USA > Ohio > Brief history of the 46th Ohio Volunteers > Part 2
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"SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, March 12, 1862.
"The undersigned. citizens of Savannah, Tennessee, and vicinity. hereby declare that the presence of the 46th Ohio volunteer regiment. on the Sth instant, proved most opportune in preventing the arresting and pressing into service of persons subject to the draft or detail ordered by the State authorities. Refuge was thereby afforded to those who had to leave home on account of the draft. and in prevent- ing many of them from being pressed into the rebel army, and adding a considerable number of recruits to the Union army. The troops under Colonel Worthington have been quiet and orderly, committing no trespass or intrusion on our citizens or their property. That they were actively engaged as sconts and pickets, is proven by their capture of a number of the rebel cavalry. Information of hostile operations was sedulously sought for, and aetive measures taken for their sup- pression by the officers in command. And we further declare that the opportune arrival of said regiment here gave great satisfaction to our community, and by their efficiency and good conduct they merit our thanks and approval, as they will doubtless receive that of the national government and all true friends of the Union. W. HI. Cherry. H. Stephens. J. S. Berry, B. Hinkle, George L. Morrow, Donald Campbell, H. HI. Brogles. I. N. Kindel. I. N. Herring, C. W. Morris, Bert S. Russell. B. B. Alexander, J. I. Trist. D. T. Street, T. N. Cald- well, T. G. Lee. R. T. Picket. John H. Maxwell. John Williams, E. Walker, W. N. Maxwell, Win. Russell, John W. Eccles. J. D. Don- ahne, C. C. Franks. Thos. Maxwell, J. S. Winton, W. W. Thurston. Robt. Meader. W. D. Booth, T. L. Puckett, D. D. Crook. T. F. Frazier, R. H. Russell."
TW
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WHILE UNDER COL, WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
unteers bravely and surely delivered in that moment of terror and of blood.
Far away on the banks of the Tennessee the fallen heroes of that brave attack lay almost unnoticed and unknown, and as some trifling token of remembrance for the service of the dead and the living to the Union, and from their commander for the more than entire justice they have done him for his action that day, he has from the first wished to have struck a medal of honor, with some appropriate de- vice or design, with the name of each volunteer embossed upon its face, showing whether he was killed or wounded, and present at the first fire of the regiment, at noon, April 6, 1862. And for this purpose he had a correct list of those present made out immediately after the battle; the number being 556 or 560. He has not so far been able to obtain the means due him from the government for his civil service in 1861 to strike such medals, which will not cost to exceed one dollar each.
He, therefore, respectfully requests of the Ohio Legisla- ture that he may be authorized to contract for the dies for such a medal, and the medals, not to exceed five hundred and fifty six (556), to be paid for by and deposited with the Adjutant-General of Ohio, to be delivered to the volunteers of that regiment on proof of identity, if living, or to their representatives, if dead, unless it may be considered that the medals of those killed in battle or who have since died may be more appropriately held for exhibition at the capitol of Ohio.
Very respectfully submitted,
T. WORTHINGTON. Late Colonel 46th O. V. I.
WASHINGTON, March 18, 1879.
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WHILE UNDER COL. WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
CHAPTER III.
EASTPORT EXPEDITION.
"Sherman, on the 14th March, went to Tyler's landing, whence the 6th Ohio marched to Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, some miles east of Corinth, which was destroyed, and returned unmolested to Savannah." (Hon. H. Greeley.)
"On the 14th of March, Sherman. with the leading division of Grant's army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and, after mak- ing a feint of landing at Eastport. dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh landing." (All on the 14th.) (Bowman & Irving's Sherman and his Campaigns.)
"General C. F. Smith pushed forward troops to Eastport, on the Tennessee, but ultimately took Pittsburgh landing as the initial point." (E. D. Mansfield's Lives of Grant and Colfax.)
"C. F. Smith took command of the expedition, and while the cap- tain of Donelson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops were pushed forward as far as Eastport, on the Tennessee. The operations, however, were without results. and Smith returned to Pittsburgh landing, on the western bank of the Tennessee." ( Badeau's History of Grant.)
By the above the honor of this Eastport affair seems to remain easy as between the claims of Smith and Sherman to the same, while Grant is entirely accessory, and was, perhaps, more than so in reality, though: Smith bears the blame. Now, there may be many inferences dedneed from the above-cited quotations by the admirers of these two rebellion-risen commanders. Inseparable in the origin and cause of their success as the twin brothers of the old Dorian mythology, though which is the pugilist and which the cavalier their admirers may take their own time and way to determine. ( Both are of the ring.)
From this category of admirers may, perhaps, be ex- cluded that most benevolent and impracticable political philosopher and too practical utilitarian sage, Greeley, never satisfied without the evolution of results from causes. In such earnest and laudable research he has found it
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HISTORY OF THE 46TH OHIO
essential to tell, in order that actions may have results, that Sherman went to Tyler's landing, whence the 6th Ohio (under the general's command, of course) marched to Burnsville, some miles out of Corinth, which (Burnsville or Corinth ?) was destroyed, and returned unmolested to Savannah. It is difficult to distinguish as to the merit of these wonderful performances, if accomplished ; but it seems plain that the 6th Ohio should have the palm, not as to the imaginary destruction of Burnsville or Corinth, &c., but, being at the time ( March 14th) at Nashville, Tennessee, its march must, if made, have far exceeded in celerity that of Nero, the consul, (not the fiddling firebrand,) from Venusia to the Metaurus.
There seems, at the same time, little or no disposition on the part of Sherman's admirer, Bowman, to impute that merit to his patron which, according to Badeau and Sherman, properly belongs to C. F. Smith, the real hero of Fort Donelson, if there was one. The fast friend (Fidus Achates) and uncertain eulogist of the President is clearly entitled to the merits, and still more clearly to the de- merits, of this wonderful, dangerous, and mysterious ex- pedition, comparable only to that of Jason, to Colchis after the Golden Fleece-time out of mind.
This expedition is, or was, as brilliant, according to Greeley, as it is terrible, according to Draper. If we are to believe this most erudite, critical, and most veracious historian, Sherman lost many men and horses in the swollen streams, striving to reach the Memphis and Charles- ton railroad. If any men and horses were really lost, their record has been kept more quiet than that of the three horses which were not killed under Sherman at Shiloh, unless, like the knight of old, he killed them to prevent their captivity by the enemy.
The venerable Mansfield makes the Eastport honor un- certain, but drops the matter as provocative of inquiry by curious readers.
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WHILE UNDER COL. WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
The true history of this affair, so studiously covered up by Badeau and Bowman, is taken from the diary of an officer who was an actor in this worse than useless expedi- tion which was most fortunately arrested, as it might plainly have produced the most ruinous results to the troops en- gaged in it-though a gain with that cost-if Sherman, its instigator, could thereby have been set aside for a more worthy commander at Shiloh.
"SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, March 14. 1862.
" About 1 P. M. Sherman's troops left on an expedition to Missis- sippi, and tied up a few miles below Eastport. Rain last night and rain all day after 12 M. We were to have left for the interior at mid- night, but about 11 P. M. had orders that the start was postponed till 2 A. M., (15th,) the river rising six or eight inches an hour, and filling a bayou or thoroughfare next the hill. which will be impassable long before noon to-morrow.
"Saturday, March 15, 1862 .- Up at half-past 12 ; raining, as it had been all night. The expedition had been ordered, with two days' cooked provisions, to march ont and break up the Memphis and Charles- ton railroad, and return .- a useless job, unless we can effect a lodg- ment, which does not seem intended. Started in the rain about 3 A. M., though, from the rising water, it was plain we would soon have to return. Went out about three or four miles. over a road impractica- ble for artillery without repair, and were there stopped by a creek backed up from the river and several feet deep npon the road. My regiment having charge of the artillery, I went back and reported to Sherman, who ordered a return about 7 or S A. M. At the bayou found the 54th Ohio zouaves, Colonel Smith, wading back breast-deep.
"A very silly expedition under the circumstances, and adding hun- dreds of weakly men to the sick list."
The high water was fortunate, as had we got a few miles farther toward the railroad, the division would have been captured, as the rebels were in force about Inka, and A. S. Johnson was just passing his troops over the route from Decatur to Corinth, expecting the occupation of Flor- ence every hour of every day after the capture of Fort Henry, up to the time he concentrated with Bragg and Beauregard, about the 20th of March, 1862. (W. P. G.)
This Eastport affair demands attention, on account of the endeavor, by imputing it to Smith or dropping it en- tirely, to conceal a characteristic blunder of Sherman's in the opening of the campaign, which was repeated by him 2
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HISTORY OF THE 46TH OHIO
whenever an opportunity offered throughout the war. It was the blunders, and nothing else but blunders, and far worse, at Shiloh, which have given him his present posi- tion, and blunders alone characterized him in the advance on Savannah, Tennessee, as improvident, reckless, violent, and unjust, while his advance on Savannah, Georgia, earns for him the reputation of the "Attila of the age." It took all day of the 15th to get the troops and artillery on board the fleet. Left soon after midnight, and on the morning of Sunday, the 16th, the boats tied up at Pittsburgh, which also deserves attention, as this first landing of troops at Pittsburgh is imputed by Grant to C. F. Smith.
NOTE .- This most extraordinary and indeed insane movement could not be accounted for by the writer till he found ample evidence that it was intended to cover Halleck's avoidance of the occupation of Flor- ence for personal purposes. It would not have been undertaken had there been any probability of its success. Time will doubtless develop that these operations of Halleck's had their origin in Washington, having several purposes-one to supplant Mcclellan, one to prolong the war, and beyond this to put Halleck, Grant. and Sherman into the positions they attained, at the sacrifice of hundreds of millions and myriads of lives. Treacheries -- not blunders.
CHAPTER IV.
INTO CAMP SHILOH.
" A small stream that rises in the field in front flowed to the north along my whole front. (This faces the division to the west. 'T. W.) I saw that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals MeClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it." (Sherman's Report of Shiloh.) (The Tennessee running due north at Shiloh.)
These divisions are also faced east or west, and are in a line parallel with Sherman's division, exposing their flanks to the attack from the south, (see plate 2.) which was about an equivalent arrangement to that which existed. (T. W.)
Sherman's 5th division went into camp three miles out from Pittsburgh landing, on the 18th and 19th of March,
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WHILE UNDER COL. WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
and Hurlbut's division (the 4th) from half a mile to a mile out about the same time, and to the right and left of the Corinth road, with little or no order whatever. C. F. Smith's and McClernand's divisions came out from the 20th to the 22d of March. Smith's, the 2d division, was scattered along the upper Purdy road from half a mile to a mile or over, out west from Pittsburgh landing.
McClernand's (1st) division was encamped in better order and on better ground than any other. His left was a little east of the main Corinth road, about four hundred yards nearly due north from Sherman's centre at Shiloh church, and bending a little back or eastward from the centre to the right or north; the ground was, in general, wooded on the east of this camp, with open ground on the west, which was a good arrangement for defense, so far as it went.
Its general direction made an angle of about seventy degrees toward the northwest, with the direction of Sher- man's line at its centre. Sherman's statement of his centre as being at Shiloh church is about the only correct state- ment in that report, except, perhaps, his account of his wanton destruction of a battery of his own artillery, and his desertion of what organized troops he had left at the most dangerous hour of the day, 10 o'clock A. M., as he specifies, but only one brigade, not two, as he says. (9 A. M.)
Badeau's map of Shiloh, corrected both by Grant and Sherman, has his (Sherman's) centre far east of the Corinth road; while the official map, corrected by the same authori- ties, puts the same centre five hundred yards or more west of the Corinth road, so that both maps contradict the di- vision report and each other. Badean's map refuses, or throws back the right or 1st brigade of Sherman's, which was the reverse of fact. This map also throws the 1st brigade across the Purdy road, where it was not, but where one of its regiments should have been.
The two extreme right regiments of the army lay di-
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HISTORY OF THE 46TH OHIO
rectly along the lower Purdy road, which passed between the field and staff quarters on one side and the company quarters on the other. Sherman's division was on a line concave, instead of convex, to the front.
It is most probably arranged convex on the map to pro- duce the impression that Sherman's centre, behind which he had his headquarters, was the most advanced part of the line, as it was southwest towards Corinth, but not southward.
The camp of General B. M. Prentiss, established ten or twelve days before the battle under General Grant's imme- diate direction, was located with its right over a mile from the left of Sherman. Its centre was in latitude near a quarter of a mile south of Shiloh church, or a little south of east from Sherman's centre. It had seven regiments scattered without order along a distance of half its proper front, which would have been over three-quarters of a mile.
On Badeau's map a third brigade, which is a fiction, is thrown in to fill up the vacancy. The left of Prentiss was in nearly a north and south line with the right of Stuart's (2d) brigade of Sherman's (5th) division, and was about eighty rods south of Stuart, whose three regiments were dumped down anywhere, near a mile from the Hamburgh ford of Lick Creek, half a mile from its mouth at the river.
It has been asserted, according to Whitelaw Reid and others, as an excuse for so exposing and detaching this brigade, that as Buell's troops were to be posted at Han- burgh, two miles above on the river, the exposure would cease when this posting should occur. Now, Buell's ad- vance division reached Savannah, eight miles below Pitts- burgh, before noon of the 5th. The same afternoon the rebel army was concentrated westwardly, at and from the southeast bend of Lick Creek. This bend is about a mile northwest of Hamburgh, on the river, and the same dis- tance nearly due south of Stuart and Prentiss, making the right of the enemy a little over a mile from the river at
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WHILE UNDER COL. WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
Hamburgh, according to Badeau's map. So that, if the intention of posting Buell at Hamburgh had been carried · out, the rebel army might have been attacked at 4 P. M. (5th) or after, on its right and rear, by Buell, and on its front by our army of 40,000 men, at Shiloh. Its capture and dispersion would have been inevitable. But, if done, this would have been done by Buell's troops, and was not in accordance with the views of Grant, Sherman, and Hal- leck, in the field, nor the Committee on the Conduct of the War, &c., at Washington. This digression will be re- peated whenever opportunity offers to show how and why the Union troops at Shiloh were slaughtered for personal purposes, after their betrayal into security, for purely or impurely political objects, by direction of those in power .*
After which digression return is made to the camp. Grant and Sherman, to make the front look respectable, have posted the right of Prentiss half a mile nearer Shiloh than it was, while the brigade of Stuart, the only body of troops placed anywhere near right on the front, is separated. from the left of Prentiss by a gap of half a mile, which did not exist, so as to close the gap towards Shiloh.
To cover this fictitious gap there is very cunningly placed a body of troops which was not there till after the battle.
The very worst fictional feature of this map of Grant's and Sherman's is the poking in of McClernand's left flank between Sherman and Prentiss, over half a mile east from its true position. This is an attempt to close up on paper a gap of over a mile, which did really exist in fact, and which Sherman swears did not erist at all, and did erist. for Buell's troops, which were to be sent to Hamburgh, as they would have been sent, were it not necessary, as he says, to have had a "Shiloh" trial of pluck. So they were left at Savan- nah, were Buell's troops. This gap was a bait; the bait
* The war was cultivated as old hunters cultivate she-wolves, for wolf-scalps for the sum of so much a head or scalp.
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HISTORY OF THE 46TH OHIO
took, and took with it 13,000 Union soldiers on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862.
'The gap was not only the key-point, but the wide, open highway to the flanks and rear of the Union line; and this is the key Grant says Sherman held into the inside of the line, if line that can be called, without military connection ; without connecting roads, front, flank, or rear; without prop- er guards; without defenses, for fear they would invite an attack; without anything especial but the gaps, like the intervals between herds of buffaloes scattered over the western plains, if buffaloes do scatter at all, even when out of danger. The least broken ground on this battle-field of about ten square miles, except that of MeClernand's 1st division, was the line of this front, of about two and a half to three miles from Stuart's left to the extreme right of Sherman's 1st brigade. This extreme right rested on a height one hundred and twenty rods north of Owl Creek. There was a rivulet, with swampy borders, between the left regiment, the 53d Ohio, which separated it about two hundred yards from the 57th, on its right. Over this swamp there was no causeway or connection with the centre, but by the high land in the rear. The ground on this line being unbroken by ravines, was easily defensible from infantry, and no line ever more required defenses than did this line of Sherman's three right brigades, and de- fenses sufficient could have been made by all the troops in an hour. Located on the upland, bordering a creek fifty to one hundred and fifty yards in front, with a wooded, bushy border, the line was approachable and was ap- proached within half-musket shot by an enemy remaining almost entirely unseen. Beyond the creek, four hundred to six hundred yards in front, was a range of low hills, commanding the camp, and forty to sixty feet or more above its level, which level was thirty to forty feet above the creek bottom immediately in front. The left might have been so located as to be completely protected by the
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WHILE UNDER COL. WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.
Tennessee River, but it was so posted as to be turned easily, as it was turned soon after the attack on the 6th. On the extreme right, Owl Creek might have been used to strength- en that flank, but it was left as a mask for a hostile approach. Had this right flank been attacked, as was Sidney John- son's intent, by even a single brigade, at the same time with the left, and held its ground no better than the 53d Ohio, under Sherman's immediate direction, the destruc- tion of the Union army before noon would have been in- evitable.
The same result would have occurred at or about noon, had our right been turned by the rebel flanking force, which for several hours was repelled by the 1st brigade of the 5th division, which brigade was detached under the charge of Sherman's aides, and, deserted by them and him, was left unsupported and alone, far on the extreme right and front of the Union line of battle. (See Sherman's report.)
Such as is above imperfectly described, was the battle- field of Shiloh, selected by Sherman with demoniac sagacity and approved by Grant, before the troops went into camp on the 18th and subsequent days of March, 1862-chosen with as much anxious and personally-interested sagacity as marked the patriotic purpose of the great German libera- tor Arminius (Hermann) in choosing among the forests of the Lippe (Det mold now) that battle-field for the destruc- tion of Varus and his legions, denominated, as one part of it is, the "mord kessel" ("death pot") to the present day.
To fix the day of our being ordered into camp, the fol- lowing diary extracts may be of interest:
"PITTSBURG LANDING, March 18. 1862.
"Went to Sherman's boat, the Continental, for orders, and was told to get everything off the boat of the 46th Ohio at once, and to the camp about three miles out near Shiloh church. During the night the 3d Iowa and SIst Ohio had completely clogged the road, which they did not clear for the teams of the 46th till near 2 p. M. By night the teams were worn out and had to stop. There seems no order or
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HISTORY OF THE 46TH OHIO.
regularity about anything. Every volunteer regiment is allowed to dump its camp down anywhere and in everybody's way."
"WEDNESDAY, March 19, 1862.
"A damp morning, after rain during the night. At 8.30 A. M. saw Sherman on the Hannibal, and reported that the road was clogged by the - regiment and would soon be impassible. Without waiting for my suggestion that the road should be left open or I could not get ont, he said very brusquely that he could not act on my mere ipse dixit; that his engineer had examined and reported on the road. (He had no engineer.) 1 then suggested that one thousand men on the road towards the proposed camp could put it in pas-able order in a few hours, and requested that I might be myself permitted to repair the road. He said he would do nothing with it to-day. but might to- morrow. (Nothing, however, was done.) Rode out to the camp about noon, stepped off the ground for the ten companies, and had my own tent pitched about sunset."
REPORT
OF THE
FLANK MARCH TO JOIN ON MOCLERNAND'S RIGHT.
At 9 A. M.,
AND
OPERATIONS OF THE 46TH REG'T OHIO VOLS.,
IST BRIGADE, 5TH DIVISION,
ON THE EXTREME UNION RIGHT,
At SHILOH, APRIL 6, 1802.
"Into the jaws of death, -into the mouth of hell, Charged the six hundred."
COL. WORTHINGTON, COMMANDING.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 1880.
CONTENTS.
PAGE.
Time of the first attack at Shiloh 3
I, hoạt " the 1st brigade by the left flank at 9 A. M. 1
T io posted on the extreme right. 5 Fugitives from the left announce the dispersion of six centre regiments, 5th division.
5
To quiet the troops, Col. W. makes a reconnoissance to the front in face of the enemy 6
The first brigade disorganized and 46th Ohio deserted in the
face of destruction by brigade and division commanders, at 113 A. M.
€
The warning at noon by Capt. Heath, Company A. 7
The change of front in face of the enemy at a ready to fire 8 The attack of 550 on 2,500 men 8
The flight of the 46th ..
9
The fall of Col. W's horse and the rally. 9
The 6th Iowa attacks the enemy. 10
The retreat in disorder of the Union right wing just before General Johnson's fall. 10
The Colonel of the 46th Ohio finds Grant at dinner on his boat about 3 P. M .. 11
The Colonel of the 46th Ohio prevents the capture of McAllis- ter's battery. 11
Arrival of Nelson and Ammen at 5 P. M. to the rescue. 12 To the Legislature of the State of Ohio in behalf of the 46th. 18
REPORT
Of the flank march to join on McClernand's right, and opera- tions of the 46th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, 1st Brigade, 5th Division, at Shiloh, April 6, 1862; Colonel Worthing- ton, commanding.
This brigade consisted of the 6th Iowa, Colonel John Adair McDowell, commanding the brigade, on the right; 40th Illinois, Colonel Stephen Hicks, on the left; and the 46th Ohio, Colonel T. Worthington, in the centre.
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