USA > New Hampshire > History of the Twelfth regiment, New Hampshire volunteers in the war of the rebellion > Part 23
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It was the only time that the regiment was unwilling to be relieved from the front line, either in the field or the trenches : but this was so greatly in contrast with any battle experience they ever had before that they actu- ally enjoyed the fun more than they feared the danger ; and, besides, it seemed too bad to abandon the field to the foe when, so far as could be observed, everything on that part of the field warranted an advance rather than a retreat. Notwithstanding the advantage gained by the enemy on the extreme right. by the capture of General Heckman and a part of his brigade, it would seem that if the order to fall back was not premature, the continuation of that retrograde movement to the relinquishment of all that had been gained by five days of continuous fighting, and until the Army of the James was completely penned in and .. bottled up," was, to say the least, ill-advised. That there was scarcely an attempt made in any considerable force to follow up our retreat is explained by the report of General Ransom, who, under General Beauregard, had the immediate command of the rebel forces engaged. From this report we learn that a vigorous advance, instead of disgraceful retreat by our army would prob- ably have changed the result of the conflict.
After falling back through a narrow strip of woods and across an open field, the artillery of the division was aligned on a ridge running parallel with the belt of woods, and the Twelfth and some of the other regiments of the brigade ordered to lie down just in front of the guns. Soon the rebel skirmishers were seen slowly and cautiously advancing. Waiting until a portion of their line had reached the edge of the woods, from the cover of which they did not seem inclined to show themselves, the officer in command of the batteries gave the order : Half-second fuse : fire ; and a deafening roar, a blast of hot air. and a "swish" of shells just above our heads, and we laugh to watch the effect of their bursting upon the Johnnies, jumping. dodging, and running among the trees. This was the last seen by us of the gray uniforms that day, although we remained in position there for several hours : and near night marched back to our old camp ground again. The men were so tired and worn down from want of rest and sleep that some were unable to march after the excitement of the battle was over, and had to be carried back in .
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ambulances : one officer who was unable to walk, but disdaining to take a sick man's conveyance, rode back to camp on one of the cannon.
General Beauregard, finding that his adversary was either too weak to do, or too timid to dare - both equally ineffectual in war - determined to follow up his advantage: and, being reinforced by General Whiting's command that had failed to come up from Petersburg in time for the bat- tle, he resolved to attack General Butler again before he could have time to strengthen his entrenchments. It was now, per force of necessity, that spades were trump and hearts obliged to sadly follow suit. For two days and one night the men - first altogether, and then by short reliefs - were incessantly at work throwing up a strong line of breastworks with redans and bastions, except when obliged to drop the spade and grab the musket to defend themselves against the attacks of the enemy. They worked with their equipments on and their guns close at hand, ready to take and fall into line at a moment's warning. The Twelfth was called out to resist attacks three or four times ; and once, during the night of the 19th, it was double-quicked about half a mile toward the right to help repulse what seemed a determined attempt of the enemy to break through that part of the line.
The next day the regiment moved camp to its proper place in the line of works, which were soon completed. There was some fighting on the right, however, before night, the enemy reluctantly giving up their attempts to break through.
Of the 21st the reader may learn from the following entry in the author's diary : .. The boys resting in camp. and they need it badly. Last night was the first we have been allowed to sleep all night for three weeks or more." It had, indeed, been a hard campaign, considering the time and territory occupied and the little or nothing accomplished.
The following account of the engagements at Drury's Bluff is from letters of Colonel Barker, then captain in command of the regiment, written on the field, the 15th, and the day after the retreat :
Close under cover of a rebel earthwork which we captured yesterday does the Twelfth New Hampshire hold position this morning. Early yesterday our lines were ordered to advance and take the rebel works, just through a belt of woods on our front. As I advanced my regiment through to near the edge of the woods there loomed up before us about three or four hundred yards from the opening a small fort or redan, on which floated a rebel flag, and from the embrasures of which belched forth intended death and destruction for us ; but we were so near, and the shooting so high that without halt or hesitation we moved on over the glacis, which, by the way, was so obstructed by fallen trees that our movement was necessarily very slow. Through fear of capture the rebels beat a hasty retreat. leaving this work to us; but about seven hundred yards beyond, from another fort with embrasures for six guns, they opened fire upon us. We came to a halt in position, where, lying, we were slightly protected from their fire. Let me give you an idea of the position :
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Fort Stevens.
Rebel works.
Turnpike.
Rebel works.
Redan.
Arti lliery. IIIIIIIIII
13th N. H.
10th N. Il. 118th N.Y. 8th Conn.
12th N. H. 11th Conn. 2d N. H.
148th N. Y.
Burnham's Brigade.
Wistar's Brigade.
Brooks's Division.
Weitzel's Division.
You will observe that Wistar's brigade (ours) is at the right of the Richmond and Petersburg turnpike, left resting on it; on the left is Burnham's brigade of Brooks's division, right resting on the pike. In front of the Twelfth you will observe the fort we captured, from which our sharpshooters pick off the gunners from the fort beyond. You will also notice that Brooks occupies the rebel rifle- pits, which, I can assure you, are very formidable. The short marks indicate our battery, four twenty-pound Parrott, four ten-pound brass pieces, and two small guns all trained on the rebel fort. [This, as will be seen, refers to the 14th. ]
During a portion of the day the rebs poured a terrific fire upon us. but very soon our sharpshooters got in their work and silenced most of the guns in the fort by picking off' the gunners. During the day we shot away their colors sev- eral times and blew up what some thought was their magazine, but this could not have been.
It is quite amusing to see how jolly the boys are under fire. One of the sharp- shooters told me that he fired one hundred and twenty rounds of ammunition and took aim every time.
[The following refers to the 16th : ]
As promised in my last letter. I will in this give you the particulars of yester- day's fight. As I wrote you, but little else than picket firing was carried on during the night ; but at a very early hour in the morning, before light, the rebels opened several pieces of artillery upon us, and the fact that nearly every shell burst among and about our guns and artillery horses was good evidence that their gunners were experts, and knew how to get range, even in the dark. The fourth or fifth shot blew up one of our caissons, killing several men and horses, and producing the most intense excitement. For a long time we were idle, not knowing where to direct our fire. The rebs were approaching under cover of the darkness. and we were quite ignorant of their position. As soon as the day began to dawn and the fog, which was very dense, began to lift, we discovered the rebel sharpshooters, less than a hundred yards away, picking off our gunners and battery horses. I immediately directed Company G (Captain Bedee) and Company C (Lieutenant Sanders ) to engage those gentlemen, and drop every man that showed his head above the earthworks, a little to our left, to which they had advanced and taken shelter behind. I cautioned the men to waste no ammuni- tion, but take deliberate aim at every shot. After one of the brass pieces at our
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left had been abandoned by its officers and men, Captain Bedee with a few of his men worked it on their own hook, delivering to the Johnnies charge after charge. While this was going on I observed to our right, and just in front of the Eleventh Connecticut. a rebel regiment advancing; between the two was a thick growth of high bushes, so that within fifty yards neither regiment could see the other. I ordered the right wing of my regiment to open an oblique fire upon them. and at the same time a regiment appeared at our left upon which I opened fire with my left wing. Both regiments were so near that I could easily count the stars upon their battle-flags. The Eleventh Connecticut on learning of the presence of a regiment of the enemy on their front, opened so hot a fire upon them that they broke and ran, and while retreating the slaughter we made among them was terrible.
After all the battery horses had been killed, I sent word to General Wistar and suggested that some means be provided to take the guns to the rear. While awaiting his orders I took a part of one company and dragged one of the Parrott guns on to the turnpike, ready to be taken away.
The men were greatly disappointed at having the order for retreat announced, for everyone felt confident of our ability to hold the position. I called the regi- ment to attention, faced them about, but. reluctant to give up the position. faced them again to the fiont, and for a moment hesitated. hoping that the order might be eountermanded : finding the lines to our left retreating, I concluded there was no alternative for me but to obey orders. I again faced the men about and retreated in as fine order, almost, as if on parade ; and from the fact that very little damage was done to us while retreating, I was more than ever convinced that we had most essentially crippled the enemy. During the morning engage- ment my regiment expended nearly sixty rounds of ammunition per man. and to very excellent advantage. Our loss was only one killed, nineteen wounded, and three missing. After the first retreat we manœuvred about until nearly night, when, for some reason, we returned to camp.
The Twelfth New Hampshire has been in the front line of battle for five days without being once relieved. and every day under fire, losing two killed, twenty- nine wounded, and three missing.
We have been in sight of and within eight miles of Richmond. and fought a battle, in which, it seems to me. the enemy suffered the greater loss - three to one.
Comparative quietness prevailed for the next few days after the enemy's failure to break through our lines. The Army of the James was safe but powerless, for it could no more get out of the pen into which it had been driven, than the rebel forces could get in. About this time came news from the Army of the Potomac that Lee was retreating across the North Anna. and then it was hurrah for Grant, and a groan for Butler. Although the rank and file of an army are supposed to obey all orders and question none. to do everything and know nothing. or as poetically put :
.. Theirs not to question why.
Theirs but to do and die."
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Yet with the education and intelligence of the average Union volunteer, it did not take long for a northern army to understand final results, if they did not always comprehend the wisdom of original designs.
It was known to the soldiers then, as well as afterward, that Butler's campaign was a sad failure : but the reasons why were not so well under- stood. Those in the army and out naturally attributed the cause of the defeat of the Army of the James, from which so much had been expected, to the inability of its commander, and such has been the popular belief even to the present day. But the history of that campaign, when care- fully read and considered, will do much to greatly modify, if not entirely reverse, what has so long stood as the public verdict.
It now appears from the official records. lately published, that Butler had enemies inside, as well as outside his intrenchments, to fight against : and that his two corps commanders, Smith and Gillmore, were quite as much, if not more, interested to defeat him, as the enemy.
These generals, instead of showing themselves the true and trusted right and left hand advisers and supporters of their chief, as was all the more needful and expected, from his own inexperience in the field, seemed to take pleasure in seeing him thwarted and defeated in his plans, even though the enemy would be greatly benefited thereby. This, upon the authority of General Grant. seems to be especially true of General Smith. who, " whilst a very able officer, is obstinate, and likely to condemn whatever is not suggested by himself," as written by Grant himself to General Halleck, concerning the inethiciency of the Army of the James, arising from the very troubles between Butler and his commanders, here referred to. He was afterward sent home in disgrace by General Grant, upon unmistakable evidence of treachery and falsehood, which too plainly showed the character of the man.
If Butler's own account of his campaign is true, there was hardly an important order that he gave to either of his corps commanders while they remained with him that was executed promptly and vigorously as it might and should have been. But however this may be, there are few who fought in the battle of Drury's Bluff, and have taken pains to inform them- selves concerning it since, but will agree with the following extract from General Heckman's account of that battle and comments upon the result :
The press and the histories of the war blame Butler with the severest language, and even now the nation at large call him . Bottled-up-Butler." But the opinions of intelligent officers who fought in the campaign, and who judged it impartially from a military point of view, as well as the facts, will rather lay the fault at the door of his corps commanders, Generals Gillmore and Smith. They did not seem to comprehend what was to be done, and then failed to cooperate in what at- tempts they did make.
But with all this and much more that might be written in excuse for Butler and his futile efforts south of the James, the fact still remains that
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New Hampshire Volunteers.
he was by no means blameless. Knowing, as he did, the prejudice exist- ing among nearly all the regular army officers against civilian volunteers holding important commands, and how sensitively adverse they were to being made subordinate thereto, he could not otherwise than have plainly seen and sorely felt afterward. as he ought to have known at the time. that some of his acts and words toward his two highest officers were. to say the least, very injudicious.
Most prominent and damaging to himself of all. was his not very re- spectful and very unwise reply by letter to some written suggestions sub- mitted by them for his consideration on the night after the engagement at Swift Creek. In the absence of any plan of operations. that they claimed to know of, " further than to ent the Petersburg and Richmond railroad," they had suggested to Butler the propriety of crossing the Appomatox river, on the next day, and cutting all the roads that came into Peters- burg on that side. as the quickest and easiest way of capturing the city itself. This, though respectfully recommended over their joint official signatures. instead of being kindly and gratefully received, was haugh- tily rejected and ignored : and they received a sting of insult as well as injury, by being accused, in the same letter, of " vacillation " and " in- firmity of purpose."
In the rejoinders that both Smith and Gillmore made to this almost abu- sive reply to their well meant suggestions, the latter seems to take no offense, but the former, after referring at some length to the facts and situation. uses the following significant language :
I have made this long explanation for peculiar and private reasons, and can only say in conclusion, that as I have never before been accused of infirmity of purpose, I shall not take the charge as seriously affecting my military reputation.
Ilere was the keen edge of a highly tempered blade dangerously touched. It would have been better for General Butler to have turned it against the foe instead of himself. He had unwittingly provoked the an- ger of one who could neither forget nor forgive. After this he tried both coaxing and threatening. but to no purpose, for Smith did about as he pleased. Butler soon saw his mistake, and must have bitterly deplored it. for none could better realize than he, that it not only made an enemy of his ablest general whose friendship he so badly needed. and lost to him Petersburg, when almost within his grasp, but it was the beginning of that unfortunate and humiliating end, first of his campaign, that promised so much and effected so little, and finally of himself as military com- mander.
None, we think, conversant with General Butler's military history of 1864, will seriously question the truth of the assertion, that while his fail- ure at Fort Fisher was the ostensible occasion, it was by no means the chief reason of his removal from command in the field and retirement to
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private life. The real cause lay much further back, and General Smith, as it appears, had no little to do in preestablishing it.
So much has been written in reference to General Butler and his corps commanders that the readers of this history - especially the survivors of the Twelfth and the descendants of them and their dead comrades - may know, or take pains to more fully inform themselves, why the Army of the James, numbering over thirty thousand men, did so little toward put- ting down the Great Rebellion of 1861.
While, as we have seen, Butler was not all to blame, as the rank and file and most of the officers of his army (ignorantly believing what his next ranking generals were only too glad to have them) used to think, yet it must be admitted that he was not " the right man in the right place," and that Grant himself was some to blame for ever having put him there with such a man as General Smith.
In explanation and verification of the author's statements in relation to the battle of Drury's Bluff, and especially to those relating to the effect- iveness of the telegraph wire as a line of defense. and the struggle for the guns upon the turnpike, the following extracts and quotations from official reports of generals and commanding officers upon both sides, will be found both serviceable and interesting. As bearing upon the precarious situation of Butler's army, alluded to at the commencement of this chap- ter, is the following from General Smith : *
On the morning of the 15th, my position gave cause for anxiety. On my right, extending to the river and up to Drury's Bluff, was an open, undulating country more than a mile in width. and offering every facility for the movement of a col- umn on our right and rear. This was covered by one hundred and fifty mounted men of the colored cavalry. My troops were all in one thin line, without re- serves. * * *
On reporting my weak and exposed condition to General Butler, I was informed that three regiments were at the Half-Way House which could be used as a re- serve.
During the day I had instructed Generals Brooks and Weitzel to gather tele- graph wire from the turnpike road, and stretch it among the stumps in their front.
Here reference is made to a foot-note, which gives the origin of the wire-line idea and the reason, as given by Smith, why it was not stretched in front of Heckman's brigade. As there has been much dispute about both of these subjects, the note is here given in full :
In ISS3 General Butler claimed the credit for the use of the wire, and intimated that in leckman's case his order in reference to it was not carried out. The fact is, there was not wire enough to go round. Brooks and one brigade of Weitzel were so near the enemy that I was fearful they might be run over. Heckman was not in such danger of a sudden rush, and so the wire was used in the direct front in contact with the enemy.
* Century Company's War Books, Vol. IV, page 210.
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New Hampshire Volunteers.
General Butler in his autobiography ridicules the lack of wire state- ment and remarks: " How that can be I do not understand. for there was nine miles of wire to be had for the taking and the time in which to do it was more than ample."
He therefore expresses his surprise and regret that Heckman's front, " where there was almost a necessity for a double line of wire." was left entirely exposed, and says it was ." for some reason never yet satisfac- torily explained."
But whatever the reason, accidental or intentional - and it sometimes seems that it must have been the latter -one thing is certain. that there was no lack of wire when it was procured for one regiment: and from the fact that none had then been taken down near where the line crossed the turnpike. it may reasonably be inferred that the Twelfth was the first regiment to use it.
But who first thought of the idea is quite as much a mystery as why Heckman did not have the benefit of it. General Butler says that Gen- eral Smith ordered it. "at the suggestion of General Weitzel," and Weitzel says he ordered it " at the suggestion of the major-general com- manding the corps," who was General Smith ; and Smith. as we have seen. while he corroborates Weitzel-making two to one against Butler -does not deny but some one suggested it to him. although he leaves it to be understood that he was the originator: and, although there have been many claimants for the honor, including all grades of rank from major-general to a private, the weight of evidence, so far as it is compe- tent or worth considering. is heavily in favor of General Smith, into whose prolific mind the happy thought probably first entered.
But whoever it was that first thought of making a Yankee skirmish line out of a telegraph wire, the line, wherever formed, proved a most effective one. Generals Brooks and Weitzel reported, says their corps commander, " that not a man was driven from their lines in front. and that the enemy, in falling over the telegraph wire, were slaughtered like partridges."
General Weitzel, after referring in his report of May 22 to the crush- ing of Heckman's brigade, continues :
The other seven regiments of my line did not move until after they had twice repulsed the enemy with terrible slaughter - they being piled in heaps over the telegraph wire - when we were ordered back.
In his supplementary report of the 29th he adds :
I have just received full files of Richmond papers, from the 16th to the 2Sth. The force that attacked my division was six brigades of infantry. one unattached regiment of infantry, and three batteries of artillery, all under the command of Major-General Ransom. His entire loss was near three thousand by official lists. They have about five hundred of my own men prisoners. General Heckman. who was captured in the fight, sends word that Gillmore could easily have gone
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in. They speak of the wire as a devilish contrivance, which none but a Yankee could devise.
To oppose this force of six brigades and one regiment General Weitzel had but two brigades and three regiments, making about two to one against him, assuming that the brigades and regiments were about the same size, but it is probable that the disproportion in men and muskets was not so great.
Captain Ashby, commanding Battery E, Third New York Artillery, whose four twenty-pound Parrott guns were planted on the turnpike reports that -
Shortly after resuming my position on Monday morning, the 16th, the enemy opened upon me with a heavy fire of artillery. I immediately replied with all my guns. Under cover of this fire and a heavy fog, a large force of the enemy advanced up the road and charged on the battery. At the same time their artillery ceased firing, and changing the direction of my pieces, I ordered them to be charged with canister, which was poured into the columns of the enemy. As they advanced the first charge was repulsed, but they only retired behind the line of breastworks, from which they poured continuous volleys of musketry. The fog and smoke were so dense that they could not be seen, and their exact position was doubtful. Very soon they charged again. As long as the canister held out I used it, and when it gave out ordered percussion shells to be used. At this time I was struck in the head by part of a case-shot and carried to the
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