USA > Maine > The story of the Maine Fifteenth; being a brief narrative of the more important events in the history of the Fifteenth Maine regiment; together with a complete roster of the regiment , embracing the name of every officer and enlisted man serving > Part 14
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ing general, who, night and day, with an ever-abiding faith, had watched the work with an interest so intense that failure must have produced a fear- ful shock. At the moment one of the crack bands of Emory's Division was discoursing enchanting music at headquarters, but the chief of the offi- cial galaxy was vastly more interested in the music of the ax and hammer, at the river's bank, at that critical moment so fraught with very great re- sponsibility to the commander of the Expedition. Had the naval com- mander been equally interested and on the alert, the work would sooner have reached its successful completion.
By the afternoon of the 8th of May the structure was well-nigh complete. For a mile and a quarter in extent the water had been raised seven feet. There was a descent of six feet below the falls, giving a pre- cipitation of thirteen feet above and below the falls. The pressure was tremendous ! Whatever was to be done must be done quickly ! But the Navy was listless, and inexcusably indolent. True, three of the lighter- draught vessels had been made ready to run the gauntlet, and moved down to the vicinity of the dam, but all the others remained serenely and pro- vokingly undisturbed, at anchor above the Upper Rapids. At about midnight Gen. Banks went over the works, and was much impressed with the conviction that the dam could withstand the pressure but a few hours. He was, of course, very strenuous that the vessels make the passage at the earliest moment possible. He rode, post-haste, to where the fleet was an- chored, a mile or more above, only to find the vessels enshrouded in dark- ness, with scarcely a man anywhere to be seen ! He aroused Admiral Porter, sent a staff officer on board to apprise him of the situation and urge him to make ready ; and three hours later-at 5 a. m. of the 9th --- a con- siderable portion of the dam was swept away. Two of the stone-laden barges had swung in below the dam on one side, allowing the water to es- cape in torrents. Porter, seeing the catastrophe. rode up to the vessels above the Upper Falls and ordered the Lexington to attempt to make the passage. She passed the Upper Falls just in season, the water falling very rapidly. The water was rushing through the opening in a furious torrent ; nevertheless the vessel made for the narrow aperture -- and thousands of men lining the river's banks held their breath and anxiously awaited the result ! Entering the gap under a full head of steam, she pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, lingered a moment on the rocks below as if to gather courage for the final effort, and then safe- ly leaped into deep water and the current below, and was soon moored by the river's bank ! Did anybody cheer? Well, the boys now living who were lookers-on very well remember ! The Lexington was soon followed by the three vessels that had early come over the Upper Falls. The Neo- sho's pilot lost courage as she approached the abyss and stopped his engine.
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The hull of the vessel was entirely submerged under water, and all sup- posed that she was hopelessly wrecked. She soon showed herself above water, however, jumped over the rocks, irresistably swept by the current, and escaped with ouly slight bruises. The other two followed quickly and successfully-and the gunboats were rescued. The stone-barges swept away had fortunately so swung around as to form a cushion against which the vessels might strike, preventing them from rushing to certain destrue- tion upon the rocks on the river's bank. But the water had now all passed ont, the rocks were again bare, and six of the most valuable gunboats, and two tug;, were still above the Upper Rapids ! And up to the hour of the carrying away of the dam no effort had been made to lighten the vessels, either in the way of the removal of cargo, armament, or iron-plating. There was no alternative but to make a second experiment. Engineer Bailey was by no means disheartened, and he renewed his exertions with re:loubled cuergy. In the re-building the plan was changed ; instead of a continuous dam of six hundred feet across the river, the gap in the old dam was but partially closed and a series of eight or teu wing-dams constructed at the Upper Falls, ou either bank of the river. This plan turned the cur- rent of water directly upon the channel, raising it at different points suffi- ciently to allow the vessels to pass, and work their way to the chute in the dam, fifty-five feet wide. Three days were occupied in the construction of the second dam. On the 12th of May all the vessels worked their way over the Upper Falls, and two of them through the opening in the dam ; and by 9 o'clock on the morning of the 13th all the vessels had safely pass- ed to deep water below. The ingenious engineering feat of a Yankee lum- berman had proved a grand success, and had saved to the government a fleet of naval vessels valued at more than two millions of dollars.
While the work upon the dam was in progress the rebel Gen. Pol- ignac was waging savage warfare upon our navigation, on the stream below. effectually blockading the river from the 4th of May until army and navy had passed below. Two gunboats, convoying a transport steamer upon which was from four to five hundred soldiers, bound down the river, were compelled to run the gauntlet of a very severe fire, from infantry and bat- teries, for many miles, the vessels being completely riddled with shot and shell. disabled, and rendered helpless. From four to five thousand infantry were in the attacking party. One guuboat was abandoned and burned ; the other, and the transport, surrendered to the enemy. Our poor boys were exposed to this barbarous warfare for five hours. Many were scalded to death ; some were drowned ; and others met with death in various tragic modes Of the four hundred or more soldiers over one hundred were killed and wounded and one hundred and fifty captured ; the residue took to the shore and escaped-a party of them making their way to Alexan-
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dria, pursued to within ten miles of the city by the enemy's cavalry. Another vessel coming up the river, with an Ohio regiment on board, was most cruelly assailed, only two hundred out of a party of four hundred and fifty escaping. The second shot from the enemy's batteries cut the steam- er's smoke-stack. filling the vessel with steam and smoke, and placing all on board completely at the merey of the rebels on shore. Half of those on board were either shot down, burned to death by the escaping steam, or found a watery grave in the river, into which they had jumped as the only avenue of escape. Three Ohio Colonels were killed outright. The annals of the war may be searched in vain for more tragic incidents than those experienced on the naval vessels and transports along the line of this river, while the rebels were holding high carnival along its banks.
CHAPTER XXIV.
FROM ALEXANDRIA TO THE MISSISSIPPI AND " THE END " OF AN EVER-MEMORABLE CAMPAIGN.
THE IMPRISONED GUNBOATS RELEASED AND ARMY AND NAVY STRIKE OUT FOR THE MISSISSIPPI. - THE EVACUATION AND BURNING OF ALEXANDRIA. -- SKIRMISHING IN FRONT .- THE REBELS MAKE A SPIRITED STAND AT MARKSVILLE AND AGAIN ON THE PLAINS OF MANSURA. - OUR ENTIRE ARMY EXHIBITED ON THE PLAINS. - A NOVEL BRIDGE ACROSS THE ATCHAFALAYA. - SMITH AND POLIGNAC WRESTLE AT YELLOW BAYOU. -- END OF THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. --- THE CAMPAIGN AND ITS BLUNDERS. - THE CREDITABLE PART IN THE DRAMA PLAYED BY EMORY'S DIVISION.
O sooner had the last of the imprisoned gunboats been released than the entire army was put upon the move for the Mississippi, on the river-road-the naval vessels and transports keeping us company. The head of the column marched out of Alexandria May 12th ; the entire command following during the next day. A cavalry brigade and the 19th corps took the right ; the trains, guarded by the 13th corps, the centre ; the 16th and 17th corps, with cavalry and artillery, bringing up the rear. Before the rear-guard had left the city-early in the morning -- fire broke out in a building within a few yards of a depot of ammunition on the wharf, and contiguous to the transports laden with ordnance and ammunition. The soldiers were able to resene the ammunition by some very lively work, and the steamers by hurriedly pushing them away from the levee ; but. unfortunately, a high wind prevailed, and a considerable
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portion of the town was destroyed before the flames were subdued. Soon after the column was well under way cavalry skirmishing became quite brisk ; the gunboats frequently " lending a hand " by tossing ten-inch shell into the woods. on either side of the river, to scatter any of the " Johnnies " within reach. Abandoned earth-works and batteries, constructed by the rebels, were frequently passed ; and at one point a huge mass of mail mat- ter was found in the road, the letters torn into shreds-the pilo being the ruins of a mail captured by the rebels from some of our vessels. No inci- dent of importance transpired until the afternoon of the 15th, when near the town of Marksville. The cavalry skirmishing had increased in inten- sity and some infantry support was thrown forward. A vast, level plain, was reached, beyond which, in a belt of woods, the enemy made a decided stand, and for awhile disputed our passage. Our army was formed in bat- tle-array, in column of regiments, making four distinct lines of infantry, besides the cavalry and artillery. It presented a very pretty spectacle. After a little manœuvering and some sharp work between the cavalry and artillery of the two armies, the enemy retired beyond the village of Marks- ville, Gen. Banks making his headquarters at that place during the night. On the 16th, however, after passing through the town, the enemy was dis- covered iu force on the outskirts of the village, with cavalry and infantry, and considerable artillery in position. Our line was formed on a vast plain fully ten miles in extent, slightly undulating, and seemingly especially de- signed for the purposes of a military pageant. At all events Gen. Banks could not resist the temptation to put his entire force into position, thus forming one of the most attractive military spectacles ever witnessed. Here, in the extreme front, was a strong cavalry skirmish line, extending across the entire clearing, and also encircling either flank ; then came a line of artillery, posted along the front and Hlanks. In the rear of the artillery line was Grover's infantry, forming the artillery support and the first line of infantry. Five hundred yards in rear of this was Emory's Division, with its artillery. On the right flank was the 13th corps; while on the left were the commands of the two Smiths. The various " headquarters " flags were conspicuously posted : while across the plain, in the edge of the timber, was to be seen the curling smoke emanating from hostile cannon. briskly responded to by a number of pieces of our own artillery. When all the dispositions had been made our whole line-deployed nearly the en- tire width of the vast plain-slowly advanced in order of-battle, gradually pushing the rebels from our tront, skirmishing across the prairie, and soon taking possession of the three roads so spiritedly contested by the enemy, and especially valuable as points of divergence from Mansura to the Atch- afalava. The " engagement " will be chiefly remembered as a most bril- lant military pageant. The entire field was in full view ; the movements
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of the rebel as well as of our own troops easily discernible ; and in all re- spects the spectacle was beautifully impressive. Though the artillery-firing was sharp and incessant for three hours or more, but triffing damage was inflicted on either side. The infantry on the flanks, by adroit manuvring, early got possession of the woods, and the enemy soon after " dusted." in the direction of Cheneyville. We captured quite a good many prisoners. and also re-captured quite a number of our own men taken by the rebels on the river. The loss was not large on either side.
At the little village of Mansura our boys " inspected " the dwellings of some of the inhabitants, and were so fortunate as to obtain choice mor- sels of meats and other dainties, from heavily-laden tables evidently spread as a royal feast for the rebel officers, who, at a late hour, concluded to dine elsewhere. The Yankee soldiers were not at all backward in partaking of the repast, even though the host was not in all cases especially agreeable.
Pushing on, through Moreauville, crossing the bayou on pontoons. encamping early to await the arrival of the teams, and resuming in the morning, the army's advance reached Sinunsport, on the Atchafalava, on the afternoon of the 17th. Here another ingenious engineering feat was made available. The river was six hundred vards wide, and no bridge- material at hand. Engineer Bailey promptly met the emergency by lash- ing a sufficient number of the steamers side by side to extend across the river, upon which wagon-trains, artillery, and troops. safely crossed.
While the army was crossing the river-a slow, tedious process- Gen. Polignac savagely attacked Gen. Smith's troops at Yellow Bayou. The engagement continued several hours. Smith lost one hundred and fifty men. The enemy's loss was much greater; and we captured a good many prisoners, three hundred or more. During the fight Smith's men charged the enemy across the bayou several times, driving him back three miles from the pontoons. Nine infantry regiments, with cavalry and ar- tillery, were engaged on our side. The ambulances brought in a large number of frightfully wounded men. We were delayed three days at Simmsport : renewing the march on the morning of May 20th ; reaching the Mississippi on the afternoon of the 21st : and going into camp at Mor- ganzia Bend. May 23d-thus completing our period of " wanderings " in the " Red River Wilderness," which covered a period of seventy-seven days, during which we had " tramped " not less than eight hundred miles ! At the junction of the Aichafalava and Red Rivers, near Simms- port, we parted company with the troops of Gens. A. J. and T. K. Smith, and also with the large fleet of naval vessels and transports. The West- ern troops and the naval vessels proceeded up the Mississippi River to re- join the Army of the Tennessee ; and the forces of the Gulf Department returned to the Defenses of Orleans and the Mississippi. Cien. S. P.
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Banks. also, was relieved at about this time, Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby having arrived to take command of the troops, as a portion of the new Military Division of West Mississippi, to which he had been assigned.
Before entirely parting company with the ever-to-be-remembered Red River Expedition, it seems proper to briefly consider its purposes, its accomplishments and its failures, with the view of fixing the responsibility for the numerous misfortunes attending it, and which seem to have given the Expedition an undisputed claim to be characterized as " a campaign of blunders."
It should be said, at the outset, that the Expedition's first and most inexcusable blunder was in being born. It never should have been. Suc- eess was never among the possibilities, under the conditions -- at least with anything like the force placed at the disposal of Gen. Banks. The cam- paign was of Gen. Halleck's conception. He had formed a plan, as he evidently supposed, by which he was to concentrate from forty to fifty thousand troops at Shreveport, in a combined movement, from the armies of Steele in Arkansas, Sherman at Vicksburg, and Banks at New Orleans ; the ostensible object being to open up to commerce the fertile region west of the Mississippi, and at the same time deprive the rebels of its advan- tages as a source of supply for their armies. The permanent occupation of both Western Louisiana and Texas was involved in the scheme. The success of the undertaking depended mainly upon such a combined move- ment, unheralded and unannounced-which, as Gen. Sherman expressed the idea -- " should be made rapidly by simultaneous movements from Little Rock on Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of gunboats and transports driving up Red River-the whole to appear at Shreveport at about a day appointed." That was the programme which Gen. Banks undertook to carry out, but only as general manager and one of the performers. But after the audience had gathered and the curtain had been " rung up," the muich-advertised star, " Steele from Little Rock," failed to materialize. Sherman's troops, only about half the number prom- ised, came as an independent side-show ; while the naval appendage really proved an embarrassment rather than an efficient aid, on account of the heavy draught of the vessels and an insufficient supply of water to float thein."The tardiness of the navel vessels in ascending the river gave the rebels abundant opportunity to concentrate their forces and interpose ob- structions well-uigh impossible to overcome. In a severe criticism of this arrangement Gen. Banks utterly disclaimed all responsibility. protesting- " had it been left to my discretion, I should have reluctantly undertaken, in a campaign requiring but eight or ten light draught gunboats, to force twenty heavy iron-clads four hundred and ninety miles upon a river pro- verbially as treacherous as the rebels who defended it. and which had given
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notice of its character by steadily falling, when, as the Admiral reports, all other rivers were booming." Clearly, when Admiral Porter found no water in the river at Alexandria -- even though a rise was confidently ex- pected -- he should have possessed the nerve and the discretion to decline further attempts at its ascent ; just as Gen Banks should have protested against embarking upon the campaign with an inadequate force, without more positive assurances of aid from the commanders beyond his reach. In his justification. however, Gen. Banks urges that even as late as the day of the battle of Pleasant Hill, Gen. Sherman had dispatched the message that Steele and his entire force (from Arkansas) had been ordered to co- operate with him (Banks) and the navy in a movement upon Shreveport ; and that he ( Banks, confidently expected to form a junction with that force, somewhere in the Red River region, even as late as his concentration upon Grand Ecore. Nevertheless, the upshot of the matter seems to have been. that instead of the force of forty-two thousand men, as promised, we were at no time able to bring twenty thousand effective men against the enemy ; not to mention the utter uselessness of the naval fleet which Ad- miral Porter had brought to Alexandria, and which he undertook to haul over the shoals and mud-flats, where a sensible turtle would hardly have undertaken to navigate.
But, the Expedition having indiscreetly been entered upon, the most serious and reprehensible blunder of the entire campaign was that of fighting the battle of Sabine Cross Roads. To the uninitiated it may seem strange that a soldier, whose business it is supposed to be to fight always, should ever be censured for engaging an enemy whom he finds in his path-way ; nevertheless it is a well-recognized truth that to engage in bat- tle with the troops so illy prepared to fight that defeat seems iney- itable, is a most stupendous blunder, if the wager of battle can honorably be declined. Gen. Banks' command had not planned to fight at Sabine Cross Roads, was in no condition to do so, and the bringing on of a general engagement, under all the circumstances, was wholly inexcusable. The battle might easily have been avoided, had the cavalry commander been a competent officer ; indeed, it would have been had he implicitly obeyed the instructions of Franklin, -" attack the enemy, wherever found, but do not bring on a general engagement." That of course involved the retreat as well as the advance-the withdrawal of the cavalry skirmishers when the enemy stubbornly refused to give way. Instead of this-and with our in- fantry scattered over a single road for a distance of from forty to fifty miles, leisurely preparing for a much needed rest-infantry support, brigade after brigade, was ordered into the fight, a general engagement brought on, the army in front whipped in detail and by detachments. and the first and only reverse of the campaign. on the battle-field, sustained. The responsibility
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for this unfortunate blunder has been charged both upon Franklin and Banks; but, clearly, Gen. Banks seems to have been the responsible party. It was he who ordered forward the infantry support after Franklin had re- peatedly declined so to do ; and not only this, but he at the same time neg- lected the necessary precautionary measures for bringing the troops in rear within supporting distance, until too late to avoid the disaster which seemed inevitable as early as noon. The situation of the cavalry wagon-trains proved a serious impediment, to be sure, but they would not have been found at all troublesome had no general engagement been fought that day. "The loose talk of Banks' " charging the enemy with a wagon-train," will be seen to be meaningless, if it be remembered that the rebels were doing the " charging " upon that occasion, and that the wagon-blockade was not reached until our battle-line had been broken and our demoralized troops driven back a distance of anywhere from two to three miles. With our army compactly " closed-up," as was the plan for the following day, the Sabine Cross Roads stampede never could have occurred ; hence the cay- alry wagon-trains would have been found just where they were needed.
The retreat of the army from Pleasant Grove to Pleasant Hill seems to have been a necessity ; and perhaps the cruel desertion of our dead and wounded, already commented upon, was Pleasant Hill's only con- spicuous blunder. The abandonment of the campaign-not fully deter- mined upon until about the time of the departure from Grand Ecore --- seems to have been forced upom Gen. Banks not so much on account of the unfortunate condition of our army or navy, as by instructions from Washington, inspired by Lieut .- Gen. Grant's determination to concentrate every available soldier of the Union army in a position to be serviceable in the campaigns soon to open on the Potomac and the James. True, af- ter the army's concentration about Alexandria, with the naval vessels high and dry on the rocks, permission was given to renew the movement against Shreveport, but then, under existing conditions, it was found wholly im- practicable, and even impossible, to have made such an attempt. Indeed, the chances are that had there been no interference from Washington, the disasters of the campaign would have proved much more serious than they were.
The Expedition, from first to last, was a disjointed, incongruous. and an entirely illogical combination. Admiral Porter and the Navy, in conjunction with the officers and troops " loaned " by Gen. Sherman " for thirty days," seem to have conspired to render the duties devolving upon the commanding general inuch more difficult than they might otherwise have been. The Smiths arrogated to themselves the prerogatives of inde- pendent commanders, while Admiral Porter and many of his subordinates wemed much more concerned as to the matter of cotton-gathering than for
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the success of the campaign. The western troops were jealous of the officers and soldiers from the eastern states-claimed to have done all the fighting-and, in short, contrived to render themselves excessively disa- greeable -- in some instances closely bordering upon decidedly unmilitary acts and expressions. Especially was this true of Gen. A. J. Smith, who, had he received his just deserts, would have gone to the rear in arrest.
Iu justice to Geu. Banks it should be said, that barring the errors of judgment in the instances attributed to him, he proved himself a wise and sagacions commander, extricating the army and navy and vast stores of public property from a most perilous situation, with a skill rarely excelled in any campaign of the war. In battle he was ever cool and brave even to rashness, and his rare executive ability served the country an excellent purpose in the management of a campaign in which such diversified inter- ests were involved. For the failure of the Expedition-due in a large measure to circumstances entirely beyond his control -- he must of course ever be held responsible, and be criticised quite as severely for the faults of others as for those justly chargeable to himself. Nevertheless, much as he has been maligned, Gen. Bauks is deserving of the country's gratitude for the substantial services rendered the government in the management of this unfortunate campaign.
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