USA > Washington > History of Washington; the rise and progress of an American state, Vol. II > Part 4
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A few years later the Hudson's Bay Company, of which the Northwest Company had then become a part, replaced it, and remained in practical possession for twenty-two years, exercising in it all the powers and functions of an actual government, so far as government was needed. The only
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law known or recognized in it was an act of the British Parlia- ment, made to be administered there, and the rules and regulations of the Hudson's Bay Company. The flag of the United States was nowhere displayed or seen except upon the rare occasions when some American war ship or trading vessel brought it to the coast. The only ensign regularly dis- played was that of the Hudson's Bay Company. And yet this simple ceremony was a formal admission, in terms, of our right to the country as one of our "possessions," and it subsequently became an element of strength in our claim of title. It was an element we probably never should have gained if the captain of the Raccoon, who was so disap- pointed when he found that Astoria had been betrayed into the hands of his own people, had been content to swallow his wrath and leave things as he found them. But by going on shore, hauling down the flag of the United States and dis- playing his own in its stead, and taking formal possession of the country, as a representative of the armed force of his government in time of war, he prepared the way for a just demand, under the treaty which ended the war, to have that possession restored.
In subsequent negotiations held in 1826 an attempt was made, by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, to show that restoration could not have been legally claimed by the United States, under the treaty, because the place was not a national possession, nor a military post, and was not taken during the war. It was also claimed that Great Britain had consented to make restitution only in order that no shadow of reflection might be cast upon its good faith, and that particular care had been taken at the time to prevent any misapprehension as to the extent of the concession made. In support of this last named contention, copies of two letters of instruction were
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produced, which it was claimed had been furnished by the British ministers to those who were to carry out their orders. One of these was from Lord Castlereagh, in which he declared that while his government was not disposed to contest the point of possession, as it stood in the Columbia River at the moment of the rupture, it was "not prepared to admit the validity of the title of the government of the United States to this settlement." The other was from Lord Bathurst to the partners in the Northwest Company, directing them to restore the post on the Columbia in pursuance of the treaty of Ghent, "without however admitting the right of that government to the possession in question."
It was not claimed or pretended that these conditions had been admitted by the United States, or even that copies of the letters containing them had ever been shown to, or served on, their representatives during the negotia- tion, or that they had been informed of them, except verbally. They could not therefore be held to have any authoritative or binding force, and were never seriously regarded.
While the arrangements for the restoration of Astoria were still pending and incomplete, Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush were appointed plenipotentiaries, and dis- patched to London to negotiate a settlement of several ques- tions still pending between the government of the United States and Great Britain. Among these was the question of the northern boundary of Louisiana, and the Columbia River country. The first was not very difficult to arrange at that time, since it had been agreed upon once before. The British negotiators endeavored, for a time, to secure to Brit- ish subjects the right of access to the Mississippi and of navigating that river, but finally agreed to accept the
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forty-ninth parallel, precisely as it had been described in the treaty of 1804 which had never been given effect.
As to the boundary west of the mountains there was more difficulty. Messrs. Rush and Gallatin proposed to make the forty-ninth parallel the boundary there, as well as on their eastern side. The United States had not yet acquired the rights of Spain in that quarter, and therefore they "did not assert that the United States had a perfect right to the country," but they did hold "that their claim was at least good against Great Britain," and in support of this position they cited the discovery of the Columbia by Gray, the ex- ploration of it from its source to its mouth by Lewis and Clark, and the first establishment of settlements in the country through which it flows by American citizens. The British representatives on their part based their claims upon the discoveries made by Cook and earlier explorers, and urged with particular emphasis that Sir Francis Drake's voyage had extended as far north as the forty-eighth parallel, a claim which could not, by any means, be satisfactorily established. They also asserted that certain purchases of territory from the natives had been made by British naviga- tors, even farther south than the Columbia, prior to the Amer- ican revolution. They did not make any specific proposition for a boundary, but indicated that the Columbia was the most convenient which could be adopted, and positively declared that they would not agree to any which did not give them the harbor at the mouth of that river, in common with the United States.
As they were not able to show that Cook had seen any part of the coast south of Mount San Jacinto, which had not previously been observed, and in some cases actually visited by Spanish explorers, and as they could present no proof
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that purchases had been made from the natives south of the Columbia, these pretensions were not received as having much force, or as being entitled to grave consideration, but their determination to accept no boundary that did not give Great Britain the mouth of the Columbia was so positive, that no argument by the American negotiators could move them from it. After a long discussion of the matter, it was agreed on the 20th of October 1818: "that any country that may be claimed by either party on the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains, shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open, for the term of ten years from the date of the signature of the present conven- tion, to the vessels, citizens and subjects, of the two powers; it being well understood that this agreement is not to be con- strued to the prejudice of any claim which either of the two high contracting parties may have to any part of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the claims of any other power or state to any part of the said country; the only object of the high contracting parties, in that respect, being to pre- vent disputes and differences among themselves."
This convention has commonly been known as the agree- ment for joint occupation of the country. Mr. John Quincy Adams, who was secretary of state at the time it was made, subsequently insisted, in a speech in the House of Represen- tatives, that it was really an agreement for non-occupation, as its purpose was to leave the queston of title exactly as it was for a period of ten years, during which neither country could, by the acts of its citizens or subjects, gain any advan- tage in it. Mr. Greenhow, in his history of Oregon and Cali- fornia, defends it as "perhaps the most wise, as well as the most equitable measure which could have been adopted at that
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time : considering that neither party pretended to possess a perfect title to the sovereignty of any of those territories, and that there was no prospect of the speedy conclusion of any arrangement with regard to them, between either party and the other claimants, Spain and Russia. The agreement could not certainly, at the time, have been considered unfa- vorable to the United States for, although the Northwest Company held the whole trade of the Columbia country, yet the important post, at the mouth of that river, was re- stored to the Americans without reservation, and there was every reason for supposing that it would immediately be occupied by its founders; and it seemed, moreover, evident that the citizens of the United States would enjoy many and great advantages over all other people in the country in ques- tion, in consequence of their superior facilities of access to it, especially the introduction of steam vessels on the Missis- sippi and its branches."
This may have seemed to be good reasoning in 1818, or even in Mr. Greenhow's time, but it left out of account the important consideration that a strong British fur-trading company was already established in the country, while no American was yet within a thousand miles of it. The foreign company had its lines of communication across the mountains established : the trails by which the Americans could reach it were not yet even explored. While the treaty provided that the country should be open equally to the citizens and subjects of both nations, it was impossible, under the cir- cumstances, that it could be so. The struggle between the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Fur companies in Canada, which was not ended when this treaty was made, had clearly demonstrated that rival trading concerns could not subsist in the Indian country upon equal terms. The one first on
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the ground, especially if backed by the largest capital, had an immense advantage. If it managed the Indians as skil- fully as it might, its advantage could be immensely in- creased. Its ability to crush out opposition would be absolute, as was amply proved by the experience of Wyeth and Bonneville, whose efforts to establish trade were every- where rendered futile, while at the same time their lives, and those of their people, as well as their property, were protected so far as possible by all the influence of their competitors. As individuals they were refused nothing that humanity demanded for them. "Guidance and rest, and food and fire" they never sought in vain. They were hospitably received and even generously entertained upon occasion, as both have abundantly testified. The established company could easily afford all this, because it had abundant resources for its own defense, that it never had occasion to call upon. The Indians supposed at that time to number a hundred thousand, were every- where their allies. There was no need to encourage them to make war upon the newcomers. If their inclinations had not been steadily restrained, as there is no lack of proof that they were, the company would have had but little annoy- ance from rival traders.
Its power to assist or resist the advance of the settlers was as great, or even greater than to crush out its competi- tors. It had only to withhold its supplies and settlement would have been next to impossible. It is not pleasant to contemplate what might have been, if it had even no more than refused to help those who could not pay. If the settlers had been left to depend only upon such equal privileges as they could claim under the joint occupation treaty-the priv- ilege of coming and remaining as long as they could without
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other resources than their own-the settlement of Oregon by Americans would have been long delayed, if not made alto- gether impossible. On the other hand if Dr. McLoughlin's enterprises had been encouraged by his company-if a few industrious and thrifty Canadians had been added to the little colony on French prairie, or if some more Scotch high- landers and Orkney men, such as Lord Selkirk had sent to the Red River country a few years earlier, had been sent to the Willamette before 1840, the organization of a provisional government of any kind would have been impossible. It would not then have needed the "thirty thousand settlers, with their thirty thousand rifles," of which Senator Tappan of Ohio spoke in 1843, to have settled the matter. A few hundreds would have accomplished it, and for bringing these few hundreds into the country the Hudson's Bay Company had every advantage.
Within a few months after the convention of 1818 had been signed a treaty was concluded between the governments of the United States and Spain by which the latter ceded to the former all its rights and claims of every sort to the possession of the country on the Pacific Coast, north of the forty-second parallel. By this same treaty the United States acquired Florida and the treaty is usually called the Florida treaty. It was concluded after a long negotiation for the settlement of certain claims for indemnity preferred by Americans against Spain, and by Spanish people against the United States, and for the determination of certain matters com- plained of by the Spaniards in the way of violations of the neutrality laws by American sailors, in the wars which Spain was then waging upon her revolted American colonies, as well as for the adjustment of the southern and western boundaries of the Louisiana territory. These questions
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were so involved that much time and a vast amount of corre- spondence were required for their adjustment. It is not necessary to review the entire negotiation here. In the end and as the only part of the result reached which affects the history of Oregon, it was agreed that the western boundary of Louisiana should be fixed on a carefully described line from the mouth of the Sabine River to the forty-second paral- lel and thence west to the South Sea, Spain ceding to the United States "all its rights, claims, and pretensions to any territories north and east of said line."
Had the long negotiations which resulted in this treaty been concluded a few months earlier, it is hardly probable that the treaty of joint occupation would ever have been made. The claims of the United States, having been strengthened by the addition of those of Spain, would have been too strong to be successfully disputed by Great Britain, and our representatives would not have been justified in con- senting to any postponement of their recognition, and although it in effect did do so ten years later, Congress could hardly at this time have consented to admit, as it did by confirming the convention, that our title to the Columbia River country was still subject to question.
The charter of the Russian American Fur Company which was originally granted for twenty years, was renewed upon its expiration in 1819, and in 1821 the emperor issued an imperial decree laying claim to all the west coast of North America north of the fifty-first parallel, and all of Asia north of the latitude of 54° 40' with all adjacent and intervening islands, and prohibited all foreigners from approaching within a hundred miles of any of these coasts under heavy penalties. When this decree was officially brought to the notice of President Monroe, an explanation of the grounds on which
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these pretensions were based was asked for, and a correspon- dence followed, which ended in a suggestion from our depart- ment of state that a joint convention might be concluded between the three powers having claims to territory in the North Pacific. The suggestion did not meet with favor, and was not accepted by either of the European powers, the prin- cipal reason being that President Monroe, in communicat- ing to Congress the information that our ministers to Russia and Great Britain had been instructed "to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interest of the three nations on the northwest coast of the continent," had also announced that "the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European powers."
This was the famous Monroe doctrine, though it ought more property to be called the John Quincy Adams doctrine, as Mr. Adams, who was then secretary of state, had expressed it, months earlier, and in similar terms, in the instructions sent to Henry Middleton, our minister to Russia, and Richard Rush, our minister to England .* While it was a general notice to all powers, it was a special and particular notice to England that she was not to attempt to gain any advantage, under the joint occupation treaty, by colonizing the disputed territory on the Columbia, and that was its principal purpose.
Against this declaration both Russia and Great Britain protested, and as it did not seem probable that the three powers could reach any conclusion, all hope of making a joint
*In letters dated July 22, 1823.
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treaty was abandoned, and it was determined that separate negotiations should be continued, as they had been begun, at London and St. Petersburg.
At London they were not carried far, nor were they long continued. The English ministers were in no temper to consider any proposals, but their own, with favor. Closely following Mr. Monroe's declaration a select committee had been appointed by the House of Representatives to inquire into the expediency of occupying the mouth of the Colum- bia, and the quartermaster general of the army had been called on for a report as to the force likely to be required, and the means that would be necessary, to establish and main- tain control there. This was regarded in London as an addi- tional cause of offense and General Jessup's reply as another, for he expressed the opinion that the possession and military command of the Columbia and upper Missouri were neces- sary for the protection, not only of our fur trade, but also of the whole western frontier which was still practically in the possession of powerful and warlike tribes of savages. He advised that a force of two hundred men should be dis- patched overland to the Pacific, while guns, ammunition and other necessary supplies should be sent them by sea, and that four or five intermediate posts should be established at suitable points between Council Bluffs, then the most remote outpost occupied by American troops, and the station on the Columbia. " By such means," said General Jessup, " present protection would be afforded to our traders, and, on the expiration of the privilege granted to British subjects to trade on the waters of the Columbia, we should be enabled to remove them from our territory, and to secure the whole trade to our own citizens." The suggestion that any other government than that of Great Britain could grant privileges
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in any country to which it laid claim, and particularly that any persons whom it had favored by such grants might be removed from it, was received with particular disfavor, and following so closely, as it did, the president's frank declar- ation in regard to colonization, made negotiation next to im- possible. Nevertheless the conferences were begun.
For the first time in all the negotiations with Great Britain in reference to the northwest territory, the representatives of the United States were in position to name definite boundaries for the country claimed. The cession by Spain of all its claims and pretensions in this neighborhood had cleared the way for this, and Mr. Rush began by claiming the whole coast from the ocean to the mountains, and from the forty- second parallel on the south, to the fifty-first on the north, which boundaries, as was then supposed, included all or nearly all the territory drained by the Columbia and its tributaries. He based this claim, as before, on the discovery of Gray, the exploration by Lewis and Clark, the settlement by the Astor party, and in addition upon the restitution formally made by Great Britain to the United States after the war of 1812, as well as upon the cession of all the claims of Spain, which had been made after the close of the negotiations in 1818, and he insisted, as he had been instructed to do, "that no part of the American continent was thenceforth to be open to colonization from Europe."
The English negotiators, Messrs. Huskisson and Canning, on their part, denied that the visit of a trading ship to a river hitherto unknown could give any claim of title by discovery to the country whose flag it carried. Moreover they insisted that earlier discoveries had been made in that neighborhood, and along the coast, by British ships "fitted out under the authority and with the resources of the nation." They also
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insisted that British subjects had made settlements on the Columbia, or its tributaries, as early, or perhaps earlier than any made by Americans. They contended that the restora- tion of Astoria had been made in fulfillment of the treaty of Ghent, and that it did not affect the question of the rights of the two powers in any way. As to the claims of Spain, they professed to believe them of such doubtful value as to be quite unworthy of recognition, and as in former negotia- tions, they referred to the voyage of Drake, which they again claimed had extended as far north as latitude 48°, which was several degrees farther than any Spaniard had pretended to have reached at that early date. As to the later Spanish explorers they refused to admit that any title could be derived from what they had done, since at most it could only be shown that they had observed the shore from a distance, and no- where set foot on it. Finally they positively asserted that their government would never assent to the claim set forth by Mr. Rush respecting the territory watered by the Colum- bia and its tributaries, for besides being objectionable in its general bearings, it in effect interfered with the actual rights of Great Britain, derived from use, occupancy and settle- ment. At the same time they asserted that "they considered the unocccupied parts of America just as open as heretofore to colonization by Great Britain, as well as by other European powers, agreeably to the convention of 1790, between the British and Spanish governments, and that the United States would have no right to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe in any such parts of the American continent."
There being little hope of a final definite agreement, Mr. Rush at length proposed that any country west of the moun- tains that was claimed by both powers, should be free and
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open to the citizens and subjects of both, for ten years from the date of agreement, provided that during this period no settlements should be made by British subjects north of the fifty-fifth or south of the fifty-first parallels, nor by Americans north of the last named line; and this proposition he subse- quently amended by substituting the forty-ninth for the fifty- first parallel.
The British negotiators then, for the first time, definitely proposed that the boundary line between the territories of the two nations should be the forty-ninth parallel, from the mountains westward to the northeasternmost branch of the Columbia, then called MacGillivray's River, and thence down the middle of that stream to the Pacific, the British to have the country north and west of that line, and the United States that on the east and south; provided that the citizens or sub- jects of both nations should be equally at liberty, during the space of ten years, to pass by land or water through all the territory on both sides of the boundary, and to retain and use their establishments already formed in any part of them. This they said was a proposition from which Great Britain would positively not depart, and as no agreement could be reached by parties whose views differed so widely, the negotiation was broken off.
The proposition thus made by the British plenipotentiaries in this negotiation, to make the Columbia River the boundary, seems to have been regarded by the officials of the Hudson's Bay Company as an expression of a fixed determination to ask for or at least to expect no more than the territory lying west and north of it. Perhaps that was the determination, for Dr. McLoughlin in his memoir says he was officially informed in 1825, by the Hudson's Bay Company, "that in no event could the British government claim extend south of the
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Columbia." All that the British negotiators claimed in addition, in subsequent negotiations, they seem to have claimed only as a means of strengthening their hold upon that region. It was for a long time feared, indeed it was by many confidently asserted, that the ultimate intention of the British ministers, and the Hudson's Bay Company, was to secure all of Oregon. It was even asserted long after the boundary question was finally settled, by some who pretended to write history, that subtle influences were long at work with the purpose of defeating our claims to any part of the country, and that those who were for the time being charged with the duty of guarding our interests thought so lightly of them that they would willingly have seen them sacrificed. But there is absolutely no ground for such statements. The suggestion made by our representatives in the first negotia- tion for fixing the northern boundary of Louisiana in 1804, that the forty-ninth parallel be extended to the Pacific, was never varied from, except to suggest a line further north.
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