USA > West Virginia > History of the Twelfth West Virginia Volunteer Infantry > Part 14
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(507) The firing first heard was caused by an attack upon the First Virginia, which had ony been put on picket about a half hour before, on the Berryville pike. The fight lasted till after dark. We held our ground on the night, while Duval's division on the left drove the enemy capturing about 60 prisoners. Crook's loss in this affair was 166. While the fighting was going on wagons were heard driving rapidly down the Valley on the road crossing the Berryville pike just to our rear. These belonged to a force of our cavalry that had been
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on a reconnoisance up the Valley. After dark the Rebels threw some shells over our heads which seemed to fall pretty close to the passing wagon train. The next day some of the cavalry said that we of the infantry had saved them from being cut off in their return down the Valley, for the Rebels would have had to go only a short distance until they would have been across the cavalrymen's road. Crook's command held its position till near morning when it drew back toward Charles- town about two miles. And Sheridan's whole force began to intrench.
(508) Just why this fight at Berryville took place, so far as the purpose and movement of the enemy brought it on, was not at the time understood among our men. The impression seemed to be that Crook's force was there to hold the Berryville pike, while the cavalry were making a reconnoisance up the Valley and the Rebels moving on that road with the purpose of cutting off their return had encountered us, and that was the reason, it was thought the fight took place. But the fact is the fight resulted. so far as the enemy was responsible. from a part of his force in the Valley having started on that evening on the return to Richmond by way of Berryville. Something over two weeks before this Early received. as before stated, reinforcements from Lee, consisting mainly of Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps, which corps was now commanded by Anderson. who had come into the Valley with the division. Lee being hard pressed by Grant at this time had called for the return of these troops, and it was they whom Crook had encountered that evening. The fight was a mutual surprise. Crooks men were getting supper when the enemy attacked the First Virginia on picket sending them back precipitately: thus bringing on the fight. This unexpected engagement de- layed the departure of this Rebel force for some days.
(509) After the Berryville battle there was no general movement of the Union forces for more than two week ..
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On the 8th, however, Crooks' corps was moved from its position on the left of the lines to Summit Point on the right. The status of things on our side was maintained in the main, for the next ten days. Maj. Brown, who was captured about seven weeks before at Winchester, and had escaped from the Rebels at Harrisburg, returned to the Twelfth from home on the 10th.
((510) On the 13th, Gen. McIntosh of Wilson's division of cavalry reconnoitering on the Berryville road in the direction of Winchester, captured a South Caro- lina regiment of infantry, the whole of it, however, being only a little over 100 men and 30 other prisoners. The news of the capture spread through the canip and had an inspiriting effect, no doubt upon the army ; and per- haps was regarded as presaging further victory.
(511) There having been of late great urgency to have the Baltimore and Ohio railroad opened, and a pressure generally to have the people north of the Po- tomac freed from the menmace of Early's army. Gen. Grant paid Sheridan a visit on the 16th to talk over the situation and see what should be done. Just two days before this, Anderson's division had again started to return to Richmond; this time moving through Chester Gap farth south, and thus the condition, the withdrawal of a part of Early's force, that Grant and Sheridan had been waiting for, had come about. So when Grant asked Sheridan on that Friday if he could be ready to attack Early on the next Tuesday he did not want, like Mc- Clellan, to delay awaiting reinforcements, or plead lack of means of transportation or supplies, or some other dif- ficulty, but he answered like a man who meant business, that he could be ready the following Monday ; thus show- ing so far as this instance would indicate, not that "There is luck in leisure," but rather that there is a bright promise in promptitude. For by attacking on Monday he took the enemy somewhat at a disadvantage, his forces then being scattered along the Martinsburg pike,
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thus rendering victory certain for Sheridan, while if the attack had been delayed till Tuesday Early's forces would have been concentrated, they being on the move on Monday for that purpose, and the result of the battle might have been otherwise.
(512) Sheridan having decided to attack Early on the memorable 19th of September, had sent his unnecessary. trains and the sutlers to the rear the day before; and accordingly on the eventful Monday he moved to the attack before day. Our brigade consisting at this time of the First, Fourth and Twelfth West Virginia Infan- try, then under the command of Lieut. Col. Northcott marched at 5 o'clock P. M., the body of the troops having started earlier. The serious character of the work that the men of the Twelfth believed to be before them had a sobering effect upon them; but they marched bravely forward that morning willing to do their part in the com- ing struggle. Nearing the Berryville ford of the Opeguon, over which all the infantry had to pass, and between which and Winchester, five miles distant, the battle was fought, we heard heavy skirmishing. The battle was opening. The Twelfth and in fact our whole brigade, was lucky that day, if it may be regarded as fortunate to escape the chance of being killed or wounded. And it may be said, the regiment was rather favored by fortune in this regard from this time to the end of our service.
(513) When we reached the ford to our not very sor- rowful surprise-for the boys had got over being eager for a fight-it was announced to us that our brigade was detached to guard the wagon train and field hospital to be established at that point. Lieut. Col. Northcott was mortified and vexed that his brigade should be left out of the fight, and he inquired of Col. Thoburn, command- ing the division, the reason of it. Thoburn answered that he, Thoburn, had no choice in the matter, his orders being to detach his smallest brigade to be left as a
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guard at the ford. And thus we were left out of the battle. However, it is not always safe to be in the rear, as is shown by the fact that Sheridan intended to attack Early in the rear that morning, but changed his plan when he learned that the enemy's forces were then strung along the Martinsburg pike. As it was, we had to be on the alert, for there were guerrillas hovering about us ready to pounce on any small squad that might become detached from the command.
(514) It was nearly noon before the battle, because general, and for four or five hours thereafter we could see, from our position at the ford, the smoke of the con- flict rolling up beyond the woods in our front, and hear the roar of the battle. There we stayed and during all this time we were unable to determine from the sound how the battle was going. In the meantime the men and officers were debating as to the probable result. Adjt. Caldwell of the Twelfth saying that Sheridan had about 40,000 men and the enemy presumiably not so many, thought that we would win the day. At length toward evening the Eighth Corps (ours) struck the enemy on their left flank and soon their rout became general. They were sent through Winchester on the run. And the news of our victory soon reached us at the ford.
(515) This was a bloody battle. The total Union lost being about 5,000, there being 4,300 killed and wounded. The total Rebel loss from the best obtainable data was about 4,000. Of this number about 2,000 were prisoners. If the data are correct, there was a great disparity in the losses of the two armies in killed and wounded. Early's losses in these lists being less than half of Sheridan's. This fact may be explained by reason of the enemy's having the protection of trees, rocks and other shelter during most of the battle. Besides the prisoners, Sheridan cap- tured five pieces of artillery and seven battle flags.
(516) At the time of this battle of Winchester or the Opeguon, Sheridan had in the Valley an army of 4,300
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men, in round numbers ; while according to Pond's Shen- andoah Valley," the Rebel records show Early's force in that battle to be less than half that number. How- ever, there are some facts which point to the conclusion that the Rebel force was under estimated. Grant puts Early's strength at the time Sheridan was put in command of the Union forces in the Valley, August 7th at about 30,000 ; and he was somewhat stronger at the time of the battle with Anderson's division absent, than he was at the date to which Grant refers. Greely says in his Ameri- can Conflict that, in a newspaper controversy between Sheridan and Early in 1865, Sheridan stated "that the prisoners taken by him from Early (during the Valley campaign) exceeded the number to which that general limited his entire command."
(517) Sheridan was a dashing, rushing and seemingly reckless kind of man, with no pretense of pomp or polish. So when he sent his dispatch to Washington announcing his victory, he did not say,"Winchester is ours and fairly won," as the illustrious Gen. Sherman would perhaps have said, or that "Victory had perched upon our banners and we have sent the traitor hosts vanquished and vanquish- ing up the Valley," or anything of the kind ; but he simply said: "We have just sent them whirling through Win- chester." The following dispatch was received by Sheri- dan :
(518) "Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you. A. LINCOLN."
(519) Here is a characteristic incident showing some- what the style of man Sheridan was: In his first move- ment up the Valley in August, when we had reached Cedar Creek where the enemy was, the First and Twelfth, it will be recollected, were ordered to charge some Rebel skirmishers, one company of the Twelfth having prev- iously been put upon our skirmish line. Just as the two regiments were in the act of charging, Sheridan and
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Crook, passing from the right to the left along the skir- mish line to take in the situation, had come opposite the charging troops ; when Crook seemed inclined to stop and watch the result. Sheridan, however, appeared to be in a hurry, wanting to pass on; so he said: "Come on Crook, never mind, they'll give them h-11." Perhaps because of the character of Sheridan as indicated by this incident, and as shown by his dispatch to Washington as given, and the observations in connection therewith, he was popular with the soldiers. But by, more than all else in goining the victory at the Opeguon he gained their abiding confidence and admiration ; which fact gave promise of future victory.
(520) The Twelfth with its brigade remained at the Berryville ford till the 22nd, when we marched, follow- ing the army up the Valley. We passed through Win- chester. From there we guarded a wagon train of supplies up to Cedar Creek reaching there about sun down, just as our army was driving Early's from Fisher's Hill, in sight from the creek. Sheridan employed the same tactics in this battle that he did in the battle of the Opequon, sending Crooks, (the Eighth) Corps to attack the enemy on on the flank. Sheridan's loss in this battle was only about 400; while Early's was be- tween 1,300 and 1,400 mostly prisoners. This time the enemy's loss was much the heavier making the losses in each army in the two battles about 5,400. Sheridan captured 16 cannons at Fisher's Hill.
(521) After Early's rout his army retreated up the Valley, followed by Sheridan's after night for 12 miles to Woodstock. It was perhaps an unprecedented thing in the annals of the war for one army to follow another opposing army after dark on the same road, as was done in this instance. Our men had been dropping out of ranks all along the road to rest or sleep; and as the Twelfth passed along, it looked as though there was a string of those dropped out soldiers all along the 12
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miles from Strasburg to Woodstock. When our regi- ment reached this latter town there was not more than the equal of a company left in the ranks, the most of the Twelfth having fallen out of ranks too. Those of the regiment remaining in ranks, marched 35 miles that day and night. The Rebels were followed so sharply, that many of them to escape took to the mountains. It was said also that, in this right pursuit of the enemy. in some instances, a Union soldier becoming tired and sleepy and seeing some one lying by the road side, would stop there for company; and in the morning he would discover a Johnny by his side, who of course, would be made a prisoner.
(522) The Twelfth remained at Woodstock one day with its corps, then pushing on after the bulk of the army to Harrisonburg, about 25 miles from Staunton, arrived there the 25th, the cavalry going as far as Staun- ton and Waynesboro destroying arms, ammunition and so forth at the latter place, and in accordance with Grant's orders all the mills, barns and stacks of hay and grain were burned, and the stock driven off in the Valley from Staunton down to Harrisonburg. The Sixth Corps and Nineteenth marched up to Mount Crawford on the 29th, and back to Harrisonburg the next day in support of the burning operations.
(523) The army remained at Harrisonburg till October the 6th; when the whole force marched down the Valley, arriving at Strasburg the Sth. All the way down to this place as we marched, the smoke could be seen rolling up behind us from the burning barns, mills and so forth. It was said that in many instances, in burning barns, reports of fire arms hidden in them and discharged by the heat were heard. Early reinforced by Anderson's division and Rosser's cavalry followed us down the Valley to Strasburg. The cavalry styled them- selves the Saviors of the Valley, and were particularly aggressive. Sheridan got tired of their annoyance and
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determined to dispose of these new found "Saviors of the Valley." He directed Torbet accordingly to start out at daylight on the morning of the 9th and "whip the Rebel cavalry or get whipped himself." Our cavalry promptly to time attacked Lomax's cavalry on the pike and Rosser's on the back road and after a fight of about two hours routed them on both roads, capturing about 330 prisoners. 11 guns-all they had but one-and 47 wagons-"every- thing on wheels." The Rebels were run about 26 miles up the Valley on the jump. After the battle for the rest of the day, about all the saving the Johnnys wanted to do was to "save their bacon." Sheridan was very enthusiastic over this victory offering, it is said, $50 for the other piece of artillery.
(524) The second day after this battle of Tom's Brook, as it is called, the 11th, our brigade started from Cedar Creek for Martinsburg as a guard, with a wagon train and the captured property. Near Newton, which is about eight miles from Cedar Creek, we met two or three cavalrymen coming at a headlong rate. They be- longed to a party of 25 that had been guarding an ambu- lance conveying some officers and mail matters, which had just been attacked a little farther on by Mosby. This was a very bloody affair with our men nearly half of them being killed or wounded. Lieut. Col. Northcott stopped the command, and scoured the woods nearby, to see if there were any Rebels about; but it was too late. Mosby had got off with nearly all the unwounded and the ambulance. We camped that night at Winchester where we met Col. Curtis returning from a leave of absence, who now took command of the brigade. The next morning we marched for Martinsburg arriving there after dark.
(525) We remained at Martinsburg two days. Dur- ing this time Mosby captured a train of cars at Kearny- ville, a town between former town and Harpers Ferry. On the afternoon of the 15th, we started to the front
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again with a wagon train arriving at Winchester the next day, at which place we were told to pitch our tents, as we were likely to remain there for a few days. Ac- cordingly the tents were put up.
(526) As before stated Early had followed Sheridan down the Valley from Staunton to Strasburg; but it was only the cavalry that came all the way, his infantry having halted at New Market. Sheridan believed the enemy would not again attempt to come down in force and therefore he had ordered the Sixth Corps to return to the Army of the Potomac in accordance with Grant's desire to have a part of the Valley force sent to him as soon as it could be spared. This corps had started to return about the time we had left Cedar Creek for Mar- tinsburg. But there was an unexpected turn in affairs. Early on the 13th had arrived with his whole army at Fisher's Hill, and without halting sent a reconnoitering force to Cedar Creek, which threw some shells into Tho- burn's camp while the men were at dinner. Thoburn's men were almost as much surprised as if the shells had dropped from the clouds; for a reconnoitering party had been up the Valley the day before, ten or twelve miles, and reported that no enemy had been sen. Tho- burn's division was soon formd, and he undertook to capture the Rebel artillery, the command crossing the creek to attack it but, the enemy being in strong force he failed. Thoburn's loss in this engagement was 200 or 300. The gallant Col. Wells of the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts was killed in this fight. After Early's demonstration in Sheridan's front, the Sixth Corps on its way to Grant by way of Washington, having got as far as the Shenandoah beyond Front Royal, was ordered back, arriving at Cedar Creek, the 14th.
(527) The next day Sheridan received a message con- cerning the desired destruction of the Virginia Central railroad from Grant about which he, Grant, had been anxious for some time, and accordingly Merritt's division
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of cavalry was sent that night as far as Front Royal with the intention of reinforcing it by another division, the design being to employ these troops to break the road just referred to and also the James River Canal or at least to threaten them. Sheridan went with the cavalry to Front Royal, being on his way to Washington, going there at the urgent request of the authorities at the capitol to have a conference with them. But just before leaving Front Royal for Washington he received the following dispatch from Wright, copied from the Rebel signal flag on Massanutten Mountain in sight of our camp :
"To Lieutenant General Early :
Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.
Longstreet, Lieutenant General."
·
(528) Sheridan suspected this to be a trick of the enemy, which it was, but in order to be on the safe side, he ordered the cavalry back to Cedar Creek. In this instance the enemy in his strategy over-reached himself, and three days later on account of this trick, he had to fight two more divisions of cavalry than he would other- wise have had to do. Sheridan continued his journey from Front Royal to Washington, stopping on the way som hours at Rectortown to telegraph to and and get an answer from Halleck as to whether he had any information that Longstreet was or was not moving as indicated by the Rebel dispatch. Finally Halleck, after communicating with Grant at City Point answered : "General Grant says that Longstreet brought no troops with him from Richmond," adding some less important intelligence. After getting the telegram from Halleck Sheridan again pushed on toward the capitol.
(529) Coming back to our brigade with the wagon train at Winchester, we remained there just two days, when by orders we were to guard the train on up to
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Cedar Creek, to start on the memorable morning of the 19th of October, 1864. The soldiers generally of Sheri- dan's army by this time had settled down to the con- viction that the campaign of severe fighting was ended in the Valley for that year. And we at Winchester were at that time ignorant of the changed condition of things at the front ; so we lay down to sleep the night before we were to start for Cedar Creek, little dreaming of what was in store for our army there, or of the pregnant events of the coming day. But the dawn of another day has come, and hark! what thunderous sound from the south is that? ""Tis the cannons opening roar." The fair Valley is to be the scene of another day of blood and carnage ; the last battle for its possession.
(530) Notwithstanding there was fighting going on at the front we started for Cedar Creek some 15 miles distant but we had not gone far when we met, at about 9 o'clock some stragglers and wagon trains retreating from Cedar Creek. Col. Curtis then ordered his train to be parked. And now there was about to take place one of the most marked extraordinary and dramatic inci- dents or events, taken in connection with the outcome of it, in the annals of our country. Indeed it may be said it is imparalleled in the history of American warfare. It was Sheridan's Ride from Winchester to the army in front "to save the day." He rode up the pike past our brigade on his famous black horse at a brisk trot with a small escort following, at or soon after 9 o'clock in the forenoon, and every soldier of the brigade had a chance to witness the immortal scene.
(531) When the stragglers were met, Col. Curtis threw a line of men across the road to stop them, and put them under guard. There have been statements say- ing, or leaving the impression, that the number of stragglers getting back to or near Winchester was quite large, but as well as is remembered, there were not more than 100 or 200 of them. Col. Curtis says that
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when Sheridan passing to the front came to where our brigade was noticed the demoralized stragglers, he rode up to them, and standing straight in his stirrups and gritting his teeth as he looked at them, shouted at the top of his voice : "Boys if you don't want to fight yourselves, come back and look at others fighting. We will whip them out of their boots before 4 o'clock. " He then ordered Col. Curtis to organize the stragglers into a battalion put officers in command of them and move im- mediately to the front with his entire force. This the Colonel proceeded to do, bringing up his wagon train. He had gone but a short distance, however, when he received another order from Sheridan to return to Win- chester and protect that place from an apprehended attack by Rebel cavalry. Accordingly the command returned with the train to the town.
(532) Our army at Cedar Creek had met with a sur- prise attack mainly against its left flank. The Eighth Corps (Crook's) being farthest to the front and left, was struck first, just at break of dawn, before the men were all out of their tents, and being attacked almost simul- taneously in front,, flank and rear it was soon routed losing heavily in killed and wounded and prisoners, the loss in prisoners being quite large. Our army was forced back by the suddenness and vigor of the Rebel attack and principally by the necessity of having to give ground, in order to clear its flanks about four miles from Crook's camp by 11 o'clock A. M. It gave no further ground. And it appears that from about 9 o'clock it being that time before all our previously unengaged infantry had been engaged, the attacks of the enemy were feeble. This fact may be explained by the reason that they had been marching and fighting from near midnight, and because many of them had fallen out of ranks it seems, to plunder our camps. When Sheridan came up at about half past eleven A. M., the only parts of our force engaged were one division of the Sixth Corps and the cavalry, and
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they not heavily. There was a lull before the counter- storm.
(533) Sheridan came upon the field about half past eleven o'clock A. M. As he was approaching our army, tremendous cheers were heard in the rear. The cheering cam from th stragglers that, though there were not many of them far in the rear, were two or more thousand in number, from all the corps a mile or two in the rear. They were cheering the returning commander. And one of the singular and surprising incidents of this remarkable battle was that the stream of these stragglers now turned toward the front. It is not probable that any other commander in the Union army could have inspired so telling moral effect. When Sheridan reached the line of battle along which he rode swinging his hat, he was hailed by the men with throwing their hats and tempestuous cheering. While his arrival had an encour- aging effect on our men, it would ten no doubt to have a discouraging effect on the enemy, causing them to think that our army was getting reinforcements it may be.
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