USA > Virginia > Henrico County > Henrico County > A history of the Laurel brigade, originally the Ashby cavalry of the Army of northern Virginia and Chew's battery > Part 4
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By the 20th of April Ashby had twenty companies. His command, however, was unorganized. Though a brigade in size it did not have as many field officers as one regiment ordinarily has. Besides Ashby, Major Funsten was the only officer above the rank of captain.
On the 15th of April General Banks wrote to McClellan : "The progress of Fremont in the west towards Staunton has alarmed Jackson, who has moved above New Market. Ashby is still here. We have a sleepless eye upon him, and are straining every nerve to advance as quickly as possible."
The advance of Fremont was part of a concerted move- ment to drive Jackson out of the Valley and seize Staunton.
On the 17th of April Banks marched to Mt. Jackson. Ashby having ordered Chew's guns back to Rude's Hill, remained on a eminence north of the bridge. He had with him a small body of men. He had prepared the kindling to burn the bridge, but the cavalry of the enemy, with exceptional enterprise, charged him with a large force and drove him across the bridge, pursuing along the turnpike. A Federal cavalrymen riding up near Ashby endeavored to kill him with his pistol. Harry Hatcher of Loudoun county observing his danger, with the greatest coolness galloped forward and killed the trooper. Ashby paid little attention
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to this attack, being intent on getting his cavalry back to recapture and burn the bridge. His cavalry had gone so far, however, in the direction of Rude's Hill, that it was impossible to recall them in time. Ashby escaped from this conflict unscathed, but his famous white horse was shot by the enemy. He was led back beyond Rude's Hill and died near the Valley turnpike.
On this retreat Ashby fought the advance of the enemy from every hilltop, and at Edenburg, where he laid for thirty days, he was engaged with his guns and cavalry twenty- eight times.
On the 17th Jackson broke camp and retreated up the Valley. The next day he reached Harrisonburg, and there leaving the turnpike, marched in the direction of Swift Run Gap. Crossing the Shenandoah he went into camp at Conrad's Store in Elk Run Valley, and there stood at bay. The place lies between the South Fork of the Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap. A road running through the latter furnished easy communication with General Ewell, whose division of about 7,000 men lay encamped along the Rapidan River, within two days' march.
He now seemed to have abandoned the Valley and Staunton to the mercies of the Federals; but, in fact, nothing was further from his mind.
In the meanwhile Ashby, with his cavalry, confronted Banks, disputing his advance and so worrying him that he was kept in a chronic state of bewilderment as to Jackson's movements.
So completely was Banks deceived, that at one time he thought Jackson had crossed the Blue Ridge. He reports nothing to Washington except that, "Ashby is here."
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Jackson, though quiet, was intensely on the alert. From his mountain perch he was watching and planning.
The road was opened to Staunton, but Banks hesitated to go forward. Perhaps he was waiting for Fremont, who, on the other side of the North Mountain, was moving slowly southward.
In the meantime Jackson, who neglected nothing, was busily engaged in reorganizing his command. The infantry recruits were distributed among the old companies and the skeleton regiments were rapidly filled up.
The mounted men were put into the cavalry, and Ashby now reported twenty-one companies. There was still no regimental formation, and his large brigade with only two field officers was an unwieldy body. There was no regi- mental drill, and no action as regiments in the field or elsewhere. It was more like a tribal band held together by the authority of a single chief.
Increase of numbers rather diminished than increased its efficiency as a whole, and made it more unmanageable. Jackson saw the evil and tried to correct it.
1
The constant demand for Ashby's presence on the enemy's front, and the absence of so many of his companies on detached service, had hitherto proved a serious obstacle to reform, but at Swift Run Gap Jackson took summary proceedings.
Eleven companies of the Ashby cavalry were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Taliaferro and to be attached to his command. The rest were ordered to report to General Winder. For Ashby was reserved the honor of commanding the advance and rear guards, with authority to call for portions of his command as necessity required. The effect of this order, was to virtually deprive Ashby of
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his command. But what followed is best told in Jackson's own words. In a letter to Colonel Taylor, Lee's assistant adjutant-general, of date May 5th, 1862, Jackson says: "I so felt the importance of having the cavalry of this district more thoroughly organized, drilled, and disciplined as to induce me to take action in the matter; but Colonel Ashby claimed that I could not interfere with his organiza- tion, as he was acting under the instructions of the late Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin. * When I took steps for organizing, drilling, and disciplining the cavalry, both of its field officers sent in their resignations; and such was Colonel Ashby's influence over his command that I became well satisfied that if I persisted in my attempt to increase the efficiency of the cavalry, it would produce the contrary effect, as Colonel Ashby's influence, who is very popular with his men, would be thrown against me. Under these circumstances, I refrained taking further action in the matter (as I was in the face of the enemy), until the War Department should have an opportunity of acting in the case. At present there is no field officer on duty with the cavalry referred to, as Colonel Ashby and Major Funsten are both sick."
This letter, written from Staunton, explains why Jackson about ten days before had reinstated Ashby in his command.
It is true that Ashby's mode of fighting and managing his command, was quite at variance with West Point methods, but this was to be expected, both on account of the rapid increase of his force from raw recruits, and the active field service demanded, and also from the irregular nature of the service.
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+
Jackson kept Ashby so busy fighting the enemy night and day, that he had no time to give to the details of organiza- tion.
Then, too, it may be said of Ashby's method, that it was most likely the best under the circumstances. He taught his men that war meant getting close to the enemy, and requiring him to fight for every foot of the ground he attempted to advance upon; a lesson, if choice had to be made, of far more importance than dress parades and regimental maneuvers. At any rate, his mode of fighting had the desired effect of beating the enemy in small as well as in large affairs, and at the same time of attracting the chivalry of Virginia and Maryland to his standard.
On the evening of April 30th, General Ewell arrived at Swift Run Gap with an aggregate force of 8,000 men. A few hours before Jackson had broken camp and, ascending the right bank of the Shenandoah to Port Republic, crossed the river through Brown's Gap, and thence marched to Staunton along the line of the Virginia Central Railroad.
In the meantime Ashby's cavalrymen were busy among the Federal outposts, keeping Banks in constant expectation of an attack, and acting as a screen to Jackson's movements.
But, in some way, news of Ewell's arrival and Jackson's departure reached Banks, and he felt sure that Jackson was coming by way of Thornton's Gap to attack his rear. He at once broke camp and fell back to New Market. Ashby, with eleven companies, remained to make demonstrations upon Banks' front and to mask Jackson's movement against Milroy, while the other companies went with Jackson, who was now on his way to McDowell.
Lee had directed Jackson to assume an offensive course, but his movements were left to his own discretion.
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Fearing a union of Banks' and Fremont's forces, he determined to fight them in detail, and to make his first attack upon Fremont.
Leaving Ewell with 8,000 troops in the Luray Valley, on the 7th of May Jackson left Staunton, where his com- mand had halted to rest for a day, and making a junction with Genl. Edward Johnson west of Staunton, marched against Milroy, who was at McDowell.
The cavalry that accompanied Jackson on this expedition, did little else but capture the enemy's pickets, and at different points blockade the roads leading to Jackson's rear by felling trees across them.
While Jackson was marching west in search of Milroy, Banks pushed his cavalry advance as far as Harrisonburg. Here, May 7th, quite a spirited skirmish with Ashby's horsemen occurred.
In his report of this, General Banks says: "The enemy does not show himself except by cavalry. * His chief object will doubtless be to prevent a junction of forces on this line with General McDowell."
Evidently he, ignorant of Jackson's designs, thought the Confederates intended to abandon the Valley. A like impression prevailed at Washington, and when Shields, with his division, was shortly afterwards ordered to cross the ridge and join the forces of General McDowell, Banks was ordered to fall back to Strasburg, so as to be able to leave the Valley on short notice and aid McDowell if necessary.
When Banks found that he might probably be left alone to confront Jackson, he began to change his opinion as to the designs of Stonewall. He made frequent requests for aid, but nothing could shake the purpose of the Federal administration.
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The demonstrations on McDowell's front created alarm at Washington, and the Federal authorities might almost be accused of leaving Banks in the Valley, as a bait to keep Jackson from uniting his forces with those in front of McDowell.
Jackson, even while pursuing Milroy, feared that Banks would get away before he returned. But he defeated Milroy and then began to retrace his steps.
The fruit of Kernstown was now to be plucked by Stone- wall. His audacity there in attacking a force so superior in numbers, had caused his enemies now to suspect him capable of any bold and unusual enterprise.
General McDowell (May Ioth) writes that Jackson is in his front. Schenck at Franklin, nearly 100 miles distant, is positive that Jackson is trying to get in his rear, while Fremont is equally sure that Jackson is going west.
Of course, from these conflicting accounts, the authorities at Washington remained in dense ignorance and fear of Jackson's designs.
Much of Jackson's success is justly attributed to the 7 secrecy of his movements. His rapid action and closeness of counsel, joined to a bold strategy, had much to do with the mystery that enveloped his actions, but not a little of that secrecy and mystery was due to the impenetrable veil created by the cordon of pickets maintained by Ashby, and the audacious demonstrations of his cavalry.
This was only possible where there were great activity, and sleepless vigilance on the part of the cavalry detach- ments, joined to their uniform successes over the foe in the numerous skirmishes.
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,
While Jackson is away beyond the Shenandoah moun- tains, Ashby is busy with the companies left him in screen- ing the movements of his chief.
May Ioth Ashby writes from Lacy Springs to Maj. James Barbour, Ewell's adjutant-general: "You will please inform the General (Ewell) that I have moved to this point on my way from New Market to Luray, but will wait until my companies with General Jackson, expected today, come up. * I thought it best not to leave this road until I had followed their column as far as Strasburg, so as to cause them to believe you were behind them upon this road."
In the last sentence we get a glimpse of Ashby's idea of his duty as the leader of Jackson's cavalry; namely, to so use it that the movement of the main body should be effectually hidden from the enemy.
Whatever he did was without reference to selfish ends.
We find him never attempting a brilliant raid for personal glory. Though always close to the foe and worrying them in a thousand ways, it is solely to further what he conceives to be the plan of his commanding officer.
On Sunday morning, May 18th, Jackson rested after his long march from Franklin at Mt. Solon. Ewell rode across the Valley and joined him here. In the interview that occurred between them it was resolved to go quickly and assail General Banks' army.
Fearing, if they attacked him by marching down the Valley turnpike, he would retreat to Strasburg and thence to McDowell's army, they determined to head him off by delivering the first blow at Front Royal.
Success depended on secrecy, and secrecy on the activity and faithfulness of the cavalry in front of Banks.
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So well was the movement hid by Ashby's cavalry that Jackson had reached Front Royal, routed and captured the force there before General Banks heard a word about it. And when a messenger in hot haste brought him the news, it was not credited, so confident was the Federal general that Jackson was on his front.
Jackson, with his division and that of Genl. Edward Johnson, followed the Valley turnpike to New Market. Here he turned to the right and, passing through New Market Gap in Massanutton Mountain, crossed the Shenandoah River at Columbia bridge and united his column with Ewell's, that had marched down the Luray Valley.
The Confederates went from Columbia bridge straight towards Front Royal, until within four and a half miles of the town, when they turned from the main road and followed one that approached the place from the south. At Spangler's crossroads the cavalry under Ashby and Flournoy were sent to destroy communications between Strasburg and Front Royal.
A short distance beyond the river Ashby and Flournoy , separated, the former taking a more western course, while Flournoy kept on so as to strike the railroad near Front Royal and come around in the rear of the Federal garrison.
Ashby moved towards Buckton Station, between Front Royal and Strasburg, a point of importance, and guarded by three companies of Federal infantry.
Upon discovering his approach, the Federals quickly took shelter in the depot building and the outhouses of a Mr. Jenkins.
Thus protected they made a spirited defense. Their musket volleys poured into the ranks of the grey horsemen were not without effect, but the continued persistence of
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the mounted men finally ended all resistance. The station was taken and the Federals were captured or driven off.
The victory, however, was dearly bought, for two of Ashby's best captains fell mortally wounded-Fletcher and Sheetz.
In the meantime Front Royal had been taken by Jackson.
The Federal garrison, consisting of Colonel Kenly's First Maryland Infantry and two companies of the New York cavalry, retreated across the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah. A short distance beyond the latter, they were overtaken by Colonel Flournoy's cavalry. The rear guard made but a feeble resistance, then broke and fled. The infantry made a brief stand, but upon Flournoy's men charging among them, they also soon gave way.
Company B, Captain Grimsly, charged directly up the turnpike supported by Company E; Colonel Flournoy on the left, and Companies A and K on the right.
Colonel Kenly made a gallant effort to rally his men in an orchard. Here for a few minutes stout resistance was made, but the progress of the Confederates was not stopped. Charging boldly among the infantry they attacked them furiously with sabre and pistol, Stonewall himself near the front urging them on.
Colonel Kenly fell badly wounded; his men broke and fled and the retreat of the Federals soon became a wild rout.
As the result of this day's fight 750 prisoners were captured ; also two parrot guns and nearly all the enemy's wagon train.
Jackson camped at Cedarville that night and waited for the rest of his forces. Ewell's division arrived about dark. Jackson's old division and that of Genl. Edward Johnson,
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weary with their long march from Franklin, 120 miles distant, got no further than Front Royal.
Banks was still at Strasburg. A courier despatched from Front Royal had ridden around the cavalry pickets of the Confederates and carried the information that Jackson in heavy force was at Front Royal.
Banks refused to believe the messenger.
Firmly convinced that Jackson's main body was still in his front on the turnpike, and that the attacking force at Front Royal was only a raiding body of cavalry, he took no steps to retreat until despatches were received from Winchester from fugitives who had come from Front Royal.
His persistence in believing that the Confederate main body was south of him was probably due to a demonstra- tion made in that quarter by a small body of the Ashby cavalry under Capt. Sam Myers. With his own company and those of Capt. E. H. McDonald and Capt. William Harness, he had boldly driven in the Federal pickets and erected breastworks on the hills near Strasburg in sight of Banks' army. Moving his troops about from point to point partly in view of the Federals, he created the impression that he was supported by a large force.
1
That the demonstration had the effect intended is shown by the fact that even after hearing from Winchester General Banks did not abandon Strasburg until he had sent out a cavalry force towards Woodstock and learned that the driving in of his pickets and the bold display of the Ashby cavalry was a "take in."
After resting all night at Cedarville, Jackson in the morning set out to find and assail the foe.
Not knowing which way General Banks would retreat, whether by Strasburg or Winchester, Jackson planned to
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intercept him by either road. In his official report he says : "In order to watch both directions and at the same time advance upon him if he remained in Strasburg, I deter- mined with the main body of the army to strike the Valley turnpike near Middletown, a village five miles north of Strasburg and thirteen south of Winchester."
As the column moved towards Middletown, Ashby led the advance supported by skirmishers from Taylor's brigade, with Chew's Battery and two parrot guns from the Rock- bridge Artillery.
Ashby was directed to keep scouts on his left in order to prevent Banks from passing unobserved to Front Royal.
Some time before Genl. George Stuart, temporarily in command of the Sixth and Second Virginia Cavalry, had been sent to Newtown, a village five miles north of Middle- town, to observe the movements of the enemy.
While Jackson was thus preparing to confront Banks, the latter, whom Jackson describes in one of his letters as a "cautious" man, was making great speed down the turn- pike. It was a race between the fresh troops of the Federals and the footsore Confederates; a race, too, in which the Federals had several hours' start.
General Banks was long in making up his mind, but the conclusion once formed he acted promptly, and his retreat- ing column moved rapidly.
By the time Jackson's advance reached Middletown all the Federal infantry had passed and were nearly to Win- chester.
When near Middletown Ashby discovered that the enemy's cavalry, 2,000 strong, was rapidly retreating, only trains and a large body of cavalry being seen.
ASHBY'S CHARGE AT MIDDLETOWN
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Ashby, with a small body of cavalry, ordering three guns of Chew's Battery to follow him, swooped down on their right like an eagle. The guns moved with the cavalry, and unlimbered within a few hundred feet of the retreating column, and opened on them with canister. Soon the road was so blockaded with dead men and horses that those in rear could not pass, and an indescribable scene of carnage and confusion ensued. The main body of the Federals escaped in detachments across the fields westward.
General Jackson, in his official report referring to this incident, says : "In a few moments the turnpike, which just before had teemed with life, presented a most appalling spectacle of carnage and destruction. The road was literally obstructed with the mingled and confused mass of strug- gling and dying horses and riders. Amongst the survivors the wildest confusion ensued, and they scattered in disorder in various directions, leaving some 200 prisoners in the hands of the Confederates."
Ashby then pursued the enemy with the utmost vigor to Newtown, fighting his guns upon the skirmish line, and with the greatest boldness and audacity he pressed the enemy through the whole night. The morning following, he was at the head of Jackson's column, and after the battle of Winchester, followed the enemy on the turnpike until dark.
Dabney, in his "Life of Jackson," says Ashby went off on an independent expedition towards Berryville, and sub- sequent historians, including Henderson, have fallen into this error. It is thoroughly attested by soldiers who were with him at the time, that, at no time was Ashby anywhere during this particular conflict, except at the head of Jack- son's army on the Valley turnpike.
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The Federal column was effectually sundered, the rear retiring towards Strasburg, though not until after a gallant effort was made to cut its way through towards Winchester.
Jackson halted his force at Middletown until he could ascertain whether the Federal main body had passed or not. Upon learning that it had he pressed on towards Winchester.
In the battle of Winchester, which occurred May 25th, Ashby, with the few cavalry with him, took position on Jackson's left.
It has been claimed that the small number of the Ashby cavalry present for duty at this battle was due to the fact that they stopped the pursuit in order to plunder the captured trains.
This was in part true, but the same may be said of many of the infantry, as Jackson bears witness in his report.
The true reason was, that Ashby had only a small part of his command with him when he reached Middletown, the greater number of his men being engaged in picketing the roads leading to Jackson's line of march fron McDowell, and many were detailed to guard prisoners. After the battle at Winchester, Ashby, notwithstanding his small force, kept up the pursuit to Martinsburg.
It would seem that a vindication is due to Ashby as to the commonly accepted statement contained in Dabney's "Life of Jackson," and quoted later by Henderson in his "Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War," that at the time of Banks' defeat at Winchester, Ashby was off on an independent expedition, and not present on the turnpike in pursuit, and also as to the alleged plundering of the wagon trains by his cavalrymen. Such vindication is amply found in a letter of Col. R. P. Chew to Rev. Jas. B. Avirett,
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found in his "Ashby and His Compeers," page 269, here quoted in part by permission of the author-
"CHARLES TOWN, W. VA., Jan. 18th, 1867.
REV. J. B. AVIRETT.
DEAR SIR :- *
* * With reference to the affair refer- red to by Dr. Dabney, I will give you a statement of the facts as far as my observation and knowledge extend. General Ashby followed the infantry of General Jackson with a detach- ment of his cavalry, a portion of it having been sent down the Shenandoah Valley to confront the enemy at Strasburg. I accompanied him with my guns. He diverged from the Front Royal and Luray Road, and struck the railroad, as you know, at Buckton. I was not with him until I rejoined the head of the army near Cedarville. Here General Ashby, with his cav- alry, my battery, two guns of Poague's Battery and some infantry skirmishers, left the turnpike and pushed for Middle- town.
After a short delay, to enable his force to reach its destination at the proper time, he formed his skir- mishers and advanced rapidly across the fields to the lower part of the town. Here he encountered a considerable force of cavalry, and running up his artillery to within 100 yards opened on the Federals with artillery and small arms. The enemy crowded in the turnpike, gave way and retreated in all directions. Ashby dashed in among them, pistol in hand, and captured himself many prisoners. Major Funsten in the mean- time had reached the turnpike below Middletown, perhaps two miles, and forced the retreating cavalry of the enemy towards the Back Road, besides capturing a large wagon train. It was here that our cavalry became dispersed, and the reasons why Ashby failed to have his cavalry in hand next morning, as I have understood them, were these: The cavalry we defeated at Middletown retreated towards North Mountain and Win- chester, scattered, in fact completely routed. Major Funsten prevented those going towards Winchester from pursuing their retreat in that direction, and forced them to retire across the
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