USA > Maryland > Chronicles of colonial Maryland, with illustrations > Part 23
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General Charles Lee, a Welchman, and not of the family of Light Horse Harry Lee, who with about 5,000 troops, had been left at North Castle, with orders to at once march to the aid of Washington, wilfully disregarded the order, though peremptorily given several times. This disloyalty and treach- ery, as subsequently proven, exposed Washington to a posi- tion of the most eminent danger, and but for his strategy, disaster and ruin to the remnant of the army then with him
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must ultimately have come, while Lee, sulking in his tent, was holding back all re-inforcements. Though ordered on the 17th of November to cross the Hudson and come to the as- sistance of Washington, he did not attempt to move until the 2nd of December, and even then he moved so slowly that on the 13th he had only gotten as far as Morristown. There, fortunately for the American cause, he was captured. Sulli- van then took the command and hastened to the support of the Commander-in-chief, reaching him on the twentieth. With these re-inforcements, and some additional men for the Mary- land Line, just arrived, Washington determined to strike a blow, and it turned out to be one of telling effect and far reaching results. Howe and Cornwallis, still waiting for the river to freeze, had gone to New York for the Christmas fes- tivities. Colonel Rahl, commanding a body of Hessians, was stationed at Trenton. On Christmas night, when the revelries of the season would likely make the enemy less active and vigilant, Washington crossed the Delaware, nine miles above Trenton. The night was dark and stormy and the river was filled with heavy, floating ice, but in spite of the difficulties, and dangers, Glover's fishermen sailors, of Long Island fame, got the little army safely over, after ten hours work, and the march upon Trenton was started amid a terrific storm of blinding hail, snow and sleet. As expected, the enemy was "caught napping". Colonel Rahl was himself so absorbed in a social game of cards at the house of a friend, that he would not even take the time to read a note sent in by a Tory inform- ing him of Washington's approach, but put it in his pocket to be read at a more convenient hour. The movement proved a complete surprise, and threw the enemy into a state of su- preme consternation, but they rallied and fought with desper- ation. Colonel Rahl soon fell mortally wounded, and Wash- ington captured 1,000 of his men, 6 brass field pieces and all his valuable stores and arms, except the arms carried by the men who escaped. The Hessians lost six officers and about 30 men killed, while Washington lost only 4, two killed, and two who froze to death. It was a splendid victory, but it would
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have been even more so had the two divisions of the army in- tended to support him, have gotten there. They were to cross the Delaware at different points and march by different routes, but the night was so stormy and the river so treacherous, that the attempt to cross was not made. Washington was ap- prised of this when he first reached the river, but he was bent on a fight, and having with him Smallwood's Maryland and the Virginia and Delaware troops, he determined to risk it with the limited force at his command.
The same day Washington recrossed the Delaware into Pennsylvania with his prisoners and prizes, but on the 30th, returned and occupied Trenton. Cornwallis, with 8,000 men, was sent forward from Princeton to dislodge him. To check the advance, harrassing parties of riflemen, sent out by Washington and stationed in the woods along the way, so retarded him that he did not reach Trenton until nearly night, by which time Washington had retired beyond the Assunpink river, a tributary of the Delaware just below Trenton, and had the bridge over it securely mounted and garrisoned. After several attempts to cross and each being repulsed with heavy loss, Cornwallis concluded to wait un- til the next morning, order 2,000 more troops from Princeton and make quick his work of demolition. But again he failed to reckon the strategy of Washington. Realizing that he could not cope with such an overwhelming force in a drawn battle, and also the danger of being hemmed in between the Delaware and Assunpink rivers, he completely foiled the enemy by playing a game which was a marvel in its concep- tion and no less wonderful in its execution. He had large camp fires started, and set a lot of men to work apparently throwing up entrenchments, in full view of the enemy, thus removing all suspicion that everything would not be ready in the morning for a battle, and one which, to Cornwallis meant certain victory and the capture of Washington. The camp fires, and the make believe entrenchments having served their purpose and lulled the enemy to sleep, Washington about mid- night slipped away, and by a route from which alarm was not
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likely to be given proceeded to Princeton, then garrisoned, as he believed, by only a few thousand men. As he entered Princeton at sunrise on the 2nd of January, the 2,000 troops ordered to the support of Cornwallis at Trenton, were just preparing to march and a sharp encounter with them ensued. Soon the entire force there was in the field, and a fierce, gen- eral engagement followed, Washington personally leading and rallying on his men until the British were completely routed, with a loss of 200 killed and 300 prisoners and all their cannon and stores. The American loss was about 30 killed and wounded, among the former being General Mercer, who with a part of the Maryland Line and Delaware troops, formed the advance guard in the march upon Princeton. The brave colonel Has- lett was also mortally wounded. When Cornwallis awoke in the morning great was his surprise and chagrin when he real- ized the trick which Washington had played on him, the whole army gone, even to the last man of those left to keep up the fires, throw up the earthworks and make the noise. They had kept up their work until about day break, when they took to the by-paths and started to join the army at Princeton, leaving only an empty camp and a feint at breastworks in front of Cornwallis.1
1 This campaign was the most brilliant one of the war of the revolution. Stonewall Jackson's valley campaign, in 1862, reminds the military student of it. Cornwallis-the ablest soldier the British fur- nished-gentleman and knight as he was, generously expressed his ad- miration for it. Stedman, his historian and comrade, considers that Washington's most remarkable and strongest marked characteristic was his supreme and unfaltering courage. To cross a wide and rapid river in winter, by night, with an inferior, half clad and half fed force, sur- prise and capture a veteran commander of regulars, to make off with his booty, and then re-occupy his position in front of Cornwallis with thrice his .numbers, fighting, holding back, eluding and strike his rear, and make him give up all the territory won by the preceding cam- paign, was an achievement of tactics and strategy, of endurance and of courage, nothing but supreme audacity, pugnacity and courage could accomplish *
* The courage displayed by Washington in this short campaign, not the physical courage of the fighter, but the intellectual intrepidity of the thinker, at once won him the respect of niilitary
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The army being greatly fatigued, having fought two bat- tles within a week, and exposed during the whole time to most trying hardships, Washington occupied Princeton for a few hours only, when he recrossed the Delaware with his prisoners and trophies, and by easy marches went into quarters at Morristown, a strong position, and spent the rest of the winter in recruiting his shattered army, and otherwise pre- paring for the spring campaign.
The battle of Trenton was a distinctive turning point in the American Revolution, for through its brilliant results, Washington was able to hold his army together. On New Years day, six days only after the eventful crossing of the Delaware on that memorable Christmas night, the term of ser- vice of the most of his men would expire and it was certain that they would disband. But Trenton dispelled their gloom, revived their spirits and inspired fresh hope, and for a small premium, which he personally guaranteed, Washington pro- cured an extension of the term of enlistment six weeks. This made possible the battle of Princeton, which gave still further buoyancy and inspiration to the army, and so enhanced its confidence, as well as that of the entire country, in Washington as a military leader, that it greatly facilitated and aided in the work of preparing for the ensuing campaign.
But it was truly a critical period in the history of the Revo- lution. The terms of enlistment of the most of his army were about to expire, and the conditions were such as to call forth the most unremitting efforts and pathetic appeals from the Commander-in-chief. In a letter to Governor Johnson of Maryland, he said: "I have no army, the men with me are too few to fight, and not enough to run away with." He also
men and military nations all over the world, and, what was of equal importance, the confidence of the people at home. There is no doubt that there was a widespread dissatisfaction with his caution and his slowness. The gentlemen who sit at a safe distance studying the map, unshaken by responsibility, always know more about war than the Generals who are fighting, and are liberal with their advice-after the event. The debaters are the most impatient for action by others.
General Washington by General Bradley T. Johnson, page 155.
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appealed most urgently to Patrick Henry, Governor of Vir- ginia, and Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut. To the latter he wrote on March 6th: "I tell you in confidence that after the 15th of this month I shall be left with the re- mains of five Virginia regiments, not amounting to more than as many hundred men, and parts of two or three other conti- nental battalions. The remainder of the army will be composed of small parties of militia from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, on which little dependence can be put, as they come and go when they please". On March 14th, from Morristown, he wrote the president of Congress: "From the most accurate estimate I can now form, the whole of our numbers in Jer- sey fit for duty at this time is under three thousand. These, nine hundred and eighty-one excepted, are militia, and stand engaged only until the last of this month". He was thus re- duced to about five hundred continentals from Virginia and four hundred and eighty-one from Maryland and a very small remnant of Haslett's brave Delaware troops. New England, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were now extremely quiet and inactive.
CAMPAIGN OF 1777
Congress, now in Baltimore, having changed the seat of the National Capital, concluded to invest Washington with practically dictatorial powers in the matter of the organization and management of the army-a power which he should have had from the beginning.
The Commander-in-chief deeply impressed with the ex- treme importance of having a regular standing army to take the place of the hastily recruited and short termed enlistments of the militia which most of the states were sending in, pre- vailed upon Congress, near the close of the previous year, to organize an army of eighty battalions of regulars, and to call upon the states to furnish them. Congress also ordered
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sixteen additional battalions to be raised on its own account and wherever the men could be found to fill them. These were independent of the several state lines, or troops of lines, as they were sometimes called. Many of these battalions were never raised, but the order resulted in bringing into the field a considerable re-inforcement and of placing the army upon a much more efficient footing. Maryland's quota was eight battalions, of 500 men each, one tenth of the whole requisi- tion upon the states, and seemingly an undue proportion, but Maryland determined to exert every effort to comply with the order. The independent companies, then in the field, were com- bined into one battalion. Commissioners were hurried to camp to try to induce the Maryland militia of the Flying Camp, whose term was about to expire, to re-enlist for the war, and to a large degree they were successful. This, together with a most marked activity in the recruiting station of the state, enabled Maryland to comply with the requisition of Congress. That is, she furnished five new battalions, which, with Small- wood's battalion, and the one formed of the independent companies, made seven, the remnant of the rifle regiment of Colonel Rawlings, to which her four German regiments were added, constituting the eight. These battalions constituted two brigades, the one being under the command of General Small- wood, whom Congress had promoted in October to a Brig- adier-General, and the other, that of Brigadier-General De- boore the whole division being commanded by Major-General Sullivan.
The season was well advanced before any movement of importance occurred. Washington, now with 8,000 men, moved down from Morristown to Middlebrook, a central and strong position, from whence he would endeavor to check any advance of the enemy upon Philadelphia, while Gates, Schuyler, Arnold, and Morgan, with about the same force, were on the upper Hudson to anticipate the descent from Canada into New York of the army of General Burgoyne. Howe had been instructed
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by the British Board of War to form a juncture at Albany with Burgoyne and with the combined forces endeavor to capture the State of New York, use it as a military center and thus completely cut off the States lying south of it from those on the north. It was a long March for Burgoyne, and Howe concluded, in the meantime, to slip down and capture Philadelphia, apparently easy to do with 18,000 men. To that end, he left New Brunswick, his winter quarters, on the 12th of June, but he never got beyond Middlebrook, where Wash- ington was so securely entrenched that Howe could neither get by him or successfully assail him. By a series of marches and counter-marches, skirmishes and strategic movements, Washington, with his 8,000 men and strong position, not only prevented the further advance of the British, but so harrassed and perplexed Howe that dismayed and worn out, on the 30th of June, he abandoned his project and returned to Staten Island. In those eighteen days there was not a battle fought, and yet, the superlative genius of Washington brought to its cause one of the most notable achievements of the American Revolution.
But as great a marvel in military skill as it was, it meant vastly more than simply driving Howe from his course. It meant even more than saving for the time, Philadelphia from capture, which after all was, as a war measure, of but little importance, as it was neither a governmental position or a military center, but was simply the seat of Congress, which could hold its session as easily elsewhere ; but it carried with it the significant fact, as will be seen, that Howe was foiled in his plans to reach his objective point and get back in time to form the expected union with Burgoyne at Albany. Howe was now so eager to get to Philadelphia that, unmind- ful of Burgoyne, he sailed away with his 18,000 men down the Ocean, passed the Delaware, which he feared was obstructed, and up the Chesapeake Bay to Elkton, consuming 24 days, from whence he expected to march upon Philadelphia. Wash- ington now had Howe where he wanted him, for though he could
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scarcely hope to win a battle against an army of veterans more than twice the size of his own and consisting chiefly of new re- cruits and raw militia, he felt that he could obstruct, check and retard his progress, and thus gain time, until it would be too late for Howe, now 400 miles away, to get back and re-inforce Burgoyne. And he did it, for while Howe in time reached Philadelphia, he had been held back nearly a month, and had been so harrassed before and after, that before he could give a thought as to how he could get away, Burgoyne had fallen and Saratoga had been won.
While waiting for Howe to complete his sea voyage, Sul- livan, with the Maryland Line, determined upon an attack upon Staten Island in the hope of capturing about 1,000 Tories stationed there, some distance from the regular army. The attempt was made on the night of the 22nd of August, but owing to the mistake of Smallwood's guide in leading him in the darkness in front of the enemy instead of its rear, the movement became known, a general alarm was sounded and a retreat was ordered. It was made in the midst of sharp skirmishing, with a small loss on both sides, and the Americans brought away with them two Colonels and about thirty men.
On the 24th, Washington, learning that.Howe had reached Elkton, and that he was preparing to land there, at once took up his line of march to meet him. The two armies met at Wilmington, Delaware. Sharp skirmishing ensued, but Wash- ington slowly retreated in front of the enemy until the Brandy- wine was reached, whence he determined to give him battle. On the IIth of September the Hessian troops as an advance reached the opposite side of the Brandywine at Chads Ford, but did not attempt to cross in the face of the American Army. Nor did Washington deem it wise to make an offen- sive movement at that moment, not knowing just where Howe and the main Army were stationed. Washington was now in- formed that Howe had crossed the Brandywine much higher up and was making a circuitous march of seventeen miles to Chads Ford, hoping to trap and hedge in the Americans between the two wings of the British Army. He ordered
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Sullivan with the Maryland Line, Stirling's, Stephen's and Hager's regiments to advance and check Howe's march, while he in front, and Green in the rear, would cross the Brandywine and capture the Hessians at Chads Ford. As this order was being executed, Sullivan received information that Howe was not advancing as at first alleged, and his whereabouts not being known, for though in a thickly settled country not a soul would reveal Howe's movements, the plan of attack thus ordered, and which, if properly executed, must have brought brilliant results, was countermanded. Amid the confusion in- cident to these conflicting reports and ignorant of the real po- sition of the enemy, Howe was found to be within a few miles only of Chads Ford. It was now too late to carry out Wash- ington's first plan, but Sullivan met Howe and a terrific and murderous battle followed. With such immense odds against him, Sullivan could not of course, hold out, and to prevent the useless loss of life of his men, retreated, the movement being covered by Washington and Green in such a masterly way that Sullivan's troops did not even know they were retreat- ing, but thought they were simply falling back to a stronger position. The enemy not further pursuing the attack, the bat- tle of Brandywine thus ended-a battle which is generally recorded as a British victory. In so far as the secrecy of Howe's movements having prevented the capture of the Hes- sians at Chads Ford it was, but the chief value of that splen- didly planned and carefully executed march was thrown away and forever lost when Howe failed then and there to completely annihilate the American Army. He had 18,000 men, and now had Washington wedged in between the two divisions of the British Army, and yet he allowed Washington to escape, "horse, foot and dragoon" with the loss of only about 1,000 men, his own loss being largely in excess of that number.
Though only a few miles away, by the surprise of Paoli, and some effective manoeuvers and skirmishes, Washington de- layed Howe's entrance into Philadelphia until the 22nd of Sep- tember. Congress on the 18th, had adjourned to Lancaster, Pa. But Washington still did not intend to give Howe time to
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consider how he could get back and form the juncture with Bur- goyne. Howe did not occupy Philadelphia, but was stationed with the main army at Germantown, nearby. On the night of the 3rd of October, Washington began a march of 42 miles to put into execution a boldly conceived plan to either cap- ture Howe's army, or to completely route it, and he came within an ace of doing it. He was to enter Germantown in four divis- ions and by four different routes and the enemy, thus hemmed in, would be forced to surrender. Sullivan was in command on the right, Green on the left while Armstrong was to attack in front and Smallwood and Foreman in the rear. The attack was to be made at day break by all the divisions at the same moment, but owing to unforeseen difficulties, this simultaneous movement could not be made. Green had found obstructions which delayed him more than an hour, and Smallwood and Foreman encountered breast works in their line of march which had to be overcome and they did not reach the ground until the battle was practically over. But in spite of Wash- ington's plans being thus upset, Germantown came marvel- lously near being an American victory. Sullivan at the ap- pointed time, sent forward the Maryland Line to attack the out- posts of the enemy. This was done with such vigor and steadi- ness that the British light infantry fled from the field and their whole encampment fell into the hands of the advancing col- umn. Sullivan's whole division now came up with great resolu- tion and behaved, throughout, as Washington said, "With a degree of gallantry that did them the highest credit". The British were stampeded, and such as could do so, took refuge in the Chew Stone house. By this time Green had arrived, and threw himself with powerful force into the engagement. The enemy was fast recoiling under a terrific fire, when a Virginia brigade, under Stephens, owing to an almost opaque fog and the thick and dense smoke, mistook Wayne's division for the enemy, and opened fire upon them in the rear, thus causing a panic in that division, which, not being understood, rapidly spread, causing a general disorder and the day was lost. Sullivan, who was in the advance, finding that in the
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confusion he could get no support, retreated, and returned with the rest of the army to its encampment. The loss on each side was about 800 men.1
Howe now wanted to get into communication with his fleet, but to do so he had to reduce . Fort Miffen and Fort Mercer in the Delaware, but General Samuel Smith, of Maryland, in command of the former and the one first attacked, maintained his ground with such determined cour- age that, long before the reduction could be accomplished, the crowning glory of the campaign of 1777 had come and Washington had his coveted goal. Howe had been success- fully held back until Burgoyne, unsupported, had surrendered, and Saratoga, with its significant bearing upon the cause of American independence, had triumphantly been won.
Washington now retired to White Marsh. Howe sent a force to draw him out, but after a short but desperately sharp attack by the Maryland Line and Morgan's riflemen the enemy returned to Philadelphia.
In December, Sir William Howe resigned as Commander- in-chief of the British Army, and Washington went into his memorable winter quarters at Valley Forge. Sullivan was relieved of his command of the Maryland Line, which now devolved upon Smallwood who went into winter quarters at Wilmington to protect the State of Delaware. While there he captured a British vessel loaded with provisions and stores, and a sloop loaded with tents and arms, and which materially contributed to the comfort and cheer of Smallwood and his troops during that eventful season.
CAMPAIGN OF 1778
The winter at Valley Forge was one of acute distress and anxiety to Washington and of intense suffering for his men, many of whom were barefooted and almost naked. One
1 Lossing, and other historians quoting him, say, the Maryland Militia did not come into action. This is misleading. The Maryland Militia-raw recruits, then being marched to the front, were delayed. by breast works, but the Maryland Line, then seven full regiments, under Sullivan, was the first in action at Germantown, was constantly engaged, and for its gallantry and resolution received the highest com- mendation. Sparks V-80; Life of General Sullivan, 64.
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suit for two men, wearing it alternately, was not uncommon, the one staying in when the other was out. They rudely constructed for themselves huts built of poles with mud dob- bing and roof, but even they were little more than an apol- ogy for the name. Blankets too, were scarce, one frequently sufficing for two men, the one sitting up by the fire while the other slept, and the question of food even became a serious, and at times, a most alarming one. This seemed the harder be- cause apparently unnecessary and the result of an insufficient commissary department, which, after getting clothes, shoes and blankets, failed to have them transported while the army was suffering and dying from severe exposure. Washington's pathetic appeal for his men was most powerful, but it failed of results until a degree of hardship had been endured that would almost defy accurate description and yet, those who survived, bore it with a fortitude and spirit which could only be done by the exercise and the display of the highest and noblest sense of patriotic duty.
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