USA > Massachusetts > History of the Second Mass. Regiment of Infantry, third paper > Part 7
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Of this movement Banks was ignorant ; for when we aban- doned New Market Ashby occupied it, and posted scouts as far as Strasburg, so that the valley was closed and every inovement effectually screened. i
Although Jackson made every preparation for rapid marches, leaving behind him even the knapsacks of his men, he made only twelve, miles the Arst day, - one half of which were passed in crossing the ; ip road over the mountain. The next day, however, the united force moved forward, making a march which carried the advance under Ewell to within ten miles of Front Royal : and this so secretly that not a single inhabitant suspected Jackson's presence. #
" It was now hoped by all the: Banks would leave the road, push on through Harrisonburg, and attack us. Battle- Fields of the South, P. 324.
t D:Lucy. p. yo.
# Cooke, p. 141.
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On the 23d of May the whole of Jackson's army, con- sisting, according to Southern accounts, of about sixteen thousand effective infantry and forty field guns,* with three regiments of cavalry, was within twelve miles of our principal outpost at Front Royal. The whole of our feeble command on this same Friday morning, at Strasburg and stretched along the railroad towards and at Front Royal, was one divis- ion of two brigades f of infantry at Strasburg, commanded by Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, numbering less than thirty- six hundred men present for duty. # My own brigade com- prised the regiments given below, ยง and numbered in all 2, 101. There were also at Strasburg of cavalry 800, and of artillery ten Parrott guns and six smooth-bore field-pieces. At Front Royal there were in all not to exceed nine hundred men. ||
Along the road nearer Strasburg, and already counted in
* Gen. Jackson's own division comprised brigades of Winder, Campbell, and Taliaferro; Ewell's division comprisel brigales of Taylor, Trimble, Elzey, and Stewart ; Brigadier-General Stewart's brigade comprised First Maryland Regi- ment of Infantry al. Brockerboroughs battery ; Cavalry regiments of Ashby, Mumford. and Flourroy, with eight battalions of artillery. (Dabney, p. 90.)
f The first brigade commanded by Col. Donelly of the Twenty-eighth New York. The second commanded by Col. George HI. Gordon, of the Second M. >achusetts.
: S. e Gen. Williams's report.
$ 5. . on! Mas achusetts
Officers. Enlisted Men. 27 550 555
Third Wisconsin . . Twenty Seventh Indiana
20 436
'Twenty Ninth Pennsylvania (S Cos.)
17
453
S3
2,013 Total, 2, 101
Eight companies First Maryland Regiment, 775 men ; two companies Twenty- Vith Pennsylvania, Hint, -Col. Palari comibanding ; Fifth New York, two & mipanies, Ira Hartiss civalty (too men) : one section of artillery, Knapp's Battery, Licut. Atwell. 33 men ; Capt. Mapes's Pioreer Corps, 56 men (engaged in reconstructing bilt es); total under command of Col. Kenly, of the First Maryland, scarcely 1,250 men, - did not exceed 935 men. -- Banks's Report.
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the total, there were three companies from my brigade : Capt. HI. Russell, of the Second Massachusetts, at the bridge just out of Strasburg ; one company of the Twenty-Seventh Indiana, and one of the Third Wisconsin, both about five miles out from the town.
So far as the concealment of Jackson's march was one of his main purposes, it was most effective. This is claimed by Southern writers * to have been one of his main reasons for planning his attack between Front Royal and Strasburg ; although it is said others of weight were, to avoid our fortifica- tions, and ensure the issuing of Banks from them to save his communications with eastern Virginia. That Jackson got fairly upon Banks's flank without his knowledge, the latter admits. i
Col. John R. Kenly, commanding the First Maryland (Union) Regiment of infantry, with the force already men- tioned, had been sent from Strasburg in pursuance of orders from the War Department, on the 16th of May, to protect the town of Front Royal and the railroads and bridges between that town and Strasburg. By the road the dis- tance between these towns is about fourteen miles. The picturesque town of Front Royal nestles at the foot of high hills, which tower abruptly above it on almost every side. To the east runs the Blue Ridge, over whose summits, by winding and steep pathways, roads lead through the gaps known as Chester and Manassas into the valleys of East- cru Virginia. About one mile and a half north of Front Royal, in a direct line with Winchester, the two branches of the Shenandoah unite into the single stream that pours its waters into the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. The pike
" Dabney. p. gt.
i On the 23d of May, it was discovered that the whole force of the enemy was in movement down the valley of the Shenandoah, between the Massanutten range of mountains an ! the Blue Ridge, and in close proximity to the town (Front Royal). - Bazie's Officiel Report.
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road from Front Royal to Winchester crosses both Forks of the river, -the South Fork at a distance of one mile and a quarter from the town, the North Fork about one mile farther on. At the two Forks there were two bridges stand- ing Col. Kenly had pitched his camp north of and about half a mile from the town, in a lovely valley, in which, on the morning of the 23d of May, there was no token of the impending storm. Trees of richest verdure were bathed in the morning sun, and fields sparkled with dew-drops shining amidst luxuriant grasses. Everything around seemed more in harmony with life and peace than with bloodshed and death. At two o'clock in the afternoon two companies of infantry were on duty as advanced guard upon the roads leading south and west from Front Royal ; at the bridges, and along the railroad for about five miles towards Strasburg, guards had also been stationed. Suddenly, and without the slightest warning, Jackson's advance was upon them.
On the end of May. at night, we left the enemy's advance, under Ewell, in bivouac on the road that runs up the eastern bank of the South Forl: of the Shenandoah from Luray, and only ten miles from Front Royal. To conduct his march so secretly that the descent of his columns would give Kenly the first knowledge of his approach. Jackson, in the morn- ing, diverged from ils well-travelled highway that leads from Luray to Front Royal, and by a steep and narrow footpath gained the wooded hills to the east. Thence Descending, it was Jackson's purpose to cut Kenly off from fight across the passes of the Blue Ridge towards Wash- ington, while Ashby's covaly, with Flournoy, crossing the South Fork of the Shenandoah, moved to intercept the flight of the little band to the west towards Strasburg. Ashby directed his march as far to the west as Bu.kton, where there was a bridge and some fortifications, occupied by the two companies from my brigale, while Flournoy's movements were between Backton and Front Royal.
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Before the pickets at Front Royal had been fairly dispersed, Col. Kenly had formed his command on the crest of a hill about a mile north of the town and in rear of his camp. Here was his whole disposable force of about nine hundred men and two pieces of artillery ; and here he calmly awaited the onset of the vastly superior force of the enemy. In his front the ground was level ; his guns commanded the approaches. The enemy advanced cautiously, and were received with shells from Knapp's Battery. With a grim humor Jackson selected a rebel Maryland Regiment to attack the loyal Marylanders. Supported by cavalry, who were in turn sus- tained by Taylor's Brigade of Infantry and two battalions of Louisiana Tigers under Major Wheat, an attempt was made to turn both of Kenly's flanks, while the Maryland Rebel Regiment advanced to make the attack in front. Against such odds there was no hope. Setting fire to his camp, Kenly now retreated to the first bridge, closely followed by the rebel Maryland, the Louisiana Battalions, and cavalry. Here a stand was made, but the overwhelming numbers of the enemy pushed on, captured the bridge uninjured, and drove our forces a mile farther to the bridge over the North Fork of the river. Again a stand was made with an unsuccessful attempt to burn the bridge, bet Kenly was once more forced back on the road towards Winchester. About a mile from this second bridge the road runs over a commanding eminence, on the right of the turnpike. There Kenly determined to fight. When the enemy appeared he opened on them with his two guns ; but the enemy's infantry and skirmishers attacked him in front, while the rebel cavalry, crossing to the left, turned his position, and he fell back. It was from here that Keniy dispatched couriers to Gen. Banks, -some of whom got through, as will appear. Kenly now marched up the road in such excellent order that his enemies viewed him with admiration. Reaching a favorable position his guns were posted, and again the roar and rattle of his artillery fell about
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Jackson's ears, who is reported to have groaned out aloud, "Oh, that my guns were here!"
By this time the enemy's cavalry, who had been fighting and capturing prisoners all along the railroad from Front Royal to Buckton, came upon the stricken band. This cav- alry force appeared on the Winchester road, and above Kenly, who had now been driven back as far as Cedarville, which is five miles north of Front Royal, on the Win- chester road. Here Kenly formed a line of battle with his own regiment, the two companies of the Twenty-Ninth Pennsylvania, his artillery, and a few cavalry. Now Jackson ordered the new cavalry force under Flournoy to charge. It is claimed that Kenly's line was somewhat broken before Jackson gave this order, and that Kenly, when he saw the necessity of obstructing the cavalry, ordered his command to form over a fence in a wheat-field (an orchard, the rebels call it). This was done, and then the enemy's cavalry was upon them. Successive discharges were poured into the enemy from Kenly's right and left wings, but in vain. Artil- lery and cavalry were mingled together, sabres waved over the heads of the doomed loyalists from Maryland, and the word "Surrender!" passed from every mouth. It was finished. Save an insignificant number of men, and one piece of artil- lery, which was carried to within five miles of Winchester and there abandoned, the whole of Kenly's command was killed or captured. The fight, which had begun at 2 1.3r., lasted until dark. While these scenes were transpiring, Ashby, with his cavalry, had attacked and dispersed the two companies at Buchton and had torn up the raffroad track. Then night came, and all around the Shenandoah, at Front Royal, and on the road to Cedarville, there were corpses of brave men, recently strong in life ; and there were wounded, moaning in their agony, unprotected from the rain that fell in torrents ; while an exulting foe of at least twenty thousand men turned their eyes towards Strasburg for the larger game of the morrow.
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At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 23d not one word of the capture of Kenly had reached us at Strasburg. The day was intensely hot and the air positively stifling under canvas. A general languor was manifested in the drowsy way in which the sentinels dawdled along their posts, or in the aimless, sleepy air in which the troops addressed themselves to such amusements as were suggested by time and place. Suddenly a mounted orderly, dashing violently up to my tent and inquiring for Gen. Banks in an eager tone, aroused a spark of life in the lifeless scene. Gen. Hatch of the cavalry was sitting by my side, speculating upon our probable movements and fate, as the orderly rode rapidly away without revealing his message. "This man, I think, may have news that will solve our doubts," I said to Hatch; " I believe he brings news of an attack upon our outposts." *
In less than two hours Strasburg was aroused. On the road towards Front Royal, Banks sent his troops, with the vain purpose, perhaps, of seeming to act, or, it may be, that with a single regiment of infantry he might recover what he had lost. The Third Wisconsin Regiment I bad hardly sent, by verbal orders, to the assistance of Col. Ken'y, when Banks directed me to add to it a battery. i Then there came a lull, and many anxious inquiries : " What is it?" " Is it Stonewall Jackson or only 'a cavalry raid?'" was often asked, to be as often askel again. Soon, however, it was known that Kenly had been attacked at Fient Royal ; thit when the messenger left, the fight was in progress ; and hardly had this been announced
* For some days, from the heights around Strasburg, we had seen the sun reflectel fruim teres, at the Swift Kun Gap of the Blue Ridge, whose increasing numbers indicated reinforcements to the cheity.
{ STRASBURG, 5.45 F. M., 23d May. COL. GORDON, Commanding Bride, d. C .:
Sir, -- You will direct a section of the battery nearest your command to move with your regiment.
N. P. BANKS, M. G. C.
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when an orderly, rushing with haste through the town, cried out that the second bridge had been attacked."
Daylight melted into night, stars twinkled in the heavens, lights glistened from the windows of houses in the town or shed a murky glare through canvas in the camps ; and no movement was made by Banks indicating that be had received any information of the strength of the enemy or the purposes they contemplated ; nothing done towards sending away to Winchester any of the immense quantities of public stores collected at Strasburg ; no movement made to place our sick in safety; nothing that indicated any intention by Banks of changing his position by reason of anything that had come from the attack on Kenly at Front Royal. Indeed, it did not seem as if Banks interpreted this attack to signify aught of future or further movements by the enemy ; or that it revealed that he was acting with any force larger than he had exhibited in brushing away our outposts ; or even that it betokencd any purpose to cut us off from Winchester, and capture our com- mand and material. I was so fully impressed, however, with Jackson's purposes, as they were afterwards revealed, that as soon as night set in I sought Banks at his headquarters, and I dl ored long to impress upon him what I thought a duty, - to wH. lis immediate retreat under cover of the darkness to- wards Winchester, carrying his sick and all supplies that he call transport, and destroying the remainder. On the sole ground that thus a superior force could not cut the only line , communications lett open to him, did I urge it. I en- bored to impress upon Banks the probability of the vastly ir numbers of the enemy, as manifested in the increased
" Six miles from Strasburg is Backton Station. When Jackson's infantry god at Best & gal, Asthe's cavalry, Serding the Perks of the Shenan- :: 1. in, swept westward as far as the posts where the two compaines of the Second Massachusetts and Third Wistousin were stationed. Here a brisk fight touk fire and our troops wen. overpower. I. though not without a severe loss to the
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size of his camp on the Blue Ridge. Even if it should turn out that I had overestimated his numbers, we should be in a better position, I urged, to fight at Winchester than at Stras- burg : our enemy would then be in our front and not in our rear. I failed to accomplish my purpose. Notwithstanding all my solicitations and entreaties, Banks persistently refused to move, ever repeating, "I must develop the force of the enemy." No argument, no reply to my arguments could sup- press this monotonous utterance. Banks seemed brooding over thoughts he did not reveal; he was spiritless and de- jected. His mood depressed me, and I hastened to return to my command. At about ten o'clock at night I received a note, containing instructions sent to Col. Ruger of the Third Wisconsin,* from which I inferred that possibly Banks had obtained further information, and that now I might press my views with better success.
First I called upon Major Perkins, the chief of Gen. Banks's staff. Finding that my suspicions of the strength and pur- poses of the enemy were shared by him, I asked Perkins if he agreed with me in the advice I had given. Replying that he did, I asked him if he had urged Banks to move with- out delay. He said he had, but without effect; and he begged me to endeavo: once more to persuade Gen. Banks. So I sought our commander, and again, with some warmth and not a little indignation, used every argument I could, to move him to make instant preparation to leave Stras- burg and put himself in a true position. It is not a retreat. I urged, but a true military movement to save yourself from being cut off; to prevent stores and sick from falling into the hands of the enemy.
+ HEADQUARTERS, 9.45 1. M.
COL GORDON :
Sir, - I sent a note about an hour ago to Col. Ruger to halt. If at or beyond Buckton to fall back, if necessary, to a position where he would not run any tik of being out of. I send the the wagons back.
Yours, etc.,
D. S. PERKINS, Mejor, etc.
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Moved with an unusual fire, Gen. Banks, who had met all my arguments with the single reply, " I must develop the force of the enemy," now rising excitedly from his seat, with much warmth and in loud tones exclaimed, " By God, sir, I will not retreat ! We have more to fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of our enemies."
The thought, so long the subject of his meditation, was at last out. Gen. Banks was afraid of being thought afraid. I rose to take my leave, replying, "This, sir, is not a military ground for occupying a false position; and, Gen. Banks," I added, "I shall now return to my brigade and prepare it for an instantaneous movement, for I am convinced that at last you will move suddenly. At a moment's notice you will find me ready. I shall strike all my tents, pack my wagons, hitch up my artillery horses, and hold myself in readiness to form line of battle. I have to request that you will send me word if anything new transpires."
It was eleven o'clock at night when I left him. As I returned through the town, I could not perceive that anybody was troubled with anticipations for the morrow. The sutlers were driving sharp bargains with those who had escaped from or were not amenable to military discipline; the strolling players were moving crowds te noisy laughter in their canvas booth, through which the lights gleamed, and the music sounded with startling shrillness. I thought, as I turned towards, my camp, How unconscious all are of the drama Jackson is preparing for us, and what merriment the morning will reveal !
As my troops were aroused from their slumbers a low murmur ran through camp, followed by the louder noise of packing camp equipage and baggage, the harnessing of artil- lery horses, and hitching up of trains. We were ready for action. But the night sped on; silence fell upon the town, and slumber was as deep that night in Strasburg as if without there was no cause for watchfulness. My brigade, however,
found little comfort sitting around dismal camp-fires, reduced! to expiring embers by the falling rain. Unsheltered and unprotected, in a damp clover-field, the morning dawned upon a cheerless group. Some unimportant steps had been taken for the security of the sick and for the safety of public property. I had ordered my brigade and regimental trains forward to Winchester, and they were saved. After three o'clock in the morning Banks had sent off some ambulances with sick and disabled ; and this was all.
The certainty of demonstration which Banks seemed to require to develop the numbers of Jackson's force, he evi- dently did not secure during the night nor long after daylight on the morning of the 24th ; nor was he on that morning any more convinced of the prudence of my advice of the night before, - to remove all the public property to a place of safety, and take a better position, so that if perchance the enemy were present in overwhelming numbers, he could save his command and material. As a very small part of Jackson's force took part in the affair with Kenly at Front Royal, it is possible that the reports of Kenly's messengers convinced Banks that all they saw was all there were.# If this were true, to act during all that night, and far into the forenoon of the next day, as it Jackson was engaged in a cavalry raid, was an error of judgment unpardonable in a commander. When did Banks come to a different conclusion, and act ac- cordingly? This is an important question.
In his official report of the affair Banks declares that " before three o'clock on the morning of the 24th," about four hours after I left him at night, he had information that the enen ... 15,000 or 20,000 strong, was advancing upon Winchester ; that more were threatening; " that to remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded," and " that to attack the enemy in such overwhelming force could only result in certain destruction."
* Han's in his oficial report says this fielding was mostly & ne by the enemy's cava'ry, and that this force is estimated at S,szo men.
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"It was, therefore, determined to enter the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle [as he should choose] for the possession of Winchester, - the key of the valley, and for us the position of safety." * The report then continuing, as giving the narrative in the order of occurrence, says: "At three o'clock, A. M., on the 24th instant, the reinforcements sent to Kenly were ordered to return, several hundred disabled men left in our charge by Shields's division were put upon the march, and our wagon train ordered forward to Winchester under escort of cavalry and infantry. Gen. Hatch, with nearly our whole force of cavalry and six pieces of artillery, was charged with the protection of the rear of our column and the destruc- tion of any stores for which transportation was not provided, with instructions to remain in front of the town as long as possible, and hold the enemy in check, - our expectations of attack being in that direction. All these orders were executed with incredible celerity, and soon after nine o'clock ; the col- umrn was on the march, Col. Donelly in front, Col. Gordon in the centre, and Gen. Hatch in the rear." #
When I besought Banks. at If p. M. of the 23d, to start then for Winchester, he replied that he would not retreat. repeating with an oath his fear of public opinion. At 3 A. M. of the 24th (he says in his official report) he was convinced that Winches- tur was for " us the key of the valley," " the position of safety." On the 3ist of May, when Banks made that report, he wrote with a full knowledge and a lively experience of all that had transpired; he wrote as he would have acted hal he known on that night of the 23dl what he knew when he wrote on the day of the gist of May, 1862 : but he did not write the truth, as I will now proceed to demonstrate. It is true that after I left Banks on the night of the 23d, he did determine to send some of his sick to Winchester, and
# See Banks's Official Report, Moore's Reb. Record, Vol. IX.
+ It was eleven.
| See Banks's Official Report, Moore's R. b. Record, Vol. I.N.
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it is true that they did start some time after three o'clock on the morning of the 24th; but that is all that was done to save our supplies or to meet the enemy. Instead of our wagon train being ordered forward to Winchester at 3 A. M. of the 24th, it was not ordered forward until nearly eleven o'clock of that day, eight hours later. Instead of Gen. Banks, at three o'clock in the morning, resolving that to remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded, at between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, after more than twelve hours of reflec- tion, he had determined to remain at Strasburg, and only changed his mind when news came to him that his sick in ambulances had been attacked en route to Winchester. So, with Gen. Hatch as rear-guard, and ordering forward the trains, the "incredible celerity " was between 9 and II A. M., and not between 3 A. M. and II. Let us return, and move forward with events.
After daylight of the 24th we remained inactive until between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, at which time I received the following note from Gen. Banks : -
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SHENANDOAH, STRASBURG, VA., May 24, '62.
COL. GEO. H. GORDON,
Commanding Brigade :
Sir, --- Our information this morning shows that the enemy returned to Front Royal last night, and will not, now at least, attempt our rear. Our force will remain in Strasburg, therefore, until further orders.
Our trains will be sent to the rear except those necessary for supplies, and the depots established at some other point.
You will make your men as comfortable as our circumstances will permit. The brigade trains will be sent back for supplies. The Secretary and Assistant Secretary of War both telegraph that ample reinforcements will be sent. You will give such orders as may be necessary for your command.
Respectfully yours, etc., N. P. BANKS, M. G C., etc.
That even Banks could be so deceived filled me with amaze- ment as unspeakable as the perplexity which overcame me
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