USA > West Virginia > History of the Fifth West Virginia Cavalry > Part 27
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The losses of the brigade on the Salem Raid were 8 killed and drowned, 8 wounded, and 122 captured: total 138. Our regiment lost I wounded, and 17 captured.
The following is General Avereil's thrilling and complete report of this great raid, one of the most wonderful of the war:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade since the date of its arrival at New Creek, W Va., November IS: Having been noti- fied by the brigadier general commanding the department, that active service would
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be expected of me very soon, measures were at once taken to place the command in as good condition as possible, but owing to the meagre supply of horses, shoes, nails, coal, and forges furnished, and the shortness of the time allowed, the mounted forces of the brigade were but poorly prepared to make a long march on the 6th of Decem- ber, when I received orders to move on the 8th. My orders did not contemplate the movement of any co-operative forces excepting a small force under Col. Thoburn, but after representing to the department commander the importance of such movements, and my desire that they should be made, he kindly invited me to accompany him to his headquarters at Cumberland and arrange a plan for them. I went with him to Cumberland on the evening of the 6th, and drew up a plan which was briefly, as fol- lows, viz: Brigadier Scammon, commanding forces in the Kanawha Valley, to be at Lewisburg on Saturday, December 12: to look out northward and endeavor to inter- cept the enemy from that direction; to remain until 18th, taking advantage of any op- portunity to strike the enemy in the direction of Union or elsewhere. Col. Moor to be at Marlin's Bottom, Friday, December 11; to feel the enemy in the direction of Lewisburg on the 12th and 13th; to remain near Frankfort until the 18th, and on his return to bring off the wounded left after the battle of Droop Mountain. Brig. Gen. Sullivan, commanding forces in the Shenandoah Valley, to be at Woodstock on Fri- day, December II, to make careful demonstrations until the 18th, when he was to move toward Staunton, and threaten the same boldly on the 20th and 21st. The com- mand of Col. Thoburn was to turn off at Monterey, and moving toward Staunton, keep the attention of the enemy fixed upon the Parkersburg pike. A copy of the above plan was given to the dep't commander and I received his promise that his orders should be given in accordance with it, with the exception of Moor's and Tho- burn's commands, which were to receive orders from me. It was thought that be- tween the two demonstrations of the Kanawha and Shenandoah forces, I might pass the enemy's lines without delay, and that the threatening of Staunton on the 20th and 21st with the operations in the direction of Union, would divert the enemy from offering any great resistance to the return of my fatigued command.
The Second West Virginia Mounted Infantry, Lieut. Col. Scott; Third West Vir- ginia Mounted Infantry, Lieut. Col. Thompson; Eighth West Virginia Mounted Infan- try, Col. Oley; Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieut. Co !. Blakely; Maj. Gibson's battalion of cavalry, and Ewing's battery set out from New Creek on the morning of the 18th of December, with fair weather, but with many misgivings on account of our poor condition to overcome the weary distances and confront the perils incident to such an expedition. During the march of two days to Petersburg. constant exertions were made to complete the shoeing of the horses, but- lack of means and material rendered it impracticable to attain the desired object. At Petersburg, on the 10th, the command of Col. Thoburn about 700 strong joined mine, and together we pro- ceeded southward, arriving nearly at Monterey on the rith. The most of my train was placed in charge of Col. Thoburn and, on the morning of the 12th, my com- mand and his started in a severe and discouraging rain storm, Thoburn toward Mc- Dowell and my command down Back Creek. The secluded road which runs along and across this now swollen stream, was pursued, the ensuing day without any incident worthy of note, until our arrival at Gatewcod's, where the rear guard of Jackson's forces, flying from the advance of Moor, was encountered and dispersed, and four wagons destroyed, loaded with ammunition and stores. The storm continued on the 14th, and Jackson's river was found hardly fordable. Upon arriving at Callaghan's reports reached us that Scammon had advanced and occupied Lewisburg, and that the rebel forces, commanded by Gen. Echols, had retired toward Union, under orders from Maj. Gen. Sam. Jones. We halted a few hours to rest and feed the animals, and to make a false advance in the direction of Covington. At 2 A. M., December 15, the column was in motion upon a dark and difficult road, which runs up Dunlap Creek to the pike, connecting the White with the Sweet Sulphur Springs. We
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reached the beautiful valley of the Sweet Sulphur about 10 A. M., and halted two hours, availing ourselves of the plentiful forage found there. *
At the Sweet Springs it was learned that Echols' forces were encamped four miles from Union, to the northward, and that Gen. Scammon had retired from Lewisburg. The road to New Castle was taken at I P. M., and near the summit of the Sweet Springs Mountain a rebel quartermaster met us and was captured, which assured me that our advance was unknown as yet to the enemy. From the top of this mountain a sublime spectacle was presented to us. Seventy miles to the eastward the peaks of Otter reared their summits above the Blue Ridge, and all the space between was filled with a billowing ocean of hills and mountains, while behind us the great Alle- ghanies, coming from the north with the grandeur of innumerable tints, swept past and faded in the southern horizon. When within twelve miles of New Castle an- other halt was made to feed and rest, while a squadron advanced toward Fincastle, conveying to the enemy a false impression, and bringing to us some sixty horses and some prisoners. . New Castle was passed during the night and efforts were made to reach Salem by daylight in the morning. A party of rebels, under Captain Chap- man, reconnoitered our advance during the night, and all were captured except their leader, who, declining to surrender, was killed. The head of my column was pre- ceded by vigilant scouts, armed with repeating rifles, mounted upon fleet horses, who permitted no one to go ahead of them.
WVe approached Salem unheralded, and the whistling of locomotives could be heard from that point long before it was reached by us. Four miles from Salem, a party of rebels from the town in quest of information concerning the Yankees, met us. From some of these it was learned that the division of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, had left Charlottesville on the 14th to intercept my command, and that a train loaded with troops was momentarily expected at Salem to guard the stores at that point. I has- tened with my advance, consisting of about 350 men and two 3-inch guns, through the town to the depot. The telegraph wires were first cut-the operator was not to be found, the railroad track torn up in the vicinity of the depot, one gun placed in battery and the advance dismounted and placed in readiness for the expected train of troops. An inspection and estimate of the stores contained in the depot and two large buildings adjacent were made, and upon a subsequent comparison of notes taken, found to be as follows: 2,000 barrels of flour, 10,000 bushels of wheat, 100, 000 bushels of shelled corn, 50, 000 bushels of oats, 2,000 barrels of meat, several cords of leather, 1,000 sacks of salt, 31 boxes of clothing, 20 bales of cotton, a large amount of harness, shoes, saddles, equipments, tools, oil, tar, and various other stores and 100 wagons. A train from Lynchburg, loaded with troops, soon approached. My main body was not yet in sight, and it was necessary to stop the train; a shot was fired at it from one of the guns, which missed; a second went through the train dia- gonally, which caused it to retire, and a third and last shot hastened its movements. My main body arrived, and parties were sent four miles to the eastward and twelve miles to the westward to destroy the road. The depots with their contents were burned; three cars standing upon the track, the water-station, turn-table and a large pile of bridge timber and repairing material destroyed. Five bridges were burned and the track torn up and destroyed as much as possible in six hours. The "yanks" with which we had provided ourselves, proved too weak to twist the U rails, and efforts were made to bend them, by heating the centers, with but partial success. A few small store houses, containing leather and other valuable articles were destroyed in the vicinity. The telegraph wires were cut, coiled and burned for over half a mile. Private property was untouched by my command and the citizens received us with politeness.
It was intimated to some inquisitive ones that we were going back by Buchanan, but about 4 P. M. my command quitted the work of destruction and returned upon the
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road it came some seven miles, when it halted for the night. The last eighty miles had been marched in about thirty hours. Little sleep had been enjoyed by my men during five days and nights; it was necessary to pause and collect our energies for the return. During the night of the 16th it rained heavily and also the ensuing day and night. My column was caught in the many windings of Craig's Creek, which was now swollen to a dangerous torrent, which uprooted trees and carried them away. Heavy caissons were swept down the stream, and great exertion and skill were required to save them. In the river and in the rain forty-eight hours, it was impracticable to keep our ammunition dry, and my command, drenched, muddy and hungry arrived at New Castle about sun-down on the 18th, in a miserable condition to make the march before us. Information that Fitzhugh Lee was at Fincastle reached me at New Castle, and that Jones was between me and Sweet Springs. At 9 P. M. while a false advance was made toward Fincastle, my column took the road to Sweet Springs. WVe soon encountered and drove the enemy's pickets about twelve miles, to the june- tion of the road with the Fincastle pike, to the Sweet Springs. The command halted and built camp fires.
The condition of my ammunition made it prudent for me to avoid a fight. It was evident from a survey of the enemy's positions, that I could not get to the Sweet Springs without a contest, and that with Lee only a few miles to my right and rear. Two ways were left, both difficult and obscure; one to the southwest leading around Jones' right, through Monroe and Greenbrier counties; the other, northeast to the Covington and Fincastle pike, which I took, as it was the most direct and dangerous, consequently the safest if I could only make the march. We left our camp fires burning and went forward in the darkest and coldest night we had yet experienced. Thirty miles through the forest and frost, brought us to Fincastle pike about noon of the 19th. It was yet fifteen miles to the bridge. The river was reported unfordable on account of the depth of the water and the obstructions formed by the ice. I had carefully calculated the possible marches of the enemy, and felt certain that we could make the march through the points they deemed most secure, but no halt could be made. When eight miles from the river a force of 300 mounted rebels opposed our advance. As soon as they were broken, they were closely pursued at a gallop to the first bridge, five miles below Covington, and thence to the bridge at Covington, both of which were saved from destruction, although faggots had been piled upon them ready to burn. The head of my column reached the first bridge about 9 P. M. and three officers and six orderlies were sent back to keep it closed up
The approach to the river is through a gorge which opens to the stream a mile be- low the first bridge. There the pike from Covington passes along the right bank to Clifton Forge and Jackson's River Depot, where Jackson was supposed to be with about 1,000 men. I sent a company upon the road to Clifton Forge, with orders to dis- mount and move out three-fourths of a mile and hold the road until the column passed. A captured dispatch from Maj. Gen. Sam. Jones to Maj. Gen. Early, at Millborough, confirmed my opinion with regard to the position of the enemy, and gave me the in- formation that Gen. Early's division had been added to the forces opposed to my re- turn. The dispatch is as follows:
ON TOP OF THE SWEET SPRINGS MOUNTAIN, Dec. 19, 1863-7 A. M. GENERAL : The enemy drove the pickets about twelve miles from here, near Mrs. Scott's, in the direction of New Castle, about 2 o'clock this morning. Gen. Echols has a strong position here and I think can effectually block this way to them. To avoid him, I think it probable that the enemy may attempt to escape by Covington or by Clifton Forge. Col. Jackson's troops are at Clifton Forge. I would suggest, instead of keeping any force at the Warm Springs you would place it at Morris Hill and picket at Callaghan's. I presume that you are in communication with Col. Jackson, and he may be able to give you information of the enemy's movements. I expect to ascertain the enemy's movements in the course of the morning. If he attempts to
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avoid Echols here and escape by Callaghan's we can reach Callaghan's before he can. Echols will hold the place here until he ascertains the enemy's movements. It is possible that they will attempt to pass Echols' right by Gap Mills, by passing one of the many gorges in these mountains to the south of this position between Echols and McCausland, who is at Newport, in Giles county. If he does that, he will pass out by the western portion of Monroe and Greenbrier ; if he does so, you cannot touch him. Under all the circumstances of the case, as I see them now, I think that you should have a force at Morris Hill and a strong picket at Callaghan's. The enemy were certainly at New Castle at sun down yesterday. They cannot pass Echols here. They may escape by Clifton Forge or by Covington if you do not prevent them. Echols will give you all the aid that he can. We are closer to the enemy than you are and will be more likely to know their movements. I will endeavor to keep you informed. A portion of our small mounted force has been directed if the enemy attempts to pass from New Castle direct to Covington, or by Clifton Forge, to fall back in front of them so as to give Col. Jackson and you the earliest information.
The operator at Jackson's River will use every effort to get the above to Gen. Early and a copy to Gen. Jackson. Col. Jackson must have a copy of it.
SAM JONES, Maj. Gen.
I relied somewhat upon the demonstration which was to be made against Staunton on the next day. I also thought that Gen. Scammon might divert the force under Echols from interfering with mine. In both these trusts I was at fault. From all the information I have been able to collect, I believe the Kanawha force retired from Lewisburg on the 13th without waiting until the 18th, as prearranged, and without making an effort in the direction of Union. The detachment sent from the command of Gen. Sullivan was too feeble to make the threat upon Staunton of sufficient avail to keep Early from besetting my command upon its return. Instead of approaching Staunton on the 20th and 21st, it was retiring through New Market on the 20th. The dispositions of the rebels had been prompt and skillful ; Rosser's brigade had crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the 14th, made some demonstrations upon the Orange and Alexandria railroad near Bull Run; thence passed the Blue Ridge through Ashby's Gap; were stopped by the high water in the Shenandoah, and moved up by Front Royal to cut off the detachment from Harper's Ferry. The divi- sion of Early left Hanover Junction on the 15th ; arrived at Staunton the same night ; marched to Buffalo Gap the ensuing day and thence to the Warm Springs and Mill- borough. Fitzhugh Lee's division, leaving Charlottesville on the 14th, came into the valley, where it was deceived by Thoburn's presence and diverted by the detachment from Sullivan's command, for a day or two, when it set out for Buchanan.
At Jackson's River, though trusting in the co-operation of the Kanawha and Shen- andoah forces, I acted as though they would be of no assistance to me, which was, indeed, the case. My column, nearly four miles long, was hastened across the first bridge. When all had passed but my ambulances, a few wagons and a regiment in the rear, an attack was made by Jackson's force. The company on the Clifton Forge road was driven away ; three ambulances were captured and an effort was made to take the bridge, which was unsuccessful. A night attack is always appalling even to experienced troops. Unavailing efforts were made to open communication with the regiment cut off, until morning, when it appeared that the enemy was determined to maintain his position upon the high cliffs which overlooked the bridge. During the night the balance of my command had been concentrated upon Callaghan's, and an efficient defense established upon all the roads approaching that point. Finding it impossible to dislodge the enemy as long as the bridges remained, I directed them to be destroyed. The enemy at once left the cliffs and endeavored to reach the flank and rear of the regiment which remained on that side. Orders were sent to the regi- ment to swim the river or come to me over the mountain, around the bend; and after destroying the train, it swam the river with the loss of four men drowned. When
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nearly across, a formal demand from Gen. Early was received by the officers com- manding the rear guard to surrender, addressed to the commanding officer of the United States forces. As my column was then in motion over the Alleghanies, no formal reply was returned to the demand.
During the night attack five officers and 119 men were lost by being captured. It was thought that had the regiment in rear been advanced steadily forward, these cap- tures might have been mostly prevented, and we should not have been obliged to destroy our wagons and ambulances the following day. The road over the Alleghe- nies led us to Antony's Creek, between the White Sulphur Springs and Huntersville. A force of the enemy was reported at Gatewood's, which is twelve miles cast of Hunt- ersville. My command was yet thirty miles from that point. If I could cross the Greenbrier and reach Marlin's Bottom before the enemy, my command would be safe. By a very obscure road the Greenbrier was reached and crossed on the 21st, opposite Hillsboro, and we encamped for the night at the northern base of Droop Mountain. My scouts thrown out kept me informed of the enemy's movements and positions.
For thirty hours after my command left Callaghan's, the enemy made great efforts to intercept my force, but they generally took wrong roads. The citizens who knew the country best regarded our capture as unavoidable. It was expected, as may be seen from the orders given Col. Moor by me, that he would remain near Droop Moun- tain until the 18th, but owing to orders he received from the general commanding the department, subsequent to the reception of mine, he also retired on the 14th, thus leaving no co-operative forces except Col. Thoburn's, in the positions I had reason to expect them to be on the 20th and 21st. Unaided, with a weary command of 2,500 men, I had marched through a difficult country in which not less than 12,000 rebels were maneuvered to effect my capture.
On the way to Edray, my rear guard experienced some trifling attacks on the 22d. The road thence to Beverly was a glacier, which was traversed with great difficulty and peril. The artillery was drawn almost entirely by dismounted men during the 23d and 24th. Couriers had been sent forward to Beverly to bring out subsistence and forage, which we succeeded, after extreme hardships, in meeting on the 24th. The officers and men undertook all that was required of them and endured all the sufferings from fatigue, hunger and cold with extraordinary fortitude, even with cheerfulness. The march of 400 miles, which was concluded at Beverly, was the most difficult I have ever seen performed. The endurance of the men and horses was taxed to the utmost, yet there was no rest for them. Believing that some retaliatory operations would be at once inaugurated by the enemy, I telegraphed to the general commanding the department that I thought it advisable to get my command into the valley as soon as possible, and set out for Webster, whence, by means of the railroad, I arrived at Martinsburg just in-time to confront the enemy, who was advancing to- ward this place.
There is nothing of value or interest in the official report of Maj. Gen. Sam Jones, who commanded the confederates, and it is omitted from this work.
The command left Beverly on December 27th, in a heavy rain, and on the 28th reached Webster. From there they went to Martinsburg, Va. The trip to Martinsburg was a very severe one, the cold being intense. so much so that bread froze in the box cars in which the men were transported. It will never be forgotten by those who participated in it. Upon reaching Martinsburg, our regiment went into camp without tents or covering of any kind, and suffered severely. Fuel was scarce, and there was really no condition of comfort.
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General Order No. 39, War Department, dated January 26, 1864, was issued, changing the Second Virginia Infantry to the Fifth West Virginia Cavalry, by which designation it was known until mustered out of the service. The regiment remained at Martinsburg until March 19, 1864, with a vast amount of picket duty and scouting. One of the most pleasant incidents of the stay here was the visit of Gen. Milroy to the brigade on January 31, three regiments of which were formerly in his brigade. A happier meeting was seldom seen in the service. He made a speech full of the old fire, and very flattering to the boys.
At noon, March 19, 1864, the brigade left Martinsburg, went into Maryland, thence back into Virginia, and marched to Charleston, West Va., arriving there April 30, 1864.
CHAPTER XVII.
CAMPAIGNS OF 186.4.
T HE Department of West Virginia was under the command of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel in the spring of 1864, who was in the Shenandoah Valley in personal command of the troops there, while Gen. George Crook was in command of a large part of the forces, in the Kanawha valley. Gen. Averell's brigade, except Capt. Ewing's battery, went early in the spring to the Kanawha to operate with Gen. Crook, while the battery remained with Gen. Sigel. Gen. Grant directed the advance of these two columns, Crook to break the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at the New River bridge, while Sigel was to dis- tract attention from Crook, by menacing the Virginia Central railroad at Staunton.
We have first to notice the Shenandoah campaign. On May 9th Gen. Sigel's forces moved up the valley pike to Cedar Creek, thence through Strasburg to Woodstock, the cavalry advancing to Mount Jackson. Col. Moor advanced to the same place with his infantry on the 14th, and there the cavalry reported the enemy to be in force at New Market. Moor advanced still further, when the roar of the artillery announced the presence of the enemy. The confederate force thus met was the advance of Gen. Breckenridge, who marched rapidly from Staunton to oppose him, with a force of nearly 5,000 men. Moor had four regi- ments of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery, of which Gen. Stahel assumed command the next morning. The union forces were scattered along the pike and were not prepared for battle, but it was upon them. Sigel came to the front, and had in line the 18th Connecticut and 123d Ohio Infantry and a small body of cavalry, under Col. Moor in the ad- vance, to break the enemy's onset. The main line was under the per- sonal direction of Gen. Sigel, consisting of the 34th Massachusetts, Ist Virginia, 54th Pennsylvania and a few companies of the 12th Virginia, the artillery being carefully disposed, and the cavalry was behind the center of the left flank.
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Breckenridge moved to the attack with the veteran brigades of Echols and Wharton, a battalion of cadets and other local forces, with cavalry and artillery. Breckenridge soon drove Moor in confusion, and promptly attacked Thoburn's brigade and was checked. Imboden's cavalry with artillery charged Sigel's left flank, which, with Brecken- ridge in front, caused our whole force to retreat, bringing up at Cedar Creek.
Battery G had a prominent part in the expedition, being connected with some cavalry under Col. Wyncoop. On the 14th one section of the battery with the cavalry, was ordered up the valley, meeting the enemy before reaching Mount Jackson. The confederates fell back across the river, and were vigorously shelled by the battery, continuing the retreat. Then Col. Wyncoop ordered a charge, the battery to keep on the pike, and the cavalry to be deployed right and left, after crossing the river. The bugler sounded forward, and away went the charging forces, the enemy hastily getting out of the way. The chase was con- tinued for three miles beyond New Market, and then our forces fell back to New Market. In the meantime the rest of the army was brought up, the rest of the battery also coming up, and went into camp for the night. It was a stormy night, the rain falling in torrents, but not so hard that the battery boys forgot their cunning; for a good chicken breakfast, of the fattest and choicest poultry from the Dunkard settle- ment near, attested their foraging qualities. The horses were not un- hitched, or their saddles taken off, being ready for a sudden attack. The next day the battle was fought, the battery being in position on the left and had to wait until our troops got past, before they could do much. As our right and centre were driven back, Col. Wyncoop was like a caged lion, as his orders prevented him from doing anything, but his time came. The bugle sounded forward, and the cavalry and battery came out on the pike. Just as they crossed it, the battery un- limbered and opened fire with canister, keeping it up for about 10 min- utes, when they had to fall back, and the battle was over. Alex. Mc- Kinzie, of the battery, was killed, and Jerry Leadom had an eye shot out, and was sent to the rear. Sergt. Evans lost his hat, and when he picked it off the ground, found the top gone. It might have been the top of his head. One of their guns was disabled in this fight.
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