USA > Washington > History of Washington; the rise and progress of an American state, Vol. IV > Part 5
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On the same date, July 18th, Colonel Casey was informed that Major Haller's company had been ordered from Port Townsend, and that he might send it or another company
GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT.
The confederate general who led the grand charge at Gettysburg. As a captain in the 9th U. S. Infantry he served several years in the territory and in 1859 took and held possession of San Juan Island.
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OF AN AMERICAN STATE
to San Juan, by the steamer Massachusetts, which was placed at his disposal for that purpose, after which she was to cruise among the islands, "for the better protection of the settlers."
Captain Pickett acted promptly, and arrived on the island July 29th. On the 30th Justice Griffin, who was also an agent of the Hudson's Bay Company, served him with formal notice that he was on Hudson's Bay Company's property, and requested that he and his party would immediately vacate the same, or he would feel bound to apply to the civil authorities. He was next summoned before a civil magistrate, but did not go, and then, on the morning of August 3d, three warships from Victoria-the Tribune, Plumper and Satellite-were anchored in the harbor, and he was invited to a conference with their officers. This he declined, but replied that he would be glad to receive the officers of the ships, or any of them, in his camp. The three captains accepted his invitation, and a conference followed in which Pickett was asked why he had taken up his position on the island, which was claimed by both governments, and he replied that he had come by order of his commanding general, and as he supposed in pursuance of instructions from the president, to protect it as part of the United States territory. The officers then presented him with a copy of the proclamation of Governor Douglass, issued the day pre- ceding, protesting against the presence of his soldiers on the island, and suggested that it would necessitate similar occupancy by British soldiers, which would involve imminent risk of a collision, unless an arrangement for joint military occupation were first made. But Pickett replied that he had no authority to arrange for joint occupation, and sug- gested a reference of the matter to General Harney and
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Governor Douglass. Captain Hornby, who spoke for the British officers, then suggested that his proposition was in accord, as he thought, with the tenor of Secretary Marcy's letter to Governor Stevens in 1855, which he had previously referred to, while Pickett's position offered no security against the occurrence of some event that would further embarrass matters. He also claimed that in landing an armed force in disputed territory, pending the settlement of the question of title in the usual way, without warning, and without giving the person in command discretionary power to make such arrangements as he had proposed, the United States and its officers alone must be held responsible for any consequence that might result, either immediate or future.
At Pickett's request, Captain Hornby put the substance of their interview in writing, and closed the letter by saying, "I reserve to myself, in the event of your non-acceptance, entire liberty of action, either for the protection of British subjects and property, or of our claims to the sovereignty of the island, until they are settled by the Northwest Boundary Commission now existing, or by the respective government."
To this Pickett replied that, being under orders from his government, he could not allow any joint occupation until directed to do so by his superior officer, and "that any attempt to make such occupation as you propose, before I can com- municate with General Harney, will be bringing on a colli- sion, which can be avoided by awaiting this issue," and he thought no discredit would be reflected upon either party, or their flags, by remaining in their then positions until those higher in authority could be heard from.
Pickett's course thus far was bold, but tactful. "They have a force so much superior to mine," he wrote Harney, that evening, "that I shall be merely a mouthful for them;
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still I have informed them that I am here by order of my com- manding general, and will maintain my position, if possible." He also added: "The excitement in Victoria and here is tremendous. I suppose some five hundred people have visited us. I have had to use a great deal of my peace-making disposition, in order to restrain some of the sovereigns."
Under the circumstances, his diplomacy is certainly to be commended, for if he had Harney's temper-if we may judge by the letter sent to Governor Douglass three days later, in reply to his protest-he would doubtless have precipitated a conflict. In that letter General Harney said : "I placed a military command upon the island of San Juan to protect the American citizens residing on that island, from the insults and indignities which the British authorities of Vancouver Island, and the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company, recently offered them by sending a British ship-of-war from Vancouver's Island, to convey the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company to San Juan, for the purpose of seizing an American citizen, and forcibly trans- porting him to Vancouver's Island, to be tried by British laws. . . . I have the honor to inform your excellency, that I shall not permit a repetition of that insult, and shall retain a command on San Juan to protect its citizens, in the name of the United States, until I receive further orders from my government. "
On August 8th, Harney authorized Colonel Casey, who was still in command at Fort Steilacoom, and who was Pick- ett's immediate superior, "to strengthen his position on San Juan Island, by four companies of the 3d artillery, should he think this necessary, and to remove thither so much of the supplies then at Bellingham and Port Townsend, as might seem to be required."
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Casey left Steilacoom by the steamer Julia, on the 9th, and shortly afterwards met the Active, whose captain advised him not to attempt to land any reinforcement on the island, as that would almost certainly precipitate a conflict. The Tribune, he said, was lying in the harbor with her fires up, and her broadside to Pickett's camp, and he believed her intention was to begin an attack at the least sign of a hostile demonstration on our part. But notwithstanding this warn- ing, Casey proceeded to carry out his orders. He left Port Townsend about 12 o'clock that night, intending, as he says, to reach the island early on the morning of the 10th, but a thick fog came up and so delayed his progress that the island was not reached until about 7 o'clock. Then finding himself near Pickett's camp, at a favorable place for landing his men and cannon, and the captain of the steamer complaining of the fog, and of the fact that the tide was so low that he would probably not be able to make the landing in the harbor, he determined to land where he was, and this he did. Then taking his adjutant, and a small guard for the ammunition and stores he had on board, he proceeded to the harbor. There he found the Tribune lying as had been described, with "several hundred " sailors, marines, members of the royal artillery and sappers and miners on board, but no opposition was offered to the landing of his freight. "Whether they would have interfered with the landing of the troops, I cannot say," says Casey in his report. “It is Captain Pickett's opinion that they would."
Before Casey landed, he received a hurried message from Pickett, asking him to come immediately to his camp. On arriving there, Pickett pointed out to him a British war- steamer, which he had not before seen, and which appeared to be taking position to shell the camp. This was the Satellite,
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which had apparently just arrived. The Tribune was in position, with broadside to the camp, and could open fire at any moment. Pickett, having long been looking for an attack from this direction, was prepared to "fire on the ship with his howitzers, then spike them, deliver a volley with his musketry, and retreat to the woods," but now that both sides had received reinforcements, it was not clear what ought to be done, and Casey, having just arrived on the ground, had no plan formed. But seeing the imminent danger of a collision, that would surely lead to war, which- ever way it might terminate, he resolved to make an effort to avert it, and sent an officer on board the Tribune to request Captain Hornby to meet him in his camp. The captain replied that "he was much engaged at the time, but would come if he could conveniently," and in a few hours he came, accompanied by Captain Prevost and Mr. Archibald Camp- bell, the British and American boundary commissioners.
"I informed Captain Hornby," says Colonel Casey, "that I had landed that morning, with a force of United States troops, and explained to him the reason why I had not landed them at the wharf, under the guns of the frigate. I also said that I regretted that Captain Pickett had been so much harassed and threatened in the position he had occupied."
He then asked the captain who the officer highest in com- mand was, and where he could be found, and was informed that Admiral Baynes was in command, and that he was at Esquimault, on board his flagship the Ganges. Casey expressed a wish to have a conference with him, and indi- cated that he would go to Esquimault for that purpose on the following day, if circumstances permitted, and at this, "both the captain and the British commissioner seemed pleased," he says. Next morning, accompanied by Captain Pickett,
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both in full uniform, he left the island for Esquimault, on the revenue cutter Shubrick, and arriving there, sent a note to Admiral Baynes, requesting an interview on board the Shubrick. The admiral replied that he would be glad to receive Colonel Casey on board the Ganges. To this Colonel Casey replied, expressing his regret that circumstances pre- vented Rear Admiral Baynes from accepting his invitation to meet him on the Shubrick, and sent Captain Pickett to deliver the note in person. Governor Douglass happened to be on board the Ganges at the time, and after reading the note, the admiral passed it to him. As a colonial governor, he was the admiral's superior officer, while his ship was in a harbor of his colony, and he inquired if Colonel Casey knew that he was on board. To this Pickett replied that he had no reason to suppose he did, but that the colonel had not sought an interview with him, but with the admiral. He also informed the admiral that the Shubrick was then firing up and making ready to sail, but that Colonel Casey would be happy to see him if he should consent to a con- ference. The admiral would not go to the Shubrick, but expressed his willingness to receive the colonel on board his own ship, but Casey, thinking he had carried official courtesy far enough, "by going twenty-five miles to see a gentleman who was disinclined to come one hundred yards to see me," declined to go, and sailed away.
In his report he says he intended in case the admiral would give his pledge that no threats should be made, or molestation given by the force under his command, for the purpose of preventing Captain Pickett from carrying out his orders and instructions, to propose to him that he would recommend the withdrawal of the reinforcements recently landed on the island, and that affairs should remain as they
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were until the sovereign authorities should announce their intentions.
On the morning after his return from this interview, Major Haller arrived with his company at San Juan. This was a further cause of irritation to the British officers, but in view of what had already taken place no resistance was made to their landing.
For many years afterwards Colonel Haller was of the opinion that this was the crucial moment in the controversy, and that a conflict would certainly have been precipitated, but for the fact that he happened to have received some copies of newspapers, of later date than any of the British officers had seen, just before he started for the island. These con- tained reports of the battle of Solferino, of which they had not heard. He mentioned the matter to some of the officers who had accompanied Hornby on shore, while he and Casey were conferring together, and gave them the papers, and immediately a marked change in their conduct and bearing was noticeable. Nobody in their situation could foresee what effect the issue of such a battle might have on the peace of Europe. It might be that Great Britain was at the moment in a position where a controversy over such a matter as the title to so small an island as San Juan would be very embarrassing to her, and for that reason, in Haller's opinion, Hornby and those about him chose, for the moment, the conservative course.
Haller also strongly suspected that Harney was aware of the plans of the conspirators who were already preparing for secession, and that his aggressive policy, and the selection of Pickett in preference to other officers of equal or higher rank, to command on San Juan, was prompted by a hope of bringing on a war with England that would embarrass our
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national government, and so aid the conspirators. But there is no sufficient ground for such a belief. Harney, although 1
Southern born, was not a traitor at heart. It is true that his conduct at the beginning of the war, was not such as to inspire confidence in his loyalty, and he thereby lost a great opportunity. He was the only brigadier-general in the regular service at that time, except Wool, who did not go over to the enemy. With such an advantage at the start, it would seem that he should have won more distinction, when majors like George H. Thomas, Robert Anderson and E. R. S. Canby, who like himself were from Southern States, won immortal fame by their aggressive loyalty. His conduct in 1861 was not as uncompromisingly loyal as theirs was, but there was and is no reason to suspect it in 1859. If there were no other reason, his intimacy with Stevens, and the fact that he sought and undoubtedly enjoyed his confidence and counsel during the time when his responsibility was greatest, would be sufficient proof that he was not then plotting to overthrow his government.
There is still another reason for believing that he was not in the confidence of the conspirators, or working to further the undertaking for which they were preparing, and that is that the war department, of which Floyd, one of the most unscrupulous of their number, was then the head, did not encourage or very cordially support him in the step he had taken. Mr. Floyd himself took no part in the correspon- dence, as he would almost certainly have done if the plotters of secession had been at all concerned about the matter. Mr. Drinkard, his assistant, wrote General Harney on September 3d that "the president was not prepared to learn that you had ordered military possession to be taken of San Juan Island. . . . In cases respecting territory in dispute
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between friendly nations, it is usual to suffer the status of the parties to remain until the dispute is terminated, one way or the other, and this more especially, whilst the question is pending for decision before a joint commission of the two governments. If you had good reason to believe that the colonial authorities of Great Britain were about to disturb the status, by taking possession of the island, and assuming jurisdiction over it, you were in the right to anticipate their action. . . . The president will not, for the present, form any decided opinion upon your course, on the statement of facts presented in your dispatch."
This certainly was not the sort of approval General Harney would have been entitled to expect, and would most certainly have received from Floyd, if he had been endeavoring to bring on a war with Great Britain, to aid the secessionists.
The Buchanan administration, notably the weakest in our history, made haste to relieve Harney of responsibility, and by means which Buchanan, himself an experienced diplomat, would have been least expected to resort to. Instead of taking the matter up with the British minister in Washington, where negotiation could be conducted by the secretary of state under his own immediate direction, or of directing the American minister to take it up with the authorities in London, which would have been the usual method, General Scott, who was then at the head of the army, was dispatched to the coast, with instructions from the war department to propose almost the exact terms the British officers had offered from the first. "The president perceives no objection to the plan proposed by Captain Hornby, of her Majesty's ship Tribune, to Captain Pickett," says Mr. Drinkard, in his letter of instruction to the general, "it being understood that Captain Pickett's company shall
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remain on the island, to resist, if need be, the incursions of the northern Indians on our frontier settlements, and to afford protection to American citizens resident thereon. In any arrangement which may be made for joint occupation, American citizens must be placed on a footing equally favorable with that of British subjects."
If an actual collision should have occurred before the general arrived on the ground, the assistant secretary realized that the situation would be greatly complicated, particularly if blood had been shed. It was difficult to give such instructions as ought to govern in such an event, but the assistant secretary thought "it would still be your duty, if this can, in your opinion, be honorably done, under the circumstance, to establish a temporary joint occupation of the island, giving to neither party temporary advantage over the other."
It has been customary to criticize or mildly censure General Scott for arranging the joint military occupation of the island, which continued for something more than a dozen years, or until the question of title was finally settled, and the boundary fixed in the De Haro Channel, by an arbitra- tor, the Emperor William of Germany, in 1871; but it is clear, from the instructions given him, that this is what he was sent to do, and that he could hardly be expected to do anything else.
Upon arriving on the Sound, General Scott addressed a letter to Governor Douglass, under date of October 25th, proposing that each government should occupy a separate portion of the island, with a detachment of infantry, riflemen or marines, not exceeding one hundred men, "for the equal protection of their respective countrymen in their persons and property, and to repel any descent on the part of hostile
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Indians," and that such occupation should be without prej- udice to the claims of either party. Governor Douglass did not feel authorized to accept this proposition, without referring it to his government, but in time it was accepted, and the joint occupation so arranged continued until the dispute was finally settled.
By the treaty of Washington, concluded on the 8th of May 1871, all matters of difference between the United States and Great Britain were adjusted, except this, and by the 34th article of that treaty, this boundary question was referred "to the arbitration and award of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany," whose decision was to be final and without appeal. At that time the United States was again fortunate in having Mr. George Bancroft, the statesman and historian who had been so familiar with this boundary matter from President Polk's time, and who was now more than seventy-one years old, as its minister at the imperial court. He addressed a letter to the emperor, in which he pointed out that all the sixteen members of the British cabinet who had helped to form the treaty, the British minister who signed it, and all the American statesman concerned in it, except one, and that one himself, were dead. "I alone remain," he said, "and after finishing the three score years and ten that are the days of our years, am selected by my country to uphold its rights." Six times arbitration had been offered, as a means of settling the dispute about our northern boundary, and six times we had refused it. In closing this most diplomatic letter, Mr. Bancroft made this most wise and useful suggestion: "The case involves questions of geography, of history and of international law; and we are glad that the discussion should be held in the midst of a nation whose sons have been trained in those sciences by
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a Carl Ritter, a Ranke and a Heffter." The suggestion thus cleverly made, the old emperor evidently followed, for he consulted and obtained opinions upon the question from three eminent specialists on international law, in history and geography, and these were Dr. Grimm, vice-president of the supreme court at Berlin, Dr. Kiepert, a pupil of Carl Ritter, and Dr. Goldschmidt, a member of the Superior Commercial Court at Leipsic. He is also said to have caused a survey to be made, or at least to have had the depth of the several channels taken into account, by which means it was clearly shown that the Haro Channel, being the deepest, the greatest volume of water flowed through it, and therefore there could be no doubt that it was the main channel.
Reviewing the controversy at the present time it seems almost remarkable that a conflict was avoided, particularly at two or three critical moments. When Pickett landed on the island his whole company amounted to only 66 men, and it is not entirely clear that all these were with him. Within a few hours after landing he was confronted by three British ships-of-war with a total of 775 men and 62 guns. These ships anchored within easy range, with their broad- sides to his camp, and so remained while their officers and he were in conference, and long after. Probably their very strength made their officers more conservative than they otherwise would have been, though Pickett's firmness and tact are to be credited in a large degree, with the happy outcome of the interview. With his vastly superior force and armament, Hornby would naturally be reluctant to attack a brave man in so desperate a situation, who was simply carrying out the orders of his superior. He would be certain to be so, unless certain that he was in the right, and this he could not have been at that time.
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Another critical moment was when Casey landed his reinforcements. It is to be doubted whether the fog and the low tide, which compelled him to land before reaching the harbor, and without announcing his arrival, were really favorable circumstances, since it would have been easy to construe his action, had it been discovered while the troops were landing, into a clandestine attack, or a movement preparatory for something of that kind, which would have gone far to excuse forcible resistance, if it had been offered. The landing, thus made, was evidently made at a most opportune time, since the Satellite, another ship with 326 men and 21 guns, arrived almost immediately after. Had she appeared while Casey's men were debarking, or had Casey encountered her before reaching the island, serious consequences might have followed. It seems probable also that a collision was only averted after Casey had reached the harbor, by his prompt explanation of the reasons which had compelled him to land as he had done.
The reinforcements brought at this time, and those which arrived subsequently, increased the force on the island to 46I men, with eight 32-pound guns taken from the Massa- chusetts, one 6-pound and three mountain howitzers. Sup- plies for three months, and a sufficient quantity of ammuni- tion for all arms, were also landed. Fortifications were thrown up, and by the last of August Harney was able to inform the adjutant-general that "the English have no force that they could land, which would be able to dislodge Colonel Casey's command as now posted."
The British ships then in or near the straits were the Ganges, Tribune, Pylades, Satellite and Plumper, carrying 1,940 men and 167 guns.
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The people of the territory took a lively interest in the controversy, so long as it was doubtful what the result would be, and not a few of them were ready to take a part in it should it become necessary. On August 7th, General Harney wrote Governor Gholson, who by that time had succeeded McMullin, enclosing a copy of his order to Colonel Casey, the proclamation of Governor Douglass, and his reply to the same, and informing him that he had authorized Casey to call for volunteers in case he should think it neces- sary. To this the governor replied that "your just expecta- tions of the course to be pursued by myself shall not be disappointed, and that in such an event, I have an abiding faith that the citizens of this territory will, with enthusiastic alacrity, respond to any call necessary for the defense of individual rights; the rights of their country, or their coun- try's honor."
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