USA > Massachusetts > History of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, Mass., Volunteers, in the civil war of 1861-1865, with a comprehensive sketch of the doings of Massachusetts as a state, and of the principal campaigns of the war > Part 21
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The position of the Confederate army was along a range of hughts half a mile or more in the rear of Mine Run. The stream it-elf was difficult of passage, its banks being marshy and
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fringed with bushes and vines. Beyond it a gentle slope led up to the enemy's position, swept every foot of the way by their fire and filled with abatis and other obstructions. Having ad- vanced as far as practicable without a conflict, General Meade disposed his army in front of the Run in this order : General Newton's First Corps formed the center, lying just south of the old turnpike, with the Fifth Corps on its right and the Third on its left. General Sedgwick with his First and Second Divi- sions was thrown well to the right, while his Third Division. which had for some time been under the command of General Terry, was detached to co-operate with the Second Corps in feeling for a more vulnerable point to the left.
Accordingly the men of the Thirty-seventh found themselves aroused at 1 o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 29th, drew a small additional supply of rations, and before daylight were on their way, passing Robertson's Tavern, through to the plank road and beyond it, around the head of Mine Run, the advance skirmishing continually with the enemy's outposts and driving · them back till near night, when General Warren, believing that he had found a comparatively weak point, so reported to Mende and disposed his forces for the attack whenever it should be ordered. General Sedgwick from the right also reported that he deemed an assault in his front practicable. General Warren was strengthened with two divisions from the Third Corps and directed to attack at 8 o'clock next morning in connection with a heavy artillery fire from the center, while Sedgwick was to " go in" an hour later.
The Thirty-seventh were in reserve during the night of the 29th, lying on their arms and sleeping as much as possible in the intense cold, which had now become so intolerable that mon were frozen to death on the picket line. Early in the morning the regiment was moved forward to the front line, taking posi- tion on the extreme left. It was terribly uncomfortable lying upon the frozen ground hour after hour waiting for the signal to spring to their feet and dash forward into the face of death. and the men would almost have welcomed the command, sine. it would have stirred the blood and warmed the benumbed line:
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THE CAMPAIGN ABANDONED.
but it did not come. The morning's inspection of the works in his front revealed to Warren that his intention to attack had been anticipated, that the enemy had used the entire night in extending and strengthening the fortifications, that the latter were filled to the utmost capacity with exultant defenders and bristling with cannon which had not been there the previous evening. Warren reported the discouraging outlook to his com- mander and awaited orders. Meade sent a hasty order to Sedg- wick, who was waiting the passage of the few intervening moments to hurl his human avalanche against the foe, directing him to suspend the attack, and hurried to a personal consulta- tion with Warren.
The judgment of the lieutenant was confirmed on inspection by the general commanding. The plan of attack which on the previous afternoon had seemed feasible was now seen to be haz- ardous to the degree of rashness. The two points of assault were fully five miles apart, rendering perfect co-operation very difficult; there were no reserves to follow up and secure any ad- vantage which the attacking columns might gain; but above all there was the extreme doubt of any lodgment being made in the hostile works. The common soldiers saw the desperate outlook as clearly as their generals. They had never shrunk from the call of duty-they never would; but with firm fingers each man had written his name and pinned it upon his blouse that his dead body might be identified when the burial parties should do their sad work!
To make other dispositions of the army-to search for an un- defended flank or a practicable point of attack on a concentrated foe whom Meade believed his equal in numbers-would require time, while the rations with which his men set out were nearly exhausted, and his supply trains were under cavalry guard beyond the Rapidan. The steadily increasing cold weather seemed to indicate the setting in of a severe winter, and reluctantly the orders were issued which should record upon the movement the verdict of "failure."
All day the Thirty-seventh remained in their uncomfortable position, the skirmishers and sharp-shooters in front keeping up
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an incessant fusillade, thoughi by rare good fortune the loss was only one or two men wounded. There were plenty of narrow escapes, as always at such times, among them being that of Chaplain Morse, who on one of his several visits from the hos- pitals in the rear to the regiment at the front was fired at and narrowly missed by a sharp-shooter on two occasions. At night the regiment was relieved and with the rest of the division marched back to the turnpike, some three miles, where the Sixth Corps was reunited, the other two divisions having been recalled from their advanced position at the right. Large fires were made and the men went to sleep about them, but as soon as the flames died away the torturing cold reasserted its cruel power, and long before daylight the camp was voluntarily astir, building fires and preparing breakfast, in the expectation of being presently called to sterner duty.
But all that day, December 1, wore away with no summons till evening, after many of the men had disposed themselves to sleep, when the familiar invitation to "Pack up and fall in lively!" rang through the oak forest, and at 9 o'clock the col- umn sped swiftly back toward the Rapidan, but not by the route which it had traversed in coming through the wood and which had proved such an entanglement to the Third Corps. Following the turnpike back to its junction with the Brock road, a mile or so cast of the Old Wilderness Tavern, and then turning nearly due north, the regiment crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford about daylight, and after making a mile or two on the north side of the river halted for breakfast and rested till noon. Most of the men and the officers as well slept during the wait. for the night's march had been swift and continuous .and they were severely exhausted. The mounted officers had shared their horses with line officers, enlisted men and servants, who were unable otherwise to accompany the column, and thus nearly every member of the command was in his place when the regi- ment halted. and the few who were behind soon came up.
The march was resumed at midday, and the tottering column. sore, stiff and weary, plodded along till after dark, crossing Mountain Run where they had crossed it a week before in going
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THE RETURN TO BRANDY STATION.
out, and soon afterward the Thirty-seventh halted in a piece of woods for the night. The ground was low and marshy, with frequent pools of water into which the men stumbled, but they gave little heed to the discomforts. Wrapping themselves in their blankets, officers and men alike threw themselves upon the ground and slept the sleep of exhaustion till morning. As it was now certain that the regiment was near the old camp, and hence probable that they were to return there, the men devoured for breakfast what little food remained in their haversacks, in many cases ardently wishing it were more, and shortly afterward resumed the march, which led directly back to the old camp,- quitted seven days before for one of the most tedious, exhaust- ing, depressing and apparently fruitless expeditions in the his- tory of the army. History will justify,-it has already justified, -the wisdom of General Meade; but the thinking men who made up the army could not then comprehend as they now do the unfortunate combination of circumstances which conspired to defeat the skillful plans of the general commanding, and it - was not remarkable that there was bitterness of feeling and of speech among those who had endured the severe sufferings of the bootless campaign.
Tents were hastily pitched during the afternoon and three days' rations drawn, but the camp was not at once to settle into dull routine. When in possession of the new supply of rations, the men prepared bountiful suppers and crept into their tents under the warning to be ready to move at a moment's notice. A little later they were called up to draw more rations and took the occasion to eat some more supper, after which they returned to their blankets and were not again disturbed that night. . Next day details were made for guard and picket, the camp lines were established and a settled conviction began to be felt, despite all manner of camp rumors as to possible expeditions in the near future, that winter quarters would now be established. Within a few days that conviction deepened into certainty, the site for a new camp was selected and the men set to work upon it, pat- terning closely after "Camp Edwards," the famous habitation of the previous winter.
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Up to this time several additional changes had taken place among the officers of the regiment. Second Lieutenant Harri- gan of Company K resigned October 30, and as that company, like most others in the regiment, was reduced below the number for which the government allowed the muster of a new second lieutenant, the latter vacancy remained unfilled, as did other vacancies in the same rank, except when promotion is noted. First Lieutenant Charles Phelps of Company I resigned Novem- ber 17, Second Lieutenant F. Edward Gray of the same company being advanced to fill the vacancy. Major Eugene A. Allen re- signed November 25, and was succeeded by Captain Marcus T. Moody of Company G, whose commission bore date December 5 though he was not mustered to the new rank until January. First Lieutenant Bliss of Company G was at the same time commissioned captain, but before the receipt of the commission he resigned as first lieutenant, December 23, being influenced by family considerations, among them the death of his only brother, Captain George S. Bliss of the Fifty-second Massachu- setts regiment. Second Lieutenant James C. Chalmers of Com- pany A was promoted from December 5 to first lieutenant and assigned to Company G. The resignation of Lieutenant Bliss making another vacancy in the roster of captains, First Lien- tenant John C. Robinson of Company C was promoted to date from December 24, taking command of Company G. Second Lieutenant Jones of Company F was made first lieutenant of Company C.
CHAPTER XII.
WINTER ON THE RAPIDAN.
THE CLOSING YEAR .- PROGRESS OF THE WAR .- THE WINTER CAMP AND THE LIFE IN IT. - A FUTILE EXPEDITION.
Mention has been made of cheering news which came from Grant in the West as the troops of the Army of the Potomac were about to set forth on the Mine Run expedition. To see what it was we must return to Bragg and Rosecrans, whom we left, the former at Chattanooga, Ga., with the principal Con- federate army west of Virginia, the latter near Stevenson, Ala., preparing to cross the Tennessee river in pursuit of his antagon- ist. In co-operation with Rosecrans, General Burnside took the field actively in Eastern Tennessee, capturing Frazer's brigade and Cumberland Pass September 9, thus interposing his own army between Bragg and Virginia, besides dispelling the frag- mentary forces of armed Secessionists who had been maintaining a reign of terror in the region about Knoxville, and the faithful Unionists who had been obliged to flee for their lives now vent- ured to return to their homes again.
Bragg's position at Chattanooga was one difficult of approach by a hostile force from any direction, since it was shut in by commanding mountain ranges, with numerous ereeks and rivers; but Rosecrans decided to push straight across the Tennessee, over the mountains beyond, and threatening the enemy's com- munications either drive him toward the interior of the Confed- eracy or force him to a decisive battle. With numerous feints completely deceiving Bragg as to his real intentions. the Union commander crossed the Tennessee at four different points, and the first days of September saw his army pushing its way over the ranges to the eastward. Bragg immediately evacuated
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Chattanooga, moving due south some 15 or 20 miles and estab- lishing his army along the east bank of West Chickamauga Creek, facing the advancing Union army. By this movement General Rosecrans was sadly deceived, thinking that the Confederates were in full retreat. Fearing that Bragg might attempt to escape to the westward, and again carry the theater of war into Tennessee, Rosecrans sent to Sherman for co-operation to prevent such a result, and scattered his own forces for 40 miles through the mountains to operate against the supposed fugitives.
But nothing was further from Bragg's mind than flight. He had been heavily reinforced by the merciless conscription which was being carried on through the South, by most of Johnston's available force, and finally by the two divisions from Lee's army commanded by Longstreet in person, who had made their way through the Carolinas and were now coming up via Atlanta. Most of these troops were veterans, they vastly outnumbered the Union army, even if the latter had been consolidated, while in its present scattered condition there was every hope that it might be broken up in detail with little cost to the Confederates. Rosecrans did not know of these reinforcements, but he became aware of the presence on the Chickamauga of the enemy in strong force, and easily divined Bragg's intention. By skillful disposi- tions and great exertions he succeeded in rescuing the scattered detachments of his army, and by the time the Confederates were ready for the attack their antagonists were tolerably ready for the defense. In fact the initial blow was struck by the Union army, though with no conception of the results which were to follow. The morning of September 19, 1863, opened the struggle. General Thomas, commanding the Union left, had thrown out a detachment in search of an isolated brigade of the enemy which had been reported on that side of the creek, but after a brief engagement found that a strong force was developing in his front. In fact Bragg had intended to throw his right under General Polk with crushing weight upon the Union left, but the engagement which ensned showed that he had somewhat mistaken the position of his antagonist, whose flank extended farther to the north ward than he had anticipated. The Southern
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THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
army was across the creck, however, in much stronger force than Thomas had in readiness for immediate operation against it, and the boys in blue were driven back. They were speedily rein- forced and drove their antagonists in turn, and so through the day, with the advantage favoring first the Stars and Stripes and then the Stars and Bars, the battle raged with terrible despera- tion but without decisive result. The Union right was also repeatedly assailed, but on that part of the field every attack was repulsed and the lines stood firm.
That night Longstreet came up with a division and two bri- gades of fresh troops and took command of the Confederate left, in place of Hood, who had the immediate command of that wing during the first day. The fight of the 20th opened by a deter- mined effort on the part of Polk to turn Thomas's left flank and interpose between the Union army and the Rossville Pass through Missionary Ridge to Chattanooga, but every attempt was stub- bornly contested and defeated with the assistance of troops drawn from other parts of the line. On the right, meantime, owing to misunderstood orders in connection with the reinforcements sent to the left, a considerable gap was left in the line, and Long- street's quick eye grasped the opportunity. Hood's command in overwhelming force was pushed into the opening, cutting off five brigades and inflicting upon them terrible loss. Then the whole right crumbled before the riving of this monstrous wedge of exultant victors. Brigade after brigade was struck in the flank and swept back in confused masses; Rosecrans and his corps commanders, McCook and Crittenden, were carried back with the flood which they had no power to stem ; while General Garfield, the chief of staff, was dispatched to Thomas to bear the news of disaster, urge that general to maintain his ground as long as possible, and then to hold Rossville Pass at all hazards while Rosecrans disposed his scattered forces for the defense of Chattanooga, on which they were in full retreat.
It was during the closing hours of this disastrons day that General Thomas won the sobriquet of " The Rock of Chicka- manga." With a force not exceeding 25,000 men, in a position strengthened by such slight intrenchments as circumstances
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WINTER ON THE RAPIDAN.
would permit, he received attack after attack without flinching or yielding, holding his ground determinedly against the pres- sure of at least twice his numbers ; finally retiring one division at a time to Rossville Pass in accordance with orders,-the last to leave the field being Wood's division, whose faulty movement had opened the way for the breaking of the right. The Pass was firmly held during the following day, when all retired to the fortified. lines about Chattanooga.
The battle of Chickamauga was one of the bloodiest known to modern warfare. Out of some 55,000 men engaged, the Union loss was 16,336; from the best data attainable it is estimated that Bragg lost from his 70,000 effectives present over 20,000, though in this as in so many other important battles no official report of the aggregate Confederate loss is made.
The victors did not press the vanquished, but contented them- selves by taking position on the mountain ranges within a few miles of Chattanooga, whence they could look down upon the Union camps, while their position upon Lookout mountain completely closed the Tennessee river, so that Rosecrans was obliged to throw a ponton bridge across in the rear of the town and haul his supplies over the mountains 50 or 60 miles by the most wretched roads, which as soon as the autumn storms began to prevail would become utterly impassable. As it was, the army almost at once was distressed for rations, and many thousand horses and mules were lost from want of forage and by excessive work upon the roads. Clearly this situation could not long be borne without the utter overthrow of Rosecrans's command, and the Washington authorities acted with commendable prompt- ness. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, as we have seen, put under the com- mand of Hooker, and placed in position to protect Rosecrans's long lines of communication,-having marched to Washington and been transported thence by the roundabout route necessary in eight days from the time of leaving the Rappahannock, They were sadly needed, since the immense Union wagon trains. in addition to all other drawbacks, were constantly exposed to the raids of the vigilant Confederate cavalry, from which serions
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GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA.
losses were suffered. General Burnside was also directed to move to the assistance of the Army of the Cumberland, as was Sherman from his position in Mississippi. There was change in all direc- tions. On the 28th of September the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps were consolidated into the Fourth and placed under com- mand of General Gordon Granger, while McCook and Crittenden, the relieved corps commanders, were ordered north to await the result of a court of inquiry.
The crowning change was made, however, on the 16th of October, when the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee were consolidated as " the Military Division of the Mississippi," and placed under the command of General Grant. At the same time General Rosecrans was relieved of the command of the Army of the Cumberland, to which General Thomas was assigned, the former issuing a farewell address to the command on the 19th and at once departing for his home at Cincinnati. General Grant's first order to Thomas on taking command was to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, to which Thomas, whose army had already been on half rations for a month, made answer, "We will hold the town till we starve." The important events which followed were so entirely governed by the remarkable conformation of the region about Chatta- nooga that a general idea of the geographical features becomes necessary.
The town is situated at the head of the valley of the same name, through which flows Chattanooga Creek, emptying into the Tennessee a few miles below the town. This valley extends in a direction somewhat south of west, and its eastern boundary is formed by Missionary Ridge, a well-defined range extending far past the town at a distance of three or four miles to the eastward. Half a dozen miles south of Chattanooga was Ross- ville Pass, opening through the Ridge into Chickamauga Valley, in which the battle of that name had taken place. Bending southward around the town the Tennessee flows three or four miles till it reaches the base of Lookout Mountain forming the western boundary of Chattanooga Valley, when it turns almost due north in the shape of the letter U, the inclosed tongue of
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land being known as Moccasin Point. Lookout Mountain, which rises very abruptly, has at the top a table land of varying width, extending back for several miles, upon which, near the northern extremity, was situated the village of Summertown. Near the western base of the mountain ran Lookout Creek, giving name to the valley through which it flowed. Beyond this valley rose the less elevated Raccoon Mountains, on the other side of which the Tennessee again resumed its general southwestern course. The Confederate main force was disposed across the valley in front of Chattanooga, their pickets close up to those of the Union army, their right extending to the north- ward along Missionary Ridge, while their left ran over and along the northern and western faces of Lookout. It was this left wing, composed of part of Longstreet's troops, which command- ed from their elevated positions so much of the river and of the roads beyond as to necessitate the interminable mountain trans- portation from which the Union army was suffering.
The first movement of the campaign was planned before General Grant took command, and, as he approved it, was im- mediately carried out. Its object was to open a line of com- munication from the rear of Chattanooga across Moccasin Point and Brown's Ferry, thence through Lookout Valley, crossing the Tennessee again at Bridgeport, Ala., thus avoiding the mountains and redneing the distance one-half. To gain posses- sion of the left bank of the river at Brown's Ferry a very brill- iant night expedition was planned and successfully executed. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 24th of October 50 squads of 24 men each were quietly embarked in as many ponton boats under the command of General W. B. Hazen and without the use of oars floated down the current as near the right bank as possible till the ferry was reached. For seven miles the flotilla drifted past the Confederate picket lines without receiving a shot or being noticed, but as the oars were used to bring the boats to the landing the picket post at that point delivered a volley. The little force promptly lauded, took a position to cover the ferry and began to intrench, while the boats hastened to bring over the brigade of General Turchin which had marched
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THE NIGHT BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE.
overland to the opposite bank. A sharp attack was made on Hazen's command, but the gallant fellows held their own and the bridge was soon completed.
At the same time General Hooker set out from Bridgeport to cross the Tennessee and open the route through Lookout Valley. General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was in advance and during the 28th penetrated to Wauhatchie without encoun- tering serious opposition. After midnight, however, it was savagely assaulted by McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps, which crept upon it in the darkness hoping to take the sleeping camp by surprise. Geary and his men were wide awake, well realizing the danger of their position, and though enveloped on three sides fought unfalteringly till one brigade of Schurz's di- vision of the Eleventh Corps, encamped some miles in the rear, came up on the double-quick and relieved the pressure upon Geary's left. The other brigade had been detached en route to operate against a second body of Confederates who were advanc- ing against the camp of the Eleventh Corps. As Steinwehr's division was moving to join in the fight nearest it fire was open- ed by a strong force of the enemy posted on an almost inaccessi- ble hill 200 feet in hight. Two regiments under Colonel Orlan- do Smith,-the Thirty-third Massachusetts, Colonel A. B. Under- wood, and Smith's own, the Seventy-third Ohio,-were ordered to clear the hill with the bayonet, which was magnificently done. Colonel Underwood was severely wounded, and at the request of General Hooker received a promotion to a brigadier general- chip for his gallantry. Probably no more picturesque night battle than that of Wanhatchie was ever fought. All along the valley and up the slopes of the hills the bursts and flashes of fire ran, while from the frowning hights of Lookout, as though from batteries built amidst the clouds, the Confederate artillery joined in the strife. But the attack was everywhere repelled, and within a day or two the route though the valley was opened and firmly held. The partial freeing of the river also allowed the employment of a small steamer which some of the Michigan troops in the army had built and named the " Chattanooga, " by which supplies were brought to the ferry.
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