USA > Indiana > Allen County > Fort Wayne > Valley of the upper Maumee River, with historical account of Allen County and the city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Volume I > Part 10
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der now being given to the front to advance, all marched forward ex- cept the company under Faulkner, which not having received the order, was left behind. Having advanced some three miles, two Indians afoot, with packs, were discovered; but they dropped their burdens at the sight of the troops and were soon lost sight of. The absence of Faulkner at this time becoming apparent, Major Fontaine, with a portion of the cav- alry, was sent in pursuit of him, on the theory that he was lost.
The report of a gun to the front soon fell upon the attentive ear of Captain Armstrong in command of the regulars-an alarm gun, per- haps, suggested he. He had discovered the "tracks of a horse that had come down the road and returned." Captain Armstrong also ob- served the fires of the Indians in the distance. Hardin thought the Indians would not fight, and moved forward in the direction of the fires, neither giving orders or preparing for an attack. The band of 300 was now several miles from camp and marching through the forest, unaware that the enemy was in ambush, and Little Turtle was the leader. Be- hind the fires lay the red men with guns leveled. No sooner had the troops approached the fires than a destructive volley burst upon them from the ambush. The militia were panic stricken, and all but nine began a precipitate flight for the camp of Gen. Harmar. Hardin had retreated with them, and in vain strove to rally them. The regulars bravely faced the enemy, and returned the fire. The nine remaining militia were pierced by the balls of the enemy, and twenty-two of the regulars fell, Captain Armstrong, Ensign Hartshorn, and some five or six privates, alone making their escape. This bloody engagement was near the place now known as " Heller's Corners."
Having, after the departure of Hardin in the morning, destroyed the Miami village, Harmar moved about two miles down the Maumee to the Shawnee village, known as Chillicothe. On the 20th he issued the following order:
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"CAMP AT CHILLICOTHE, one of the Shawnese towns, on the Omce river, Oct. 20th, 1790.
" The party under command of Captain Strong is ordered to burn and destroy every house and wigwam in this village, together with all the corn, etc., which he can collect. A party of 100 men (militia), properly officered, under the command of Col. Hardin, is to burn and destroy effectually, this afternoon, the Pickaway town, with all the corn, etc., which he can find in it and its vicinity.
" The cause of the detachment being worsted yesterday, was entirely owing to the shameful, cowardly conduct of the militia, who ran away, and threw down their arms, without firing scarcely a single gun. In returning to Fort Washington, if any officer or men presume to quit the ranks, or not to march in the form that they are ordered, the general will most assuredly order the artillery to fire on them. He hopes the check they received yesterday will make them in future obedient to orders. JOSIAH HARMAR, Brigadier-General."
From the scene of the smoking remains of the Indian village of Chillicothe, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the army under Harmar began march toward Fort Washington, and proceeded about seven miles, when a halt was made and the troops encamped for the night.
The evening was clear and beautiful - ushering in a glorious Oc- tober night. There was no sign of the enemy and the hoarse calls of the night owl, mingled with the voices of the soldiery, were all the sounds that fell upon the attentive ears of the sentinels.
Reassured by this peaceful outlook, a desire for revenge came to the mind of Colonel Hardin. His desire for the chastisement of the In- dian was by no means appeased by burning villages. The Miamis had perhaps returned to the village immediately after the departure of the army, thought he, and a most propitious opportunity was presented to return and surprise them. He urged upon General Harmar "that, as he had been unfortunate the other day, he wished to have it in his power to pick the militia and try it again." He sought to explain the cause of the militia not meeting the Indians on the 19th; and insisted that he wished to vindicate their valor. The earnest demeanor of Hardin pre- vailed, and Harmar. gave his consent, as he was anxious that the In- dians should be as well subdued as possible, that they might not give the army trouble on its March to Fort Washington. That night Hardin set out, intending to strike the Miami village before daylight. Under his command a body of 340 militia, and sixty regulars under Major Wyllys, took up its line of march, in three columns, the regulars in the center and the militia to the right and left. Captain Joseph Ashton moved at the head of the regulars, while Major Wyllys and Colonel Hardin were in his front. Contrary to Hardin's hopes, some delay hav- ing been caused by the halting of the militia, the banks of the Maumee were not gained till after sunrise. Indians were soon discovered by the spies, and Major Wyllys called the regulars to a halt, and ordered the
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militia on to a point in front, and presented his plan of attack to the commanding officers of the detachment. Major Hall was directed, with his battalion, to move round the bend of the Maumee, cross the St. Mary's and take a position in the rear of the Indians, until an attack should be made by Major McMullen's battalion, Major Fontaine's cavalry, and the regular troops under Major Wyllys, who were all ordered to cross the Maumee at or near the ford. Hardin and Wyllys had aimed to surround the Indians in their encampment; but Maj. Hall, having reached his flanking position unobserved, disregarded the orders given by firing upon an Indian that appeared in sight before the general attack was made. This startled the Indians, and small squads of them being seen hurrying away in many directions, they were rapidly pursued, contrary to orders, by the militia under McMullen and the cavalry under Fontaine, leaving Wyllys, at the head of the regu- lars, without support. In crossing the Maumee they were attacked by a superior body of Indians, under the lead of Little Turtle, and at length, after the fall of Wyllys and the larger part of the regular troops, were forced to retreat. Major Fontaine, at the head of the mounted militia, in a charge upon a small body of Indians, was killed, and a con- siderable number of his men fell, and the remainder sought safety in retreat. While the regulars were being slaughtered by Little Turtle, the militia under Hall and McMullen, at the confluence of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph, were briskly engaged with small parties of Indians, but when they learned of the misfortune of the regulars they scurried away toward the camp of Harmar. A single horseman having reached the camp of the main army with the news of the defeat about II o'clock a. m., Harmar at once ordered Major Ray, with his battalion, to advance to the aid of the retreating forces. But the effect of the panic on the militia was too great - but thirty men could be prevailed on to advance to the rescue under Major Ray, and those had gone but a short distance when they were met by Hardin and the retreating forces. Gaining the encampment, Colonel Hardin, flushed with excitement, and still entertaining a strong desire to fight the Indians, urged Harmar to set out at once with the entire force for the Miami village. But Har- mar would not venture a return. Said he: "You see the situation of the army; we are now scarcely able to move our baggage; it will take up three days to go and return to this place; we have no more forage for our horses; the Indians have got a very good scourging; and I will keep the army in perfect readiness to receive them, should they think proper to follow."
The remains of Major Wyllys and Fontaine and eight other officers and men who fell in the engagement with Little Turtle, were buried in trenches near the river, some twenty rods below the site of the residence of J. J. Comparet, which was built just above the fatal ford. Before the destructive fire of the red men the soldiers fell in such numbers that the water, then of no great volume, became bloody. One of the sol- diers wounded here, John Smith, managed to conceal himself on the
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bank, and after witnessing the triumph of the savages, escaped down the Maumee and reached Fort Washington. Returning with Gen. Wayne, he became a resident of the village about the fort
The militia had now become little better than wooden men in the eyes of Gen. Harmar. He had lost all faith in them, and on the morn- ing of the 23d of October, after a loss of 183 killed and thirty-one "wounded, the army again took up its march for Fort Washington, where it arrived on the 4th of November. Among the killed in this campaign were Maj. Wyllys and Lieut. Ebenezer Frothingham, of the regulars; Major Fontaine, Captains Thorpe, McMurtrey and Scott, Lieutenants Clark and Rogers, and Ensigns Bridges, Sweet, Higgins and Thielkeld, of the militia. The loss on the part of the Indians was thought to be about equal to that of the forces under Harmar.
Major Hamtramck, who had moved fromn Vincennes up the Wabash, had proceeded with his command to the mouth of the Vermilion river, and after laying waste several deserted villages, returned again to Vin- cennes. The campaign of 1790 against the Indians of the northwest was now closed, and the chilling blasts of another long, dreary winter, with its anxieties, its hardships, and its perils, had begun to set in about the lonely settlements.
St. Clair's Campaign .- The defeat of Harmar gave great encour- agement to the Indians, as well it might, and brought corresponding de- pression to the settlements. So elated were the savages, that they renewed their attacks upon the frontier settlements with greater vigor and ferocity, if possible, than ever before, rendering it necessary for the settlers to combine and take prompt measures for their safety. Meet- ings were held all along the frontier. The government was freely criti- cised and in many instances severely denounced for the inefficient management of the campaigns of the past. Particularly, they denounced as unwise, the appointment of regular army officers, unused to Indian warfare, to command the militia, which was composed of men accus- tomed to study the Indian and his cunning from boyhood, and they earnestly implored the president to employ only the militia, under officers of its own choosing, for frontier defense, offering at once to raise a force sufficient not only for frontier defense, but to carry an aggressive war forthwith into the Indian country. This was not granted, but the presi- dent readily favored the increase of the regular army on the frontier, and appointed Gen. St. Clair to the command.
On the third of March, 1791, congress passed the " act for raising and adding another regiment to the militia establishment of the United States, and for making further provision for the protection of the frontier." It was proposed to place an army of some 3,000 men un- der the command of St. Clair. On the 21st of March, instructions were addressed, by the secretary of war, Gen. Henry Knox, to that general, which show what importance was attached to the possession of Kekionga. Said the secretary: "While you are making use of such desultory operations as in your judgment the occasion may require, you
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will proceed vigorously in every preparation in your power, for the purpose of the main expedition; and having assembled your force, and all things being in readiness, if no decisive indications of peace should have been produced, either by the messengers or by the desultory oper- ations, you will commence your march for the Miami village, in order to establish a strong and permanent military post at that place. In your advance you will establish such posts of communication with Fort Wash- ington, on the Ohio, as you may judge proper. The post at Miami vil- lage is intended for awing and curbing the Indians in that quarter, and as the only preventive of future hostilities. It ought, therefore, to be rendered secure against all attempts and insults of the Indians. The garrison which should be stationed there ought not only to be sufficient for the defense of the place, but always to afford a detachment of five or six hundred men, either to chastise any of the Wabash or other hos- tile Indians, or to secure any convoy of provisions. The establishment of said post is considered as an important object of the campaign, and is to take place in all events. In case of a previous treaty, the Indians are to be conciliated upon this point if possible; and it is presumed good arguments may be offered to induce their acquiescence. * * * Having commenced your march upon the main expedition, and the In- dians continuing hostile, you will use every possible exertion to make them feel the effects of your superiority; and, after having arrived at the Miami village, and put your works in a defensible state, you will seek the enemy with the whole of your remaining force, and endeavor by all means possible to strike them with great severity.
In order to avoid future wars, it might be proper to make the Wabash, and thence over to the Maumee, and down the same to its mouth at Lake Erie, the boundary [between the people of the United States and the Indians ], excepting so far as the same should relate to the Wyan- dots and Delawares, on the supposition of their continuing faithful to the treaties. But if they should join in the war against the United States, and your army be victorious, the said tribes ought to be removed without the boundary mentioned."
Following this Brig .- Gen. Scott, of Kentucky, marched with about Soo mounted men toward Ouiatenon, and destroyed the villages and cornfields, and in a fight with the Indians killed thirty and took fifty-one prisoners. On the 5th of July, Gen. James Wilkinson was sent in com- mand of another expedition against the Wabash and Red river Indians, and destroyed a number of towns and cornfields. These campaigns were undertaken principally with the object of weakening the strength, and destroying the resources of the Indians on the Wabash, and thus giv- ing material aid to Gen. St. Clair in the campaign he was preparing to enter upon against the Miamis at Kekionga, but they accomplished little in that direction and served to increase the hatred of the Miamis, who, filled with desire for revenge, instead of slackening their efforts, or ceasing to make war upon the Americans, began to call to their aid numerous warriors from the surrounding tribes of the Pottawatomies,
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Kickapoos, Delawares, Ottawas, Wyandots, and other tribes of the northwest. While Gen. St. Clair was making preparations to estab- lish a military post at the Miami village, Little Turtle, the Shawnee chief Blue Jacket, and the Delaware chief, Buck-ong-a-helas, were ac- tively engaged in an effort to organize a confederacy of tribes sufficiently powerful to drive the white settlers from the territory -receiving aid and counsel from Simon Girty, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott (the latter two sub-agents in the British Indian department), and from a num- ber of British, French and American traders who generally resided among the Indians, and supplied them with arms and ammunition in ex- change for peltries.
This Girty was a noted character in all the frontier Indian wars. A renegade white man who allied himself with the Wyandots, and for many years was their leader in battle, as well as the planner of their campaigns, he exhibited a savageness of disposition, and a heartlessness in witnessing (if he did not direct), the torture by his savage allies of their white prisoners, which display almost unparalleled depravity, but by means of it, he no doubt obtained and held a supremacy of control over their minds. He was often at the Miami villages of the Maumee, and is said to have resided for some time at the town of Chillicothe, two miles east of Fort Wayne, at the bend of that river.
It was unfortunate for the success of the movements against the Indian tribes, that although in the treaty of 1783 with Great Britain it was declared in the seventh article of that document that the king would, " with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his forces, garrisons and fleets from the United States, and from every post, place and harbor within the same, yet, at the time of Harmar's, St. Clair's and Wayne's campaigns, he still held and gar- risoned the posts of Niagara, Detroit and Michillimackinac. From these points, under the plea that that part of the treaty of 1783, relating to the collection and payment of all debts theretofore contracted with and due to the king's subjects, had not been faithfully complied with by the Americans, the English government continued, from time to time, to give aid and comfort to the Indians and others in open warfare upon the United States forces and the settlements along the Ohio, and at other points in the west. Accordingly, while Gen. St. Clair was preparing to march upon the Miami village, the British at Niagara, Detroit and Michillimackinac, were using what means they could to defeat the pur- poses of the United States; and an insight into their movements, at that time in league with the Indians, would doubtless have discouraged St. Clair in his effort to capture the Miami village, or to establish a mil- itary post at this point. But the effort was destined to be made; and after much delay and many impeding and perplexing circumstances, in the early part of September, 1791, the main body of the army, under General Butler, marched from the vicinity of Fort Washington, and, moving northward some twenty-five miles, on the eastern bank of the
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river Miami erected a post, which they called Fort Hamilton. On the 4th of October the army continued its march, and having advanced forty-two miles from Fort Hamilton, they erected Fort Jefferson, six miles south of Greenville, Ohio. The season was now far advanced, and the 24th of October had arrived before the army again moved for the Miami village.
Some of the militia deserted, heavy rains fell, provisions became short, a reconnoitering party was fired upon, two were killed and one supposed to have been taken prisoner, and St. Clair was sick, during the nine days' march which followed. On the 3d of November the main army reached the site of Fort Recovery, and encamped at the head- waters of the Wabash, in view of several small creeks, about fifty miles from the Miami village. The chill of winter now begun to be felt -snow had already fallen. Some Indians were seen but they fled as soon as observed.
The famous Shawnee chief Tecumseh had been placed in charge of a party of spies and scouts, with which he had hung upon the route of the army of St. Clair as it advanced toward Greenville, and reported the movements and strength of his forces to the head chiefs of the Indians. The advance and general movement of St. Clair thus became well known to the confederated tribes and their allies, and this information inspired them with the determination to draw the army into their power by wiles and stratagems, and, if possible, destroy it. Under the lead of the fa- mous Little Turtle, and Buckongahelas, and Blue Jacket, the renegade Simon Girty and several other white men, they prepared to meet St. Clair with a force of 1,400 warriors.
This force was assembled for review on an extensive plain about five miles southwest of the village on the banks of the St. Mary's [part of the Richardville reserve ]. A considerable altercation arose among the Indians on the review ground relative to a commander-in-chief. Some were in favor of Buckongahelas, while others favored Little Turtle. At length Buckongahelas settled the controversy by yielding the command to Little Turtle, saying that he was the younger and more active man and . that he preferred him to himself. This reconciled the opposing factions and Little Turtle took command.
He divided his warriors into bands or messes, to each mess twenty men. It was the duty of four of this number alternately to hunt for provisions. At noon of each day the hunters were to return to the main army with what they had killed, and by this regulation his commissariat was well supplied during the seven days they were advancing to the field of battle.
Meanwhile, at the camp of St. Clair, a site afterward known as Fort Recovery, the commander desiring a place of safety for the knapsacks of the soldiers, had, on the evening of the arrival of the army, concluded " to throw up a slight work," and then after the arrival of the regiment still on the way, to move on and attack the enemy. But before the sun had risen on November 4, following that hour which is accounted
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the darkest just before day, the Indian whoop startled the army of St. Clair, just getting under arms. A furious attack burst from the dark- ness, upon the militia, which soon gave way, and came rushing into the camp, through Major Butler's battalion, creating the wildest disorder on every side, and closely pursued by the Indians. The fire of the front line checked the red men, but almost instantly a very heavy attack be- gan upon that line; and in a few minutes it was extended to the second likewise. The greatest pressure was directed against the center of each, where was placed the artillery, from which the men were repeatedly driven with great slaughter. Perceiving but little effect from the fire of the artillery, a bayonet charge was ordered, led by Lieut .- Col. Darke, which drove the Indians back some distance, but they soon returned to the attack and the troops of Darke were, in turn, compelled to give way; while, at the same time, the enemy had pushed their way into camp by the left flank, and the troops there also were in disorder. Repeated charges were now made by Butler's and Clark's battalions, but with great loss; many officers fell, leaving the raw troops without direction - Major Butler himself being dangerously wounded. In the Second regi- ment every officer had fallen, except three, and one of these had been shot through the body.
The artillery being now silenced, half the army fallen and all the officers killed, except Captain Ford, who was very badly wounded, it be- came necessary to regain the trail from which the troops were now cut off, and to make a retreat if possible. For this purpose the remnant of the army was formed, as well as circumstances would admit, toward the right of the encampment, from which, by the way of the second line, another charge was made upon the enemy, as if with the design to turn the right flank, but in fact to gain the route. This was effected, and as soon as it was open, the militia took the lead, followed by the troops, Major Clarke with his battalion covering the rear. Everything was now in confusion. The panic had produced a complete rout. The camp and artillery were all abandoned-not a horse was left alive to remove the cannon; and the soldiers threw away their arms and accoutrements as they ran, strewing the path for miles with them. The retreat began about half-past nine o'clock and continued a distance of twenty-nine miles, to Fort Jefferson, where the survivors arrived soon after sunset, St. Clair having lost thirty-nine officers killed, and 593 men killed and missing; twenty-two officers and 242 men wounded. The loss in stores and other valuable property was estimated at $32,810.75.
The officers who fell in this memorable occasion were: Major Gen- eral Richard Butler; Lieutenant Colonel Oldham, of the Kentucky mil- itia; Majors Ferguson, Clarke, and Hart; Captains Bradford, Phelon, Kirkwood, Price, Van Swearingen, Tipton, Smith, Purdy, Piatt, Guth- rie, Cribbs, and Newman; Lieutenants Spear, Warren, Boyd, McMath, Bead, Burgess, Kelso, Little, Hopper and Lickens; Ensigns Balch, Cobb, Chase, Turner, Wilson, Brooks, Beatty, and Purdy; Quarter- masters Reynolds and Ward; Adjutant Anderson, and Dr. Grasson.
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The officers wounded were: Lieutenant Colonels Gibson, Darke, and Sargent (adjutant general) ; Major Butler; Captains Doyle, Trueman, Ford, Buchanan, Darke and Hough; Lieutenants Greaton, Davidson, De Butts, Price, Morgan, McCroa, Lysle, and Thompson; Ensign Bine's; Adjutants Whisler and Crawford, and the Viscount Malartie, volunteer aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief.
In this engagement, Little Turtle displayed feelings of humanity to- ward his retreating foes, of which few examples have been recorded in the history of Indian warfare, and which reflect honor on his character. On beholding the soldiers fleeing before the exasperated Indians, and falling every moment under the merciless blows of the tomahawks, his heart revolted, and ascending an eminence he gave a peculiar cry, which commanded his forces to cease from further pursuit and return to their camps. He also sent out messengers to inform them, wherever they might be, that they must be satisfied with the carnage, having killed enough. But this humane effort was of little effect.
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