USA > New Jersey > New Jersey and the rebellion : a history of the service of the troops and people of New Jersey in aid of the Union cause, Pt. 1 > Part 7
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restraints imposed by the former. In comparison with the same army two years later, MeDowell's force appears little better than a huge mob, with noble instincts, but having no adequate conception of the grave duties laid upon it."-Lossing's History.
"I got everything with great difficulty. Some of my regiments came over very late; some of them not till the very day I was to move the army. I had difficulty in getting transportation. In fact, I started out with no baggage train, with nothing at all for the tents, simply transportation for the siek and wounded and the munitions. The sup-
plies were to go on afterwards. * * * * I had no opportunity to test my ma- chinery ; to move it around and see whether it would work smoothly or not. In fact, such was the feeling that when I had one body of eight regiments of troops reviewed together, the General (Scott) eensured me for it, as if I was trying to make some show. I did not think so. There was not a man there who had ever maneuvered troops in large bodies. There was not one in the army; I did not believe there was one in the whole country ; at least, I knew there was no one there who had ever handled thirty thousand troops. I wanted very much a little time; all of us wanted it. We did not have a bit of it. The answer was: 'You are green, it is true; but they are green also; you are all green alike.' We went on in that way."-General Me Dowell's testimony be- fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War ..
"The men were not used to marching; they stopped every moment to pick black- berries, or to get water."-Ibid.
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two miles further, going into camp at the little village of German- town. Meanwhile, General Runyon, as we have already seen, had on the 16th sent the First Regiment of his brigade to a point occu- pied by our pickets on the Orange and Alexandria railroad three miles beyond Springfield, where they acted as a guard to a party engaged in repairing the railway.19 On the same day four hundred and twenty-five men of the Third Regiment were detailed as an es- cort to a provision train, en route for the main body of the army.20 At the same time, a guard was detailed from the Fourth Regiment for another section of the railroad which it was important to hold. Another detail of one company from this regiment was then guard- ing the Long Bridge, and still another on duty at Arlington Mills. The remainder of the regiment was ordered to proceed to Alexan- dria, together with the Second (three months') Regiment. Colonel Taylor, commanding the Third (three years') Regiment was at the same time ordered to march to a point on the Orange and Alexan-
19 The Brigade Journal has the following entry : "HEADQUARTERS, CAMP TRENTON, July 16th, 1861.
" Received from the headquarters of the department this morning the following des- patch :
' Order at once one of your regiments forward on the Orange and Alexandria railroad to a point occupied by our pickets, three miles beyond Springfield. The regiment is to act as a guard for the repairers of the road, now being pushed forward with the ut- most dispatch. Dated at Arlington, July 16th, and addressed to General Runyon.
Signed J. B. Fry, A. A. G.'
"In pursuance of this ordered the First (three months') Regiment to the duty re- quired, with one day's rations."
20 The following entry appears on the same page of the Journal :
"Received the following : , ' ALEXANDRIA, July 16, 1861.
'To General Runyon : I am directed from the headquarters of the Department to send to you for an escort for two provision trains. If the number is not designated already, will you please have four hundred and twenty-five men here before sundown this evening ? G. BELL, Captain and A. C. S.'
"Pursnant to the above, issued an order to Colonel Napton (Third Regiment) to detail the required number under his own command or one of his field officers, with one day's rations."
From a letter to the Monmouth Democrat, from Major Yard, of the Third Regiment, it appears that this detachment was detailed, and guarded two trains. The first train consisted of a herd of ninety-one beef cattle and fifty-seven large wagons heavily loaded, cach drawn by four horses. The column started about nine o'clock at night, and at six the next morning entered Fairfax, the army having marched for Manassas. The second detachment of the same regiment conducted a train several miles beyond Fairfax-both detachments returning to camp upon the performance of the service assigned.
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dria Railroad,"1 and during the night following the First and Second (three years') Regiments were moved forward to Vienna. On the same day the division headquarters were transferred to Alexandria, and instructions were issued to the DeKalb Regiment, which had become attached to the division, with other troops hereafter to be named, to keep a guard at all times on the railroad from Camp Trenton, the former headquarters, to Arlington Mills. On the 17th orders were issued to all the regiment in the command to provide themselves with two days' cooked rations, and on the 18th General Runyon formally assumed command of all the troops not on the march to the front."
Meanwhile, operations at the front were going actively forward. On the morning of the 18th, General Tyler's Division moved for- ward from Germantown in the direction of Bull Run pushing un- opposed through Centreville, and halting in a valley beyond. Later in the day, he advanced toward Blackburn's Ford, where he found the insurgents in force and an engagement followed, result- ing in the withdrawal of our troops, with some loss, to Centreville. Here General McDowell at once concentrated all his available forces, some thirty thousand in all, not including the reserve under General Runyon, and made final dispositions for a formidable ad- vance. Intending to move on the 20th, the previous day was occu- pied in making a thorough reconnoissance, but his supplies failing to arrive, the movement was delayed until the morning of the 21st,
21 " HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, July 16th. Special Order No. 2.
"Colonel Taylor of the Third Regiment of three years New Jersey volunteers will proceed with all practicable dispatch, in light marching order, up the Orange and Alex- andria railroad to a point occupied by our pickets, about three miles beyond Spring- field, or thereabouts, to report to the railroad manager there for duty.
"By order of Brigadier-General THEO. RUNYON."
22 General Order No. 4, under date of "Headquarters Army of N. E. Virginia, Alex- andria, July 18th, 1861, announces this fact as follows :
"In compliance with General Order No. 17 from the department of North East Vir- ginia, the undersigned, commanding the Fourth Division of the Army of North East Virginia, assumes command of all the troops not on the march to the front, including those within the various fortifications and camps. * * *
THEODORE RUNYON,
Brigadier-General commanding Fourth Division."
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when the three divisions advanced, in the bright moonlight, to the attack of the enemy.
In assuming command of all the troops not actually ordered to the front, General Runyon's sphere of duties was greatly enlarged and his responsibilities correspondingly increased. He was expect- ed not only to keep open the line of communication with General McDowell's army, but from time to time, as he might be ordered, to forward reinforcements, thus diminishing steadily his available force while not relieving him in the least from the necessary per- formance of the principal task assigned him. Nor was this all. With many of the troops which now passed under his command, he had hitherto had no relation whatever; and of course knew nothing as to their efficiency or the trustworthiness of their officers. Besides, the command being suddenly devolved upon him, he had not been able to consult with McDowell as to his general plans or the possible exigencies of the conflict, and was, in fact, during the actual progress of the battle, unsupplied with any information at all as to the real situation of affairs. Thus his position was one of the extremest difficulty, and his duties of a character requiring the very highest executive qualities. He did not, however, so far as the records show, shrink from the prodigious task imposed upon him.
The troops actually under General Runyon's command at this critical and important period, numbered thirteen regiments, com- prising, perhaps, ten thousand men. Of these, the term of service of some four thousand would expire within a week, and that of one regiment within two days after his assumption of the com- mand.23 His preparations, however, went regularly forward, every
23 " HEADQUARTERS, ALEXANDRIA, July 19, 1861 .- Received the following despatch from Captain J. B. Fry, A. A. G., dated at Centreville, July 19:
'The General commanding directs you to send two regiments to Fairfax Station to guard it as soon as the railroad is open to that place, and that you station three other regiments at such places on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and points to the left or south of it, as will best protect it. You will also see that the track and telegraph wires are protected.
'Report what is the station of your troops, on receipt of this.'"
"The following reply was sent:
'Yours of this date is just at hand. I will, as directed, station two regiments at Fairfax Station as soon as the railroad is completed to that place. I will also station
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call upon him being promptly met. On the 21st of July, the day on which the army advanced to the attack, he forwarded the De- Kalb Regiment-part of whom were Jerseymen-together with the First, Second and Third (three years') New Jersey Regiments, and the First (three months') Regiment to Centreville, in obedience to orders from General McDowell." In the evening of the same day, orders being received to cease sending reinforcements, the battle having been lost, the forts were at once placed in readiness to receive the enemy should he pursue our retiring columns, and every possible preparation was made to retrieve, so far as possible, the misfortunes of the day. On the 22d, orders were sent to the guard at Long Bridge to pass neither officers nor privates of the retreating forces, nor others. The captain of the brig Perry, lying
the other regiments on the left or south of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad for its protection. I go over the road this afternoon, for the purpose of making the dispo- sition. The tracks and wires are all well protected now.
'My troops are now stationed as follows : First and Second three years' New Jersey Volunteers, at Vienna; Third three years' New Jersey Volunteers, guarding repair- ers and repairing the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, advancing to Fairfax Station and guarding railroad and telegraph repairers; Second three months' New Jersey Militia, six companies, at Alexandria; Third three months' New Jersey Militia (part, 200,) guarding provision trains-balance at Camp Trenton; Fourth three months' New Jersey Militia, guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Alexandria to Spring- field-some companies on Loudon and Hampshire Railroad, and at Arlington Mills and Long Bridge; the DeKalb Regiment, part guarding Loudon and Hampshire Railroad, the balance at Camp Trenton; Fifth Pennsylvania (term of service expires next Friday), at Alexandria, to be replaced by the Mozart Regiment ; Seventeenth New York, in Fort Ellsworth; Twenty-First New York, in Fort Runyon; Twenty-Eighth New York, in Fort Corcoran ; Twenty-Fifth New York, at Fort Albany. These troops have all been stationed where they are pursuant to directions from Department Headquarters. The guard for provision train was furnished at request of Captain Bell.
'It will be seen that the DeKalb Regiment, part of Third New Jersey three months' Regiment (time expires 21st inst.), Fifth Pennsylvania and six companies of the Second New Jersey three months' Regiment (time expires 26th inst.), are all the troops I have left here out of earthworks, and it will take them all to comply with your order for three regiments on left or south of Orange and Alexandria Railroad.'"-General Run- yon's Journal.
24 " Special Orders, No. 3.
"To Colonel Von Gilsa, commanding DeKalb Regiment : You will proceed with your command immediately to Centreville, by the railroad to Fairfax Station, and thence to march. You will report to Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General." (Dated at Alexandria, July 21, and signed, "By command of Brigadier-General Theo- dore Runyon.")
. A similar order to Colonel Montgomery of the First New Jersey (three years') Regi- ment, directed him to "march his command to Centreville, by way of Germantown. starting as soon as possible after receipt of this order." Colonel Montgomery received this order carly in the morning. A similar order reached the Second (three years') Regiment at eiglit o'clock.
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off Alexandria, was also directed to remove all means of water communication, in order that stragglers might be brought to bay. Bodies of troops having, during the night, reached Alexandria in an unorganized condition, they were posted in position to render service. The pickets were strengthened, the garrisons placed on the alert, and a complete system of defence promptly organized. All these steps, it is to be remembered, were taken in the face of the gravest peril, and surrounded by all the confusion and panic of a disastrous retreat. The army which marched out with cour- ageous front to grapple with the enemy had been defeated, and was dissolving into disordered fragments which the highest skill could scarcely reunite. The story of that battle it is not for us to re- hearse in these pages, except in so far as our own troops were participants in it; and we gladly abstain from the recital. The repulse was complete. With some regiments, when the decisive blow had been struck, the retreat was not an orderly flight, but a reckless, uncontrollable rout. Arms, ammunition, baggage, every- thing, was abandoned in the mad flight to a place of safety. Frightened teamsters cut loose their horses, mounted them, and rode affrighted away, leaving their wagons to obstruct the roads. Carriages in which civilians had gone out to witness the fight, as men flock to a race course on féte days, became entangled in the flying masses of men, and added to the confusion. It was, for a time, a saturnalia of panic, fright and disorder. The simple state- ment of these incidents of the day is sufficient to show that the task which fell to the share of New Jersey's General was one of most formidable magnitude.
It has pleased some historians, speculating upon the events of that memorable day, to stigmatize the failure of General Runyon to despatch all his available reserves to the front, as evidence of incapacity and unfitness for command. Why, it has been enquired, were ten thousand effective men, who panted for the fray, held inactive far to the rear, when their presence on the field might have turned the tide of disaster, and broken, by one overwhelming blow, the power of the hostile Confederacy ? The answer to this enquiry, so repeatedly and, often so offensively made, is simple and conclu-
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sive. The regiments in reserve were stationed in precise accordance with the orders of the commander-in-chief, and performed precisely the service to which they were assigned. All the evidence shows that, in this respect, every detail of the plan of battle so far as General Runyon was concerned and so far as he was apprised of the programine, was faithfully executed.23 But he did not merely exhibit a rigid adherence to actual orders ; the moment that adverse reports were received from the field, he promptly anticipated the probable commands of his superior, and forwarded toward the front every regiment not actively employed on the necessary and vital duty of guarding important lines of communication. At the same time he sought, by all the means at his command, to open direct communication with McDowell, sending his aids in all direc- tions over the field in the hope of obtaining explicit orders. But all these efforts failed. General McDowell, shifting his headquar- ters from hour to hour, carried to and fro by the varying currents of the day, was not to be found, and it was only at a late hour in the afternoon of the day, as we shall presently see, that any of our regimental commanders were able to reach and communicate with
25 The following shows the estimation in which General Runyon's services were held by General McDowell:
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. VIRGINIA, } Arlington, July 28th, 1861.
"Brigadier-General Runyon, commanding Fourth Division Reserves-
Sir: The General commanding dircets mne to express his appreciation of the industry, zeal and efficiency manifested by you in commanding the Fourth Division Reserves, during the late advance towards Manassas Junction.
"The promptness with which troops and supplies were thrown forward on demand, and your efforts in collecting, controlling and providing for the stragglers after the re- treat, were of great service to the army and the people.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
JAMES B. FRY, Adjutant General.
The above is a complete answer to the intimation in Greeley's " American Conflict," that Runyon's Division was not vigorously employed in arresting the fugitives from the battle field. Mr. Greeley says :
" After the mischief was done Runyon's Division was ordered forward from Fairfax- of course to no purpose. But it should at least, have been promptly employed to block completely with its bayonets the roads leading to Washington, sternly arresting the flight of the panic-stricken fugitives and gathering them into something which should bear once more the semblance of an army."
The letter from General MeDowell, above given, shows that Runyon not only obeyed orders, but did it with promptuess, and that the duty of arresting the fugitives and gathering them together, of which the historian speaks, was performed by General Runyon in such a manner as to merit special commendation.
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them. Then, the battle had been ended, and our forces were in full retreat toward the Potomac defences. But even then the troops of Runyon's Division performed the work assigned them without a tremor of unsteadiness amid all the panic and tumult.
We have seen that the First and Second (three years') Regiments were, on the morning of the 21st, encamped at Vienna, Lieuten- ant-Colonel McAllister in command of the former, and Colonel McLean nominally, (but Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker, really,) com- manding the latter. Three of the companies of the First were absent on a reconnoisance, when orders came for an advance of the two regiments to Centreville. This order was promptly obeyed, the regiments hurrying forward with all possible haste, encounter- ing now and then a civilian anxious to get beyond the reach of possible harm, but unable to gather any satisfactory information as to the progress of the conflict. Presently, as they approached Centreville, the guns, whose sullen roar had filled all the morning, suddenly ceased firing, and then, for the first time, these Jersey troops, marching steadily forward, knew that the battle was decided. But how decided, was still an anxious, fearful question. The an- swer was soon given by the confused masses of the retreating army, drifting down by every available channel from the disastrous field. It was a sad and bitter awakening to the advancing troops, whose exultant hopes were thus in a moment dashed to the ground. But they did not falter in their duty. The commandants of the regiments determined at once to employ all the means at their dis- posal to arrest the stampede, and, throwing their columns across the road, sought to stay the fugitives, appealing to their patriotism, their honor, their sense of duty, to gather once more in line and make another effort to save the day. But, for a time, so great was the panic, no attention was paid to these urgent appeals. Then, it being apparent that more vigorous persuasion was required, the regiments charged with fixed bayonets upon the bewildered mass, and soon effectually arrested the retreat, permitting only the wounded to pass through the lines. The First Regiment, alone, turned, into its ranks some five hundred of the fugitives, march- ing straight through their retreating columnis. In some cases the
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officers drew their swords and pistols on men and officers who refused, upon appeals to their sense of honor, to turn back." As the regiments advanced, cheer upon cheer greeted them from the fugitives, who, as they saw help in sight, grew more calm and cour- ageous. Many fell into line, while others encouraged the advan- cing Jerseymen with applauding words. It was now nearly five o'clock in the afternoon, and the stampede was stopped, the road had been cleared and regulated ; the army wagons halted, still in line, on one side of the pike, and order had come out of chaos, solely through the efforts of two New Jersey regiments. By this time the First Regiment had reached the heights of Centreville, and by sundown, the greater part of the retreating troops had found shelter behind the ridge. It then became a question whether an effort should, or should not, be made to hold the position and rally the demoralized commands for a fresh encounter. Colonel Mont- gomery sought out and had a conference with General MeDowell,
25 General McAllister, in a letter written at the time, says: "The whole seene beg. gars all description; and yet, strange to say, our officers and men, raw as they were, remained cool and collected, and marched through these retreating columns with a firmness which astonished all who saw the regiments, and which has since been a theme of universal praise."
In the same letter, General MeAllister gives the following amusing account of the manner in which William H. Russell, of the London Times, fled from the field. The account is a curious commentary on Mr. Russell's pieture as presented in the Times, of the retreat of our troops, characterized by him as cowardly and disgraceful in the last degree. General MeAllister says :
" A civilian, with a broad-rimmed hat, his face pale as death, came riding down the road at a furious rate. I ordered him to halt. He, very much agitated and frightened, said, 'I am a civilian, and must pass on.' 'No, you can't pass,' I replied; "my orders are to stop everybody." He then said, "I am a bearer of despatches to Washington, and it is imperative that I should go on." "You cannot pass until this panic is stopped ; every one who passes helps to increase the stampede," was my answer. "Here are my papers-look at them," at the same time pulling them out of his pocket. I replied, "No time to examine papers now; wait 'till we are through with this job, and we will consider your case." He again implored me, in pitiful tones, to let him through, whereupon I said, "There is my commander, go to him," pointing to Colonel Mont- gomery. He went to the Colonel, had some conversation with him, when Montgom- ery, disgusted with the man's cowardice, raising himself up in his saddle, cried at the top of his voice, "Let that man go!" I did so, when the stranger put spurs to his horse, and made the very stones of the pike fly behind him. That man was no other than Russell, the correspondent of the London Times.
"In contrast with this gallant Englishman, I saw a lady on my left, sitting in a buggy, amid the throng of soldiers, civilians, horses, mules, wagons, ambulances, right side up and wrong side up, quite calm and unconcerned. The Colonel enquired, 'Madam, are you not afraid ?' To which she replied, 'No, Colonel, I feel perfectly safe.'"
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strongly urging the propriety of making a stand. He suggested that breastworks should be thrown. up, the freshest troops placed in the most exposed positions, and any attempt at pursuit on the part of the enemy resisted to the last extremity. There was really no reason why this course should not have been pursued, the heights forming an admirable position for defence, while several thousands of fresh troops, who, being in the reserves, had not been engaged, could in a few hours have been advanced to the front. General Mc- Dowell, while unwilling to commit himself to an attempt to hold the heights permanently, instead of falling back to the line of the Po- tomac, finally acquiesced in so far to Colonel Montgomery's sugges- tion as to permit an organized effort to defend the position for the present, in order to check the enemy, who were then supposed to be pursuing ; and the First Regiment was at once advanced to a point beyond Centreville, where it took up position on the hill, with its right resting on the road by which it would be necessary for the enemy to advance. The Second Regiment, meanwhile, being without orders, and supposing a general retreat had been de- cided upon, had retired. Two regiments, however, under command of Colonel Blenker, still remained, and the Colonel of one of these at a consultation held during the night, agreed to stand by the First, whatever might occur, and fight to the last. Slowly the night waned. Silence, deep and profound, for a time reigned over the valley, disturbed only by the groans of the wounded and dying in the hospitals hard by. Pickets having been placed, the men, foot- sore and exhausted, laid down upon their arms. Presently there was a rustle, as of men marching by stealth, and the officers of the First were soon on the alert. An examination discovered the un- welcome fact that, notwithstanding the fair promises of an hour or so before, the Blenker regiments had moved off in the darkness, and the First were left alone in possession of the field. This dis- covery added, necessarily, to the anxiety of Colonel Montgomery and his associate officers, and they anxiously discussed the question as to what was next to be done ? Finally, it was determined to take up another position, close to one of the hospitals which it was desirable to protect to the last, but with the line still covering the
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