Biographical encyclopedia of Maine of the nineteenth century, Part 35

Author:
Publication date: 1885
Publisher: Boston : Metropolitan Publishing and Engraving Company
Number of Pages: 548


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Early in September, the First Maine Battery was ordered to Carrollton, five miles up the river from New Orleans, to relieve Nims' Battery, which had been considerably reduced by service at Baton Rouge and by disease. Lieutenant Hubbard welcomed the change, as it gave better opportunity for drill than the confined camp in the city afforded, and it was also an advance toward more active service. Soon after reaching its new camp the battery was ordered up the river and across toward the Opelousas Railroad on a scouting expedition. But the expedition, as his next letter mentions, " did not amount to much. We went up the river about thirty-five miles, and surrounded and drove into the swamp a band of four or five hundred. Texan horsemen. They only fired one volley, and then the shells from our guns sent them to the right about. The expedition appeared to be badly managed, or we might have taken the whole band. As it was, we killed ten or twelve, captured about twenty, and took some two hundred horses. The men plunged their horses into the swamp, where they in a few minutes became mired, and then trusted to their own legs-in most cases with entire success. This affair is apparently the same mentioned by General Dick Taylor in his work called "Destruction and Reconstruc- tion." The defeated force was Colonel Waller's battalion of mounted riflemen from Texas. General Taylor had cautioned this commander that the danger while operating on the river was that forces might be thrown ashore from transports above and below him at points where the swamps in the rear of the river.are impassable ; "and this trap," General Taylor mournfully adds, " Waller fell into. Most of his men escaped by abandon- ing arms, horses, etc. Immunity from attack for some days had made them careless. Nothing compensates for absence of discipline."


Soon after this affair, Lieutenant Hubbard was selected by Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel for the position of Assistant Adjutant-General, with rank of Captain, and upon General Weitzel's recommendation received his commission from the War Department at Washington, with rank from October 27, 1862. Prior to this date he was assigned to duty in his new capacity by orders of September 29.


General Weitzel had been Chief Engineer of the Department of the Gulf upon the staff of General Butler. He was a graduate of West Point, and was held in high esteem for his superior ability, his unusual scientific attainments, and his many excellent qualities. Those who served with him hold his memory in affectionate remembrance, and the soldiers of the Army of the Gulf are willing witnesses to his manly character and his military suc- cesses. In October, 1862, then newly appointed brigadier-general, he was put in com- mand of a large brigade, consisting of five infantry regiments, two batteries, and four


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companies of cavalry, designed for an expedition into the interior, west of the city. The purpose was to secure New Orleans from constantly threatened attack by extending the Union lines ; to restore to the control of the United States the fertile and extensive region of the Lafourche ; and to secure a base for the operation of light-draught gunboats from Berwick's Bay up the Teche and Atchafalaya rivers. The plan of campaign embraced three distinct lines of operation : one to Donaldsonville, eighty-two miles above New Orleans, and thence down to the bayou Lafourche toward the point where it is crossed by the Opelousas Railroad ; one on the line of the railroad from Algiers, opposite New Orleans, toward the Lafourche crossing ; and the third by gunboats into Berwick's Bay, from which the numerous interior watercourses of the State could be entered, and the rebel craft that traversed them might be reached. The operations of the land force, if successful, would compel the enemy to retreat across Berwick's Bay, where the gunboats might intercept them, or, failing in this, might prevent their return toward the city. General Butler had prepared a few light-draught boats for this expedition, and had given to Lieutenant T. McK. Buchanan, their chief command. This brief campaign, though overshadowed by the numerous movements of larger forces in other sections of the country, reflects great credit on the commander who conceived and the officers who suc- cessfully executed it.


On the 24th of October General Weitzel left Carrollton with his brigade, and pro- ceeded by river transports, under escort of gunboats, to Miner's Point, six miles below Donaldsonville. There the troops disembarked, and on the morning of the 25th, at about IO A.M., entered Donaldsonville without opposition. A reconnoitring party of two infantry companies and one company of cavalry, accompanied by Captain Hubbard, chief of staff, was at once sent out. They drove in the enemy's pickets, and captured nineteen prisoners, who "reported forces on both sides the bayou, numbering in all some three thousand, and commanded by General Mouton, a graduate of West Point. Early on the morning of the 26th Weitzel advanced down Bayou Lafourche, leaving one regiment of his command, the First Louisiana, to hold the post at Donaldsonville. Anticipating that the enemy would avail themselves of the numerous flat-boat ferries known to be in the bayou, to cross from one side to the other, General Weitzel took in tow a flat-boat bridge, and carried it with him throughout his whole march. This proved to be of invaluable service, and indeed contributed more than any single circumstance to the success of his operations.


All day the enemy's scouts were continually in sight of the advanced guard, and just before the command went into the camp a captain of the enemy's forces was killed and three prisoners were taken. Weitzel had marched on the left or eastern bank of the bayou, with one company only of the Eighth New Hampshire on the right bank. When within a mile of Napoleonville, about sixteen miles from Donaldsonville, the troops bivouacked for the night in line of battle, On the morning of the 27th the command moved at six o'clock,


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but feeling that the enemy was in some force on the right bank, General Weitzel threw the whole of the Eighth New Hampshire and one company of cavalry (Perkins') to that side, by means of his floating bridge. In this order the command moved down the bayou. About eleven o'clock, when within two miles of Labadieville, the enemy was reported to be in force a mile ahead on the left bank, with six pieces of artillery. General Weitzel immediately ordered four pieces from Carruth's Massachusetts Battery to join Thompson's First Maine Battery in the advance, and deployed the Thirteenth Connecticut and Seventy- fifth New York regiments to support the artillery. Moving forward to the attack through a field of dense cane, it was seen on emerging that the enemy was also in posi- tion on the right bank of the bayou, and had four pieces of artillery there. At the same time the enemy's cavalry was reported to be in the rear of General Weitzel's rear-guard. He at once swung his bridge across the bayou and ordered eight companies of the Twelfth Connecticut over to support the Eighth New Hampshire, leaving to guard the rear two companies of the Twelfth Connecticut, one section of Carruth's Battery, and one company (Williamson's) of cavalry. A road was immediately cut up the steep banks of the bayou on both sides for the passage of artillery. The enemy on the left, after deliver- ing the fire of their advanced guard, disappeared suddenly. This force was afterward learned to be Semmes' Battery of six pieces, supported by Colonel Clack's Louisiana Volunteers.


Fearing some ruse, General Weitzel at once ordered Thompson's Battery to play across the bayou upon the enemy's artillery on the right bank, which was firing splendidly upon his forces and on the bridge, and ordered the two advanced sections of Carruth's Battery and the Thirteenth Connecticut over to the right bank; leaving the Seventy-fifth New York to support Thompson's Battery and guard the head of the bridge and of the train. From the right bank Weitzel at once advanced three regiments, under fire of the enemy's artillery and of his infantry supports, protected by a deep ditch in which they had taken position. Before this prompt attack the enemy gave way. Their force on the right bank consisted of the Eighteenth Louisiana under command of Colonel Armand, the Cres- cent Regiment, Colonel McPheeters, numbering together about five hundred men, and Ralston's Battery, Company H, of Withers' Light Artillery. Colonel McPheeters was killed, Captain Ralston wounded and taken prisoner, with two hundred and eight of the enemy's men. These reported that they had confidently expected to " bag" the Union force and appropriate Weitzel's train and supplies. Supposing that his forces on either side the bayou would be unable to unite, they had burned all the bridges on his route to prevent him from crossing, and had neither anticipated his expedient of towing a bridge nor provided themselves with one.


General Taylor in his work already referred to speaks of this victory as an " untoward event" for the Confederate cause. It occurred during his absence from the Lafourche Dis- trict. He says, "A feint on Des Allemands had induced the movement of nearly half the


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little force in that direction, and Mouton had scant time after he reached Thibodeaux to correct errors before the enemy was upon him. There were Confederates on both sides of the bayou, but, having neglected their floating bridge, they could not unite. The fighting was severe, and Armand " (who was in immediate command of the forces on the right bank) "only retired after his ammunition was exhausted ; but he lost many killed and wounded, and some prisoners. With his forces well in hand, Mouton would have defeated Weitzel and retained possession of the Lafourche country."


What General Taylor calls the feint on Des Allemands was the advance of two regi- ments from Algiers by the railroad, and served the purpose intended in the general plan of the campaign.


On the day following the battle Weitzel continued his march down the bayou, with the larger part of his brigade on the right bank. About 3 P.M. he entered Thibodeaux without opposition, and in time to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridges across the Lafourche and the Terrebonne, which the enemy had fired in their retreat to Berwick's Bay. On the 29th, the Thirteenth Connecticut, with a company (Barrett's) of cavalry and section of artillery, continued down the Lafourche toward Des Allemands, and opened communication with Colonel Thomas, who with the Eighth Vermont and a Louisiana regi- ment was following the railroad from New Orleans.


There were evidences of the enemy's hasty retreat toward Berwick's Bay. Consider- able rolling-stock which they had been unable to destroy or remove was taken ; guns were found spiked, and infantry equipments were scattered along the road. The partially burned bridge at Des Allemands was speedily repaired, and on November 2 a train passed over the road into Thibodeaux, where General Weitzel made his headquarters. The passage of the gunboats into Berwick's Bay was delayed by a severe storm, and some of them grounded at the entrance. On their approach the enemy crossed to the west side of the bay, "in such a hurry," reported General Weitzel, " that they left near four hundred wagon-loads of negroes behind at Brashear City. To substantiate this report, the negroes are already re- turning. Now what shall I do with them ? I have already twice as many negroes in and around my camp as I have soldiers within. I cannot feed them. As a consequence, they must feed themselves. The community, of whom quite a number have already taken the oath of allegiance, is in great terror, fearing trouble with the negroes. They beg me to allow them to retain their arms. I cannot do this without authority from headquarters. Last night my pickets were fired upon by some person, and with a shot-gun. This would make it prudent to allow only those to retain arms who had taken the oath or were pa- roled." General Butler's orders relating to the Lafourche District are historical. They created wide discussion and no little excitement when issued, and have been frequently published in connection with the chronicles of that time. They secured the sugar-crop of that season for loyal owners, where such could be found, and for the U. S. Government


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where there were no loyal owners ; they promoted quiet in the newly acquired district, by promoting industry ; and they helped solve what was called " the negro problem," by estab- lishing terms of employment between the escaped slave and his former master. The further question of organizing the freed slaves as troops caused a divergence of views even among the officers of the Northern Army, which deserves a passing illustration, drawn from the events and public correspondence of the time. In anticipation of the speedy advance of General Weitzel into the Teche country, he was offered command of a new military dis- trict, to be formed from the territory west of the Mississippi, and designated the District of the Teche. Declining the command in a communication of November 5, he expressed the following views upon the subject of arming the slaves : "The commanding-general knows well my private opinions on this subject. What I stated to him in private whilst on his staff, I see now before my eyes. Since the arrival of the negro regiments, symptoms of servile insurrection are becoming apparent. I could not, without breaking my brigade all up, put a force in every part of this district to keep down such an insurrection. I can- not assume the command of such a force, and thus be responsible for its conduct. I have no confidence in the organization. Its moral effect in this community, which is stripped of nearly all its able-bodied men and will be stripped of a great many of its arms, is terrible. Women and children, and even men, are in terror. It is heart-rending, and I cannot make myself responsible for it. I will gladly go anywhere with my own brigade that you see fit to order me. I beg you therefore to keep the negro brigade directly under your own command, or place some one over both mine and it."


General Butler replied on the following day through his Adjutant-General, Major Strong. Referring to the fears expressed by General Weitzel lest the presence of the black troops should encourage a servile insurrection, he urges that such is not likely to be the case, and adds :


"You say that the prospect of such an insurrection is heart-rending, and that you cannot be respon- sible for it. You are in no degree responsible for it. The responsibility rests upon those who have begun and carried on this war; who have stopped at no barbarity, no act of outrage, upon the citizens . . and troops of the United States.


" You have forwarded me the records of a pretended court-martial, showing that seven men of one of your regiments, who enlisted here in the Eighth Vermont Regiment, who had surrendered them- selves prisoners of war, were in cold blood murdered, and, as certain information shows, were required to dig their own graves. You are asked if this is not an occurrence equally as heart-rending as a pro- spective servile insurrection.


"The question is next to be met, whether in a hostile, rebellious part of the State, where this very murder has been committed by the militia, you are to stop in the operations of the field to put down the servile insurrection, because the men and women are terror-stricken. 'When was it ever heard before that a victorious General, in an unsurrendered province, stopped in his course for the purpose of prevent- ing the rebellious inhabitants of that province from destroying each other, and refused to take the com-


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mand of a conquered province lest he should be made responsible for their self-destruction ? As a military question, perhaps the more terror-stricken the inhabitants are that are left in your rear, the more safe will be your line of communication.


" You say there have appeared before your eyes the very facts, in terror-stricken women and chil- dren and men, which you had before contemplated in theory. Grant it; but is not the remedy to be found in the surrender of the neighbors, fathers, brothers, and sons of the terror-stricken women and children, who are now in arms against the Government within twenty miles of you. And when that is done and you have no longer to fear from their organized force and they have returned peaceably to their homes, you will be able to use the full power of your troops to insure their safety from the so-much-feared-by them, but not by us-servile insurrection. . . . If your negro or other regiments commit any outrage upon unoffending and unarmed people, quietly attending to their own business, let them be most severely punished. But while operations in the field are going on, I do not see how you can turn aside from an armed enemy before you, to protect or defend the wives and children of the armed enemy from the consequences of their own rebellious wickedness.


"Consider this case: General Bragg is at liberty to ravish the homes of our brethren in Kentucky, because the Union Army of Louisiana are protecting his wife and his house against his negroes. It is understood that Mrs. Bragg is one of those terrified women of whom you speak in your report. This subject is not for the first time under the consideration of the commanding-general. When in command of the Department of Annapolis, in May, 1861, he was asked to protect a community against the conse- quences of a servile rebellion. He replied that when that community laid down its arms and called upon him for protection, he would, because from that moment between them and him war would cease."


The dreaded servile insurrection did not occur, and the colored troops gave valuable service.


In a letter written about this time, Captain Hubbard presents a less serious but per- haps equally correct view of the same subject. He says business of all kinds has to be attended to by the brigade staff. " Desolate women, whose favorite chicken has been sadly frightened by our brutal cavalry, throw themselves on the mercy of the General, and, regard- less of the fact that their own husbands and brothers are stealing our chickens, request that the Southern poultry may have the protection of the Constitution of the United States. . . One fact always appears-while the rest of the family have been violently opposed to the United States, ... yet the husband, brother, wife, or sister, in whose name the property is held, has always been persecuted by the rest of the family for having expressed continually the strongest Union sentiments."


On the 15th of December General Butler issued his somewhat celebrated order of farewell to the Army of the Gulf, and on the following day General Banks formally assumed the command of the department.


General Weitzel had expressed confidence that with the troops and gunboats at his command he could at a certain expense of life defeat the enemy on the Teche, but he was of the opinion that no compensating advantage would be gained, unless he was given sufficient force to permanently occupy Opelousas and Alexandria, interrupt the trans-


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Mississippi communications and supplies of the enemy, and thus weaken their hold of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, which latter place was then being strongly garrisoned and fortified. He advised that a permanent occupation of Alexandria, giving our gunboats control of the Atchafalaya and lower Red Rivers, and access thence to the Mississippi, must in due time compel the evacuation of Port Hudson. But as his command was not strengthened for such a campaign he remained at Thibodeaux, making the reconnoissances and demonstrations necessary to protect the country he had acquired. One of these, which at that time attracted general attention, was the expedition against the rebel gunboat Cotton. This was originally a large river-steamer, but had been protected with railroad iron and cotton bales, and furnished with an armament of three guns. Thus converted into a formidable war-vessel, she occupied the lower Teche, served as an outpost for Mouton's force, which occupied an intrenched camp at Bisland Plantation, some thirteen miles above Berwick's Bay, and constantly threatened the small garrison at Brashear City and the two smaller craft that protected it. Those small boats had several times attacked the Cotton, but had been repulsed, the enemy having placed obstructions in the stream so that only one boat at a time could approach, and having dug rifle-pits along the banks of the bayou.


On the 12th of January, Weitzel, having concentrated at Brashear City six regiments, three batteries, and one cavalry company, crossed the bay, and on the following day moved up the bay and bayou and bivouacked in sight of the Cotton. On the 14th the forces moved slowly forward about two miles, in line of battle, to guard against attack from the enemy's cavalry, of whom some five hundred were in sight. General Weitzel's plan was to advance in line of battle until nearly opposite the Cotton, and then send sharp- shooters down to the bank of the bayou to pick off her gunners. The advance was under her fire, which was not much distracted by our gunboats, as the obstructions in the river kept them nearly a mile below the scene of action. When the proper position was reached, sixty volunteers, previously selected, sprang forward, and running to the bank, fired rapidly at short range. In ten minutes not a man of the sixty comprising the Cotton's crew could be seen. Her gunners, one after another, were killed or wounded, until all abandoned the guns. One battery from the enemy's land force came to her assist- ance, but was driven back by Weitzel's artillery, which also poured a hot fire into the boat. For an hour there was a continuous roar of artillery, but as the infantry of the attacking party was ordered to lie down, their loss was only six killed and twenty-seven wounded. The Cotton slowly backed up the bayou, and Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, com- manding the Union gunboats, ordered one of them forward as far as possible, without waiting for the detail from the Union force to cross the bayou and clear the bank of sharp- shooters on the other side. The advancing gunboat was met by the explosion of a torpedo under the water and a shower of bullets from the enemy's rifle-pits, crippling her so that


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she was obliged to fall back. Lieutenant Buchanan immediately urged forward his own boat, and, standing in full uniform on the upper deck, near the pilot-house, was shot through the head and instantly killed. The Cotton withdrew out of range, and the attacking party bivouacked for the night. On the following morning, as they were preparing to advance, the enemy, unwilling to risk an engagement of the land forces, set fire to the Cotton and destroyed her.


Having accomplished the object of his expedition, Weitzel returned to the bay and crossed to Brashear City the same night. "We marched," writes Captain Hubbard, "in mud and water; slept, without fires, in mud and water; and had only hard bread to eat. But the men were in the best of spirits, and seemed to enjoy the expedition." On the eve of the fight, Captain Hubbard writes, a bullet whistled by his ears as he was establishing a picket-line ; and in order to get possession of a sugar-mill where he wished a strong outpost, he was obliged to bring up two pieces of artillery and shell out the enemy's sharpshooters. They were also supported by artillery, and a very warm duel ensued. " I have a hole in my saddle-bags," he writes, " made by a ricochetting canister-shot. We took the building, however."


Early in March, General Weitzel moved his brigade, now increased to eight infantry regiments, three batteries, and three companies of cavalry, to Brashear City, in readiness for an anticipated advance toward the Red River country, and better to intercept any demonstration of the enemy upon New Orleans, then left with a very small garrison during a movement by General Banks with transports up the Mississippi. At this time frequent reports were brought in by spies that the enemy was preparing to bring down from the Red River and the Atchafalaya a number of gunboats to attack the force at Brashear, and parties were also reported moving to destroy the bridge at Brashear. General Weitzel sent Captain Hubbard on a reconnoissance through the adjacent bayous, and on his return changed the camp of the brigade to Bayou Bœuf, a point on the railroad eight miles nearer New Orleans. General Banks, however, returned shortly from his river expedition ; General Emory and General Grover, each in command of a division, moved out from the city to Bayou Bœuf, and General Weitzel resumed the post at Brashear. The method adopted by General Weitzel in destroying the Cotton was now used by the enemy against one of his boats, the Diana. Lieutenant Allen, of his staff, had taken her into Grand Lake, a confluence of the Atchafalaya and the Teche, at the southern extremity of which is Berwick's Bay, upon a reconnaissance, and her captain attempted to return by the Teche. Here she was opened upon by a light battery and a body of sharpshooters, who from the banks picked off her men. The captain of the Diana and his first two officers were almost immediately killed, the tiller ropes cut, the pilot knocked overboard; and after backing over a mile, riddled with shell, and with her men unable to work a gun, the boat surren- dered. The enemy repaired her, and afterward used her with effect in opposing the Union




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