USA > Ohio > Itinerary of the Seventh Ohio volunteer infantry, 1861-1864, with roster, portraits and biographies > Part 15
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The three brigades of Wilcox were posted in the rear of Hood and Evans and in close supporting distance. Between Hood's left and Jackson's right was an open field. Colonel Walton of the Washington Artillery occupied it at once, it being a commanding position.
The division under D. R. Jones deployed in the same order as the others, with a crochet to the rear across the
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Manassas Gap Railroad to guard against the forces of the enemy from Manassas and Bristow.
R. H. Anderson's reserve division marched for Gaines- ville at daylight along the Warrenton turnpike.
On the 30th the Union forces were in line-Kearny, Ricketts, Hooker, Stevens, Reno, Sigel, King, Porter, Sykes, Reynolds, Schenck, Milroy, with Banks on the ex- treme left at Kettle Run. Numerous changes were made in the position of these troops after they became engaged, moving from position to position so as to reinforce certain parts of the line which had become weakened by the fierce firing.
The positions of the different commanders of the Con- federates remained as stated previously, the only difference being that when they advanced they made a half left wheel of Longstreet's corps, the different divisions retaining their positions in line.
When Pope was driven back by the terrible onslaught of the enemy, Banks's corps was isolated and cut off. as well as the wagon-trains and cars loaded with ammunition and sup- plies.
Setting fire to the trains while on the west side of the railroad, Banks was forced to march his corps through the blazing trains and exploding ammunition, where it was as dangerous, if not more so, than in a pitched battle, so as to gain the east side of the railroad.
There was one notable exception as regards the burning. Sergt. Levi F. Bauder in command of the ammunition train of the First Brigade, Second Division, Second Army Corps, did not burn his, but escaped to Manassas with eighteen wagons loaded with ammunition and took with him sev- enty or eighty stragglers.
As soon as all of his troops had passed the obstacle, Banks made a forced marchi via Brentsville to Bull Run, reaching there at Blackburn's Ford on the 31st of August. On our arrival there the first officer we met was General Kearny.
September I, we marched on a parallel road with Kearny (to the east of his column), bound for Fairfax Court
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House. There was a heavy rain storm, and officers and men, thoroughly tired out with marching and fighting, straggled somewhat. A sharp rattle of musketry to our left, and our men closed upon the double-quick on our advance. The firing still continuing we formed in line of battle and moved to our left so as to join hands with Kearny's division as a reserve to his force.
Generals Kearny and Stevens were killed, and nearly 2,000 officers and men killed and wounded in a very few minutes, as it appeared to us. As soon as we could after the battle (which we called Chantilly ), we continued our march to Fairfax Court House.
September 2, our command marched for Alexandria, and was halted near Fort Worth, where we were informed that General McClellan had been reappointed to the command of the army.
During the retreat from Cedar Mountain the Seventh Regiment O. V. I. was continually hearing artillery and musketry firing, and was in dangerous proximity to moving cannon and musket balls.
The losses on both sides during Pope's retreat from the Rappahannock aggregated 15.000 for the Union and 10,000 for the Confederate troops. But the loss in weight on ac- count of shortage in rations could not be computed, nearly every soldier in the command subsisting on green corn for several days. Cooking the corn over the embers in this campaign was the general and accepted way.
September 3. we marched to the rear of Fort Richardson. situated beyond Alexandria, Va.
General Banks's health having failed on this campaign, he was relieved from the command of the corps and placed in command of the military defenses around Washington.
General A. S. Williams was assigned to temporary com- mand of the corps.
CHAPTER XXIII.
ANTIETAM.
BY CAPT. GEO A. MCKAY.
September 4, the corps moved to Georgetown, and cross- ing the Potomac on the Aqueduct Bridge marched to Tenal- lytown, near Washington, D. C., where they found their wagon-train waiting their arrival.
September 5. the corps moved to Rockville, Maryland, situated about sixteen miles from Washington.
September 6, it was ascertained by reconnaissances of cav- alry and infantry that Lee's army had crossed into Mary- land. An invasion of the North was threatened, Washing- ton and Baltimore were in danger. Our corps moved up in line two and one-half miles from Rockville.
In his advance through Maryland, in pursuit of the enemy, General McClellan moved his army in three parallel columns, the two corps of Sumner and Williams having the central line of march.
September 9, moved to Middlebrook.
September 10, moved to within 2 miles of Damascus.
September 11, moved to Damascus.
September 12. In General Orders, No. 129. the Presi- dent directed that the Second Corps of the Army of Virginia should become the Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac.
The corps moved to Ijamsville.
September 13, moved from Ijamsville to Frederick, ford- ing the Monocacy River on the way. It arrived in the same fields that were occupied the previous day by the Confeder- ate division of Gen. D. H. Hill. Corporal B. W. Mitchell, of Company F of the Twenty-seventh Indiana, picked up an order written at Confederate headquarters, which was at once transmitted through the ordinary medium of com- munication to McClellan's headquarters, where it was found to be a general order signed by Lee's adjutant-general. giv-
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ing directions for the movements of the entire Confederate army, thus revealing the plans of the enemy .*
Fully informed now as to the location and movement of each column of the Confederate army, McClellan gave im- mediate orders for an advance, overtaking their rear in the passes of the South Mountain. Here the enemy had made a determined stand, but was defeated and driven out with severe loss.
September 14, moved forward, passing through Fred- erick, where we did not see "Barbara Frietchie or her gray head." The troops pushed on to the front, where the fight- ing had already commenced, as the marching troops could hear the boom of artillery at South Mountain and Harper's Ferry. It was past midnight when the head of the column reached the field and went into position in reserve. The enemy retreated during the night, leaving their dead un- buried on the field.
September 15, Maj .- Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, who had been assigned to the command of the Twelfth Army Corps, joined us while on the march, General Williams re- suming charge of the First Division. Resuming the march the corps passed over the battlefield, and through Boons- boro. The hospitals were filled with Confederate wounded, while along the roadside lay many of their dead. That night the corps bivouacked in the fields near Keedysville, not far from the Antietam Creek.
September 16, received orders to move and line of battle was formed. Just over the low ridge of hills that skirted the stream a lively cannonade was in progress that sounded as if it were close by. Hooker was shelling the enemy's lines on the farther side of the creek; at times a brisk skirmish fire was heard, but the corps did no fighting.
*The gratification expressed at Mcclellan's headquarters over this event was so pronounced that it was noised about, and coming to the ears of a citizen of Frederick, who was a Southern sympathizer, he carried the news of it after dark on the night of the 13th to General J. E. B. Stuart, who transmitted it to General Lee, who was then at Hagerstown .- John Bresnahan, Twenty-seventh Indiana.
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Everywhere the brigades and divisions of the other corps were going into position. As far as the view extended were regiments on regiments, many of them closed en masse on close column by division that looked like solid squares, with their colors in the center. It was a grand, a memorable sight. The hours passed quickly, and in the fading light of a generous sunset the men prepared their evening meal. Then while the bugles were sounding sweet and clear from distant camps they made their simple bivouac under the starlight and lay down to sleep. But their rest was short. At II o'clock the men were awakened and ordered to fall in quietly ; they were instructed to make no noise. Silently and half asleep the column moved off in the darkness, and crossing the Antietam on one of the upper bridges arrived at their designated position after a three-hour march. The corps was now on the farm of J. Poffenberger, at the right of the Union army, and in the rear and partly to the left of Hooker's corps, which was in camp on a farm belonging to another J. Poffenberger and about one mile distant from the Twelfth Corps. A heavy dew was falling, but the men threw themselves down in the wet grass for a few hours' sleep. They were soon startled from their heavy slumbers by a volley of musketry that rang out noisily on the night air from a piece of woods close by. It was an accidental collision between the Confederate pickets of Hood's division and a regiment of the Pennsylvania Reserves attached to the division commanded by Maj .- Gen. Meade. Nothing came of it and soon all was quiet again.
When day broke on Wednesday morning, the 17th, Hooker, looking south from the J. Poffenberger farm along the turnpike, saw a gently rolling landscape of which the commanding point was the Dunker Church, whose white brick walls appeared on the west side of the road backed by the West Wood, which sloped toward him, filling a slight hollow which ran parallel to the turnpike, with a single row of fields between. Beyond the Miller house and barns the grounds dipped into a little depression. Beyond this was seen a large corn-field between the East Wood and the
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turnpike, rising again to the highest level. There was, how- ever, another small dip beyond, which could not be seen from Hooker's position, and the second ridge, near the church, and extending across the turnpike. Eastward into the East Wood could be seen the Confederate line of gray, partly sheltered by piles of rails taken from the fences. They seemed to Hooker to be at the farther side of the corn-field and at the top of the first rise of ground beyond Miller's. It was plain that the high ground about the little white church was the key to the enemy's position, and if that could be carried Hooker's task would be well done.
The Confederates opened the engagement by a rapid fire from a battery near the East Wood as soon as it was light, and Hooker answered the challenge by an immediate order for his line to advance. Doubleday's division was in two lines, Gibbon's and Phelps's brigades in front supported by Patrick and Hofmann. Gibbon had the right and guided upon the turnpike. Patrick held a small wood in his rear, which is upon both sides of the road a little north of Miller's house. Some of Meade's men were supposed to be in the northwest extension of the West Wood, and thus to cover Gibbon's right flank as he advanced. Part of Battery B. Fourth United States Artillery, was run forward to Miller's barn and stack-yard on the right of the road, and fired over the heads of the advancing regiments. Other batteries were similarly placed more to the left. The line moved swiftly forward through Miller's orchard and kitchen gar- den, breaking through a stout picket fence on the near side, down into the moist ground of the hollow, and up through the corn, which was higher than their heads and shut out everything from view. At the southern side of the field they came to a low fence, beyond which was an open field, at the farther side of which was the enemy's line. But Gib- bon's right, covered by the corn, had outmarched the left, which had been exposed to a terrible fire, and the direction taken had been a little oblique, so that the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin, the flanking regiment, had crossed the turnpike and was suddenly assailed by a sharp fire from the
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West Wood in flank. They swung back into the road, lying down along the high, stout post-and-rail fence, keeping up their fire by shooting between the rails. Leaving this little band to protect their right, the main line, which had come up on the left, leaped the fence at the south edge of the corn-field and charged across the open at the enemy in front. But the concentrated fire of artillery and musketry was more than they could bear. Men fell by the hundreds, and the thinned ranks gave way and ran for the shelter of the corn. They were rallied in the hollow on the north side of the field.
The enemy had rapidly extended his left under cover of the West Wood, and now made a dash at the right flank and Gibbon's exposed guns. The gunners double charged the cannon with canister, and under a terrible fire of both artillery and rifles the enemy broke and sought shelter. Patrick moved up in support of Gibbon and was sent across the turnpike into the West Wood to cover that flank.
The Confederates advanced again, forcing Patrick to re- sume his original line of front and to retire to the cover of a ledge at right angles to the road near Gibbon's guns. Farther to the left Phelps's and Hofmann's brigades had had similar experiences, pushing forward nearly to the Confederate lines, and being driven back with great loss when they charged over open ground against the enemy. Ricketts's division entered the edge of the East Wood. but here, at the salient angle, where D. H. Hill and Lawton joined, the enemy held the position stubbornly, and the re- pulse of Doubleday's division made Ricketts glad to hold even the edge of the East Wood as the right of the line was driven back.
It was about 7 o'clock, and Mansfield's corps (the Twelfth ) was approaching. for that officer had called his men to arms at the first sound of Hooker's battle and had moved to his support. The corps consisted of two divisions, Williams's and Greene's, and were marched to the field in columns of battalions en masse. Proper intervals for de- ployment had not been preserved and time was necessarily
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lost before the troops could be placed in line. General Mansfield fell mortally wounded before the deployment was complete, and the command devolved on General Williams. Williams had only time to take the most general directions from Hooker, when the latter also was wounded. The Twelfth Corps' attack seems to have been made obliquely to that of Hooker, and facing more to the westward, for General Williams speaks of the post-and-rail fences along the turnpike being a great obstruction to their front. Greene's division on the left moved along the ridge leading to the East Wood, taking as the guide for his extreme left the line of the burning house of Mumma, which had been set on fire by D. H. Hill's men.
In Greene's division was the First Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps, consisting of the Fifth, Seventh, Twenty-ninth, Sixty-sixth Ohio and Twenty- eighth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. The writer was a member of the Seventh Regiment and in future will confine himself mainly as to what that regiment, brigade, and di- vision did in the battle of Antietam, giving full credit to others for what they did so far as lies in his power, with malice to none, as the rank and file of every corps present and in action did their duty well. Some of the most des- perate fighting done during the war took place in its im- mediate front.
Doubleday in his report notices the change of direction as indicated above of Williams's division, which liad relieved him, and says Williams's brigades were swept away by a fire from their left and front, from behind rocky ledges they could not see. Our officers were deceived in part as to the extent and direction of the enemy's line by the fact that the Confederate cavalry commander, Stuart, had occupied a commanding hill west of the pike and beyond our right flank, and from this position, which in fact was considerably detached from the Confederate line, he used his batteries with such effect as to produce the belief that a continuous line extended from this point to the Dunker Church. Our two lines of attack were convergent ones, the right sweeping
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southward along the pike and through the narrow strip of the West Wood, while the division which drove the enemy from the East Wood moved upon the commanding ground around the church. This error of direction was repeated with disastrous effect a little later, when Sumner came on the ground with Sedgwick's division.
When Mansfield's corps came on the field, Meade, who succeeded Hooker, withdrew the First Corps to the ridge north of Poffenberger's, where it had bivouacked the night before. It had suffered severely, having lost 2.470 in killed and wounded, but it was still further depleted by straggling, so that Meade reported less than 7,000 men with the colors that evening. Its organization was preserved, however.
Greene's division, on the left of the Twelfth Corps, profited by the hard fighting of those who had preceded it. and was able to drive the enemy quite out of the East Wood and across the open fields between it and the Dunker Church. It was here that Adj. J. B. Molyneaux, of the Seventh Regiment O. V. I., disarmed an officer of the Confederate army in a hand-to-hand sword combat.
Just as we emerged from the East Wood Sergt. Jere G. Claflin, of Company A, Seventh Regiment O. V. I., was wounded, being hit on the shin-bone as he was crossing a fallen tree, and for a few minutes the air was blue with ex- pletives from him on account of the severe pain occasioned by the wound.
Greene succeeded. about the time of Sumner's advance. in getting a footing about the Dunker Church itself, but only after desperate fighting. the enemy lying in windows over the corn-field. This position was held for some time.
The fighting of Hooker's and Mansfield's men, though lacking unity of force and purpose, had cost the enemy dear. J. R. Jones, who commanded Jackson's division, had been wounded; Starke, who succeeded Jones, was killed: Law- ton, who followed Starke, was wounded. Ewell's division. commanded by Early, had suffered hardly less. Hood was sent back into the fight to relieve Lawton, and had been re- inforced by the brigades of Ripley. Colquitt. and McRae (Garland's) from D. H. Hill's division.
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When Greene reached the Dunker Church with his divi- sion, consisting of the Seventh O. V. I. and other regiments, the Confederates on that wing had suffered more fearfully than our own men. Nearly half their number were killed and wounded, and Jackson's famous "Stonewall" Division was so completely disorganized that only a handful of men under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford remained and attached themselves to Early's command.
Of the division under Early, his own brigade was all that retained much strength, and this, posted among the rocks in the West Wood and vigorously supported by Stuart's horse artillery on the flank, was all that covered the left of Lee's army.
Sumner's Second Corps was now approaching the scene of action, or rather two divisions of it-Sedgwick's and French's-Richardson's being still delayed till his place could be filled by Porter's troops, the strange tardiness in sending orders being noticeable in regard to every part of the army. Sumner met Hooker, who was being carried from the field.
Both Sedgwick and French marched their divisions by the right flank, in three columns, a brigade in each column, Sedgwick leading. They crossed the Antietam by Hooker's route, but did not march as far to the northwest as Hooker had done. When the center of the corps was opposite the Dunker Church, and nearly east of it, the change of direc- tion was given; the troops faced to their proper front and advanced in line of battle in three lines. fully deployed, and 60 or 70 yards apart. Sumner himself being in rear of Sedgwick's line, and near its left. When they approached the position held by Greene's division at Dunker Church, French kept on so as to form on Greene's left, while Sedg- wick. under Sumner's immediate lead, diverged to the right. passing through the East Wood, crossing the turnpike on the right of Greene and of the Dunker Church, and plunged into the West Wood. At this point there were no Confed- erates in front of them.
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Early was farther to the right, opposing Williams's di- vision of the Twelfth Corps, and now made haste under cover of the woods to pass around Sedgwick's right and to get in front of him to oppose his progress. This led to heavy skirmishing until McLaws's and Walker's divisions came upon the field, marching rapidly from Harper's Ferry.
Walker charged upon the left flank of Sedgwick's lines, which were soon thrown into confusion, and McLaws, pass- ing by Walker's left, threw his division diagonally upon the already broken and retreating line of Sumner.
All of the troops were rallied at the ridge on the Poffen- berger farm, where Hooker's corps had already taken posi- tion, supported by thirty pieces of artillery.
Every effort of Jackson and Stuart to resume the aggres- sive or to pass between them and the Potomac was rendered abortive.
The enemy now concentrated upon Greene at the Dunker Church, and after a stubborn resistance he, too, was driven back, with his division, upon the turnpike and the open ground to the edge of the East Wood. Here, by the aid of several batteries gallantly handled, he defeated the subse- quent effort to dislodge him.
It was here that Capt. Wm. A. Howe, of the Seventh Regiment O. V. I., while flourishing his sword over his head and leading on his men, had the blade of it snapped off by a shot from the enemy. The shock from the blow temporarily paralyzed his right arm, all that was left of the sword being the hilt.
The battle on the extreme right was thus ended before IO o'clock in the morning, and there was no more serious fighting north of the Dunker Church.
French advanced on Greene's left, over the open farm lands, and after a fierce combat about the Roulette and Clipp farm buildings drove D. H. Hill's division from them.
Richardson's division came up on French's left soon after, having been relieved by Porter's corps, and the enemy were pressed back, till after several hours of fighting the sunken road, since known as the "Bloody Lane," was in
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our hands, piled full of Confederate dead who had defended it with their lives. Richardson was mortally and Barlow desperately wounded and Hancock transferred to command the division.
The Confederates during this movement ran out of am- munition, but securing enough powder for their artillery, they seized a blacksmith shop, and soon its contents, con- sisting of wagon chains, hammers, tongs, etc., were sent howling over our heads, the noise being simply horrible.
The head of Franklin's corps (the Sixth) had arrived about 10 o'clock and taken position near the Sharpsburg Bridge, which Sumner had occupied. Smith's and Slocum's divisions were ordered to Sumner's assistance, and early in the afternoon Irwin and Brooks, of Smith's, advanced to the charge and relieved Greene's division and part of French's, whose guns were foul, the men out of ammuni- tion and suffering for want of water. Greene's division had been engaged in battle for about seven hours con- tinuously, losing heavily. Just before the division was re- lieved the writer was severely wounded and taken to the brick hospital, together with Sergt. Jere G. Claflin.
In the battle the Second Division (Greene's) was supplied twice with forty rounds per man, from their ammunition- train, by Sergt. Levi F. Bauder in charge. When it entered the battle each man had sixty rounds, making a total of 140 rounds per man expended by it.
Where you read Greene's division, read Seventh Regi- ment O. V. I., as they were the advance in all of the move- ments on the battlefield of the division that day, and held on to their position in the East Wood tenaciously from the time it was captured until relieved by Franklin, who with Greene held the position until the retreat of Lee to Vir- ginia.
About 5.30 P. M. Greene's division was ordered to form in rear of Franklin's corps, in support, by General McClel- lan in person. The movement was done promptly and we lay on our arms all night.
Lieut .- Col. Tyndale, Twenty-eighth Penn. V. I., com- manding the First Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Army
.
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Corps, was severely wounded, and Lieut .- Col. Orrin J. Crane assumed command.
At 10 o'clock A. M., as a diversion, McClellan gave orders for Burnside's corps and Cox's division to try to cross the Antietam and attack the enemy. This was done by moving Rodman's division to a ford below the bridge, and Sturgis's over the bridge, strongly supported by Cox's division in reserve, although at times it became the front in the dif- ferent movements. They were confronted by D. R. Jones's division of four brigades deployed on the neighboring hills.
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