USA > Indiana > History of the Catholic church in Indiana, Volume I > Part 11
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" We come now to the period in which the feudal system pre- vails and still further modifies the tenure of lands. This system came from the peoples that invaded the Roman empire, and was founded on conquest. The conquerer allotted the land to whom he pleased, and the holder held his possession or feud from his sovereign, the donor. Blackstone, on the Rights of Things, book II, chap. I, pp.45-46 (Sharswood's edition, 1875), says on this subject, allot- ments of this nature, 'all sprang from the same right to conquest.' Prof. Stubbs, referring to the Germans (vol. I, p. 35), remarks: ' The military princeps has but to conquer and colonize a new territory, and reward his followers, on a plan that will keep them faithful, as well as free, and feudalism springs into existence.'
"From what has been said it is evident, first, that the pos- session of land in common, where it existed, was found to be impracticable on a large scale and in need of modification, and it finally gave way to individual ownership; and, secondly, that the feudal, in which all hold from the sovereign, is an artificial condition of tenure. Possession in common, therefore, being impracticable, and the possession by the sovereign of all land being a forced and not natural condition, it would follow, it seems, that neither pos- session in common nor the feudal system is according to nature, that is, according to what reason demands, although not contrary to reason.
"What will our reason teach on this subject? What will the study of the essence of things make us understand?
" Let us consult the masters to whom the world looks for guidance, and hear what they have to say." * *
Here the bishop quotes at length from Sir William Blackstone, (118)
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St. Thomas, Taletus and Cardinal Cajetan, establishing beyond dispute the correctness of the principle of individual ownership of property, and then continues:
"While nearly all who call themselves Catholics will be found holding strongly to this doctrine of individual ownership of land, there are some who unwittingly play into the hands of the ene- mies of the truth, owing to the confused idea they have concern- ing the rights of the state over the property of individuals. They confound what is known as the right of eminent domain with a right of possession to the land itself, attributing, at least in the abstract, such dominion to the state. This is a fatal error; for there cannot be two possessors. The concession that the state is a possessor even in the abstract gives up the whole case to the communist and socialist; for the principle carried out legitimately would make the individual only a tenant at will. It is for this. reason very important that we should have a precise idea of what eminent domain is.
" It is not, in the first place, a dominion properly so called, which implies ownership. The term ' dominium altum' was used by Suarez and others to signify a certain power, but not to exclude the ownership of the individual. The theory, which originated in feudalism, that all land in England was held of the crown, origi- nated in the right of conquest. But this conquest is an accidental thing, and any right which flows from it must have the same acci- dental nature, for it can not rise higher than its source. This theory, therefore, does not pertain to the essential ideas of natural right, to which alone we are to go for principles by which our judg- ment is to be formed. The same thing is to be said about various ways, of tenure of land in different countries. It is said, with how much truth I confess I am not able to say, that the land in Ireland was not held in private ownership in early times, about the fifth century, but in common by the people. It would seem to have been a system such as Professor Stubbs speaks of as obtain- ing in Germany among the Saxons. It may have been patriarchal, a system possible where the people are not numerous, and are very closely allied with each other by blood or interests. But just as in the case of the Saxons it was found impracticable to hold land
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in common, just so patriarchal systems are doomed to disappear and be succeeded by a tenure more in accord with the exigencies of society and with the dictates of human reason; for, as we have seen, supposing no prior owner, and placing men face to face with the question what they are to with the land upon which they are to dwell, the solution will be that individuals are to own the land, and the community is to protect the rights of each one.
" One or two preliminary remarks will help us to understand better what eminent domain is, regarding which we shall consult authorities, as I have just done. Government exists for the ben- efit of the people subject to it, and authority is a trust to be used for the good of those under it. All authority comes from God, and it is to be obeyed for conscience sake; who resists the author- ity of the state resists the ordinance of God. But the state must proceed by law, which is an ordination of reason emanating from the person or persons having the care of the community, and made for the common good. Reason is the life of law. The state, therefore, has to act for the public good according to reason. Its rights, therefore, are not unlimited; reason limits them in the first place, and the public good in the second place; though the rea- sonableness and the utility of a law are, in themselves, insepar- able. The state, therefore, can not arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfere with the rights of individuals. But there come circum- stances in which reason itself dictates that the state must interfere and put in abeyance the rights of individuals, for protection or general welfare; occasionally, in cases of necessity, even destroy property, as in times of war. In the present instance I am not called upon to examine the various phases of this supreme power inherent naturally in every state. I here call attention to it in regard to the property, the landed possessions of a country, and ask the question, what is meant by eminent domain, the name by which this power is known?"
Regarding the nature of eminent domain, as quite distinct from private or individual ownership, he quotes Henry E. Mills, Judge Cooley, Chancellor Kent, and such theologians as Suarez and J. Costa-Rosetti, S. J., and then continues and concludes: " Eminent domain differs from ownership:
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" First, in itself. Ownership gives dominion, eminent domain does not; for it is only a right of control, through a sovereign right, inherent in supreme power. And this right of eminent domain does not differ in any essential point from the general control which the state exercises over all the rights of its citizens. Salus populi suprema lex, the safety of the republic is the supreme law, is the axiom which is a key to understanding the true nature of this higher right or eminent domain. How that right is to be exercised is determined by the special nature of the right or rights the control of which has become necessary.
"Second, in its conception. The idea of private ownership is first in mind; then arises the idea of the control of it. Ownership in common, we may grant, was the original mode of ownership. But it was only one mode of ownership, just as private ownership is another mode. When, by the act of the community, ownership in common ceased, the community no longer retained any owner- ship in what the private individual had begun to own. There remained only the sovereign right of control inherent in the supreme power. This idea of sovereign control, in the logical order, arises in the mind following on the idea of private ownership; as we must first conceive the idea of what is to be controlled before we can have the idea of controlling it.
" Third, in its scope. Ownersnip is for the benefit and support of the family. Eminent domain exists, not for the support of the state, but for its protection, and consequent protection of the rights of all. The state may purchase and hold property for its benefit and support, as, for example, a tract of wooded land. But, then, this is the same ownership as that enjoyed by the individual, and is regulated by the same laws.
"Fourth, in its powers and in the exercise of them. Ownership allows the owner to dispose of his property when and how he pleases. Eminent domain seizes property only in certain cases determined by the public need. The need also directs how that property shall be disposed of. Compensation, too, must be made. Even when eminent domain is spoken of as 'a right of transcend- ent propriety,' as we have seen Puffendorf style it, the writer requires compensation, which implies ownership by the individual.
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The law requires compensation to be offered before seizure, which shows respect for the owner's right.
"Eminent domain, therefore, is essentially distinct from the- right of ownership, which it excludes from its very conception, compensating, as it does, the owner for his property, which can be seized on for public uses for public good. It is easy to under- stand, then, how wide of the mark they are who confound it with dominion proper. It would be bad enough to err in stating the contrary, were such an error only speculative or theoretical. But in the present tendency of many to apply this erroneous judgment in a practical manner, so a's to take away property from the- owner and tax it to its full value as rent to the state, it becomes a most dangerous error, and should be guarded against most care- fully, for it is the basis of the socialistic and communistic systems, which, as a learned writer, already quoted, says, 'agree in this, that they war against property.' (N. Signoriello, Eth. Specialis, p. 58.) Socialism has been too often condemned by the supreme authority of the church to need that we enter any further into the treatment of it. It will suffice to refer here to the encyclical let- ters of Pius IX, 'Qui Pluribus,' of November 9, 1846, 'Nescitis et Nobiscum,' of December 18, 1849, and ' Quibus Luctuosis- simis,' of September 5, 1851. Finally, the encyclical letter of the present sovereign pontiff, Leo XIII, 'Quod Apostolici Muneris,' of December 8, 1878, speaks thus in condemnation of this and like systems: 'Allured by cupidity of the goods of this life, which is the root of all evil, in seeking which some have .erred from faith (I Tim. vi, 10), they attack the right of owning property, which right the natural law sanctions, and by an enormous crime, while they seem to consult the needs and desires of all men, strive to seize and hold in common whatever has been acquired by title of legitimate inheritance, by mental or manual labor, or by frugal- ity of life.' So speaks the leader of God's hosts; the trumpet gives no uncertain sound; we know our banner, and upon it we read, ' Be just to all; respect every man's rights.'"
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"THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL OF MAN."
This was the subject of one of the series of lectures, already referred to as having been delivered in St. John's pro-cathredal at Indianapolis, by Bishop Chatard. As showing his method of pre- senting the subject, his arguments in part, and also his excellent style, the following selection is given:
The cardinal principle of the materialist is that there is nothing but matter. Under the head of materialists are to be classed the positivists, evolutionists who ·evolve everything out of matter, and those who profess a belief in the indefinite progress, in a material sense of nature. For all these theories are based on the development of matter. To these are to be added a horde of scientific men, who, without any special preconceived ideas, from their observation of the laws of mat- ter in the more perfect animal organisms, of involuntary muscular action, or reflex action in man and in the animals, of the movement of matter-of a limb, even after severance from the parent trunk- have leaped to the conclusion that thought is but a secretion of the brain, and that there is no such thing as a soul. It is use- less to deny the gravity of this error, its great danger, its most destructive conse- quences. For this reason I have taken it as the subject of my second lecture, pro- posing to show the impossibility of matter thinking, and the absolute necessity, and therefore the existence of a spiritual essence in man, thinking and ruling his acts, which is his soul, the principle of his actions, and the responsible agent of them.
By matter is understood by all that which is composed of elements, of parts, and can be divided; which has extension and occupies space. It is, moreover, inert; that is, it does not move itself; and when it does move, it moves in conse- quence of a motor or moving power, and then it moves necessarily in the direction of the force or power that acts upon it. I invite your attention particularly to these qualities of matter, its extension, form, and shape, its inability to move itself, and its necessary movement in the direction of the force that acts upon it; for I shall make special use of these facts in a moment.
If we turn our eyes upon ourselves, as it were inwardly, and consider what we are conscious of as going on within us, we have at once an idea of our identity; that is, we are conscious we are the same person we were always. Changes have gone on around us; this body of ours even has changed; but there is a something in us that has not changed; it is that which did years ago what we are sorry for now, or what we are glad we did. Again, that something which is in us rules our actions. It resolves, it acts with deliberation and promptness, it makes every part of the body act, all parts together for one pur- pose-for example, for self-preservation-with incredible rapidity. It is like the engineer who is driving his engine, or a man who is managing a pair of spirited horses; his action makes all go together and work without interfering the one with the other. We are conscious there is a something in us which acts in this way, and feel there is no discussion or agreement between several principles of being in us to produce so harmonious a result. The very quickness with which we get out of danger precludes discussion, deliberation, agreement. To deliberate would
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mean destruction. There is, therefore, no multitude of counselors, but one direct- ing power. Now, this can be only on the supposition that this something is simple, not composed of parts; the very complex nature of man's body exacts this. To consist of parts would imply the necessity of these different parts consulting, advis- ing, agreeing, or refusing to agree, if they were capable of doing this. Therefore, is it that this principle in us which is one, identically one; which is one in its direc- tion of the forces of body; one in all its operations, whether of mind or of body-of thought, that is, or of physical action-must be one by nature, not compound, not consisting of parts added to parts, and therefore simple in its essence or being- simple, and not compound, not a composite. For the acts of any being are in accordance with its nature; while its nature can be judged of from its acts. Besides we are conscious that we move ourselves. We say now and then that we are moved to do something; but we mean that considerations of various kinds have influenced our thoughts so as to make us resolve to do it. All the time we are con- scious that we move ourselves; that we needn't unless we wish; that we can do just the opposite if we desire. Reason tells us this is a quality that matter has not; and this being the case, what has that quality isn't matter, isn't this inert mass that can't move unless something moves it. Just contrast the work of this principle of action in us with that remarkable phenomenon called " reflex action." In our- selves we may see both. A blow to a nerve will cause immediate and spasmodic action of a limb which apparently has no connection with the nerve. But this is the result of mechanical action, irritating a nerve and thus stimulating the nervous system, and is determined to one thing or act, and we are conscious that this act goes on independently of us; that is, I am conscious this movement in me takes place without any control or direction of the thinking principle in me; whereas when I am self-possessed and direct my actions, such actions are mine, not those of my nerves, or of my body. Is not this the way all men talk, and is it not the judg- ment of our tribunal-reason? Therefore we are always, in a natural, easy way, distinguishing between the action of matter and the action of one, simple, self- ruling, self-directing principle in us; and this could not be, unless we were inti- mately persuaded that we had something in us not of matter, but of an order above matter and better than it, differing from it essentially in its nature.
One-the greatest-faculty of this principle in us, which we call the soul, is thought. This is its life, in fact. This belongs as essentially to the soul as breath does to the body. Now, with reference to thought, we are conscious that there is a unity in thought which does not admit a division. We recognize suc- cessive steps or stages in thought; but each thought is one in itself. It may be more or less distinct, yet it is always one. Men speak of half a mind; but this is a metaphorical expression signifying that they are not fully resolved. To speak of thought as having form, shape, color, would cause people to look at you with undisguised astonishment, possibly with disagreeable surmises. To us all thought is as fully present, as indivisible, as is the simplicity of the soul itself; and it can- not be otherwise; for, as I have said, thought is the life of the soul, and if the one excludes division the other must, too. Thought, therefore, cannot be conceived of as having extension, form, shape, color. What results from this? That the soul is simple, not composed of matter; for if it were, the thoughts would be accord- ing to its nature and consist of parts, and consequently there would be nothing strange in speaking of a half, or of a quarter of a thought.
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Again, thought cannot result from motion of particles of matter. The reason of it is this: matter is inert and moves only in consequence of force applied to it; moreover, as I have already said, it moves necessarily in the direction of the ' force acting on it. Here, then, is an additional reason which convinces us of the simplicity of the soul, for we are conscious of the freedom of our thoughts. We can interrupt them at will; we can, by the interior force of our volition, pursue an entirely different train of thought. We can check our mind so as to not let it reach a conclusion; or, having reached a conclusion, not permit our will to carry out the result. This freedom of thought is absolutely in contradiction to that necessary or compulsory movement such as belongs to matter. Besides, the necessity also of moving in the direction of the force impelling takes away all responsibility; for free- will is destoyed. Man is no longer a free agent; he becomes material wholly, and acts are organic changes in matter for which he is not answerable. These acts are not his; for the movement which produces such changes is from outside and the changes are absolutely determined in extent and direction by the outside force. Here the materialist finds himself at once in conflict with the firm persuasion and belief of human reason from the beginning; for men have always recognized the responsibility of man with regard to his actions, and have made laws on that account. The very existence of all law presupposes, as a necessary condition, the freedom of man's will, his power to rule himself, the full possession of his facul- ties of action-his personality, in fine. Reason, therefore, is with us in asserting unmistakably the existence of the soul of man as a simple substance, with a life of thought and reason and of freedom of action which constitute it a spiritual being-a spirit.
"'EARLY CHRISTIANITY. "
The most matter-of-fact of Bishop Chatard's lectures is the one entitled as above. It deals with facts touching the practices. and beliefs of the early Christians, and cannot fail of good effect upon those who read it with the desire "to know," even if "to believe " be but secondary with them. We quote the introduction and a portion of the argumentative part, leaving the reader to find the lecture complete in "Christian Truths," published by the Catholic Publication society, New York, 1881:
Although the nineteenth century is an epoch of novelty and of invention, there never has been a period in which interest in the history of remote ages was keener, or the results of archaeological investigations more satisfactory. The whole world is divided into two classes of seemingly opposite ideas. One is peering into the future, believing in the progress of humanity, casting on the past doubt which will not stand the test of principles often arbitrarily assumed. The other is matter-of- fact, does not discard the amelioration of the human race, but rejecting unsustained theories and unfounded skepticism, looks to the past for lessons of truth and of wisdom, believing that there have been wise men and truthful narrators of what once was. The spirit of the former class, though not without its beneficial feat- ures, has been the cause of immense evil in casting aside cherished memories and
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traditions, and with them the principles which gave them life. Dazzling often with the electric brilliancy of their success, they have oftener led men into darkness impenetrable, and entangled them hopelessly in the meshes of illogic or unsound thought. The latter class, in quiet, plodding, persevering efforts, attract little attention, till suddenly a result is obtained, solid in its nature, durable in its effects, and triumphant in its vindication of historic truth.
To this latter class belong generally those who are engaged in the serious study of antiquity, not led by theory, but eminently inductive in their method, gathering facts, collating them, and patiently awaiting the fruit they hope for. Not a square inch of stone bearing the marks of the hand of man escapes them; a cun- eiform character, a hieroglyph, a Greek letter, or a Latin date, invests the cold marble with an interest which gives it life and makes it speak in faltering accents first, then in language not to be mistaken, when, in union with its other parts, it tells of the past in a way that cannot be gainsaid. It is by such patient, painstak- ing care that the discoveries of Layard, of George Smith, at Nineveh, and of Schlie- mann at Troy and Mycenæ, have been brought about. The schools of Niebuhr and of Arnold may be aptly taken as representing those who write history from theoretical standpoints, and who, influenced by skepticism, have rejected as fable what they could not compass. The spirit, however, which has actuated Layard, George Smith and Schliemann is fitly shown us in the following words of Mr. William Dyer, author of the well-known article on Roman antiquity in Smith's Classical Dictionary, and subsequently of the interesting and valuable works on the histories of the City of Rome and of the Kings. At page 62 of his introduction to the History of the City of Rome, he says: " There is little motive to falsify the origin and dates of public buildings; and, indeed, their falsification would be much more diffcult than that of events transmitted by oral tradition, or even recorded in writing. In fact, we consider the remains of some of the monuments of the regal and republican periods to be the best proofs of the fundamental truths of early Roman history." This is an eminently sensible remark; and I shall take its mean- ing as our guide in the treatment of the subject of this lecture, Early Christianity. The sources, therefore, to which we shall look for information will be the monu- ments of Christian antiquity existing at the present time. These are found scat- tered over a very wide range of territory-a range co-extensive with the old Roman empire. They are of varied character-architectural, commemorative, sepulchral, artistic, in painting and in sculpture. Necessarily, in a brief lecture, it would be impossible to go over such a field, and it is imperative that I should confine myself to a part only of it, and even then in a summary way.
Of all parts of the Roman empire none could certainly reward investigation better than the Eternal city itself, its capital, which became the center of Chris- tianity, and the dwelling place of St. Peter and of his successors, the heads of the church in their respective epochs. Thither came Christians from all parts of the known world, and their piety made them devote their means to advance the material prosperity of the church in the erection of churches and sanctuaries, and sepulchral ornaments. No portion of the Roman empire, for these reasons, is richer in monuments of Christian antiquity than Rome with its territory; and to its study I invite your attention. Even here, however, as the objects deserving atten- tion are so numerous, to study profitably, it will be necessary to restrict ourselves to the exploration of the principal mines whence the treasures of Christian
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