USA > New York > Annual report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York, pt 1 > Part 3
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ADJUTANT GENERAL.
exigency requiring a large and properly disciplined army, for a long period of service, has been again and more clearly demonstrated.
At the outset, Government, instead of having at its com- mand an adequate force completely organized, armed and equipped, somewhat disciplined, and lacking only the experience of actual service to make them in every respect efficient and veteran troops, had to create such a force from volunteers drawn from the unorganized mass of our citizen soldiery. The danger and the loss of time consequent on having to organize an army out of raw material, and pre- pare it for service in the presence of a sudden and pressing danger, is manifest.
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If, instead of this, a force adequate to the emergency and equal in all respects to the best of our militia regiments, could have been called out at once, the occasion for its em- ployment might not have arisen. That such might have been the result, is another and a strong reason in favor of such a thorough and radical change in our military system. as shall in the future enable Government not only to act with promptness when necessary, but by the moral effect of an array of citizen soldiers imposing in numbers and complete in every respect for service, render the proba- bility of having to employ them more remote.
On the assumption, then, that the present militia system is inadequate to meet the wants of the Government, we must free it from its present defects, increase our standing army, or employ volunteers. In regard to the first alter- native it is only necessary to observe, that whilst the idea of a large standing army is repugnant to the feelings of the
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people and in conflict with the character of our institu- tions, the cost of maintaining it would alone render it im- possible to impose such a burden on the country, except by an obliteration of all State lines and the establishment of a consolidated government.
The employment of volunteers, though far less objection- able, is attended with many and serious disadvantages. To place in service a force previously organized, completely armed and equipped, and with the various staff appoint- ments properly filled, is of itself a great labor. But, when to this is superadded the task of creating the force itself from the mass of our population, brave, intelligent and patriotic, yet with no previous knowledge of the duties of the soldier, and with few persons of experience to take the position of officers and instructors, the whole becomes a work to accomplish which requires time, large expendi- tures, and a popular feeling favorable to the service. His- tory affords no parallel to the unexampled rapidity with which the six hundred thousand volunteers now in service were recruited, armed, equipped and placed at the disposal of the Government ; but they were without discipline, and uninstructed in the duties of camp life. These deficiencies have only been overcome at the sacrifice of months of val- uable time, which, with a force as well disciplined as the Prussian Landwehr, the French National Guards, or several of our own regiments of militia, might have been employed in active operations. That our army is fast approaching this condition, there is no doubt; but a consideration of what might have been accomplished, had they gone to the field with that knowledge of their duties which it has taken six
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months to impart, is perhaps the best reason that can be urged against the policy of substituting a volunteer for an organized force.
In the case of invasion, to rely solely on a newly orga- nized levy, notwithstanding the bravery and patriotism of our citizens, would be attended with much hazard. Should a contest occur with any great maritime power, the blow would follow the declaration too closely in the order of time to allow us to raise and equip armies, to build forts, and to fill our arsenals with the material of war. Enlight- ened wisdom dictates that all this should be accomplished in a time of peace ; and it is no light argument in favor of such a course, that it is the one best calculated to ward off the perils of war. A superiority on the ocean enabled England and France, in 1854, to place a powerful army in the Crimea in a short space of time, and to maintain it there against the immense resources of the Russian govern- ment. The suppression of the rebellion in India is another illustration of the ability of a great naval power to over- come all the obstacles interposed by distance, and, through the means of powerful steamships, to deal sudden and effec- tive blows, against which there would be no adequate pro- tection.
The authority of the State over this important subject, is limited by the Constitution "to training the militia ac- cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Whilst this is far short of that full and complete jurisdiction which would enable the Legislature to proceed without restraint. it should not prevent such improvements in the law of 1854 as can be adopted without conflicting with the para-
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ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
mount authority of the General Government. There can be no doubt of the power of the Legislature to pass an act changing the existing militia law in many essential partic- ulars, and as the action of Congress is uncertain, no time should be lost in making it as complete as circumstances will permit. I respectfully submit the following sugges- tions for your Excellency's consideration :
Ist. The study of tactics and instruction in military drills in our higher schools and academies, by diffusing a knowledge of one important branch of the duties of the sol- dier, and under circumstances where it could be acquired with but little loss of time, would be of great advantage. The labor required to obtain anything like proficiency in these matters is too great to allow of thorough instruction at the company and regimental drills which take place throughout the State. In a few of our large cities, where a certain degree of esprit du corps is maintained, we find companies and even regiments in every respect well drilled and disciplined, but this is only accomplished at a sacrifice of time which renders it a burden, and which might in a great degree be avoided by making it a part of our school education. Physically it would be conducive to health, and so far from being considered an onerous task, it would be preferred to light and frivolous amusements.
2d. There should be more encouragement given to the formation of new companies in the several arms of service. Out of a total population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five liable to bear arms, of seven hundred and sixty- six thousand, less than twenty thousand compose the whole number of the organized militia of the State. Of sixty-
ADJUTANT GENERAL.
three regiments, into which this force is divided, more than one-half have nothing beyond a bare organization to dis- tinguish them from the great mass of the unorganized militia. Deficient in arms and accoutrements, no less than in drill and discipline, they are neither prepared to render efficient service in the field, nor to make a creditable appearance at the stated inspections and parades. This condition of things arises from no indisposition on the part of our citizens to connect themselves with the militia service, but it is owing to the want of proper encourage- ment from the State. The cost of maintaining such a military establishment as our safety requires should be a public charge, and yet in consequence of the indifference both of the State and General Government no adequate provision has ever been made for its support. The negli- gence of the State has been closely imitated by civil officers, and the commutation tax, which should amount to $300,000 yearly, does not yield $50,000. The collection of this tax should be enforced by more stringent rules; and, beyond this, there should be a reasonable appropriation annually, to be disbursed under proper checks and restrictions in the payment of such charges as the State is justly and honor- ably bound to assume. The necessary means for this pur- pose should be provided by a general tax, on the principle that a military organization of this character is to be con- sidered as a safeguard to life and property whenever a coor- cion of laws is insufficient. The whole policy, in short, should be changed, and instead of being regarded with indifference, the militia system should be recognized as at ouce an important and necessary institution, and entitled to as much care as those of a civil character.
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3d. How much soever we may admire the elective prin- ciple when applied to civil offices, it is questionable whether it can be successfully carried out in a military organization, and one obstacle to the improvement of our militia are the provisions of section two, article eleven of the Constitution of 1846. The perfection of any military system depends on the absolute nature of the authority by which it is con- trolled-a proposition with which the provision making military officers elective is in direct conflict. No officer who owes his position to the votes of those whom he is to command can act with that paramount regard to the inte- rest of the service, which is necessary to promote its high- est success. Nor is the elective principle any less preju- dicial to the welfare of the soldier. It has been fully demonstrated, that the choice of officers is governed more by personal preferences, than by any regard to real merit or proficiency ; and when experience in the field has brought out the real character of the person they have chosen, they find, too often, in place of the experienced officer, thoroughly acquainted with his duties, or at least capable of learning them, a total incapacity, joined to as total a disregard of, and care for his command. Perhaps nothing has been so prejudicial to the volunteer service as the manner of choosing line officers, and it would be equally so with respect to any organization. The convention of 1846 seems to have been in great doubt as to the propriety of extend- ing the principle to military officers, and with commend- able caution left open a way of escape, in section six of the same article, which provides " that in case the mode of clec- tion and appointment of militia officers hereby directed,
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shall not be found conducive to the improvement of the militia, the Legislature may abolish the same and provide by law for their appointment and removal, if two-thirds of the members present in each House shall concur therein."
A modification of the present law, so far as to give the Commander-in-chief the appointment of all officers above the rank of captain, and requiring the choice of line officers to be confirmed by him, would, in my opinion, be a most advantageous change from the present rule.
4th. A change in the manner of appointing officers should be connected with some provision to test their qualifications through an examining board. Although a test of this kind cannot be considered as equally satisfac- tory with meritorious conduct in actual service, it is far better than no test at all. The officer who can explain and illustrate, theoretically, the movements and evolutions of the company and battalion, will not be likely to fail in carrying them into practice. His theoretical knowledge will at least afford a fair presumption in his favor; and, if he should prove incompetent in the field, it will probably be owing to other causes. But the examination of an officer should not be confined to this one branch of his duties ; an acquaintance with those which relate more particularly to the sanitary condition of troops in service, is almost as important as to know how to drill and manœu- vre them, and no officer can be considered fully competent for command who does not exhibit some degree of intelli- gence and information in regard to these.
5th. As proficiency in field exercises, and in the manual of arms, can only be acquired by practice, provision should
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be made for the more frequent assembling of companies for drill, and also for the massing of larger bodies for instruc- tion in the movements of battalion and brigades. In the latter case it will be necessary that the camp should be located at some central point in the regimental or brigade district, and as this will remove the troops from their homes and business vocations, both officers and men should be paid whilst on this duty.
6th. Nothing would tend more to promote the formation of new companies and regiments than a liberal distribution of arms. The frequent applications made to this depart- ment show that there is a strong inclination amongst a class of our citizens whose business pursuits will not admit of their entering the volunteer service to connect them- selves with military associations for home duty. If this inclination were encouraged it would lead to a large increase of the organized militia force. It will be noticed that the aggregate number of rifles and muskets of all descriptions actually distributed to the militia is less than fourteen thousand, an amount so manifestly below what it should be for a State with more than five hundred thousand men capable of bearing arms, that the most prompt means should be taken to increase our supply for the purpose of issuing them to newly formed organizations, and to com- plete the arming of those already formed.
7th. If, with such encouragement as can be offered by the State, the number of companies and regiments should not be largely increased, under the law of 1854, provision should be made to increase the number of regimental dis- tricts, and to organize therein one hundred regiments, including those now formed. This would constitute no
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larger force than, should be readily furnished from an aggregate population of four millions, nor would it be lar- ger than may be required to protect our exposed frontiers from invasion.
Should the expense of collecting so large a force for in- struction by regiments and brigades be considered an objec- tion to the plan, the new regiments might be organized for the present on the basis of ten companies of thirty-two men each. This would give a skeleton formation which could be filled up by draft whenever necessary, having meanwhile its full staff, which is indispensable to the effi- ciency of any military organization.
In the consideration of any plan for the re-organization of the militia as a government measure, an examination of the best European systems will be not only useful, but indispensable. Much will be found that is inapplicable under a government like that of the United States, but out of the whole, a system could be devised much more effec- tive than the law of 1792, free from its defects, and within such limits in regard to the cost of maintaining it, as would remove all objections on that score, except such as are based on a most unwise economy. If the idea of a military establishment, kept up at the public expense, in a time of profound peace, is opposed to our national prejudices, the spectacle of the capital of a great nation in imminent peril of being occupied by rebels, for want of a few thousand disciplined troops to defend it, is equally opposed to our national pride. We must accept either the one or the other of two alternatives; submit to the necessity of a military organization throughout the country, or to the
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danger consequent on an entire want of preparation to meet exigencies as they arise.
The objections to a large standing army, on the one hand, or to a volunteer force on the other, if they have any weight, leave but one other alternative-an organized and disci- plined militia. How effective a militia force can be made for offensive as well as defensive operations, was shown in the case of the Prussian Landwehr, which served in the allied a my, in 1813, with all the steadiness of veteran troops. The interval between the peace of Tilsit and the coalition against France in 1813, had been employed in silently organizing the mass of the population into a mili- tary force, not only formidable in numbers, but effective in discipline. The result of the campaign of 1813 showed that such an organization could be made exceedingly for- midable even for offensive operations; nor is there any reason to doubt that, had it existed in 1806, the prostration of the Prussian monarchy, after the battle of Jena, could not have been so easily and rapidly accomplished.
In the reports of the Crimean Commission is the following clear and concise statement of this admirable military organization :
"The organization is based on the principle that every able-bodied man is bound to serve in defence of his country, (fatherland) and that the army is the great school of mili- tary instruction for the whole nation. In conformity with this principle, the land forces of Prussia are composed of four classes, viz:
1. The standing army.
2. The Landwehr (militia) of the first ban.
3. The Landwehr of the second ban.
4. The Landsturm, or 'levy en masse.'
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"1. The standing army cousists of all the able-bodied men of twenty years of age, who serve three years.
"2. The Landwehr of the first ban comprises all the men. from twenty to thirty-two years old, not belonging to the standing army. It constitutes an army of reserve to re- inforce and co-operate with the standing army for all ser- vice in time of war. This force is completely organized and equipped, and is embodied twice a year for instruction, sometimes by battalions, sometimes to join the regular troops in the great maneuvers and exercises. Their arms, clothing and equipments are kept in storehouses provided for them, and a few officers and men of each battalion and squadron are retained permanently in service to take care of the depot.
"3. The Landwehr of the second ban is composed of the men from thirty-two to forty years of age who do not belong to the standing army. This force forms the garri- sons of fortresses in time of war, or it may be called to the support of the active army of operations. It is not called out in time of peace.
" 4. The Landsturm embraces all the men from seven- teen to fifty years of age who are not included in the three other classes. The force is not regularly organized, and would only be called out in case of invasion, for the defence of the country in the last resort."
It will be seen that the effective character of the Prussian militia is due, in a great degree, to the three years' service in the regular army. From this rule there are few exemp- tions, and the Landwehr is thus rendered an effective and disciplined body, and a knowledge of military affairs is
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diffused throughout the mass of the population. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, in 1815, there were one hundred and fifty thousand infantry and twenty thousand cavalry, of the Landwehr, under arms, and the reports before referred to give the total force of the first and second ban on the war establishment as follows:
Landwehr Ist Ban.
Landwehr 2d Ban.
Battalions.
Squadrons.
Men.
Battalions.
Squadrons.
Men.
Infantry
108
108,216 116
93,032
Cavalry
136
20,468
104
12.480
Artillery
$16
23,000
Pioneers
1,400
Total
108
136
128,684
232. 104
129,912
This constitutes a larger body of thoroughly disciplined militia, in proportion to population, than exists under any other government in Europe; and when to this is added the Landsturm, embracing all persons from seventeen to fifty years of age, not enrolled in the regular army, or in the Landwehr of the first or second ban, the aggregate pre- sents a force so formidable in numbers and discipline as to justify the observation, that whilst for offensive operations Prussia may be inferior to other first class powers, she is invulnerable within her own borders.
The efficiency of the Prussian Landwehr, owing as it is in a great degree to a preparatory training in the regular army, could not probably be imparted to our militia, nor would it be practicable to adopt and maintain such a mili-
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tary code, as a whole, under any other than a monarchical form of government. There are, however, a great many provisions about it, which should not be lost sight of in any comprehensive law on the subject of our militia. The principle that the safety of the State requires that every able bodied man between certain ages should be instructed in the duties of the soldier; the military schools; the division of the whole population into classes or bans accor- ding to age; the staff organization ; thorough instruction in the use of arms; frequent drills, and the massing of battalions and brigades for instruction, are all features of great importance, and applicable to any system.
The Swiss militia resembles in many respects that of Prussia. It constitutes the only military force, there being no standing army, and with a total population of less than three millions, numbers over one hundred and seven- ty-five thousand men, classified as follows :
Ist. The Elite, which takes the place of a regular force, and includes all persons liable to bear arms between twenty and thirty-five years of age.
2d. The Reserve, including all persons between the ages of thirty-five and forty.
3d. The Landwehr, including all persons between the ages of forty and forty-five.
4th. The Levy-in-masse, or Landsturm, which is not organized, and is only called out in great emergencies.
The discipline and proficiency of this force is maintained by a theoretical instruction in schools, and by frequent drills and exercises. The basis of the whole system is the supreme authority of the Federal Government, and the duty
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of all citizens between certain ages to perform military service. As a consequence there are few exemptions, so that notwithstanding the smallness of the population, an army formidable in numbers, no less than in discipline, is at all times in a state of preparation. This was shown in 1846, on the revolt of the seven cantons and the formation of the Sonderbund, when the Federal Government was able to march over one hundred thousand of the militia of the loyal cantons into the rebellious districts, and in a cam- paign of less than a month re-establish its authority and restore order. Again in 1856, on the prospect of a war with Prussia, an army of two hundred thousand men, com- pletely armed and equipped, was called out to defend the country from invasion.
These references are made simply to draw attention to the fact that, should Congress take up the subject, there will be no necessity of adopting an untried scheme. A noble system of military training and discipline could be founded on the basis of those prevailing under European governments ; nor would it be difficult to assimilate many of their more important features to the form of our insti- tutions and the character of our population. A standing army equal to any emergency will never be tolerated under the existing state of things, whilst we have daily evidence that one no larger than the present is of but small account, so far as numbers are concerned, in a contest where a single State sends one hundred thousand men to the field. To consider it in the future as a school of instruction, drawing its pupils from the several States by draft and according to population, for a service of two years, would be one of the best features in any plan for re-organizing the militia.
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It is to be hoped that Congress will give to this subject that prompt and careful consideration which its importance demands. Whilst the Legislatures of the several States can do much to improve their military organizations under the law of 1792, they should not lose sight of the fact that Congress alone possesses that full jurisdiction over the sub- jeet which is necessary to give the country a complete and uniform system, and its action should be invoked by appro- priate resolutions.
In closing this report, I desire to acknowledge my obli- gations to my predecessor, General J. Meredith Read, Jr., through whose unremitting exertions the great increase in the business of this Department had been arranged and systematised; to Col. Duncan Campbell, Assistant Adjutant General, who has been charged with the duties connected with the militia, and especially to Col. George Bliss, Jr., Acting Assistant Adjutant General, on duty in the city of New York, for the great assistance he has rendered in the organization of the large force placed in service from that . part of the State. Nor should I omit to commend to the favorable notice of your Excellency the clerks employed in this Department, who have all manifested the utmost zeal and devotion to the service, in the arduous duties which have been necessarily thrown upon them.
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