USA > Pennsylvania > History of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, together with a complete roster of the regiment and regimental officers > Part 12
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morning the march toward Petersburg was continued with the Second Brigade in the advance. After an hour's march, the advance met the Confederate pickets, who were driven to their outworks which were strongly located beyond a swamp, de -- fended by a force of infantry and three pieces of artillery. Here the dismounted men of the brigade, principally those of the First and Fourth, had a sharp skirmish with the enemy, who used their artillery freely, but did no damage. General Hinks, with his division, soon came up and relieved Colonel Spear, who with- drew and resumed his place in the column, which then marched to the southeast to within sight of the enemy's entrenchments, cross- ing the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. The works at this. point were very strong ; the commanding points were occupied by redoubts upon which permanent guns were mounted. The redoubts were connected by heavy breastworks manned by a force of infantry strong enough to stand off the cavalry division. General Kautz says: "There was nothing to do except to send forward the dismounted men, and make the best show possible in lieu of an actual attack. . . . It was an extensive field over which we had to advance, furnishing no shelter after we left the timber, commanded by the guns of five redoubts, and two more were added as we approached." The line of skirmishiers, about one and one-half miles in length, moved to within 500 yards of the intrenchments, and so far as the Eleventh was concerned. gained a fairly good shelter behind the crest of a hill, from which they kept up a desultory fire without much damage to themselves. The enemy used artillery freely during the afternoon. but being poorly directed, little damage was done. Lieutenant Lancaster was severely wounded by a piece of shell, the only casualty sus- tained by the regiment during the day.
The hours of the afternoon dragged wearily away for the exhausted men of the division who had had no sleep the previous night. and had been marching and skirmishing since 5 A. M. that morning-so fatigued were they that many slept under the enemy's fire. No sound of battle came from the direction where Smith was expected to make the attack. The enemy appeared to be receiving reinforcements, and gave evidence of moving out to make an attack as the fire of the Union forces slackened on account of their ammunition running low. General Kautz, deem- ing this evidence that Smith had retired, and that there was no longer any need of his presence on the field, between five and six o'clock, gave the order to retire, which was done in a very
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leisurely manner. About 7 P. M., while the cavalry division was moving off, General Smith made the attack, carried the entrench- ments in his front, capturing 300 prisoners and 16 cannon.
Why General Smith tarried so long has never been satis- factorily explained. The cavalry division had driven in the enemy's advance picket, leaving, at 8 A. M., Smith's advance, under General Hinks, within two miles of the enemy's main, yet it took eleven hours to cover the remaining distance, and the golden opportunity to take Petersburg was thereby lost. Smith, advised that two of Hancock's divisions were within striking distance, sat down before the works for the night. The night was clear and the moon full. Smith rested until morning. after the old, but not commendable, way of 1861-62.
"Smith's failure to follow up his success proved to be the turning point of the campaign. The delay was fatal to immediate success. Lee was not convinced. nor did he know, that the Army of the Potomac was over the James until nearly all had crossed. Beauregard, either with more information, or a better grasp of probabilities, on the night of the 16th, took Hoke's division, which Lee sent to him, and started off for Petersburg. Before morning there was a different enemy to charge than had been de- feated the previous day-the van of Lee's tried veterans, who did not know how formidable entrenchments and batteries could be lost when assailed by only a strong skirmish line. By their arrival the fall of Petersburg, a few hours before so imminent, had been indefinitely postponed. All Grant said upon arriving was: 'More blunders, gentlemen ; more blunders!' "
Major Wetherill was sent with an order to Spear to hold the line at the Prince George Road until relieved by Hink's division. He went to the front under a shower of shells. John Sheridan. Spear's orderly, undertook to act as guide in the search for Col- onel Spear. They advanced too far and had to cross the road, bringing them in full view of the enemy's works. Had the enemy taken the back sight it would have been fatal for the old man. He quickly sought the woods. A shell exploded near him, pitching him upon his face. Colonel Spear, who was stand- ing close by, said to Namara, of the Third New York: "The old gray-haired major is blown to pieces." But the old man's lease of life had not run out; getting up, the orders were delivered.
A cavalry command was observed moving toward the left of our lines. Colonel Mix's brigade was rapidly sent to meet the
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. reported movement, and the Fifth Pennsylvania also pushed for- ward. A skirmish took place. The cavalry continued until the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad was reached. Here fighting continued until evening. Receiving word from General Smith, the command fell back, but not until Colonel Mix's Third New York had carried the rifle pits. Mix was mortally wounded. He thought it unnecessary risk to be carried to the rear, and told the boys to leave him to die. At dusk, Smith's attack on Fort Sted- man was heard.
When Hancock relieved Smith in the morning and assaulted, he captured two or three of the outlying redans, together with their connected works, but after desperate fighting, and with heavy loss. On the 16th, 17th, and 18th, unsuccessful assaults were made by the Army of the Potomac and the Eighteenth Corps of Butler's army upon another series of works around Petersburg, with the loss of 10,000 men. All the assaults were gallantly con- ducted, resulting generally in success, but only after casualties. During the night of the 17th, Beauregard, who had been manag- ing affairs for the past two days, determined to withdraw to an interior and shorter line which his engineers had laid out for him. The line was back from five hundred to a thousand yards; ex- tended from the Appomattox, first southeast, and then south, and intersected the original line at the Jerusalem Plank Road. The withdrawal was accomplished after midnight, and the work of entrenchment was at once begun. This was substantially the line of resistance, extended, as new developments on our part required to be met, during the whole of the operations about Petersburg. If the vigorous assault had been as persistent while the enemy's outer works were crumbling. as it was when he had entrenched himself within his permanent lines, his rout would have been complete. General Smith was relieved of his command shortly after his failure to capture Petersburg, practically ending his military career.
The cavalry division returned to Jordan's Point Road and bivouaced for the night. The next day was spent in guarding the left flank of the Army of the Potomac, after which the com- mand returned to its place in the entrenchments. The division was allowed four days' rest, when it was called to put forth the supreme effort of its existence.
CHAPTER IX.
THE WILSON RAID.
AFTER the failure to capture Richmond, and the army had settled down to a regular investment of the city, General Grant considered it good policy to send a cavalry expedition against the railroads running southwest of Petersburg and Richmond, to cut off the enemy's supplies from that direction. General Wilson was therefore ordered to take his division of the cavalry corps, and Kautz's division, and proceed to the destruction of the rail- roads. On the afternoon of the 21st, General Kautz with his command reported to Wilson at Mount Sinai Church. six miles southeast of Petersburg. General Wilson's instructions were that he should proceed by the shortest route to the intersection of the Richmond and Danville and the Southside Railroads ; to do all the damage possible to the two roads, continuing until prevented by the enemy. Knowing that he was about to start on a perilous expedition, General Wilson desired to know con- cerning affairs in his rear, so he directed a letter to General Meade, inquiring whether the infantry was beyond the Weldon Railroad, stating what he expected to accomplish, adding that "circumstances must, however, in a great degree control after leaving Burkeville. If Sheridan will look after Hampton, I ap- prehend no great difficulty, and hope to do the enemy great damage."
General Humphrey, Meade's Chief of Staff, replied that the infantry was not across the Weldon Railroad, but would be the next day, and expected to take the Southside road soon after. Wilson was assured Sheridan would continue to look after Hampton, as he had been doing since early in June. With these assurances, the two divisions, numbering about 5.300 men and 16 pieces of artillery, at 2 P. M. on the 22d, set out upon the raid. General Kautz's division led the way-the Second Brigade in front, and the Eleventh in the extreme advance. The enemy's pickets were encountered near the Jerusalem Plank Road. and were closely pursued to Ream's Station, several of them being captured on the way. General Kautz's orders were to move directly to Southerland's on the Southside Railroad, but the cap- tured pickets informed him that General W. H. F. Lee, with two
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brigades of cavalry, was encamped in the path he was ordered to take. Being unwilling to endanger the expedition at the be- ginning by fostering an engagement, General Kautz turned the head of his column down the Weldon road, as if that was the object of the raid. After proceeding down the road some dis- tance, the column turned to the right, passed through the village of Dinwiddie Court House, through Five Forks, arriving at the Southside Railroad half way between Southerland's and Ford's Station without being molested.
The Third Division was not so successful in eluding the Confederate cavalry. General Lee made an attack as it passed Ream's Station, but met with a repulse; a second attack was. made in the afternoon, but he was again driven back. Doubt- less, General Lee was anxious to meet Colonel Spear, that he might even up the old score when he was captured at South Anna. The detour to the south by the Dinwiddie Court House. was a decided success, since it placed the only available cavalry force of the enemy where it could hinder very little the work of destroying the railroads. The Eleventh arrived at Ford's Station at 5.30 P. M. Just as the advance guard came in sight from the north, the evening passenger train came in sight coming from the south. The station agent, taking in the situation, gave the alarm, the engineer reversed his engine, and escaped before the advance could prevent it. Private Warner, who was in the advance, shot at the agent, wounding him in the arm. After supper, locomotive, cars, and seven or eight miles of track were. destroyed. The work was done with much zest. in sharp con- trast with that in the trenches, when they were called upon to do the work of infantrymen; now they were at the work of cavalrymen.
The weather was in the most favorable condition for the. destruction of the railroads; clear skies, a burning sun, and several weeks of drought, had rendered all wood materials in- tensely burnable. The work of destruction was kept up until midnight, when the tired men were allowed a brief rest. At 2 A. M., the command moved for Burkeville. The hours of early morning were pleasant, when the air was full of dew and the cool of night was still felt : but after sunrise, the drought began to have an effect upon the men. The heat was intense, while the horses raised clouds of dust which was stifling. The column took the road which runs parallel with the railroad, arriving at Burkeville at 3 P. M. Little damage was done on the way, the
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work of destroying the track having been left for Wilson's men.
At Nottoway Court House, Colonel Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division was attacked by Lee's command, which had succeeded in getting between the two divisions, while Wilson, who had taken the wrong road, was getting back again. The fight lasted from I P. M until dark. Lee was repulsed, but fol- lowed at a safe distance. On the 25th, Lee again made a slight demonstration against Wilson's division, but was driven off by Colonel Chapman. Burkeville was abandoned by the enemy at our approach, who concentrated at High Bridge, the destruc- tion of which would have been a far greater loss than the station at Burkeville. When General Kautz's command arrived at Burkeville, the destruction of the railroad began. The scene presented at Burkeville and Keysville, after dark set in, was demon-like: the burning track visible for miles, the moving figures of men carrying fuel to feed the flames, the iron rails twisted by heat into strange attitudes, were sights never to be forgotten. The men worked with spirit and cheerfully, notwith- standing their great fatigue after marching all day, and getting little sleep when night came. The work lasted far into the night, and the usual hour of starting was 2 or 3 A. M .. so that the com- mand might be well on the road by daylight. The Second Brigade destroyed about five miles of track on the Lynchburg road above the junction, went to bivouac at midnight, and was aroused at 4 A. M. to finish the destruction of the junction, which was done in an hour.
Several vacant stores at Burkeville were filled with sick and wounded Confederate soldiers, and a great number were lying on cots under the shade of the trees. The local physician in charge of these unfortunates appeared to be taxed beyond his resources. The condition of the sick and wounded was deplorable, some were lying unattended on the floor ; no screens to the doors and windows ; the flies were in swarms about those unable to help themselves. Such is war! The men did all in their power to alleviate the condition of their enemies, but it was little they could do; when the morning came. several of the poor fellows were dead.
Between 5 and 6 A. M. on the 24th, the Second Brigade marched along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, destroying the road as it proceeded. This road was evidently one of the oldest in the State. Its track consisted of wooden rails with
CAPTAIN JOHN B. LOOMIS. Killed at Ream's Station. Va., June 29, 1864.
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strap iron spiked on them. Its destruction was an easy matter. The severe heat, intensified by the burning ties, caused many prostrations during the day, and the dust, while on the march, was almost unbearable. Early in the afternoon the cavalry di- vision was massed at Keysville, and the work of destruction was continued until midnight.
After repulsing Lee at Nottoway Court House, Wilson bivouaced for the night, and early next morning struck across the country, joining Kautz near Keysville. The two divisions were united for the first time since the morning of the 22d. During the following day, Colonel West's Brigade burned three saw mills, thereby causing great loss to the enemy, who de- pended upon them for lumber to replace that which had been burned. At 5 P. M., the head of the column arrived at Roanoke Station, a mile and a half from where the railroad crosses the Staunton River, and where the enemy was found to be strongly entrenched across the river. The destruction of the bridge was very desirable, but was, from the first, a hopeless task with the means at our disposal. A wide, cultivated bottom on the north side intervened, while the head of the bridge was defended by two lines of rifle pits. On the south side of the river the bank was high, commanding the plain on the north, and the works were supplied with artillery. The face of the bluff was also de- fended by rifle pits.
General Wilson ordered General Kautz to burn the bridge. The usual number of men of the division were dismounted, those of the First Brigade were deployed to the right, and those of the Second to the left of the railroad. So far as the Eleventh was concerned, the men were poorly armed, the limited number of carbines, which were inferior when received, had become almost useless, and the ammunition for them was defective; in many cases the cartridges could be pushed through the barrel easily. Colonel Spear ordered the men without carbines on the line with their pistols, which were about as efficient. It must have been very gratifying to the enemy to see the intended charge upon their position.
At 6 P. M., the advance was made, unopposed except by the artillery, until within short range it was met with a sharp fire of musketry from the entrenchments across the river and from the bridge, which barred further progress. Our artillery opened a heavy fire upon the bridge, and another attempt was made by a quick dash to carry it, but without success. Skirmishing was
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ELEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
kept up until after nightfall, hoping to reach the bridge in the darkness, but the work of the past four days, the extreme heat, the want of sleep, added to the knowledge that they were figliting an inaccessible foe -- all tended to diminish the zeal of the men. The Second Brigade fell back after dark to the sta- tion, replenished its exhausted ammunition, and returned to its old position, remaining there until Wilson's division and the First Brigade of Kautz's division had passed.
General Kautz estimated his loss, killed, wounded, and miss- ing, at 60; of these the Eleventh lost Captain Reynolds and two men killed ; Major Ackerly and several men wounded. Cap- tain Reynolds, who was in full uniform. fell some distance in advance of his men, when our forward move was checked. Sev- eral attempts were made to recover his body, but the enemy con- centrated their fire upon the rescuers, and drove them back. Finally, Private Nelson M. Ward, of Company M, under the fire of the enemy, crawled forward, removed the captain's watch. ring, and other valuables. Private Ward received a medal of honor for the brave act.
The object of the expedition, in the main, having been ac- complished, Wilson decided to return to Petersburg, and began the return march about midnight, leaving Kautz to cover his rear. With the exception of some annoyance to the rear guard, the march was uneventful, but none of those present will ever forget it. So much time on the previous days had been con- sumed in destroying the railroads that the fatigue fell largely upon the men ; but now the animals suffered from the extreme heat and stifling clouds of dust. A new trouble arose: the command was compelled to depend upon the country for subsistence. Wilson's division, which before had been in the rear, was now in advance, consuming all the provisions and forage to be found along the route; hence, Kautz's men had to go long distances for provisions. The animals began to play out in considerable numbers. The march was greatly retarded by the sick and wounded ; also, by great mobs of contrabands, who followed, de- spite the warning of the commanding officers. The route taken was through Wylersville and Christianville. Owing to delays. the Second Brigade did not go into bivouac until 2.30 of the morning of the 27th. 40 miles having been covered since leaving Roanoke Station. March was resumed at 6.30 A. M. The day's experience was a repetition of the previous one. The rear guard was kept busy killing exhausted horses, and the guard
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had enough to do to urge on men who had become weary from loss of sleep.
The country through which we passed seemed deserted. There was nothing animated to be seen except our own people- The houses and fields were without occupants. Here and there, frenzied negroes from the woods and thickets would join the columns and insisted on going with us, but the whole popula- tion seemed to have vanished from the country.
The Second Brigade reached Boydton Plank Road about 10.30 P. M., and bivouaced for the night. A refreshing rain was falling-much welcomed. This was the only full night's rest during the entire raid. March was resumed at 5.30 A. M. on the 28th ; the rain made the march during the morning quite en- joyable for the men, but the horses were suffering for the lack of forage; numbers of them gave out. The men also began to
suffer from the scarcity of provisions. Horace Greeley says: "Soldiers may live on enthusiasm, but horses must have oats."
The Second Brigade halted at Smoky Ordinary for its scant mid-day meal, which had to serve them until noon or later on the 30th. At 4 P. M., the Nottoway was reached.
General Kautz says: "We took the Boydton Plank' Road to where it was necessary to decide which way we would take to reach the Army of the Potomac-by Ream's or Jarrett's Station. I was here summoned to confer with General Wilson in regard to the route. From all the information we possessed, and the assurance that Meade would occupy the Weldon Railroad. I gave it as my opinion that we could take either road; but that we could not stop until we had passed the danger point of either route mentioned. General Wilson decided to take the road di- rect to Meade's army, as we had reason to believe that he was expecting us. Later in the day, after crossing the Nottoway Bridge, I observed that the column had turned in toward Stony Creek Station, and I noted it with apprehension ; which fear was confirmed upon becoming aware that the head of the column was engaged. I understood that General Wilson had intended to march directly to Ream's Station, but this indicated a route to the east through Stony Creek, which I had reason to believe was not practical, owing to the number of streams and bridges. fur- nishing opportunities for detention by inferior forces. We were in no condition to engage the enemy, and a battle should have been avoided."
Instead of finding at Stony Creek a small force of infantry
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and cavalry which could easily be driven back, Wilson met Hampton's cavalry division, and the engagement which ensued lasted until daylight of the 29th. About midnight. General Kautz was ordered to march to Ream's Station. The Eleventh led the way, Company K being the advance guard. The ad- vance reached the vicinity of Ream's Station about 6 A. M. on the 29th, but instead of finding the Army of the Potomac, was saluted by the shells of a six-gun battery. Colonel Spear at once massed his brigade, dismounted the carbineers of the Eleventh and First District of Columbia, and held the mounted portion of the Eleventh in readiness to charge the enemy, should they advance.
About this time, Captain Whitaker, of General Wilson's staff, came with orders to take a detachment of Kautz's division. then cut his way through the enemy to apprise General Meade of affairs with General Wilson's command. A company of the Third New York was taken, and the orders were carried out suc- cessfully.
Colonel Spear had hardly gotten his brigade in position, when Sander's Alabama brigade came from the scrub pines on the right of our position. Colonel Spear ordered the First District of Columbia to open fire with their repeating rifles, and the mounted men of the Eleventh to charge them. The order was promptly obeyed: the Eleventh charged into the yelling mob of Confederates, who, anticipating an easy victory, had lost all formation, and drove them back, capturing 40 prisoners. The success was dearly won: Captain Loomis, Captain Baily, and Lieutenant Tears were killed. Captain Roberts was mortally wounded and left on the field; also the greater part of the 23 enlisted men, who were killed and seriously wounded. Colonel Spear held his position for nearly two hours, when the enemy attempted to turn his left flank; compelling him to fall back to a new line, where he remained until the final retreat. During the rest of the action the enemy were very quiet-prob- ably counting the force as their prisoners, preparing for the final advance which would make us their actual prisoners. By this time it was painfully evident that the Union forces were unfit to engage the enemy ; for, in addition to the labor of the previous week, they. had been in the saddle for the best part of two days. The greater part had nothing to eat since noon of the previous day, and so exhausted were they that many went to sleep on the skirmish line while the enemy were firing : in some instances the
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officers and their comrades were unable to arouse them when the final break-up came.
General Kautz says: "General Wilson came up to me about 10 A. M., realizing that we were being rapidly surrounded and that no help from Meade could be expected in time to assist us, he decided to retire, and try the route by Jarrett's Station. He directed that my division bring up the rear. To my suggestion that we entrench and hold on until reinforcements arrived, he replied : 'Cavalry must fight or run away.' Thinking that such a course would disconcert the enemy, I asked, 'Why not take different routes with our respective commands?' He answered, 'It may come to that.'" Before retreating, General Wilson ordered that every man be supplied with all the ammunition he could carry, and the destruction of all the wagons. This order was carried out, and the retrograde move commenced; but the enemy moved at the same time, throwing a strong infantry force between the two divisions. General Kautz, seeing that it was impossible to follow Wilson, turned under cover of the timber. at the enemy's left, and vanished into the forest so quietly that the pursuing forces must have been at a loss concerning the where- abouts of the retreating column. The Eleventh was in advance. General Kautz gave Major Stratton his pocket compass, and told him to determine the direction to take. After emerging from the densely timbered swamp into which the command had plunged, Major Stratton placed on the horn of his saddle a inap of Virginia ; put the compass thereon, marked the direction to be taken, and struck out. Soon afterwards the command came upon an old negro plowing corn, and the old man was pressed into service as a guide. Mounting his horse, he led the column through fields and wood roads, and arrived at the Weldon Rail- road three or four miles below Ream's Station.
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