USA > Pennsylvania > A true history of the charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania cavlary at Chancellorsville > Part 3
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All reports, both Union and Confederate, agree in their statements that the enemy flanked General Howard's right, about three miles distant from Hazel Grove, and drove it in on the right of the plank road first. This occurred at six o'clock p. M., and Gen- eral Howard immediately sent staff officers
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THE HISTORY OF THE CHARGE.
from his head-quarters near the Old Wilder- ness Church, at full speed, for a regiment of cavalry. That regiment received its orders, and left Hazel Grove before sunset, which was before General Howard's retreating troops had fallen back (but a short distance), and before it was known that there would be a general stampede of the Eleventh Corps (a portion of that corps having done good fight- ing till they were overpowered), and that the main column of the enemy, under the com- mand of Stonewall Jackson, was coming down the plank road, driving everything before them, till they almost reached the open plateau around the Chancellorsville House. At this point there was a cart-road running obliquely from the plank road, that inter- sected the road on which we were moving, about four hundred yards from the plank road.
It was at this point that the Eighth Penn- sylvania Cavalry first met the enemy; and it was probably on this very cart-road that Stone- wall Jackson came forward to reconnoitre ; and it is also quite possible that we were the canse of his turning back, as here is where I gave the command to " Draw sabre and charge." If such was the case, he was wounded by his own
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THE CHARGE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
men," as we did not use our carbines ; and I am also of the opinion that there was no firing from our lines at this time and place, as the enemy had not yet appeared at the edge of the plateau at any point to the south side of the plank road, nor had General Howard's retreating troops made their appearance at Hazel Grove.
During the first part of our march after leaving Hazel Grove we were perfectly safe, as a portion of our infantry line was between us and the enemy. We had gone more than half- way to the plank road when we passed through our straggling retreating line, with the enemy pushing elose behind ; therefore our own troops, who were in the wood, could not have appeared at Hazel Grove, or at any point on our line to the left (or south) of the plank road, till after we had gone through and emerged into the open space west of the Chancellorsville House.
The state of affairs at Hazel Grove when we left there was exactly the same as it had been for some hours before, no one fearing or expect- ing danger, unless it might have been some of those who had learned from the staff officer that Howard was in trouble. Had things been
* The Life of Stonerall Jacken, by a Virginian (a Confederate. publication), after describing his two wounds in the left arm, says: ". . . He fell from his horse, and was caught by Captain Worm.ey, to whom he said, "All my wounds are by my own men.'"
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in such a condition as General Pleasonton de- scribes in his evidence, can he make any one believe that he would have sent a regiment of cavalry, strung out in column, through a nar- row road skirted on either side by thick, scrubby timber (thus placing us in a defence- less position if attacked on the flanks), and covering the whole front of all the available artillery of our army, and at such distance from it that they could not open fire and make it effective without cutting us down as well as the enemy ? Had our infantry line fallen back as far as Hazel Grove before we started, is it likely that General Pleasonton would have or- dered us off' in that direction ? He would have brought the artillery into line and used it effect- ively on the enemy ; he would not have kept it waiting while we marched across its front from Hazel Grove to the plank road, when we could just as well have passed in its rear.
The charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry on the head of Jackson's column was simply a fortunate accident, caused entirely by the ignorance of the officers at Hazel Grove as to the position of General Howard's corps at that time and the near approach of the Confed- erates, Howard having sent to General Sickles
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THE CHARGE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
half an hour before (when the enemy first made his attack on the right and doubled it back) in the hope that with the energetic use of cavalry, who could move swiftly from one part of the field to another, he might be able to prevent a general stampede of his corps. It was impos- sible for any one at Hazel Grove to know, or even suspect, that there was an enemy between
Dowdall's Tavern and that point when we left there, and the last words spoken to me (and not to any other officer of my command) by General Pleasonton were that "General How- ard was at or near the Old Wilderness Church."
All reports, both Federal and Confederate, agree in their statements as to the position of the Eleventh Corps, and also that the cause of the stampede was the fact that the enemy had flanked them and come in the rear of General Howard's right flank, some three miles north- west from Hazel Grove, and that his troops were driven back toward the plank road. When this movement was made General Howard was at his head-quarters (at or near the Old Wil- derness Church), and it was from this point that he sent an aide-de-camp to General Sickles asking for a regiment of General Pleasonton's cavalry, to be used, as the aide said, in re- forming his scattered troops. This was all
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done before Howard's troops at the Wilder- ness Church and the plank road had given way, and before it was known either by Gen- eral Sickles or General Pleasonton that the enemy were not in full retreat, as both of them believed till the aide reported to the contrary.
The country between the plank road and Hazel Grove was a complete wilderness, cov- ered with short, stubby undergrowth so thick that it was almost impossible for a person to go through it, and extending westward almost to the Old Wilderness Church, where, as already mentioned, Howard's head-quarters were, with but one narrow road going through it over which troops could pass, and that road not running in a direction that would be available for the enemy till they had secured possession of the plank road some distance in rear of where General Howard was when his right gave way. It was on this road that the Eighth Pennsyl- vania Cavalry were when they passed through Howard's troops falling back, and struck the enemy on or near the plank road soon after. Therefore it was utterly impossible for the en- emy to have appeared till after the charge had been made and sufficient time had elapsed for them to have driven the Federal soldiers back
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through the woods to that point. As before mentioned, therefore, the charge was really one of those fortunate accidents which so frequent- ly occur to armies in the field, that no foresight could have anticipated or directed, and in all probability would not have occurred had it been known to General Sickles or General Pleason- ton when the regiment was ordered to Howard that he was completely routed, and that the enemy were then pushing for the open plateau surrounding the head-quarters of the Union army. -
Had the real condition of affairs been known, or even suspected, by Sickles when he ordered Pleasonton to send a regiment of cavalry to Howard (whose command was on his right), such an order would never have been given. As it is, he certainly would not have ordered three hundred men right into certain destruc- tion without one word of caution to their com- manding officer. The way was at that time supposed to be clear, and that we would reach Howard without any encounter with the enemy, it not being then known that the whole of his corps had given way. It was simply our igno- rance as to the real position of the enemy which caused us to march up face to face with an eu- emy thirty thousand strong, and within fifty
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paces of them, before either party knew that their opponents were so near, thus placing us in such a desperate position that it required desperate action on our part for any portion of that noble three hundred to come out alive. It was the valor and boldness of our charge, and the surprise and shock to the enemy, that did the work, which in all human probability would not have been done had not the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry been surprised and sur- rounded at a time they supposed themselves entirely out of reach of the erremy.
Before closing our remarks on the evidence of General Alfred Pleasonton the following additional extracts may be added to give the general reader some further idea of the exploits of this remarkable military hero, although hav- ing no immediate bearing on the charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry :
Conduct of the War, page 27, General Pleas- onton testifies as follows :
" He (Hooker) wished me to take what force I had as soon as I could get through, follow them up, and do them all the damage possible. I asked him if I was under General Sickles' orders or if he considered me under General Sickles' orders. He said, 'No; you will fix 4 THE NEWBERRY
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THE CHARGE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
General Sickles, however, a very pleasant, agreeable man; you will have no difficulty with him, and I want an officer of experience in that part of the field."
Every military man, on reading the above, will immediately recognize how customary it is for the general commanding the army, on or- dering his inferior to report to another officer, to soothe his apprehensions by assuring him that he will have no difficulty at all with the officer to whom he is ordered to report, by tell- ing him that he "will find him a-very pleasant, agreeable man," and that he " will have no dif- ficulty with him," and also informing him that he "wants an officer of experience in that part of the field " to watch over a corps commander !
Conduct of the War, page 29, General Pleas- onton says :
" I then sent out into the woods and captured some prisoners, who were brought in to me. .. . "
What accommodating men these prisoners were! Although, from his own account, our heroic general was "alone pretty much the whole time " (page 29), yet he seems to have plucked these prisoners as unresistingly as boys gather berries. How quickly would that bloody strife have ended had all the Confederates ex- hibited such a gentle, yielding disposition !
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One of these same prisoners seems to have posted himself remarkably well for an ordi- nary soldier on one point, even before General Pleasonton sent out for him, as he informed the general that " Stonewall Jackson was mor- tally wounded." As Stonewall Jackson was shot in the arm (a wound not necessarily mor- tal), and died eight days after (May 10) of pneumonia at Guinea Station, near Richmond,* this particular prisoner evidently added to his soldierly qualities the remarkable and uncom- mon gift of wondrous prophecy ! - It is a matter of poignant regret that the name of this military seer was not preserved by General Pleasonton for the astonishment and admiration of future generations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
THERE are in all armies, and will always be, officers more valiant and more capable of giv- ing advice after a battle is over, than before or when in progress. Their only claim to great deeds is found in most elaborate reports, which, taken by themselves, have a decided tendency
* Life of Stonewall Jackson, by a Virginian ; Losing's Civil War in America ; Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1963; Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War, vol. v.
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to lead historians astray and to give to the world inaccurate impressions of the true state of affairs and the causes that oftentimes lead to great re- sults.
When a true history of the Rebellion is written from all the official records, it will be found that some of the reports are but the productions of imaginative brains rather than veracious descriptions of actual occur- rences. Such reports always look well on paper, taken singly, but when compared with other reports of the same engagement will be found wanting in one most essential quality -truthfulness.
Although many histories have been written about different campaigns, yet we find that the majority of them often disagree, even on some of the most essential points, as to what really did occur on certain battlefields. The reason of this is, because the authors have not ex- hausted all the various channels of informa- tion possible, and have, unfortunately, too oft- en taken the reports of only one officer for the operations of certain commands, and in some cases have taken merely from the un- certain memories of those present.
The reports of generals in the field must, from necessity, be largely made up from of-
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ficial reports of the officers under them, and they should agree in the most important points if all give the incidents as they really occurred. It is impossible for a general with a large command to know from actual obser- vation what his different commands are do- ing, and even the commander of a brigade must depend largely on the regimental re- ports for the information necessary to make up his report correctly. This is especially the case in the cavalry service, as the regi- ments and companies are so often detached.
In the above case it will be noticed that the report of the commander of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry and that of Colonel Devin, commander of the brigade, agree in their most important points. It will also be seen that the evidence of General Sickles agrees with them, although in all probability he had not seen either of these reports when he testified. As the evidence of General Al- fred Pleasonton differs very decidedly from all three, the reader must come to the con- clusion that he could not have seen or known all that happened on that field.
Captain James F. Huntington, commander of the artillery (see Appendix), and other officers and men who were there, are thor-
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oughly correct in their statement as to what took place at Hazel Grove when the enemy made his appearance. It seems a little re- markable where the material for General Pleasonton's report and evidence came from, as he certainly did not take it from the re- ports of the officers of his own brigade, and those officers of the artillery and infantry who were at Hazel Grove make no mention of him in their reports. Nor have I been able, after long and patient research, to find anything in the reports of the officers of the Eleventh Corps to confirm General Alfred Pleasonton's statement that he was in or near the right of that corps when it was attacked and gave way, although, as before quoted (Supplement Con- duct of the War, Part 2, page 8), he says that he "happened to be near this scene." As " this scene" was about three miles from Hazel Grove, with a wilderness between, it would reasonably appear from his evidence
that on this particular occasion he was en- dowed with the gift of omnipresence! Pos- sibly that and other superhuman advantages enabled him to invent such a wonderful re- port, although, as he distinctly says himself, " he was alone pretty much the whole time " ! ! ! !
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APPENDIX.
Letter from J. F. Huntington, late Captain First Ohio Light Artillery.
BOSTON, Sept. 28, 1883. GENERAL PENNOCK HUEY-
DEAR GENERAL: You ask me to give you a brief report of the part taken by the artillery in the defence of the position at Hazel Grove. I will gladly do so, premising that I shall de- scribe only what I saw, and I think I saw the whole of an affair that has been made the subject of more balderdash than perhaps any minor action of the war. During the afternoon of Saturday, May 2, 1863, General Sickles, who had struck the rear of Stonewall Jackson's col- umn (then marching across our front to turn the right wing of the Army of the Potomac), sent for Whipple's division of his corps, then in reserve near the Chancellor House. It ac- cordingly moved westerly on the plank road for a mile or more ; then, turning to the left, took a cross-road through the woods, ending in a large open field, known for some occult reason
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as Hazel Grove. About fifty vards to the right of this road as it crossed the field was another thick wood, hiding from sight the position held by the Eleventh Corps in that direction. Along the margin of the wood, lying between the field and the plank road, was a line of rifle-pits. These were now vacant, the troops that had occupied them being at the front with Sickles. There was thus a large vacant space between the left of the Eleventh and right of the Twelfth Corps. After crossing the field the road led over a rugged country to the position held by Sickles near the Furnace. Whipple's infantry followed this road, while his batteries were di- rected to halt at Hazel Grove till further orders. They comprised Battery " H," First Ohio, and the Tenth and Eleventh New York Independ- ent batteries. They were drawn up in a close column of half-battery near the north-west corner of the field, facing south. For some time we had the place to ourselves; the horses were unbridled and fed, as no one thought for a moment of fighting there. From the reports of men escorting prisoners to the rear our fel- lows in advance seemed to be doing finely, and every one was in high spirits.
Such was the state of affairs when Pleason- ton's Cavalry Brigade, with Martin's Horse
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APPENDIX.
Battery, entered the field, formed up, and dis- mounted. After a while I rode out toward the front to see what was going on. I had not gone very far when a sharp musketry fire broke out beyond the woods in the direction of the Elev- enth Corps. I returned as rapidly as possible, and on reaching the field found, to my surprise, that no steps had been taken toward putting the guns in battery. Though ignorant of the nature - and strength of the threatened attack, the im- portance of holding the ground could not be overrated, controlling as it did the communica- tions between the advanced force at the Furnace and the main army. I inquired for the chief of artillery, and learned that he had left the field to look for orders-a proceeding that led to his trial by court-martial and dismissal from the service. Next in rank, I at once assumed con- mand, and was about to deploy the column pre- paratory to going into battery when a body of cavalry * took up the ground I was about to occupy.
It has been stated by General Pleasonton that he ordered the charge of the Eighth Penn- sylvania Cavalry to gain time to get the guns in position. The falsity of this statement is
* Supposed to be the two squadrons of the Seventeenth Peun- sylvania Cavalry .- ED.
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shown by the fact that the guns might have been put in battery half a dozen times after Jackson's musketry opened before I got back to the Grove, which I did not do until after your regiment had left it. For that purpose there was no need of a charge of cavalry, but only of some one to give the necessary orders. As it was, notwithstanding the obstruction I have mentioned, the eighteen guns of Whip- ple's division were unlimbered, loaded, and ready to open before the enemy fired a shot or were in a position to do so. While waiting for the ground to be cleared the situation of our batteries was awkward and perilous. In a close column, with the flank resting on the wood through which the enemy were rapidly advan- cing, they were helpless to resist his onslaught. Every minute the firing grew louder and near- er; the exultant yells of the enemy rent the air. After some minutes that seemed hours, to my intense relief the cavalry rode off. The movements required to put the guns in position were at once begun. Before the line was estab- lished a mob of panic-stricken fugitives from the Eleventh Corps broke from the woods and rushed through our incomplete formation. A lot of Third Corps forges, battery-wagons, and ambulances, that had been left in the wood-
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APPENDIX.
road, seeking to escape, galloped into the field, adding to the dire confusion. Our frightened horses reared and plunged in spite of the ut- most efforts of the drivers to control them. For a short time it looked as if the batteries would be swept in confusion to the rear; that they were not, is due solely to the exertions of the battery officers and the steadiness and dis- cipline of the men. The assertion made by General Pleasonton that these batteries were retreating panic-stricken, "drivers cutting the traces," and so on, and were by him rallied, brought back, and held to their duty, is an ab- solute falsehood made from whole cloth ! By the commands and exertions of their own officers as the torrent swept by, the batteries were formed and ready for action when the enemy, flushed with success, issued from the woods in our front. It was Archer's brigade, forming the extreme right of Jackson's line. They probably did not anticipate resistance at this point, having reason to believe that everything in that quarter had been well started to the rear. A storm of canister from our eighteen pieces and from Martin's four, in battery on the south side of the field at an angle to our line, enlightened them on the subject. They quickly regained the cover, and from there
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opened a heavy fire of musketry. Though checked in our immediate front, there was no obstacle to the advance of Archer's troops through the woods bordering the field in the direction of the plank road. They soon occu- pied the rifle-pits before alluded to, and opened an enfilading fire on our line. The Eleventh New York Battery, holding the right and close to the pits, finding it too hot, limbered to the rear and withdrew. Battery "H," in the cen- tre, then changed front to meet this attack, while the Tenth New York continued to fire in the original direction. Martin's Battery kept up a heavy cross-fire from their position on the south side of the field. The triumphant advance of the enemy was checked, and by the time the infantry of Birney and Sickles reach- ed the field the fighting was practically over. For his own purposes Pleasonton exaggerates the strength of the attack; his talk about "eight or ten battle-flags in sight at once " is simply-bosh !
The critical moment was during the first rush of the retreat. After the line was fairly established, and we had settled down to the work, I, for one, had no fear of the result. The work was done by the batteries I have named, and no others. The assertion
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APPENDIX.
that retreating guns belonging to the Eleventh Corps were stopped by Pleasonton and put in position is not true. Hazel Grove was out of the line of retreat for anything on wheels from that corps. Some guns falling back on the plank road were put in position at Fairview by Colonel Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps. After the firing ceased, Gen- eral Sickles sent for me, and through me, as commanding officer, warmly thanked the artil- lery officers and men for what he was pleased to term " their timely and gallant conduct."
In conclusion, General, permit me to say that a more impudent and unfounded claim was never made by or in behalf of any man than that General Pleasonton exercised any command, directly or indirectly, over the bat- teries of Whipple's division in the affair I have described. Of what transpired in Mar- tin's Battery I have no personal knowledge; it would, however, require much stronger evi- dence than the assertion of General Pleason- · ton to convince me that he assumed the duties of captain of that battery while Martin was at the fore. We bivouacked on the ground where we had fought. My own battery re- mained at Hazel Grove till driven from it on Sunday morning after a sharp and bloody
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fight while covering the formation of the new and interior line.
Yours very truly, J. F. HUNTINGTON,
Late Captain Battery "H," First Ohio Light Artillery.
Letter from Andrew B. Wells, late Captain Com- pany "F," Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry.
GENERAL :
As a number of accounts have been given of the battle of Chancellorsville, I contribute with much pleasure the following recollections of the part taken by our regiment in that en- gagement. The Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford about nine o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1863, at which time I was detailed in command of a company to act as an escort to General Meade. In this position I re- mained till he arrived at the Chancellorsville House, when I was relieved from duty there · and ordered to report to my regiment.
I reported to Major Huey, who ordered me to join my squadron, which was then fighting on the front skirmish-line. After driving the enemy some distance, we fell back and en- camped for the night. . .. The next day (May
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