North Channel
28
--
----
opanimas NOU Urs
and 4 Fortifyed Barks and a Shallow River hind'ring our Shippings Playing on then
slain but died like Heroes killing thrice their number. The 29th bad weather obliged the men of War to put to sea out of wch but one man had been killed. Hereupon the Siege was raised ..
Matanza River
SÅ Marks River
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---
174
BOMBARDMENT OF ST. AUGUSTINE.
Carolina regiment on a neck of land between the North Channel and St. Mark's river, called Point Quartel, commanding the castle on the north-east, while the rest of his troops passed over to Anastasia island, and joined the seamen, under Captains Warren, Laws, and Townshend, who were detached from the squadron, which lay at anchor just outside the bar. The landing of the soldiers and sailors on the island was not effected without opposition, for the Spaniards had erected a sand battery opposite the north breakers, which com- manded the landing-places for some distance on both sides; but this was soon taken, and the enemy retreated to the half gallies, which, after taking them on board, anchored a little to the south of the town, in Matanzas river. The cannon and mortars being already placed in battery, the English opened upon the town on the 24th of June, from a mortar of grenades, some of which fell and exploded within the enemy's fort, but from which, says Montiano, " glory be to God, we received no corporeal damage."
The cannonading and bombardment was continued at intervals, with occasional feints of open attack, to test their prowess or draw out sorties, until the 1st of July, when Oglethorpe sent in a flag demanding its surrender. Montiano refused; and a severe fire was poured upon the city, which the Spaniards returned with much briskness from the castle and half gallies, drawn up in Matanzas river. But though little execu- tion was done by the artillery, and no breach that would admit a storming party was made in the walls or castle, yet the distress of the besieged for food was very great, and nearly forced them to capitulate. "My greatest anxiety," writes the Spanish Governor, " is for provisions ; and if they do not come, there is no doubt
AVIEW of the TOWN and CASTLE of STAUGUSTINE, and the ENGLISH CAMP before it June 20. 1740, by THOS SILVER.
The Town
Matanza River
The Castle
S Marks River
Col.Vander Duser's
1# Camp
B
North Channel
D
28
XXX
K
G
Fishermen
H
South
26
Pelicans
20
South Channel
15
North Breakers
Breakers
6
7
4
3
A The English South Trench w. 3 18 & 2 small Mortars B A Marsh from whence we played with 20 Cohorns ( Eustatia Island, which is chiefly Sand & Bushes
D Sailors hawling Cannon in reach of the Castle
E A North Trench 3 18 & a Mortar of 24 1 10 wt
F Gen! Oglethorp's Soldiers Indians & Sailors Tents
G A Lookout taken the 12thof June
H Soldiers and Sailors landing June the II!"
I A Sand Battery quited at our approach
K Cap! Warren Commander over the Sailors hoisting the Union Flag on board a Schooner
L The Sailors wells to Water the Shipping Ships
1 Flamborough, 2 Hector, 3 Squirrel,
4 Tartar, 5 Phenix,
Stoops 6 Wolf, 7 Spence Employ'd in this Expedition about 200 Seamen
400 Soldiers and 300 Indians
Forces of the Spaniards 1000 besides a strong Castle and 4 Fortifyed Barks and a Shallow River hindring our Shippings Playing on them
An
Account of the Siege of St Augustine in a Letter from on Board y Hector. May 30 we arrived near S! Augustine, June 15 were joined by the Flamborough, Cap! Pearse, the Phænix, Cap" Fanshaw, the Tartar. Cap! Townshend, and the Squirrel Cap! Warren of 20 Guns each, be- sides the Spence Sloop Cap! Laws, and the Wolf Cap! Dandrige.
On the 2ª Col. Vander Dusen with 300 Carolina Soldiers appear'd to the North of the Town . On the 9" Gen! Oglethorpe came by Sea with 300 Soldiers nnd 300 Indians from Georgia. On the 10th they were carried a Shore in the Men of Wars boats under the cover of the small Ships Guns. They Landed on the Island Enstatia with - out Opposition and took the Lookout at G.
The 13th Cap! Warren in a Schooner and other Armed Sloops and Pettyaugers anchored in their Harbour just out of Cannon shot till the 26" when the Sailors were employed in landing Ordnance and other Stores within Reach of the Enemys Cannon, On which Occasion they discover'd a surprising Spirit and Intrepidity. The same night two Batteries were rnis'd, but too far off.
The 27hh the General summon'd the Governour to Surrender, who sent word he should be glad to shake hands with him in his Castle. This haughty answer was occasion'd by a dear bought Victory, which 500 Spaniards had obtain'd over 60 Highlanders 50 of whom were slain but died like Heroes killing thrice their number.
The 29th bad weather obliged the men of War to put to sea out of woch but one man had been killed. Hereupon the Siege was raised.
1
R
Bar 9 Foot
1
F
.
175
GARRISON RELIEVED.
of our dying by the hands of hunger." Yet they bravely maintained their posts, and heroically sustained the siege. The bombardment was kept up twenty days; but owing to the distance at which the batteries were placed, the small calibre of their guns and mor- tars, and the want of proper platforms and carriages on which to mount them, the fire was mostly ineffectual, as were also the discharges of the Spanish artillery.
The determined bravery of Montiano was now re- warded; for in less than twenty-four hours from the time when he wrote so despondingly about their necessities, three bilunders laden with provisions, sent by the Governor of Cuba, entered the Musquito bar, and gave indescribable joy to both governor and people. This supply changed the entire aspect of affairs. All hopes of reducing the place by starva- tion were at an end. To break the walls, and pour storming parties into the city and castle, was imprac- ticable with their light park of artillery ;- to remain where they were, exposed to the intense heat of the summer sun, was a reckless hazard; and to attempt to take the town in any way, by storm or siege, with- out a fleet to blockade the harbour, was an utter im- possibility ; yet the naval council of war informed the general that they could not remain on the coast longer than the 5th of July, when they must retire into har- bour at the approach of the hurricane season. They were, indeed, induced to remain a few days longer, but with an ill-concealed reluctance. The Indians, also, became exceedingly uneasy at the slow advances of the siege, a mode of warfare unsuited to their nomadic habits, and it was only by offering high premiums that Oglethorpe induced them to remain a little longer. In addition to these untoward events, the Carolina and other
176
SIEGE RAISED.
troops were becoming quite sickly, over fifty a day being sometimes reported on the surgeon's roll, their effective force being further weakened by the frequent desertions of non-commissioned officers and privates. Finding it impossible, therefore, to continue the siege with soldiers whose term of enlistment was mostly expired, with Indians sulkily retained by bribes, with cannon unequal to the task required, amidst the pros- trating heats of an almost tropical sun, and without a blockading fleet, Oglethorpe ordered the siege to be raised on the 20th of July. Such of the train, ammu- nition and provisions as were serviceable, were em- barked on board the men-of-war for Charleston; and breaking up his camp at Anastasia, he crossed over with his troops to the main land, and with drums beating and colours flying, marched in the day-time, within gun-shot of the castle, to his encampment, three miles distant. The next day he marched nine miles, and the day following reached the St. John's, having driven back a party of five hundred men who made a sortie upon his rear-guard.
He reached Frederica the last of July, from which point the different corps returned to their several homes. The formal siege lasted thirty-eight days, from the 13th of June to 20th of July, during which the English lost less than fifty killed, including those in Fort Moosa, and about as many wounded, while the Spaniards, by their own account, lost four forts, with their ordnance, munitions and garrisons, and more than four hundred killed and taken prisoners. Though Oglethorpe failed to capture St. Augustine, the siege was yet very serviceable to the colony by deterring the Spaniards from their meditated invasion of Georgia, and restraining the negroes within the English borders.
177
CAUSES OF FAILURE.
It is due to the general to say, that had his original plans been carried out, St. Augustine would in all human probability have fallen into his hands; but a series of events occurred, over which he could have no control, which frustrated one by one his well-laid schemes, until he was compelled to raise the siege and march back to Frederica. His first misfortune was in the tardy arrival of his troops. He purposed to attack the city in March, when he knew that its defences were imperfect and its supplies small ; but the delay incident to raising, equipping and marching the Carolina regiment and the Georgia rangers, lost him nearly two months of most prec- ious time, in an operation to be conducted in a climate the damps and heats of which presented such formidable obstacles. Having at last got the army in motion, his next misfortune was the failure of Colonel Vander Deusen to make the appointed junction, where he again lost several invaluable days of service. This was followed by the surprise and capture of Fort Moosa, in consequence of disobedience to his positive orders. But even this error and mis- fortune might have been retrieved had he possessed the thirty-six cannon promised by Carolina; instead of which, he had but twelve, with a few mortars and cohorns, all of which were illy mounted, badly served, and too light for breaching service. Nor would even these deficiencies have materially hindered the reduc- tion of the city, straitened as it then was for provis- ions, had the blockade been vigilantly sustained, or had there been sufficient tenders of proper draught to have sailed inside the bar and met and driven. away the half-gallies of the Spaniards ; but the Ma- tanzas inlet was not properly guarded, and the vessels.
12
178
CAUSES OF FAILURE.
of the English drew too much water to go in and cope with the well-protected gallies of the enemy. Besides these serious misfortunes, his Indian allies were discon- tented, the Carolina troops were refractory, the climate was unhealthy, the artillery was inefficient, the gar- rison had been succoured by adequate supplies, and there was no hope of reducing the place unless he had a sufficient battering force to break down the walls, or ability to invest their town until hunger forced them to capitulation. The former could not be obtained, the latter would consume the months of an ardent summer. What then could Oglethorpe have done ? To have made a desperate assault without the support of artillery, would have been a wasteful expenditure of life. To have continued the siege without the block- ading squadron, would have inevitably ensured his capture ; and for the whole naval and military force to have remained, could only end in a warfare not so much with the Spaniards as with miasma, sickness, and death.
The plans of Oglethorpe were eminently military and judicious ; his valour was unimpeached ; his zeal untiring, and his energy unexhausted. It was not, therefore, the fault of his skill or of his courage, that the expedition failed. The causes of this disaster were such as no commanding general could control, and for the results of which no one could be made responsible.
It has been asserted by some historians, that the raising of the siege was owing to the defection of Colonel Vander Deusen and the Carolina regiment. On the contrary, he remained with Oglethorpe till the last, and General Oglethorpe acknowledged his anxiety to fight for his country, by saying that Colonel Vander
.
179
CAROLINA REGIMENT.
Deusen had made several handsome offers of service, which necessity had compelled him to decline. Some of the South Carolina troops did, indeed, desert, but not more in proportion to their numbers than fell off from other corps.
Colonel Vander Deusen remained in Florida until Oglethorpe left it, and did not, with his regiment, reach Charleston until the 13th of August, having lost only fourteen men by sickness and desertion. It is true that the people of South Carolina cast many unjust reflections upon Oglethorpe, and endeavoured to elevate the military character of Colonel Vander Deusen by building it up on the ruins of his com- mander-in-chief. The controversies were bitter, but worthless. Let us not exhume such a theme, long buried in the ivy-covered tomb of the past, but rather conceding to Colonel Vander Deusen the full share of honour which the Assembly of Carolina voted to him, award to Oglethorpe also the renown he so richly merits for his skill, valour, and untiring devotion to the protection and preservation of his beloved Georgia.33
33 Hewitt, vol. ii. 75-81; British Dominions in North America, part 2d, 162-166 ; Harris's Memorials of Ogle- thorpe, 223-240 ; and other writers, have given accounts of this siege, but
the above is drawn from the official MS. papers of Oglethorpe and Mon- tiano. This may account for any dis- crepancy between this and any previ- ously published statement.
CHAPTER V.
SPANISH INVASION OF GEORGIA.
THOUGH compelled to abandon the long-cherished plan of capturing St. Augustine, Oglethorpe did not resign himself to inaction and repose.
His position, however, was one of great trial-one which demanded peculiar virtues, such as are not often associated with high military daring or impetuous courage. His lot was to bear in patience, yet with firmness, the taunts of Spanish foes, the calumny of his Carolina enemies, the censure of those who could not comprehend his retreat ; and yet, amidst it all, to sustain with a small force the posts he had established along our frontiers, protect Georgia from invasion, and rescue it from impending ruin at a time when even the smallest military knowledge conceded its almost defenceless state. The preservation of Georgia depended at this juncture upon the firmness, courage, and self-control of Oglethorpe. If he failed in any of these, all was lost. Fortunately he had the qualities required, and Georgia was saved from destruction.
Unrelaxing in his vigilance, he still kept up parties of Indians hovering about the frontiers of Florida, who occasionally brought in a Spanish prisoner ; he fitted
181
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES.
out small vessels as cruisers to protect the islands and observe the operations of the enemy, and fortified all his outposts, strengthening and defending every assail- able point, himself superintending the operations with unremitting zeal and distinguished ability. The prin- cipal seat of war in this Spanish contest was now removed from Florida to Cuba, and the forces of England under Vernon and Wentworth were aiming at the reduction of Havana. But the sudden lustre which gilded the arms of the Admiral at Porto Bello, was dimmed by that lack of energy and tameness which he subsequently exhibited; and the hopes which clustered around the land forces as they em- barked from England, or were enlisted and mustered into service in America, were dissipated by the death of the brave Earl of Cathcart, and the consequent de- volving of the command on General Wentworth, a man whose incapacity brought disaster and disgrace on the British arms. Cuba being thus menaced, all its resources were required for its own defence ; and Florida was left to the energy and care of its brave and gallant governor. Occasional but inefficent de- scents were made upon the coasts of Georgia ; alarms were often sent abroad among the settlers, and once (21st of August, 1741) Oglethorpe, with a number of officers, pursued some privateers even within sight of the castle of St. Augustine, and cruised off its bar and the Matanzas inlet, where they were very nearly wrecked by a hurricane.1 Thus wore away nearly two years, usefully occupied in preparing for the threat- ened invasion of Georgia by the Spaniards, which was only delayed by the expected attack upon Cuba of the land and marine forces of Admiral Vernon and Gen-
1 MS. Doc. from State Paper Office, ii. 7.
182
ARMAMENT LEAVES HAVANA.
eral Wentworth. This restraint removed by the recall of the fleet and the disbanding of the troops, the Governors of Cuba and Florida directed their efforts to their long-meditated plan for the reduction of Georgia.
Aware of the coolness which the government of Carolina manifested towards Oglethorpe since the un- fortunate failure of the siege of St. Augustine, owing to the mutual criminations of the Carolina and Georgia troops, the Spaniards hoped that that province would not come to his help, so that he would be thrown upon the resources which he could call around him in Geor- gia.
In May, the armament destined for the conquest of Georgia,2 consisting of fifty-six vessels and about seven thousand men, left Havana for St. Augustine. One of their large vessels, with one hundred and fifty men, was lost in passing the Moro Castle; and soon after the fleet was dispersed by a storm. On their passage His Majesty's ship Flambo, Captain Hamar, engaged and drove ashore some of them, losing, how- ever, a boat and seventeen men in the attack.3 Of the arrival of this force in St. Augustine, Oglethorpe was informed by his Indian spies, deserters, and the letters of Captain Hamar ; and he addressed himself at once to the task of preparing for their attack. " It is too late now," says the General,4 " to desire your Grace to represent this to His Majesty, and ask succours ; be- fore they can arrive the matter will be over. I hope I shall behave as well as one with so few men and so little artillery can." Messengers were despatched to Charleston, but no help was sent, owing to the dissen-
2 Gentlemen's Magazine, 1742, 695.
4 1b 25.
3 State Paper Office, ii. 28.
183
HEROIC SPIRIT OF OGLETHORPE.
sions of the Carolinians among themselves, and their wrongful distrust of the commander-in-chief;5 and he was left to bear alone the formidable invasion which threatened the destruction of the colony.
But his heroic spirit rose with the danger; and his noble language was, " We are resolved not to suffer defeat ; we will rather die like Leonidas and his Spar- tans, if we can but protect Georgia, and Carolina, and the rest of the Americans, from desolation." Well might he add, " and the rest of the Americans from desolation ;" because it entered into the design of the Spaniards not only to capture the forts of Georgia, but to invade and lay waste the coasts of both the Caroli- nas, and carry the terror of their ravages as far as their ample means would allow.
On the 21st of June, 1742, nine sail had attempted to come into Amelia sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river, but were repulsed by the cannon of Fort William on Cumberland island, aided by an armed schooner of fourteen guns and eighty men. They reappeared the next day off St. Simons sound; and General Oglethorpe, who, at the first intelligence, had gone from Frederica to Fort St. Simons, seven miles distant, ordered a party of horsemen to range the coast northward for six miles all night, to give notice should they attempt to land men or arms ; and he also ordered down two companies to reinforce the fort. Having made this demonstration, the Spaniards suddenly tacked about, and stood in for Cumberland sound; whereupon the general, with his cutter, five large boats, with a few four-pounder and swivel guns, manned by eighty soldiers and some Indians, started on the 24th to inter- cept them. He soon began a conflict with some of the
5 Ib. 28.
184
SPANIARDS REACH ST. SIMONS.
enemy, and maintained it so stoutly and desperately, that, feeble as he was, he drove them off and suc- coured Captain Dunbar, the commandant at Fort Will- iam.
The next day he returned in the guard schooner to St. Simons, and called in the Highland company from Darien, Captain Carr's company of marines, and the Georgia rangers from the several posts to which they had been detached, and sent fresh messages to Charles- ton to tell, not of anticipated attacks, but of actual invasion by an overwhelming force. On the 28th the Spanish fleet, largely reinforced, again appeared off St. Simons bar; and having taken the bearings and soundings, lay off and on, waiting for a fair wind, to run up to Frederica. All was now activity on St. Simons. The general raised another troop of rangers, armed the planters, extended his fortifications, dis- mantled many of the small vessels, and from them rigged out a merchant ship called the Success, with an armament of twenty-two guns, which he placed under the command of Captain Thompson. On the 4th of July the attacking vessels had ranged them- selves in the channel at the entrance of St. Simons sound, into which the river leading to Frederica emp- ties. The general then went on board the Success, and in the expectation of an attack next day, ad- dressed the seamen, calling upon them "to stand by their liberties and country ; for himself, he was pre- pared for all danger-the enemy were more numerous, but he relied for victory on the valour of his troops and the aid of the Almighty."6
The following day, favoured by a strong easterly wind and a flood tide, the squadron of thirty-six ves-
6 Smith's Journal, in Geo. Hist. Col., i. 276.
185
FORT ST. SIMONS ABANDONED.
sels, comprising one of twenty-four guns, two ships of twenty guns, two large scows of fourteen guns, four schooners, four sloops, and the rest half-gallies, en- tered St. Simons harbour.
Here Oglethorpe had stationed Captain Thompson's ship, two guard schooners, and some small trading vessels, reinforced by Captain Carr's corps of marines, to dispute the passage; while the fort of St. Simons, with its eighteen-pounders and the lower or water battery of four-pounders, in charge of Lieutenant Wall and Ensign Oterbridge, also defended the pas- sage. General Oglethorpe commanded all in person, now delivering his orders on board ship, and now from the fort ; for, left without an engineer officer by the departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Cook and Lieutenant Eyre, he was compelled himself to plan his redoubts, put in battery his cannon, and arrange his forces. For four hours the vessels and two small batteries of the English maintained the unequal contest ; but the fleet was too numerous, and they passed up the river with a leading breeze, sinking one guard schooner, and dis- abling several of the trading craft. A council of war was now held, in which it was resolved, in order to prevent being cut off in their retreat to Frederica, as they might be should the land forces immediately disembark, to destroy the munitions of war at Fort St. Simons, spike the guns, burst the cohorns, and withdraw the troops to Frederica. The Success and guard schooner, which, in spite of the enemy, got out of the river, Oglethorpe directed to sail to Charles- ton to arouse the people and obtain succours. In this engagement the Spaniards lost seventeen killed and ten wounded ; the English, not a man. All night the general was active, removing the troops, and only
186
SPANISH CAMP AT FORT ST. SIMONS.
reached the camp at Frederica just before the break of day. The Spanish vessels proceeded up the river, and anchoring below Gascoigne's bluff about four miles by water from Frederica, landed about five thou- sand men. Marching down to Fort St. Simons, they took possession of the unmanned and dismantled fort, the size and strength of which they multiplied ten- fold in their despatches.7 Higher up than this the vessels could not proceed without great difficulty and extreme exposure to the batteries at Frederica. The land troops were therefore debarked upon the bluff, while a demonstration was made with some of the vessels to draw the attention of the garrison to the water attack. Anticipating that they would land at Gas- coigne's, Oglethorpe ordered about ninety Indians to hover around and among them by their peculiar war- fare. This party brought in five prisoners to Ogle- thorpe the next day, and these acquainted him that the invading force was made up of two armies, the Cuba troops, commanded by De Rodendo, and the Florida force by the Governor of St. Augustine.
They made their camp at the fort which he had abandoned, and hoisting the bloody flag on the com- modore's ship, erected a battery and planted in it twenty eighteen-pounders. Among the troops landed were a regiment of artillery, a regiment of dismounted dragoons, a regiment of negroes, officered by negroes, in the style and pay of grenadiers, and a regiment of mulat- toes, besides the Havana battalion, the Havana militia, and the St. Augustine forces. On the seventh a part of this force was put in motion, and reached within a mile of Frederica, when they were discovered by the rangers, and the alarm given. Oglethorpe immedi-
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