USA > Indiana > History of the Sixth regiment Indiana volunteer infantry. Of both the three months' and three years' services.. > Part 9
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Before we advance further I will give the changes made by General Rosecrans in his reor- ganization of the Army of the Cumberland, before he went into the fight at Murfreesboro, or so much of it, at least, as is necessary to properly locate our regiment and brigade, etc., in the fight.
Major-General A. McD. MeCook was still our corps commander, and was designated as the right wing of the army in this coming battle. Briga- dier-General R. W. Johnson commanded the Sec- ond Division of McCook's Corps. This division
HAGERMAN TRIPP.
171
THE ARMY REORGANIZED.
Was composed of three brigades, of which we were the Third, commanded by Colonel P. P. Baldwin, of our regiment. Then the Sixth Indiana Regi- ment was a part of the Third Brigade, Second Division of McCook's Corps, which formed the right wing of the army. I will simply add, in or- der to give the reader a general idea of the whole army under Rosecrans, at this time, that the left wing of the army was commanded by General Crittenden, while the center was under General Thomas, who had superseded General Gilbert.
MeCook's Corps consisted of three divisions- the First Division, commanded by General Jeffer- son C. Davis : the second, commanded by General R. W. Johnson, while the third was commanded by General P. H. Sheridan.
The Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. P. Baldwin, consisted of-
Sixth Indiana Regiment, commanded by Lieu- tenant-Colonel H. Tripp.
First Ohio Regiment, commanded by Major J. A. Stafford.
Ninety-third Ohio Regiment, commanded by Colonel Charles Anderson.
Fifth Kentucky Regiment, commanded by Lieu- tenant-Colonel Wm. W. Berry.
Fifth Indiana Battery, commanded by Captain P. Simonson.
On the morning of December 26th, Rosecrans ordered a forward movement of the whole army.
172
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
MeCook was to move his command on the Nolins- ville pike to Triune.
Davis took the advance of the right wing with the First Division. He moved from camp at 6 o'clock, on the Edmonson pike. The Third Di- vision, under Sheridan, moved on the Nolinsville pike, followed by Second Division, under Johnson.
The advance under both of these columns en- countered the cavalry pickets of the enemy within two miles of the Federal picket line. As we ad- vanced there was constant skirmishing until the heads of each of these columns reached Nolinsville. About one mile south of the town the enemy made a determined stand in a defile and upon the hills through which the pike ran at this place, known as Knob's Gap. They had it well guarded by their artillery, and opened fire at long range on General Davis, who brought up two of his batteries and opened up on them in a manner that soon threw them into confusion, while Colonel Carlin's brigade of his division charged their position, capturing two guns and several prisoners. Our brigade did not get into this engagement, but followed with Sheridan's troops in supporting distance all day. Davis alone had proved an overmatch for the enemy without our assistance, and had driven him from his position all along the line, but by this time Johnson and Sheridan had come up, and night coming on we bivouacked for the night.
General McCook ordered a forward movement the next morning, the 27th, toward Triune, but a dense fog, so thick as to forbid the distinction of
173
THE SIXTH ON THE SKIRMISH LINE.
friend from foe, prevented an early advance, and it was deemed hazardous to press an engagement on unknown ground.
This time General Johnson had been put forward in the lead, and in our attempt to advance early in the morning we struck the enemy in force. The forenoon was used up by heavy skirmishing and playing on the enemy with the artillery. In the meanwhile McCook learned that Hardee was in position in our immediate front, and had been in line of battle since the night before. The fog lifted about noon and Johnson's division was pushed for- ward, followed by that of Sheridan. As we ap- proached Triune we found the enemy had burned the bridge across Wilson's Creek and retired, leav- ing a battery of six pieces, with cavalry supports, to hold the crossing.
The Sixth Indiana, along with the balance of our brigade, was placed on the skirmish line. We ad- vanced upon the enemy, who made a very feeble resistance, then withdrew their battery, followed by the cavalry, moving off rapidly toward Eagles- ville. We repaired the bridge, crossed and went into camp beyond Wilson's Creek. The resistance made to MeCook's Corps had delayed the whole line, and then the boys will remember the incessant rain on the 26th and 27th, rendering the pikes very muddy, while the eross-roads were almost impassa- ble. The condition of the roads and unwieldy con- dition of the army made it a matter of necessity to move slowly.
174
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
The 28th being Sabbath there was no general advance. General McCook sent forward General Willich's brigade on a reconnoissance to ascertain the direction of Hardee's retreat. General Willich advanced seven miles on the Shelbyville road and learned that he had retired to Murfreesboro.
Our corps lay here all day, but the next day, the 29th. McCook, leaving our brigade at Triune to cover the extreme right, moved forward with the remainder of his command, on a country road known as the "Bole Jack" road, toward Mur- freesboro. That night MeCook went into camp, arranging his corps in line of battle across the Wilkinson pike. The next day, the 30th, our brigade was ordered up from Triune, and we took our place in line along with our division. Very early on the morning of this day General McCook was ordered to move forward on the Wilkinson pike. Sheridan took the front, with Davis next, while Johnson brought up the rear. I suppose Johnson was put in the reserve on account of our brigade not being up yet when they moved. As Sheridan advanced, the enemy's resistance was more and more obstinately opposed, and when he got within two and a quarter miles of Murfrees- boro it became necessary to deploy General Davis on the line of battle. Our division was still in the reserve. All idea that Bragg did not intend to give us battle right here, and without giving back another inch, had vanished, and I believe that every soldier in the army had made up his mind
175
POSITION OF THE REBEL ARMY.
on this point. He had also made up his mind that the task we had undertaken was not only a big one, but a hard and dangerous one, and while a fellow is back in the rear, just far enough to be in the way of the stray balls, he has plenty of time to think of all these things. For my part, I had rather be right up on the front line, so that if I had to be killed it could be said of me that I died at the front, and not that I was killed by a stray, ball away back in the rear, and, anyhow, I think that one place is just about as safe as the other. After Davis took his place on the front line the business amounted to more than a skir- mish, as both armies got down to business. There would have been nothing very serions occur had not Carlin charged a battery which he failed to capture, incurring considerable loss. On this ac- count Davis' division lost near two hundred men. while Sheridan lost seventy-five.
Shortly before sunset the rebel position was plainly discernible from Davis' front, and was formed running diagonally across the old Mur- freesboro and Franklin road. In the afternoon MeCook learned from a citizen the exact location of Bragg's army, which overlapped his right so far that he became greatly alarmed for its safety. and he innnediately sent word to General Rose- crans. He then went to work at once to reform his lines. He also took the other two brigades of our division, which were commanded by Willich and Kirk, and placed them on the extreme right.
176
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
then held by Davis, directing them to form nearly · perpendicular to the main line, so as to protect the right flank. Our brigade is still on the reserve. McCook considered this line a strong one, with open ground in the front for a short distance. At six o'clock in the evening MeCook received an order from Rosecrans to have large and extended camp- fires made on the right, extending far be- vond the right of the line, to deceive the enemy, and make him believe that troops were being massed there. Fires were built extending nearly a mile beyond the right of MeCook's line. In this position the right wing rested in the cedars the night before the battle. The troops cutting cedar boughs for beds, and officers and men wrapping themselves in their blankets slept in frosty night- air with the silent stars looking down upon them.
" Just before the battle, mother, I am thinking, dear, of thee."
It may be presumptuous on my part to criticise the actions and plans of such a General as Rose- «rans, but if the building of these fires on McCook's extreme right was not a mistake, then my judg- ment is at fault. McCook had already notified Rosecrans that his right was in danger, that his right rested nearly opposite Bragg's center, and took the responsibility of taking two brigades of his reserve and extending his right still farther. Rosecrans' idea of forcing Bragg to believe that he was massing forces on his right, certainly would not induce Bragg to weaken his line in McCook's
177
SIXTH INDIANA IN RESERVE.
front, but rather to strengthen it. That portion of Bragg's army already in MeCook's front, was entirely too heavy for it, without inducing him to make it still more so. McCook himself did not approve of an effort on Rosecrans' part to induce Bragg to strengthen or extend his own left, as from reliable information the Union army was in no condition to meet any such emergency. It would be only reasonable from the information Rosecrans already had, for him to either strengthen or try to conceal the weakness of his right. We are apt to guard against impending danger. If Rose- crans had not built those fires so far out on his right, Bragg might have thought that it would be necessary for him to leave more of his troops over with Breckenridge, and then it was positively known to Rosecrans that Breckenridge's division was all the rebel force left on the east side of the river. This force under Breckenridge constituted only about two-fifths of the whole rebel army : then pray, where was the other three-fifths but to be massed on the west side of the river, and con- sequently on the immediate front of MeCook? And here is the great emergency which McCook saw, and tried to avert by taking two brigades of onr division and placing them to protect and guard his extreme right. But when the heavy massed rebel columns came against them next morning, onr thin, slender line, without any re- serve at all you might say ( for our brigade was
12
178
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
fully a mile in the rear and near Johnson's head- quarters), was crushed and compelled to give way, · while our right was continually overlapped faster than our line could be extended. The first intima- tion that we of the Sixth Regiment had of the dis- aster, was by seeing the flying, demoralized men coming to the rear.
Gen. Henry M. Cist, author of a history of the Army of the Cumberland, has this to say of Bald- win's brigade :
" Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of Johnson's division. Strag- glers from Kirk's and Willich's brigades gave the first information to Baldwin of the disasters on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely time to post them in line of battle before the enemy, in immense masses, appeared on his front in short range, their left extending far be- yond the extreme right of his line. Opening at once a destructive fire upon their dense masses with his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson's battery, posted near the woods in the rear of the first position, opened with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such over- whelming numbers that after half an hour's stub- born resistance, Baldwin was compelled to retire, not, however, until the enemy had flanked his right, and were pouring in an enfilading fire. As
179
NEARLY CAPTURED.
it was, he barely made his escape, since, in a mo- ment longer, his entire command would have been surrounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin endeavored to make another stand. but before he could form his line he was again forced back. Retiring slowly, with several halts in the cedars, Baldwin, with his brigade, reached the railroad, where the rest of the division was being re-formed.
" The right flank being driven from its position by the left of the enemy, Davis' division then felt the full force of the victorious sweep of the rebel troops. Hushed with success and aided by the forces immediately in his front. Davis, as soon as the disaster on his right had fully developed. at once changed front and formed a new line, with his right brigade upon Post. nearly at right angles to its former position, and made all necessary dis- position of his troops to receive the attack. Bald- win's brigade had hastily taken position and had already felt the force of the enemy's concentrated attack. Still the advancing lines of the enemy greatly overlapped the extreme right of Baldwin. Hardly had the troops been placed in this position before the enemy swept down in heavy masses upon both the flank and front, charging with the rebel yell. The two divisions of MeCown's and Cleburne's troops, which had driven Johnson. hurled themselves upon Baldwin's and Post's brigades, while the fresh troops of Withers' di- vision, composed of Wanigault's and Loomis'
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HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT
brigades, rushed upon those of Davis, under Car- lin and Woodruff, and upon that on the right of " Sheridan's line, under Sill.
The change of position of Post's brigade gave to the two remaining brigades of Davis' division and Sills' brigade of Sheridan's command the length of division front, and on this the enemy made a united attack. After Baldwin had been compelled to retire, Post repulsed the attack on his brigade, and Carlin, Woodruff and Sill in the front drove back the assaulting column of the reb- els with heavy loss."
The fight in this battle, so far as MeCook's corps is concerned, was now virtually at an end, as he was ordered to the rear, where he re-formed his line on the opposite side of the Nashville pike, where it lay in position, while Van Cleve's divis- ion, which up to this time had not been engaged, was brought over from the left wing and placed on the front, just in time to receive the last charge made by the rebels on that day. This charge was handsomely repulsed, and the fighting for the day was over, and on the field where death had reaped such a heavy harvest on the last day of 1862 the troops slept on their arms, waiting for what the next day might bring forth. The night was clear and cold. The armies maintained their relative positions, with some picket firing occurring during the night. Thus ended the first day of one of the hardest-fought battles of the war.
Very little sleeping did the boys do this night,
181
WE SLEEP ON OUR ARMS.
as the whole night was taken up in making the necessary changes to get into position and to re- form the lines to accord with the new order of things. During the night we refilled our cartridge boxes, took parched corn for supper, and slept on our arms with our clothes on and one eye open, ready to be called into line for action on a mo- ment's notice.
The extent of the disaster on the right was ap- palling and seemed at one time about to envelop the entire army. As the storm of battle passed down the line it reached Thomas, who, cool, calm and self-sustained, stood the test of one of the fiercest contests of the war. It was to him that Rosecrans first turned in the hour of disaster, and in him he trusted most. The commander of the army, too, was sorely tried. He had come to win victory, but in place of it defeat seemed almost inevitable. Reforming his lines and bravely fight- ing, he had hurled back Bragg's army before it had achieved any decisive success. Rosecrans knew that his losses had been extremely heavy, but those of the enemy had been still more severe. He felt that on a question of endurance his army would come out first, although the dash and onset of the rebels had at the opening been able to sweep all before them. In the face of an earnest effort on the part of some of his general officers to per- suade him to fall back to Nashville and there throw up works and wait for reinforcements, Rose- crans determined to await the attack of the enemy
182
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
in the position of his lines Wednesday afternoon. He sent for the provision teams, ordered up fresh supplies of ammunition, and decided that if Bragg should not attack before these arrived that he himself would then resume offensive operations.
General Cist gives such a minute description of this battle that I deem it proper and right to quote from him still further. He says : " During the morning of January 1, 1863, the rebels made re- peated attempts to advance on Thomas' front in the center, but were driven back before emerging from the woods. Crittenden was ordered to send Van Cleve's division across the river to occupy the position opposite the ford on his left, thrown for- ward perpendicular to it. The rebel right, under Polk, kept up a brisk skirmish fire on their front. . Chalmers' brigade was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the 'Round Forest.' .Bragg an- ticipating an attack on his right under Breckin- ridge, on the morning of the 1st, during the night ordered two brigades of that division to re- cross to the east side of the river. But none was made. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy showed signs of movement by massing large num- bers of his troops on our right, at the extremity of an open field a mile and a half from the Mur- freesboro pike. Here the rebels formed in line six deep, and massed thus heavily remained without advancing for over an hour. Gibson's brigade and a battery occupied the woods near Overalls Creek, while Negley's was placed as support on
183
GENERAL CIST'S DESCRIPTION.
McCook's right. The evident design of Bragg during the day was simply to feel the lines of our army to find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Sat- istied of this, he felt that he could maintain his position. He was not in condition to attack after the heavy hammering his army had received the day before.
" At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps commanders to feel our lines and ascer- tain Rosecrans' position. Fire was opened from four batteries on the center, and a demonstration in force was made by his infantry, followed by an- other on MeCook, but at all points meeting with a heavy artillery fire, he concluded that our army still occupied the battle field in force. Bragg or- dered Wharton's and Pegram's brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank of Stone River, immedi- ately in Breckinridge's front. Soon after this a number of his staff officers discovered for the first time that Van Cleve's troops, sent over the day before, had quietly crossed unopposed, and had es- tablished themselves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk's line was commanded and enfiladed. It was an evident necessity either to withdraw Polk's line or to dislodge Van Cleve's. The first alternative was not to be entertained un- til the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter. Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckinridge the remaining brigades belonging to his division still with Polk, and Breckinridge re- porting to Bragg received his orders. The attack
184
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
was to be made with the four brigades of Breckin- ridge's command, the cavalry protecting his right and co-operate with him. The erest of ground near the river, where Van Cleve's division was in position, was the point against which the main attack was to be directed. This taken, Breckin- ridge was to bring up his artillery and establish it on high ground, so as to enfilade our lines on the other side of the river. Polk was to open with a heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his advance. The signal for the attack was to be one gun from the center, and 4 o'clock was the hour set for the firing of this gun. Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the other some two hun- dred vards in the rear. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns, 12-pounders, were sent to aid in the attack.
Van Cleve's division was under command of Colonel Samuel Beatty with Grider's brigade for support, while a brigade of Palmer's division was placed in position on the extreme left to protect that Hank. Drury's battery was posted in the rear. In front of Breckinridge's line was an open space some six hundred and fifty vards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines. Sev- eral hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, increasing the distance as it flowed beyond.
185
FIFTY-EIGHT GUNS IN POSITION.
our left. General Rosecrans had ordered Critten- den to send Beatty's division across the river as protection to the troops on the left and center. as from the high ground near the river, the enemy by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of our lines. During the morning of the 2d, Negley's division was ordered from the right and placed in position on the west bank of the river in the rear of Beatty's division as reserves, being here on the left of Hazen's and Cruft's brigades of Palmer's division.
As soon as Breckenridge's command entered the open ground to his front, the artillery massed on the west bank of the river by order of Critten- den, consisting of all the guns of the left wing, to- gether with the batteries belonging to Negley's division and Stokes' battery, making fifty-eight guns in position, opened a heavy, accurate and destructive fire. Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached Beatty's infantry lines. Press- ing forward, without waiting to throw out a skirmish line. Breckinridge's command swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire, and that of the infantry, and struck Price's and Grider's brigades, broke their lines, drove them from their position onto their support in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire division retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge behind the line of Negley's division, and there re- forming.
Colonel John F. Miller, commanding the right
186
HISTORY OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT.
brigade of Negley's division, had ordered his troops to lie down under cover of the bluff of the river bank, and hold their fire until our troops from the other side crossed over and moved to the rear. As soon as the last of Beatty's men had passed through Miller's lines, he commanded the division to rise and open fire on the approach- ing rebels. Miller's fire was so effectively given as to cause the enemy at once to recoil. At the same time our artillery fire on the left was entilad- ing his ranks. His division soon wavered, and then began falling back. This was Colonel Miller's chance, and he ordered his troops to charge across the river, and to drive the enemy to their lines of entrenchments, which they did.
About the time Miller's command had got to the river, he received orders from General Palmer not to cross, but as he was driving the enemy nicely he did not obey, but ordered the troops forward. One of the enemy's batteries was posted in a wood close by and was keeping up a brisk fire on Miller's advance. He ordered his men to charge this battery, which they did, capturing three guns. At the time of the charge the Twen- tv-sixth Tennessee was supporting the battery. This regiment was broken by the assault and a large number of them captured with the colors of the command.
The commands under Generals Davis and Hazen were at once ordered across the river to support Miller .. They secured a good line, and went into
187
BRAGG MORTIFIED AND DISCOURAGED.
position for the night. Bragg was deeply cha- grined at the failure of Breekinridge's movement, but as night closed down he could do nothing but to prepare to defend himself on to-morrow. This he did by re-arranging his troops during the night. General Rosecrans ordered Davis to take and hold the line occupied by Beatty's division, while Crit- tenden's corps crossed the river, took position and entrenched themselves.
During the morning of the 3d Bragg ordered a heavy and constant picket firing to be kept up on his front, to determine whether our army still confronted him. At one point in the wood to the left of the Murfreesboro pike, the rebel sharp- shooters had all day annoyed Rousseau, who re- quested permission to dislodge them and their sup- ports, covering a ford at that place. About six o'clock in the evening two regiments from John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's division, co-operat- ing with two regiments of Spear's brigade of Neg- ley's division, under cover of a brisk artillery fire, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from their cover, but also from their en- trenchments a short distance from the rear.
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