USA > North Carolina > The state records of North Carolina, Vol XV > Part 4
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STATE RECORDS.
suceours were necessary for defending the town, they ordered them accordingly, and at no time intimated to me that my ideas of attempting the defense of it were improper.
That the measure was right in itself, eireumstanced as we were, will, I hope, appear, when it is considered that Charlestown is the only mart in South Carolina and the Magazine of the State, that its natural strength promised a longer delay to the enemy's operations than any other part of the country. In abandoning it we must have given up the Continental ships of war and all other stores while there was yet a prospect of succour-for the harbour had been blocked up by a superior naval force previous to the debarkation of the troops. The stores could not have been moved by water, and the waggons we had or could have procured would have been unequal to the transportation of our baggage and our field artillery. The place, abandoned, would have been garrisoned by an inconsiderable force, while the enemy's army would have operated unchecked by our handful of troops, unable to oppose them in the field or impede their progress through the country ; and, had our expected succours arrived, we could only have ulti- mately submitted to the inconveniences of an evacuation without our stores, when further opposition no longer arailed.
2ndly, why the Army, Stores, &c., were not brought off when it appeared that the post could no longer be maintained.
The expectation that our succours, when arrived, would so cover our right as to render an evacuation, which should become expedient, practicable, had been an argument in leading us to attempt a defense. That we had every reason to expect these succonrs is apparent from the assurances I received from the State of So. Carolina that they would call down 2,000 of their Militia; that the Governor of North Carolina would send on the remainder of the draughts made the last fall, amounting to 1,500 ; that he would order to embody and march, when called for, 2,000 more (they were called for) and permit General Rutherford to march with all the volunteers he could collect. Of these I was encouraged to expect 500; besides his Excellency gave me reason to expect that, as soon as the Assem- bly should meet, further aid would be given. This will appear by extraets of his letter to me of the 16th of Feby. last : " I have been honored with your favours of the 15th of December, 3d, 8th,
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24, 29, & 31st Ultimo. I certainly should have done myself the pleasure of answering them long before this if I had not waited in full expectation of the Assembly's meeting and taking them under consideration. My hopes and my expectations in that particular have been baffled ; a sufficient number of members to constitute the General Assembly have not appeared, though appointed to meet on the 25th ultimo, and those who have met are now about to disperse and leave the important matters for the next General Assembly to take up. A general election will take place on the 10th of March, and I shall convene the Members as soon after as possible. In the mean time I have issued orders to assemble two thousand militia on the borders of South Carolina, to the westward P. D., where they will be ready to march to your assistance if necessary, or to be employed in this State, as exigencies require."
" I have written to General Rutherford to give you every assist- ance in his power, and not to wait for further orders from me ; to march himself, if need be, with such volunteers as can suddenly be collected."
" I have, in the inost earnest & pointed terms, written to the Brig- adiers in the several Districts in the State to order on every man of the late draughts, and I flatter myself the present alarming accounts of the arrival of the British troops to the South ward will stimulate them and other officers to an immediate discharge of the duties of their respective stations, by which means we may hope to get the number voted by the State into the field."
The remainder of Gen Scott's Brigade was ordered on, which amounted to about 400, and the Virginia State troops about 500 more, General Hogun's Brigade, the Virginia line, and Col. Wash- ington's Horse, amounting, as returned by Congress to me, in the whole to three thousand & odd. Thus you see that the whole succours ordered were Nine thousand & nine hundred men. Of this number we received in Garrison of
South Carolina Militia 300
North Carolina Do. 300
General Hogun's Brigade 600
The Virginia line from the Main Army 750
1950
The greatest part of the remainder we expected would soon
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arrive, but in that we were disappointed. On these orders and assurances were our hopes of succours founded. To facilitate their arrival, and to aid in procuring supplies for them and the garri- son, His Excellency, Governor Rutledge, was persuaded to leave the town about the 12th of April and take post in the country between the Cooper and the Santee. That we might derive the best services from these troops, a work was ordered to be thrown up at Cainhoy, a strong commanding ground on the roads, nine miles from town, which was intended to be a deposit of our stores. Another was directed and partly thrown up at the point of Lam- pries, to keep open the communication with the town by boats, as no armed vessels, if they should pass our obstructions in the river, could lay between the works of the town and those on the point. A post was also ordered at Lanier's Ferry over the Santee to collect and secure the boats necessary with dispatch to cross our expected succours, and with facility to effect a retreat, should that become necessary.
On the 16th of April I was informed that our horse, which had been posted near Monk's corner for the purpose of covering that . part of the country, and our snccours, who were marching in detach- ments, had been surprised, and the enemy had fallen down on the peninsula, between the Cooper and the Santee, with their Horse, about 250, and about Six hundred infantry. Whether, previous to this unhappy event, while we were daily expecting succours, we could have retreated with honor to ourselves and in justice to our country, your Excelleucy will judge, and whether, hereby, the moment of doing it with a probability of success was not lost, or at least that it could not then be attempted with propriety, I beg to offer to you the opinion of the Council of Officers on this head :
"At a Council of Officers held in garrison, Charles Town, 20 & 21st of April, A. D. 1780,
Present, Major General Lincoln.
Moultrie. Brigadiers 1 McIntosh. Woodford. Scott. Hognn. Colonel Laumoy, Engineer.
Beckman, of the Artillery.
Simmons, Commandant of the Charlestown Militia.
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General Lincoln laid before the Council the strength of the garrison, the State of the provisions, the situation of the enemy, the information he had received relative to reinforcements, and the state of the obstructions which had been thrown in the river between the Exchange and Shute's Folly. He requested the Opinion of the Council what measures the interest and safety of the Country called us to pursue under our present circum- stances.
They advised, as a retreat would be attended with many dis- . tressing inconveniences, if not rendered altogether impracticable from the undermentioned causes, viz .:
1st. The civil .authority were utterly averse to it, and inti- mated in council if it was attempted they would counteract the measure.
2d. It was to be performed, under this apprehension, in face of an enemy mnch superior to us, across a river three miles broad, in large ships & vessels, the movement of which must be regu- lated to the wind and tide.
3d. Could these obstacles be surmounted and the troops trans- ported, we must force our way through a very considerable body . of the enemy, who were in possession of the passes on our rout to the Santce, the only road by which we can retreat.
4th. Supposing us arrived at that river, new and dangerous difficulties are again to be encountered from the want of boats to cross it to an army wasted and worn down by action, fatigue and famine, & closely pursued, as we must be, by the enemy's Horse and infantry, who, from the delay we must inevitably meet, might be detached early enough to reach us.
That offers of capitulation, before our affairs become more crit- ical, should be made to Genl. Clinton, which would admit of the army's withdrawing and afford security to the persons & property of the inhabitants.
[Signed.]
WILLIAM MOULTRIE. LACH'D McINTOSH. WM. WOODFORD. CHARLES SCOTT. JAMES HOGUN. LAUMOY. B. BECKMAN. W. SIMMONS.
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The terms proposed, in consequence thereof, we rejected. We did not think proper at that time to recede from them, as there was a hope left that succours might arrive, open our communica- tion and give us an opportunity of retreating ; and as, finally, we should be in no worse sitnation when we had delayed the enemy as long as possible, which was an object worth our attention, as it would give the people in the neighbouring States an oppor- tunity to rouse & embody ; and as delaying the operations of the enemy Southward would afford the Northern States time to fill up their battalions and be prepared for future service.
About the 19th of April the reinforcements from New York arrived, which enabled the enemy to strengthen with that force the troops on the Peninsula and to take post at Haddrel's Point, which obliged us to abandon Lampries. The better to effect a remove, should an opp'y offer, two twenty-gun ships were kept mantled, and all the other boats and vessels in readiness to move at the shortest notice.
The propriety of again attempting a retreat came again before a council of officers on the 26th of April. Present with me :
Brigadiers
Moultrie. McIntosh. Woodford. Scott. Duportail. Hogun. Colo. Simmons. Capt. Whipple.
I proposed to the Council whether, in their opinion, the evacu- ation of the garrison was an expedient and practicable measure. The Council were unanimously of opinion that it was not expe- dient, as being impracticable. This was signed by the Gentlemen above named. No opportunity more favorable offered before the capitulation, for Lord Cornwallis posted himself, after garrisoning Haddrel's and Lampries, in St. John's Parish, his right towards the Cooper and his left towards the Wando. His force, from the best information I could obtain, exceeded two thousand men, besides the light Horse.
Under these circumstances, & the high assurances made me that I should be succoured and reinforced, no person will, I am per- Suaded, (as I said before,) suppose that the town conld, with pro-
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priety, have been abandoned previous to the 16th of April, when I received information that our Horse had been routed, and that the enemy had taken post between the Santee & the Cooper ; and subsequent to that period many were the difficulties which intervened and would have attended an attempt to retreat. The enemy's approaches had been brought within three hundred yards of our lines. The troops must have embarked and have crossed the Cooper in full view of the enemy, on board large ships and vessels regulated altogether by the wind & tide. They must have landed at Lampries' Point or up the Wando, from either of which places they had forty miles only to march before they reached the Santec, a large navigable river, between which and the place of debarcation lay the enemy, in whose power it was to break down the bridges & encumber the roads, and to destroy the boats at the ferries, which would have effectually prevented our crossing the river and delayed us until the enemy, from the lines, had reached the Santee, which they would have been able to do nearly as soon as we could by following us in their boats and landing at Scott's ferry ; or, had they marched by land and crossed the Cooper above, the means of which were in their power, they would have had but fourteen miles farther to march than we should, had we been so fortunate to find boats where we wished them, viz .: Lynches' & Lancie's ferries ; but should we have been reduced, from the want of boats, to follow the river farther up, we must have marched across the enemy's line. Besides these obstacles, almost insuperable in themselves, we had a movement to effect which required the utmost secrecy, in opposition to the opinion and wishes of the civil authority.
3dly. Whether the necessary supplies of provisions were in time ordered, and why the defense of the town was undertaken with so small a quantity in it ?
In the latter end of July last, at the close of the campaign, I made an estimate of the supplies which would probably be wanted for the next, estimating our force at six thousand men, and gave orders to the several departments accordingly.
As, from the warmth of the Southern climate, it has been found difficult to cure and preserve salted provisions, and as the article of salt was not at all times to be obtained in sufficient quantities, our dependence for meat has generally been on fresh beef, with
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which, the greatest part of the year, the country abounds, which, while the country was open to us, could always be procured, and by which the army was with more ease supplied.
I was induced to order, in the first place, two thousand barrels of beef, and the same quantity of pork only, to be put up, but on the failure of the expedition against Savannah, the Commissary received orders to increase the quantity to five thousand barrels of each. The country did not afford us flour, but rice in plenty. As my papers, containing my orders on this head, are not here, I beg to recite an extract of a letter from Mr. Rutledge, the Com- missary of purchases, being in point : " The latter end of July, when you did me the honor of appointing me to the office of pur- chasing commissary, you sent me an indent of such provisions as would be necessary for the ensuing campaign,-among other articles, two thousand barrels of beef and as many of pork. After the repulse of Savannah, in consequence of a letter you wrote to the Governor,-I was desired to provide, in addition to your order, three thousand barrels of beef and the same number of pork."
While our right flank was kept open, and our communication with the country preserved, ample supplies of provisions could be daily thrown into the garrison. That our communication would be maintained, we had the highest expectation. And from this we were induced to attempt a defense of the town, so that when it was found there was in garrison a sufficiency of provisions to supply the troops while they could maintain the post against the regular approaches of the besieging army, an evacuation founded on the shortness of our supplies could not have been justified,
4thly. Whether the State of the Department was from time to time represented to Congress and the necessary succours called for ?
To evidence that every attention was paid to this matter would be easy for me if I could lay before your Excellency all my let- ters to Congress, the States of No. Carolina and So. Carolina ; but to examine them now would engross too much of your time. I therefore shall transcribe one of them only, and that to the Com- mittee of Congress, and remind you of the many the receipt of which has been acknowledged by His Excellency, Governor Cas- well, and the measures he pursued in consequence of them, and that Colonel John Lanrens & Major Clarkson waited on Congress
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at my request, and stated to them, viva voce, our weak and defense- less state, and solicited the necessary aid.
CHARLESTOWN, SO. CAROLINA, October 27th, 1779.
To the Honble. Committee of Correspondence.
GENTLEMEN :
I did myself the honor to address you on the 22d by Major Clarkson. I gladly embrace this opportunity by Colonel Lau- rens, who is kind enough to repair to Philadelphia, and to Gen- eral Washington's HdQuarters, to represent the particular and distressful sitnation of these Southern States, to solicit further reinforcements, and to aid in forwarding such as shall be ordered. That a respectable force of disciplined troops are necessary here, and probably will be more so, is too evident to be questioned, if we mean to secure these States. When we consider the advantages that would result to Britain on her possessing them, and the dis- advantages to the United States, her policy must point to her the necessity and importance of subjugating them ; for hereby she will secure their trade in general, a supply of lumber and provis- ions for the. West Indian Islands, from the want of which they now labor under many embarrassments ; hereby she will secure to herself many valuable harbours on the shores of the Continent, contiguous to her Islands, where she can secure her fleets sent for the protection of her own trade and for the annoyance of her enemies; hereby she will seeure a great acquisition of territory and strength for the disaffected will readily engage in her cause the Indians will be spirited, easily supplied, and withont diffi- enlty retained in her service. They will open to themselves a communication through the lakes with Canada, and by the numer- ous tribes of savages on our inland frontiers keep them con- stantly in war, destroy their growth, happiness and prosperity, if not depopulate them. In the same proportion as they acquire strength we are debilitated; besides, if the Southern States are lost, we have not only their proportion of the common debt thrown upon the other States, who are now groaning under the idea of the weight of their own burthens, but it will give a fatal wound to our paper cnrreney, and probably add more to the depreciation of it than anything which has already happened ; for the expecta- tion that it will at some future day be redeemed stamps it with valne ; as this is lessened, the value of it must deerease.
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If the enemy are permitted to enjoy the extremes of the United States, from which they ean with ease enlarge their own limits and Cireumseribe ours, we shall soon be in the most unhappy situation, encircled by land and cooped up by sea. What more would they have to do than keep garrisons in the Middle States, rnin their trade and open a generous one southward and eastward? Besides the advantages which would accrue to the enemy by enjoying these States, which are, I think, sufficient inducements to attempt a subjugation of them,-they will also be encouraged to the measure by considering what little expense and hazard they would obtain them with. Their rear is covered by their friends, their right by their marine, and their left by the disaffected and the Indians. Indeed, if this town was in their possession, from the natural strength of it, they commanding at sea, all the force we could bring against it would be ineffectnal to regain it. These are some among the many reasons which induced me to believe that the enemy will reinforce their troops, already in this quarter, and attempt to extend and secure this conquest, and that it is of the first importance to the safety and well being of the United States effectually to counteract their designs. Such are the arguments which remind us of our interest. There are others which more immediately affect our feelings. Where shall we find an asylum for those who have hitherto lived in affluence and plenty, and who, by their exertions in the cause of their country, are become peculiarly obnoxious to the common foe ! Shall we leave them the cruel alternative only of suffering the ignominious insults of an unfeeling enemy, and wearing at last those chains which they have at so much hazard sought to shun, or, foregoing their former happiness and redneed to a situation little short of beggary and want, force them to seek shelter in some neighbor- ing State? Honor and humanity both forbid it.
The necessity of sending troops will further appear when it is considered that the enemy have in this quarter about three thou- sand men; that they expect a large addition to that number ; that the whole of our forces of Continental troops now in this State is short of one thousand men ; That 150 more may be expected from No. Carolina, and about 800 from Virginia, by General Scott-the whole less than two thousand. What Militia No. Carolina will send is yet uncertain. Most of those which 15-3
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can be drawn out in this State will be needed for the back parts of the Country to restrain the unfriendly and the savages. To convince the people here that Congress have their safety at heart, and will support them & will discourage every idea that they are to make terms for themselves, is of the utmost importance. I can- not help felicitating myself in the belief that troops may be spared from the Northward, as the Campaign must be near over, and as the return of General Sullivan may be shortly expected ; and that they will be sent, especially as the objection to it formerly made, of a long march, &c., are now obviated; for part of Count D'Estaing's fleet being in Cheseapeake Bay, which with our frigates will be a Sufficient eover to their passage by water, and will give ns speedy and certain reinforcements. If the troops come by water I have to request that the Board of War be directed to send on with them the Articles mentioned in the enelosed List. A duplicate I have sent to them, for we have failed to get them from the West Indias.
Some of the vessels were taken and others carried to a bad mar- ket. For a more minute state of matters in this Department, and for a fuller representation of the miseries that await ns without prompt reinforcements, I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Laurens, from whose knowledge in war and critical observation you may expect the most perfeet intelligence.
I have the honor to be, &c., B. LINCOLN.
5th. Whether the marine arrangement was such as best to answer the purposes intended by Congress in sending the frigates to Charlestown ?
It was the general, if not universal, opinion that armed ships lying before the bar of Charlestown would effectually seeure its pass, and it was some time after the arrival of the ships before I had even an intimation that to occupy a station near the bar would be attended with hazard ; on a suggestion of this kind, I wrote the following letter to Commodore Whipple :
HEAD QUARTERS, CHARLES- TOWN, Jany. 30th, 1780.
DR. SIR :
By your instructions you will observe that you were sent here with the frigates under your command as a protection to this part
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of the United States ; & I have no doubt of your zeal and that of the officers in the common cause, or of your ntmnost exertions for the defence of this State.
Your duty will be, if possible, to prevent the enemy from enter- ing the harbour; if that should be impracticable, you will in the next place oppose them at Fort Moultrie. I have lately been informed that with an easterly wind & flood tide it will be impos- sible for a ship to lye with her broadside to the entrance of the bar. To ascertain this matter is of importance ; you will there- fore as early as possible have the internal part of the bar and the adjacent shoal sounded and buoyed by some of your officers and the best pilots you can obtain ; after that you will please, in com- pany with the Captains of the several ships, to reconnoitre the entrance of this harbour and see whether there is a possibility of the ships lying in such a manner as to command the passage and leave their station, if it should become necessary.
When you and your Captains have enquired and considered the matter, you will be so good as to report your opinions.
I am, &c., B. LINCOLN.
Commodore Whipple.
1136001
In answer to the above the Commodore gave me the following letter addressed to him :
SIR :
Having considered General Lincoln's requisition to yon of the 30th ultimo, whether there is a possibility of the ships lying in such a manner as to command the passage at the bar of Charles- town Harbour, & leave their station if it should become necessary, after having sounded and buoyed the entrance & made such obser- vations as appeared to us necessary, do declare, upon due delibera- tion, that it is in our opinion impracticable. Our reasons are that, when an easterly wind is blowing and the flood making in, (snch an opportunity as the enemy must embrace for this purpose,) there will be so great a swell in five fathom hole as to render it impossible for a ship to ride moored athwart, which will afford the enemy's ships under full sail the advantage of passing us ;
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should they effect that, the Continental ships cannot possibly get up to fort Moultrie as soon as the enemy's.
We are, &c. Signed by Capt. Hacker & a number other officers.
Commodore Whipple.
Notwithstanding this representation, I was so fully convinced of the necessity and importance of the ships covering the bar, and having no information that there was not a sufficiency of water at all times to float them, I wrote the following letter and orders to the Commodore :
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