USA > Vermont > Men of Vermont : an illustrated biographical history of Vermonters and sons of Vermont > Part 7
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On the organization of the new state gov- ernment, in 1 778, he was chosen a member of the council and was its secretary. He was also elected state treasurer at the beginning and held that office for nine years, and was surveyor-general about the same time, until the jealousies and antagonisms that accumu- lated against him, the complaints that he was holding "so many offices," resulted in his defeat in 1786, with widely-believed charges of corruption soon following, and though they were afterwards cleared away and it was shown that he had been constant- ly aiding the state with his money instead of making money out of it, enough of the cloud clung to the old suspicion about the Haldi- mand negotiation to somewhat shadow his subsequent career. In the elections of 1784 and 1785 he failed as candidate for state treasurer before the people, and was only elected by the joint assembly. He was dropped from the Governor's Council after a year of service in 1785, and the Assembly on the last day of the session of the latter year, aimed a bill at him to annul his surveys and discontinue his work as surveyor gen- eral, which the council succeeded in postpon- ing to the next session.
His military service in the Revolution, ended with the retreat from Canada in 1776, but he soon became captain, then colonel, and finally major-general of the state militia. He was also a member of the board of war during nearly the whole of the Revolution.
The Haldimand negotiations, over which so much controversy has been waged, must form a chief feature of Allen's biography. Though magazine and newspaper writers keep bobbing up with startling "discoveries" of the treason of the Vermontese, as editor H. B. Dawson of the New York Historical Magazine calls them, the facts are fully known. There are, as J. L. Payne says, hun- dreds of manuscripts in the archives of Can- ada bearing on the subject, and indicating to a one-sided view as he expresses it, "how near Vermont came to being a British prov- ince." They leave no doubt of the fact of these negotiations or of their pretended purpose. The fact was, that beginning with a cartel for the exchange of prisoners which was concluded with the Vermont authorities when it was refused to Washington, these negotiations brought about a truce between Vermont and the British forces, which was ex- tended through the last three campaigns of the war, while emissaries and spies passed back and forth in great profusion, and the hope was kept dangling before the British
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that the state would desert the cause of the Revolution and return to allegiance to the Crown. Several times the negotiations went so far as to discuss the terms of settlement and to fix dates for it ; but Ira Allen as the principal negotiator was sure to turn up with some plausible reason for postponing de cisive action .*
But all that has been published and argued has shown no more than was known more or less definitely at the time or soon after. The dispute is whether the Vermonters were sincere, or were merely fooling the British, or were playing for a position that would leave them free to take advantage of the issue whichever way it went. The conduct of Congress towards the new state, with all its people had at stake, in the controversy with New York, would make it seem natural that the Vermonters should seek safety under the British wing. But the event and the skillful way the negotiation was pro- tracted shows that they did not. It is certain that the masses of the people would not tol- erate the idea, and did not when they found out what was or seemed to be doing ; and the leaders never once lifted a finger to reconcile them to it. It is notable also that in all the correspondence and negotiations, including the conversations as reported by the English representatives, there was never once a single profession of loyalty to the King on the part of the Vermont leaders. But there is one decisive fact in this busi- ness to which the disputants have never given due attention. The participants on the Vermont side took particular pains to pro- tect themselves in history. Early in the negotiations they put on paper a record of their purpose in the form of a certificate for Allen, prepared in June, 1781, and signed by all the eight men in the secret, Jonas and Joseph Fay, Samuel Safford, Samuel and Moses Robinson, Governor Chittenden, Timothy Brownson and Jona Fassett. This certificate stated explicitly that the scheme was adopted "to make them (the British au- thorities) believe Vermont had a desire to negotiate a treaty of peace," and because it was beyond the power of the state to defend itself by arms, the negotiation was opened and "we think it to be a necessary political manœuvre to save the frontier of this state." Such a document as this, considering the times and circumstances of its writing and the confirmation of the event, ought not to leave an intelligent doubt of the design.
* It is quite possible that Allen was more inclined to gen- uineness in these negotiations than the other leaders, or at least to be looking a far way ahead for contingencies. This would be consistent with his character and a recently discovered letter from him written to Samuel Hitchcock, Oct. II. ISog. says a situation was gained by the negotiation where " if the events of the war had terminated in favor of Great Britain, Vermont would have been a favorite colony under the Crown."
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It is fortunate that this paper has been prevented, tor reasoning upon ordinary human motives, we should expect the Ver monters to be seeking British help. They had in no way obligated themselves to the cause of the colonies. They were in their own view, in the nature of politics, and prob- ably in a legal view, an independent republic. They had songht union with the confederacy and it had been refused. They had made great sacrifices for the Revolutionary cause, and the return had been to abandon them to British invasion, and even while a regiment of their own troops-and paid by them, because Congress could not pay-was serving in the Continental army, to withdraw all means and ammunition of defense from the state. Con- gress, which had been temporizing with the Vermont question for fear of alienating New York or New Hampshire, had at this time apparently reached a point where it calcu- lated in this way to drive the new state into submission to New York. Remembering how this involved the property interests of the Vermonters-their all for most of them- it would not have been surprising if it had set them against the country that treated them so, and it accounts for such disposition as there was to reach a position where they would be favorably regarded above New York in case of final British victory. And yet it is the truth, attested in a variety of ways, that from the beginning to the end there was a smaller Tory sentiment in Ver- mont than anywhere else in the country, and there was not a moment when every reservation would not have been abandoned if the state could have been admitted to the Union. The Vermonters had been too well educated in the first principles, too thoroughly innoculated with the spirit of independence to allow their sympathies to be swerved by mean considerations.
Whether in the ethics of war such decep- tion as was practiced on the British was justi- fiable, is another question. But at least it can be said that it was a necessity, the only thing the Vermonters could do, unless to ab- solutely desert to the British side, or suffer ruinous invasion, or commit political suicide by surrendering to New York, and then with- out any certainty of protection against the British. And it was the most useful thing for the American cause that could possibly have been done ; for it kept an army of ten thous- and men idle on the border in Canada. It was really a help in this way to the Yorktown movement, which would have been well- nigh impracticable with such an army besides Clinton's left in Washington's rear. Wash- ington knew all about the negotiation at least a month before the surrender of Cornwallis (so says James Davie Butler on the strength of a recently discovered letter)
and he understood its purpose. Allen in after years with the knowledge he had gained in Europe and in extensive travels about this country wrote : "I know that the capture of Ticonderoga, etc., and the fame of the Green Mountain boys are more thought of in Europe than in the United States. That in the southern states, the battle of Bennington is considered to have caused the change of the commander-in-chief of the Northern army, and a stepping-stone to the capture of Gen- eral Burgoyne and army. That the truce between the British in Canada and Vermont, in causing the inactivity of ten thousand British troops, enabled General Washington to capture Lord Cornwallis and army."
While the negotiations were in progress carly in 1781, a dispatch from Lord George Germaine to Sir Henry Clinton, disclosing their existence and the hope that the people of Vermont would "return to their allegi- ance," fell into American hands, and was laid before Congress with the effect of alarm- ing that body into a more just policy. Referring to this dispatch, Allen says it "had greater influence on the wisdom and virtue of Congress than all the exertions of Ver- mont in taking Ticonderoga, Crown l'oint, and the two divisions from General Bur- goyne's army, or their petition to be admit- ted as a state in the general confederation, and offers to pay their proportion of the expenses of the war." Out of the discovery of these negotiations and the fear that the state with the control of Lake Champlain would be thrown into British hands, came the pledge of the resolutions of August 7 and 20, 178 1, on which finally, after much back- ing and filling, came the acknowledgment of the independence of the state.
After the war ended, the Governor of Can- ada still pursued the negotiation and it has been plausibly supposed that one of the en- voys he sent to Burlington was the prince who was afterwards George IV.
Allen played with consummate address through these negotiations not only a double but a triple, and even a quadruple game. While he was fanning the British hopes to their highest, he was with Stephen R. Brad- ley in 1780, and with Jonas Fay and Bez'l Woodward in 1781, an agent before Con- gress to urge the admission of the state and resist the claims to jurisdiction of New York and New Hampshire, he was manipulating with the Legislature and authorities of New Hampshire and the commander of the New York troops, to avert bloodshed, pending a decision by Congress over the conflicting claims of the East and West unions, and in the meanwhile he converted to the support of the new state Luke Knowlton, who had been sent to Philadelphia especially to fight it by the adherents of New York in Cumber-
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land (now Windham and Windsor nearly) county, and in Allen's words, "a plan was laid between them to unite all parties in Ver- mont in a way that would be honorable to those who had been in favor of New York." The nerve, the resourcefulness and the com- prehension of human motives by which he kept all these schemes floating, and the peo- ple of his own state passably well satisfied at the same time, were little short of marvelous. They had a good illustration in the hearing before the Vermont Legislature in June, 1781, on a resolution for an inquiry into the grounds for the report of a treaty with Can- ada. Allen knew that there were several spies from Canada among the spectators. How could he answer the inquiry so as to satisfy the suspicious Vermont patriots with- out undeceiving the British authorities as soon as his words were reported to them? But he did it with a frankness that was praised by both sides. Governor Chittenden led off, stating how he had at the request of several persons who had friends prisoners in Canada, appointed Colonel Allen to meet a British commissioner to arrange for an ex- change, and how the latter had succeeded after considerable difficulty in accomplishing it, though no such exchanges had taken place with the United States or any other in the northern department. For further par- ticulars he would refer them to Colonel Allen.
The latter told how, having made his re- port to the Governor and Council, not ex- pecting to be called on, he had left his com- mission and papers at home, but he was ready to make a verbal statement, or if desired he would go home and produce the writings for the inspection of the Leg- islature. They called for the papers and the next day he appeared with them, read them seemingly without skip or hesitation, and made a short verbal explanation which seemed to show that the British had exhib- ited great generosity in the business, and narrated sundry occurrences that indicated that there was a fervent wish for peace among the British officers, and that the English government was as tired of the war as the United States, and he concluded by inviting any member of the Legislature or any au- ditor in the gallery who wished to ask any further questions to do so and he was ready to answer them. But "all seemed," to use his words, "satisfied that nothing had been done inconsistent to the interests of the states," and many of those who had before been most suspicious complimented him for his "open and candid conduct." That even- ing he had a conference with the spies from Canada and they also had nothing but praise for the devotion he had shown to the cause of union with Britain !
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His and Bradley's mission to Congress in 1780 was to prepare for the second Tuesday of September, which time had been set for the determination of the case of Vermont. Besides the claims of New York and New Hampshire, the former supported by Knowl- ton as agent from the southeast part of the state, the advocates of still another state to be carved out of portions of Vermont and New Hampshire were represented by Peter Olcott. Allen and Bradley did what they could in the way of private interviews with members of Congress, and then requested that they might be present at any de- bates affecting the sovereignty or independ- ence of Vermont. They listened for parts of two days to the presentment of New York's claims and took minutes of it, but when it came time to put in New Hampshire's claim they refused to attend because Vermont was not put on an equal footing with the others. They submitted a remonstrance to Congress against the mode of trial adopted, which meant that they should "lose their political life in order to find it." They refused to submit to "Congress acting as a court of judicature by virtue of authority given only by the states that made but one party." But they offered in behalf of Vermont to leave the question in abeyance until after the war, in the meantime agreeing that the state should do its full share in furnishing troops and supplies, and then to leave the decision to one or more of the Legislatures of disin- terested states as mediators.
They accomplished their purpose by this course and prevented any decision at all by Congress. The next year's mission was more delicate, because of the suspicion of the Haldimand business, but Allen and the others parried the inquiries skillfully while they continued to impress upon Congress the danger that the support of the Ver- monters would be drawn off from the patriot cause, and the result was the resolutions of August 7 and 20 favorable to Vermont pro- vided they would relinquish their east and west unions.
Allen had early the previous year visited the Legislatures of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland to distribute phamphlets and work up sentiment in favor of Vermont, and succeeded in gaining con- siderable favor by supporting their views of the Western land question and pledging Ver- mont if admitted to the Union, to assist in compelling unappropriated lands and the property of loyalists to be disposed of to de- fray the expenses of the war, and not for the emolument of any one state. The combina- tions which he formed had considerable effect in later driving New York and afterwards Virginia to cede their western claims to the general government.
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The British were not without suspicion while he was negotiating with Congress and on these missions to other states, especially Connecticut and Massachusetts. In June, 1781, an agent reported his belief that Allen was " gone to solicit forces to ensnare Gen- cral Haldimand's troops." But Allen always managed when he got round to allay these suspicions just enough to prevent the break- ing off of the negotiations, and to leave enough of them to deter Haldimand from any overt act against the Vermonters for fear that he would drive them to active sup- port again to the American cause. Allen accomplished this by steadily representing the people to be naturally strongly inclined that way, and only being gradually alienated by the ill treatment of Congress.
The " east union" of a number of New Hampshire towns with Vermont was based on the argument that New Hampshire was granted as a province to Jóhn Mason, ex- tending only sixty miles from the sea, and that the lands to the west were annexed only by royal authority, which ceased with the power of the Crown, and the towns had a right to join any government they chose. The real reasons were : first, the attraction which the low taxes and vigorous govern- ment of Vermont held out to neighboring peoples, and second, the scheme of influen- tial men near the Connecticut river to se- cure the center and seat of the new govern- ment for that section. The Legislature was reluctant to take in the new towns and re- ferred the subject back to the freemen, who returned a strong majority in favor of the union, and an act was passed at the next session to incorporate sixteen petitioning towns from New Hampshire, with a later provision to accept others where a majority of their people desired it. But on Ethan Allen's report of the feeling of Congress, the Legislature hastened in 1779 to get rid of the connection, with the result of stimu- lating a project for the formation of a new state from the seceding New Hampshire towns joined by some from the other side of the river in Vermont, followed still later by overtures from the dissatisfied Vermont towns to be annexed to New Hampshire.
Ira Allen was sent on a mission to New Hampshire to explain the matter and re- store amicable relations. He penetrated the designs of the Connecticut River schemers, and also found that New Hampshire was planning to revive before Congress her jurisdictional claim to the whole of Vermont under the pretense of friendship for Vermont and to defeat the New York claims. She wanted Vermont's support in this. Allen was satisfied that the scheme was deeper than this, argued his best against it without success, insisted that he had no authority to negotiate on
such a basis, and finally managed to get the matter postponed till the next session, so that the opinion of the Vermont Legislature might be obtained in the meantime. He was playing simply for time to unite the people on the Vermont side of the river against all these projects, which was success- fully done. And upon his disclosure of the intrigue the Legislature of Vermont at the next session and under his advice boldly advanced a claim to the whole of New Hampshire west of the Mason line. His skill in handling such negotiations came well into play in 1781-'82, when there was eminent danger of civil war with both New York and and New Hamp- shire over these unions which Vermont had accepted, or revived and enlarged as a buffer to the claims of both states to her.
Both were organizing military invasions. Allen interviewed General Gansevort, the New York commander, took his measure, and found that he was reluctant to engage in civil war but felt that he must obey orders by going ahead. Allen then advised Governor Chit- tenden that all that was neccessary was to take the offensive and march out a regiment against him and Gansevort would retreat, and so it proved. Then Allen proceeded to New Hampshire, sending out orders from Gov- ernor Chittenden to call out the militia to meet the "menacing insults of New Hamp- shire and repel force by force." One of these he contrived to have fall into the hands of a New Hampshire partisan and sent post haste ahead of him to Exeter. The New Hampshire authorities were thus easily fright- ened out of their project and decided to take the advice of Congress before proceed- ing to hostilities-all of which he managed to learn through a lady friend, while they sup- posed they were scaring him with their threatenings. Allen always regarded these unions as trump cards in the game with the opposing states and he regarded it as a great miss when Vermont surrendered them in compliance with the August resolutions of 1781 and before she had actually got in hand her quid pro quo in the recognition of her independence. He was on the way from Philadelphia with Jonas Fay and Abel Carter in high spirits over the success they had had with Congress which satisfied them that no measures would be taken against Vermont, when they learned of the dissolution of these unions by the Legislature. They hurried their journey to secure a reconsideration of this action but the Legislature had adjourned the day before they arrived.
After the return of peace in 1786 Allen was, with his brother Levi, a Tory who had returned to the state, and it was supposed would be useful for this purpose, commis- sioned to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Canada, and he was greatly interested
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in the idea. He tried to secure a substan- tial free trade arrangement and pictured eloquently the benefits that would come from such a use of Champlain's waters, especially if supplemented by a canal to connect the lake with the St. Lawrence river. He de- signed this connection several years ahead of the scheme of Watson and Schuyler for the present Champlain canal and he offered to cut it at his own expense if the British government would allow him to collect such a tonnage as would secure the interest on the investment, and the ships of Vermonters could be allowed to pass out into the open sea with only a reasonable tonnage at Que- bec, and the products of both countries to pass both ways without import or export duties. This was one of the enterprises in whose interest a few years later he took the trip to Europe that resulted in his business ruin. He was also an enthusiastic promoter of the canal scheme between the Hudson and the southern waters of Lake Champlain.
His official services to the state closed in 1790 when he was member of the commis- sion on the part of Vermont that finally settled the protracted controversy with New York and cleared the way for the admission of the state into the Union.
In 1795 Allen went to Europe for his canal enterprise and on a commission from Governor Chittenden to purchase arms for the state. He got nothing but fair words from the British cabinet in return for his ex- ertions for the canal, but he secured twenty- four cannon and twenty thousand muskets in France, and with them took ship for home. But the ship was captured by an English cruiser, and seized with the whole cargo on a charge that it was designed to aid the rebellion in Ireland. Allen showed conclusively by evidence secured from Ver- mont that the charge was untrue and the arms purchased for the purpose he repre- sented. But it took eight years of litigation to do it, and the enormous expense of it, with the neglect of his affairs at home, ruin- ed him. He at one time estimated his real estate in Vermont to be worth on proper appraisal from $1,000,000 to $1,500,000. He may have included in this estimate the shares of his four brothers and of Remem- ber Baker, of whose estate he was adminis- trator, but there is no doubt that he was enor- mously wealthy, or that while he was in Europe he was robbed right and left with claims of fraudulent title, executions and tax sales. He had accumulated considerable unpopularity at home, having had a long controversy over his accounts as state treasurer as well as surveyor-general, and had once gone so far, in 1792, as to begin a suit against the state in the United States Circuit Court, and these things were of material assistance to the
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people who were plundering him. Finally, wearied with lawsuits, broken in health and fortune, and even jailed at Burlington by exacting creditors, he made his escape and fled from the state for which he had done so much. He lived in Philadelphia the last few years of his life, where he died in pov- erty, Jan. 7, 1814, and was buried in a stranger's grave with no stone to mark the spot.
He married Jerusha, daughter of General Roger Enos, and three children were the fruit of the union : Two, a son and daugh- ter, died in early life, and one son, Ira H. Allen, lived to become prominent in Ver- mont affairs, showing good sense and good character but nothing like his father's bril- liant abilities, and dying at Irasburgh, April 29, 1866, at the age of sixty-five.
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