USA > New York > History of the 121st New York State Infantry > Part 13
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General Gordon says that the objects of this movement under Early were two, first, to draw some of Grant's troops from in front of Lee, and second, the release of the Confederate prisoners confined at Point Lookout. The capture of Wash- ington was not contemplated, and Early was per- plexed as to what to do, when his troops reached the outworks of the city. He might have entered before the arrival of the 6th Corps, if he had desired to do so, for a portion of the works in his front was bare of defenders. But all the facts seem to point to a different conclusion. Gordon goes on to say that the first of these objects was attained, but it was found impossible to free the prisoners, and no attempt was made to reach them.
In the affair at Fort Stevens only two divisions were engaged. The 3d Division, which started from City Point the day before the rest of the corps, was disembarked at Baltimore and ad- vanced from that city to Frederick City, where it joined the forces of General Lew Wallace, and took part in the battle of the Monocacy. In this battle the small force of General Wallace, by suc-
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cessful maneuvering and stubborn fighting, delayed General Early an entire day, and thus gave the time necessary for the 6th Corps to arrive at Wash- ington, before the Confederates could enter.
General Early afterwards said that when he saw the banners of the 6th Corps in the works at Fort Stevens, he gave up all hope of taking the city. One of his officers said, "Damn the 6th Corps, we find it everywhere." These were the men whom the corps had fought at the Wilderness battle at Spottsylvania, on the 10th and 12th of May, and a part of it at the Monocacy. Gordon's Georgians had had a conspicuous part in all those terrible battles, and they knew the metal of which the 6th Corps was made.
The day following the battle of Fort Stevens, the corps advanced and found that the enemy had retreated. This was rendered necessary from the fact that General Wallace had restored the morale of his defeated army, and was threatening Early's rear and flank. The advance continued through Rockville and Seneca on the river road to the vicinity of Poolsville, the 1st Division having the lead. At Poolsville the enemy was found, but gave way before the attack of our cavalry. The corps encamped there for the night. The next day by a long and dusty march, the cavalry leading, Ed- wards Ferry was reached. On the 16th the river was crossed and the advance reached Leesburg, and passed beyond to Clark's Gap. Here the 3d Division under General Ricketts rejoined the corps. They showed the effect of their hard fight at Mon- ocacy. Of them Beckwith says, "They gave us an account of their fight there, and spoke of the con- fidence with which the Rebels charged them, until they found out what troops were in front of them. Prisoners said that the Rebel officers told their men, that the troops in front of them were only
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militia and did not know how to fight, and would run at the first charge, but as soon as we fired our first volley, they knew mighty well that, 'You uns wan't no militia,' and the first thing they asked when they saw the crosses we wore, was, 'Where did you uns come from? Is you everywhere?' They told us that they were outnumbered and outflanked, and the new troops did not hold their ground. They made as good a fight as possible under the circumstances, (a fact that General Gordon fully acknowledges). If we had been there, we could have whipped the Rebels, and now that we were together again we were anxious to get at them and show them that we could."
Part of the 19th Corps under General Emory joined us at Clark's Gap and a cavalry engagement of some importance was fought in our front. We advanced again on the 17th along the Snickerville Pike through the gap and to Snickerville Ford on the Shenandoah River. Here the 19th Corps, un- der General Emory, joined the army. Twice the regiment crossed the river and advanced without serious opposition some distance into the valley.
The result of these observations convinced Gen- eral Grant that Early had been called back to Petersburg, by General Lee, and he ordered the 6th and 19th Corps to report as soon as possible at Petersburg. This left the 8th Corps under General Crook in the valley.
While the two corps were resting and being pro- vided with new clothing at Georgetown, Crook at- tempted to advance up the valley from Harper's Ferry, and was met with a stubborn resistance by a superior force and driven back. It was soon evident that Early with an increased force was still in the valley and bent upon more mischief. The 6th and 19th Corps were therefore ordered back through the villages of Maryland, north of the Po-
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tomac to Frederick City. A short halt was made, near the Monocacy battlefield, but the march was resumed and continued all night until Harper's Ferry had been passed and camp was made at Halltown.
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CHAPTER XVI
WITH SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY
OME of the troops of General Hunter after his S disastrous defeat by Early, had by a circuitous route arrived at Harper's Ferry, and with the two corps returned there, constituted considerable of an army. General Hunter resigned and General Sheridan was sent to command the department constituted as the Middle Military Division, and the army was designated as "The Army of the Shenan- doah." It was Sheridan's first independent com- mand, and he was cautioned against attempting any general engagement until his army had become unified in operation, and more developed in morale. He took command on the 7th of August. The army consisted of the 6th and 19th Corps, and the army of West Virginia under General Crook, Averill's cavalry and the cavalry divisions of Tor- bert and Wilson, sent from the army of the Po- tomac. In all about thirty thousand men.
A glance at the map, will give some conception of the conditions under which the succeeding operations were carried on. From Harper's Ferry the Potomac River bends to the northwest until only a narrow strip of Maryland lies between it and the border of Pennsylvania. Then it bends slightly southwest to the western limit of the state. This conformation of the country gave to the Con- federate army south of the river an advantageous field of operations. Under cover of the river, movements could be freely made to threaten Mary- land and Pennsylvania, and Early was a master
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of strategy. He had the example of Stonewall Jackson's previous successful campaign, and the troops with whom it had been made. His army consisted of three divisions of veteran troops, com- manded by Generals Breckenridge, Rodes and Gordon, and they were operating in a friendly country, on familiar grounds. The task before Sheridan was three fold, to prevent another raid into Maryland, to keep so close to Early's army that none of it could be dispatched to Lee, and to keep from a general engagement. These three facts are needed to explain the complicated and erratic movements of the period from the 7th of August to the 19th of September. The itinerary of the brigade is given in a report made by the Adjutant General of the brigade as follows:
August 10: Marched at 6 A. M., camped at Clifton, fifteen miles.
August 11: Marched at 5 A. M. and camped six miles from Winchester, southeast.
August 12: Marched at 7:30 A. M. in rear of trains, camped at Middletown.
August 13: Crossed Cedar Creek at 7 A. M., halted eleven and one-half miles from Strasburg. Enemy found in position at Fisher's Hill. Re- crossed Cedar Creek at 10 A. M. and camped on old ground.
August 16: Commenced march to Winchester at 10 P. M.
August 17: Continued march, passed through Winchester at 8 A. M. Camped on Opequon Creek at 4:30 P. M.
August 18: Marched at 6 A. M. via Berryville and camped two miles from Charlestown.
August 21: Enemy appeared at 8 A. M. Skir- mished all day.
August 22: Retired at 2 A. M. toward Harper's Ferry. Camped on former ground. At 12 M.
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moved to Crook's left and remained in reserve. August 28: Marched at 1 A. M. and camped eleven and one-half miles from Charlestown, in posi- tion held on the 21st inst.
September 3: Marched to a position near Clifton and remained until Sept 19.
September 19: Broke camp at 3:30 A. M., crossed the Opequon Creek at 9 A. M.
To fill in the incidents of this period of appar- ently erratic movement, resort must be made to Colonel Beckwith's narrative. He writes, "While at Halltown, Colonel Olcott and quite a number of men, who had been away wounded and sick, re- turned to the regiment and increased its strength and appearance materially. On the 16th we started back down the valley, marched all night and passed through Winchester at 8 o'clock in the morning and got some pies and eggs with jewelry advertisements which the inhabitants mistook for greenbacks. On the 21st the enemy drove in our pickets and we were sent out on the skirmish line and skirmished all day. On the way out, when some distance, as we supposed, from the line, Captain Van Shaick commanding our (4th) com- pany, and Bob Topping were wounded, the Cap- tain seriously, and Bob slightly. Both were greatly surprised however, as none of us heard the shots fired that struck them. Going out in regimental front, we were deployed on the run in heavy skirmish order in front of a wood and advanced some distance to the middle of a field from which the wheat had recently been cut. In front of us were some farm buildings, stacks and rail fences along which the Rebs were posted, and they kept up a rapid fire as we advanced. We were finally told to lie down and hold the position. General Upton rode along the line and said to us, 'I want you to show the army, that no Rebel line of battle
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can drive this regiment from its position.' We held our ground all day long, firing all the time. Wilbur Champany of our company was instantly killed by a sharpshooter posted near the stacks before mentioned. We had warned him to be cautious, as they had placed several balls very close to us, one lodging in the blankets of one of the boys, and another in Hank Cole's gunstock. But Wilbur said, 'I'll have another shot at him any way,' and was in the act of aiming when a ball pierced his head. He was a fine, fearless soldier, and had not been back with us long, having just recovered from wounds in both legs, received at Salem Church. At dark we carried him back and buried him. At 2 o'clock in the morning we were assembled and marched back to our old camp. After we had gotten some sleep and a meal we marched out to our left and lay in reserve behind Crook's West Virginians, the remainder of the day."
On the 16th of September, General Grant visited Sheridan and after listening to his plans and ap- proving them, gave him the laconic order, "Go in," and returned to Petersburg, confident that Sheri- dan would give a good account of himself and his army. Nor did he have long to wait. On the morn- ing of the 19th of September at daylight the army drew out of camp in front of Berryville and took the pike leading direct to Winchester. Wilson with his division of cavalry was leading, followed by the 6th Corps in double column flanking the pike which was occupied by the artillery and trains. The crossing of the Opequon and the suc- ceeding battle is described, so far as the 121st and the brigade took part in it, more accurately by Colonel Beckwith than by any other writer so far read. He says, "We were well armed, carried ex- tra ammunition, four days' rations in our haver-
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sacks, and had had a good long rest. Wilson's division of cavalry had crossed the creek and pushed the enemy baek, fighting continuously over two miles of rough ground. The 3d Division of our corps moved up, relieving the cavalry. The 2d Division following formed on the left of the 3d. The 19th Corps (Emory's) was formed on the right of the 6th. Our division was moved to the left of the pike and massed in reserve, ready for instant movement to any point. All this under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. These dis- positions occupied a long time and it was nearly noon before a general advance was ordered. The roar of cannon and musketry told that it had be- gun, and the battle was on. For a time, things seemed to be going our way, and the enemy had been driven back a considerable distance by both corps. But in advancing, a gap had been opened between the right of our corps and the 19th which Getty's division could not close. Seeing this weak spot and an opening in our line, the enemy massed some troops of Rodes' division and made a gallant and desperate charge upon the left of the 19th Corps. It was at this time that we were sent in, moving by left of regiment at quickstep across the pike and for some distance through a field into a wood. There we were ordered to lie down, Gen- eral Upton riding out some distance to hurry the broken troops behind our line. The 65th and 67th consolidated New York passed to our rear and right and formed. The 2d Connecticut formed to the right of the pike a little to the rear. We could see the enemy coming up in line of battle, and some of the men said it was our own troops, and others said, 'No, they are Rebs.' I remember Wilbur Phillips making several such statements before being convinced. To our right we could see our line advancing and the enemy in retreat both fir-
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ing, the color sergeants waving their standards to encourage the men. But our attention was fixed in that direction but a moment, yet that was of great encouragement to us. We could see a great gap in our line to the right and knew that we were at the point of danger and that perhaps the fate of the battle rested with us. General Upton ordered us to fix bayonets and not to fire until he gave the command, and the word was passed along the line. At last the enemy reached to where there could not be any doubt of their identity, and General Upton gave the order, 'Ready, aim, fire,' and crash went that volley of lead, and down tumbled those brave fellows. 'Forward, charge,' rang out Upton's short, incisive command, and away we went. Reaching the point where their line had stood we saw many of them lying there, not all shot how- ever. Some of them had dropped down to escape death and became our prisoners. But those who could get away fled for their lives, not stopping on the order of their going. At once out rushed our companion regiments in fine order. The 2d Connecticut advancing and firing, was compelled to withstand a severe fire from the right as well as front, and suffered severely. We reformed and were immediately moved forward and placed on the left of the 37th Massachusetts to close up a gap. This splendid regiment, armed with Spencer re- peating rifles, had charged in on the charging Rebels in the nick of time, and had saved our (Stevens') battery near the road, while we had reached their front and poured in our volley. It was about this time that we lost another of our famous and gallant commanders, Gen. David A. Russell, commanding our division. He was killed by a shell while moving up with his old brigade on the charge His command devolved upon General Upton, who shortly after 5 o'clock was also dis-
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abled by a severe shell wound, and compelled to leave the field. The command of the division fell upon Colonel Edwards of the 37th Massachusetts. Captain J. D. P. Douw was commanding the regi- ment. Some little time after we had formed on the left of the 37th Massachusetts, the 15th New Jersey formed on our left and some other troops formed in our rear. We continued firing some until about 4 o'clock, and the 37th, being in the open, kept up a continuous fire. We being screened by small trees and brush, could not see anything to fire at, but we kept a few men in ad- vance a little distance to keep any one from steal- ing upon us. About 4 o'clock we advanced about a third of a mile to some heavy tiniber, where the enemy opened a heavy fire upon us. But we
charged them on the run, and they did not stop running away from us till they got to the village of Winchester, and we advanced to the railroad. After leaving the last piece of woods they kept us dodging their cannon shots, from two batteries playing upon us as we advanced. It was a splendid sight to see our troops coming up on the right- Crook's and Emory's, I think they were, and the cavalry on the left closing in on them and charging over the open field, with their batteries on the hill back of the town, glistening in the rays of the sun, blazing away at our charging columns. To the
fact of our drawing four days' rations and my haversack's being full I owe my life. On that day just as we reached the road, a shell burst in front of us (I was on the color guard), I just felt a shock and tumbled forward. A piece of shell had struck my haversack, passed through it and my rations of pork, hardtack, sugar, coffee and tin plate. Then it struck my folded knife, fork and spoon in my pocket and glanced off. In running up the haversack had swung around in front of me and
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so received the piece of iron. I rolled over on my back surprised. Several of our fellows stooped over me and asked how badly I was hurt and if they should help me back. I said I would see, and very, very carefully felt for a wound, but to my great delight could not find one, and so told them, and that they could go on, I could get along all right. Except a numbness and a bad bruise, I was unhurt and soon got over it. I was somewhat lame, but managed to keep on the march, getting to our camp by the roadside shortly after the regi- ment. Our total losses of the day were two men killed, and one officer and 12 men severely wounded, several having slight wounds not being reported. As I remember, Charles Carmody was the only seriously wounded man from our com- pany."
There is no doubt that the crisis of this battle was the check given to the charge of Rodes' divi- sion of the Confederate army, upon the left of the 19th Corps. If Rodes had succeeded in driving through to the head of the ravine from which the road debouches, the army of Sheridan would have been cut in two, and the result would have been disastrous at that stage of the battle. Gen- eral Upton's quick perception of the danger and his prompt disposition of the brigade and es- pecially of the 121st New York not only checked the advance of the charging column, but also threw them into such confusion that they did not recover from it during the rest of the conflict. Due credit was given to General Upton, and the 121st New York in the official report of the battle. But Loss- ing, in his Pictorial History of the Civil War, gives the credit to General Emory instead of Upton and to 131st New York instead of to the 121st New York. The death of General Rodes at this crisis of the bat- tle was a severe blow to the Confederates, as was
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that of Russell to us. Captain Weaver in giving an account of this special affair at the crisis of the battle says that Captain Cronkite rushed out alone and captured a Rebel flag. Neither Beck- with nor Colonel Cronkite mentions this in their accounts of the affair. Of the result of the battle Colonel Beckwith says, "We were all greatly en- couraged by the splendid victory we had won. We knew the men we had been fighting and we con- sidered them as good as any, if not the best, in Lee's army, but they were no match for us on open ground. It was voted a luxury to be permitted to fight on a fair field instead of in the jungle we had been in, from the Rapidan to the James, and it did us great good. We knew that the Louisianians of Rappahannock Station were there, the Alabamians of Salem Church, the Virginians and Georgians of the Wilderness, and Dole's and Battle's men of Spottsylvania, and we did not fear them with a fair chance. But we were deeply depressed by the loss of Generals Russell and Upton. While it was reported that Upton's wound would not perma- nently disable him, we feared it would."
Of all the battles in which the brigade had been engaged since the writer was detailed to duty at brigade headquarters, this was the first in which he had not been under fire. In crossing the field later in the afternoon he came to a point where the two lines of battle must have stood for some time, steadily firing at each other. Between two thickets, probably twenty rods apart there was a row of blue clad dead lying close together, and fairly touching each other; and only a few yards in front of them a similar windrow of gray clad dead, lying as closely and straightly aligned as were their opponents of a few hours before. The wounded had all been removed.
This battle cost the enemy, besides their dead
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and wounded, 2500 prisoners, 15 battle flags and 5 cannon.
Sheridan's report of this engagement written in Winchester was, "We have just sent the enemy whirling through Winchester and are after them tomorrow. We captured 2500 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, 9 battle flags and all the Rebel dead and wounded. Their wounded in Winchester amount to some three thousand."
According to promise the pursuit was taken up the next day, and on the 22nd of September Early was found twenty miles south of Winchester in a very strong position on Fisher's Hill. Sheridan immediately disposed his army to assail the enemy. He placed the 6th and 19th Corps in front of the Rebel works and sent the 8th Corps by a concealed and circuitous route to concentrate on the left flank of the Rebel works. When this was accom- plished, late in the afternoon the command was given to charge, and while the main force of the enemy was engaged in resisting the attack in front the 8th Corps broke over the works on their left flank, and another route, more disastrous than that at Winchester, resulted. The writer had found a good position from which to view as much of the scene of battle as possible, and with a companion was watching eagerly the battle, when a Rebel battery, evidently thinking him and his companion persons of distinction and authority, sent three shells in quick succession at us, but without se- rious effects. The fragments fell uncomfortably near us however and we moved down out of sight towards the front.
Of this fight Colonel Beckwith gives the part taken by the 121st New York. "About 2 o'clock of the 22d we moved farther to the left, and then forward through some woods down a hill. Com- ing out of the woods we came to the railroad, and
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could see across a ravine, the Rebel works. The gulf was spanned by a trestle work and a number of us started to cross it, but we had gone only a few steps when we discovered a gap burned .in it, and we had to go back and go down the bank, cross the stream (Tumbling Run), and climb up the steep bank on the other side through the brush and briars. We used them to pull ourselves up by, but going up we were protected by the extreme steepness of the hill, from the Rebel fire. When we reached the top they were on the run, having left their breastworks, thanks to Crook's operation on the left. I do not think we could have carried their works in our front by assault. The ground was so rough that we could not have reached them in any sort of order; or in sufficient numbers at the same time, to have driven them out. Besides they had fine breastworks to protect them. That they expected to give us a very warm reception, was evidenced by the fact that they had arranged cartridges along their breastworks for rapid use. They did not take time to gather them up. They also left several cannon behind. We captured several prisoners and had only two men hurt in the whole affair. As soon as we got over their works, we formed and moved forward in pursuit. About this time Generals Sheridan, Wright and others with their staff officers rode onto the field near us and engaged in some congratulatory talk. We all believed that Early's army was completely broken up and pushed on after them with eager steps."
General Gordon says of this battle that the posi- tion at Fisher's Hill was considered impregnable, and the battle was lost by the fault of an "unpro- tected flank." That term covers a large number of strategic disasters. At Chancellorville it was the cause of Hooker's disaster. In the Wilderness it made the 6th of May a sad date for the 6th Corps. In many other engagements it wrought evil to the
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Union forces, and now in the valley it had twice brought disaster to the army of the Confederacy. And it was destined to nearly wreck the brilliant career of the army of the Shenandoah within another month after this battle of Fisher's Hill, lost and won because of an exposed flank. In other words the strategy that discovers and takes ad- vantage of the exposed flank of the opposing army is apt to be the successful strategy.
To take up again the itinerary of the army of the Shenandoah from Fisher's Hill to Cedar Creek. September 22: Pursued the enemy all night.
September 23: Halted near Woodstock to issue ra-
tions at 8 A. M. Marched again at 12 M. and camped at Cedar Creek.
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