USA > Colorado > El Paso County > The Indians of the Pike's peak region > Part 7
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In the Indian camp we found an abundance of flour, sugar, bacon, coffee, and other articles of
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The Third Colorado and
food, sufficient for our maintenance, had we needed it, for a time. In many of the tents there were articles of wearing apparel and other things that had been taken from wagon-trains which the Indians had robbed during the previous summer. In these same tents we found a dozen or more scalps of white people, some of them being from the heads of women and children, as was evi- denced by the color and fineness of the hair, which could not be mistaken for that of any other race. One of the scalps showed plainly from its condition that it had been taken only recently. Certain members of our regiment found horses and mules in the Indian herd that had been stolen from them by the hostiles in their various raids during the preceding year. The camp was over- flowing with proof that these Indians were among those who had been raiding the settlements of Colorado during the previous summer, killing people, robbing wagon-trains, burning houses, running off stock, and committing outrages of which only a savage could be guilty ; this evidence only corroborated in the strongest possible manner what we already knew. Among the members of our regiment, there were many who had had friends and relatives killed, scalped, and mutilated by these Indians, and almost every man had
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The Battle of Sand Creek
sustained financial loss by reason of their raids; consequently it is not surprising they should be determined to inflict such punishment upon the savages as would deter them from further raids upon our settlements. Notwithstanding the fact that this grim determination was firmly fixed in the mind of every one, I never saw any one de- liberately shoot at a squaw, nor do I believe that any children were intentionally killed. )
About noon of the day following the battle, our wagon-train came up, and was formed into a hollow square in the center of our camp, the lines being drawn in, so that if necessary the wagons could be used as a means of defense. We knew that on the Smoky Hill River, from fifty to seventy-five miles distant, there was another large body of Cheyennes and Arapahoes which might attack us at any time. In every direction throughout the day, many Indians were seen hovering around our camp. Scouting parties were seldom able to get very far away from camp without being fired upon, and several of our men were killed and a number wounded in the skirmishes that took place. During the second night of our stay on the battle ground, we were kept in line continu- ously, with our arms ready for use at a moment's notice. At intervals during the entire night, there
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was an exchange of shots at various points around the camp.
I never understood why we did not follow up our victory by an attack upon the hostile bands camped on the Smoky Hill River, but I assume it was on account of our regiment's inferior horses, arms, and equipment. Probably Colonel Chiv- ington, taking this into consideration, thought his force not strong enough to fight such a large party successfully.
The following day, the command took up its line of march down the Big Sandy and followed it to the Arkansas River, then easterly, along the north side of that stream to the western boundary of Kansas. Soon after we reached the Arkansas River, we found the trail of a large party of Indians traveling down the valley. They seemed to be in great haste to get away from us, as they had thrown away their camp kettles, buffalo robes, and everything that might impede their flight. Realizing that the Indians could not be overtaken with the whole command, on account of the poor condition of many of the horses, our officers specially detailed three hundred of our best mounted and best armed men, and sent them forward in pursuit under forced march; but even this plan was unsuccessful, and the pursuit was
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The Battle of Sand Creek
finally abandoned when near the Kansas line. The term of enlistment of our regiment had al- ready expired, for which reason the command was reluctantly faced about, and the return march to Denver begun.
From the time we left the Sand Creek battle ground, it had been very cold and disagreeable. Sharp, piercing winds blew from the north almost incessantly, making us extremely uncomfortable during the day, and even more so at night. Being without tents and compelled to sleep on the open prairie, with no protection whatever from the wind, at times we found the cold almost unbear- able. The thin, shoddy government blankets afforded only the slightest possible protection against the bitter winds; consequently those were fortunate indeed who could find a gully in which to make their bed. Our march back to Denver was leisurely and uneventful. We reached there in due course and were mustered out of service on the 29th day of December, 1864. /We dispersed to our homes, convinced that we had done a good work and that it needed only a little further punishment of the savages permanently to settle the Indian troubles so far as this Territory was concerned. 1
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CHAPTER V
A DEFENSE OF THE BATTLE OF SAND CREEK
F EW events in American history have been the subject of so much misrepresentation as the battle of Sand Creek. It has gone down into history as an indefensible massacre of peaceable Indians, and perhaps nothing that can now be said will change this erroneous impression of the world at large, notwithstanding the fact that the accusation is unjust and a libel upon the people of Colorado. Worst of all, it was given wide publicity through the reports of two Congressional committees following unfair, one-sided, and preju- diced investigations. Unfortunately, at that time, Colorado, being a Territory, had no Senators or Representatives in Congress to defend the good name of its people, and to add to the bad features of the situation, its people at home realized but dimly what was taking place at Washington, until after the mischief was done; consequently to a great extent the Congressional investigations
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The Battle of Sand Creek
went by default, so far as the people of Colorado were concerned.
It should be kept in mind that Colorado, com- paratively speaking, was more remote from the rest of the world at that time than Alaska is to- day, and the means of disseminating news through- out the Territory were exceedingly limited. From early in November of 1864 until March, 1865, the coaches that carried the mail between the Missouri River towns and Denver ceased running on account of the hostility of the Indians, and all this time Colorado was cut off from the rest of the world, except for a limited telegraph service that did not reach any point in the Territory out- side of Denver. Consequently, the enemies of Colonel Chivington and the Third Colorado Cavalry, had full sway in their efforts to blacken the reputation of these representative citizens of Colorado, I wish to emphasize the fact that a large majority of the members of the Third Colo- rado Cavalry were high-class men, whatever may be said to the contrary. Colorado had been settled less than six years and most of its inhabitants had come to the Territory in 1860, only four years previously. These people were from every part of the United States, many of them farmers, merchants, and professional men, and the men
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who enlisted in the Third Colorado were largely of this class.
The accusations on which the various Congres- sional and military investigations were based had their origin in the jealousy of military officers. It was the same kind of spirit that caused the loss of more than one battle in the Civil War. How- ever, at Sand Creek, on account of the secrecy of preparations, the victory could not be pre- vented, but the good effects could be, and were, completely nullified, to the great detriment of the people of Colorado; and this was done by officers who had been former residents of the Territory and were indebted to it for their official positions. But fully to understand the animus of these officers, it is necessary for the reader to know something of their personality, as well as that of the other officers involved in the controversy.
Colonel John M. Chivington, who was in com- mand at the battle of Sand Creek, and who was the principal target throughout the various investigations, was the Rev. John M. Chivington, who from 1860 to 1862 was in charge of the Methodist missions in the region now forming the State of Colorado. He was a member of the Kansas-Nebraska Conference, and had been se- lected for this mission work because of his
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COLORADO PIONEERS
John M. Chivington Colonel First Colorado Volunteer Cavalry
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The Battle of Sand Creek
unusual energy, ability, and force of character. The commanding position that the Methodist Church early assumed in the Territory under his administration confirmed the wisdom of his appointment.
Upon the organization of the First Colorado Volunteer Cavalry in the early part of 1862, Mr. Chivington resigned his position as presiding elder of the Rocky Mountain District, and was commissioned Major of the new regiment. He at once became the regiment's most influential officer. He was the most prominent figure in its wonderful march to New Mexico, and the re- markable victories won by it over the invading Confederates were largely due to his brilliant leadership. By the end of the active campaign, which was a short one, Major Chivington had become so popular with the officers and enlisted men that upon the resignation of John P. Slough, the Colonel of the regiment, soon after, he was promoted to that position over Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan on petition of every com- missioned officer of the regiment. Here was the beginning of all his troubles, as will be seen farther along in my narrative. Later, Colonel Chivington was appointed by General Canby to the command of the military district of Southern
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New Mexico, and was afterward transferred to the command of the military district of Colorado, which position he held at the time of the battle of Sand Creek.
Colonel Chivington was a man of commanding personality, and possessed marked ability both as a preacher and as an army officer. I can do no better than quote what General Frank Hall says of him in his History of Colorado:
Though wholly unskilled in the science of war, with but little knowledge of drill and discipline, Major Chivington, of Herculean frame and gigantic stature, possessed the courage and exhibited the discreet boldness, dash, and brilliancy in action which dis- tinguished the more illustrious of our volunteer officers during the war. His first encounter with the Texans at Apache Cañon was sudden and more or less of a surprise. The occasion demanded not only instantaneous action, but such disposition of his force as to render it most effective against superior numbers and the highly advantageous position of the enemy. He seemed to comprehend at a glance the necessities of the situation and handled his troops like a veteran. His daring and rapid movement across the mountains and the total destruction of the enemy's train, simultaneously with the battle of Pigeon's Ranch, again attested his excellent general- ship. It put an end to the war by forcing the in- vaders to a precipitate flight back to their homes. He hesitated at nothing. Sure of the devotion and
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gallantry of his men, he was always ready for any adventure, however desperate, which promised the discomfiture of his adversaries.
We cannot but believe that had his application for the transfer of his regiment to the Army of the Poto- mac, or to any of the great armies operating under Grant, been acceded to, he would have made a still prouder record for himself, the regiment, and the Territory. That he was endowed with the capabili- ties of a superior commander, none who saw him in action will deny.
I fully concur in General Hall's estimate of Colonel Chivington's marked ability. I knew him well, as he was a frequent visitor at our house in the mining town of Hamilton, in the early days. The overshadowing reputation made by Colonel Chivington in the campaign against the Texas in- vaders of New Mexico, and his subsequent pro- motion to the colonelcy of the regiment over Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan, although apparently acquiesced in at the time, aroused a spirit of jealousy, envy, and antagonism against him on the part of a small group of officers headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan and Major E. W. Wynkoop, which was participated in by Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, and other subordinates. This antagonism manifested itself on every later occasion. It was the jealousy of mediocrity
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manifested against superior ability and worth; for one can search the records of the First Colorado in vain for anything noteworthy ever accomplished by either Tappan, Wynkoop, or Soule. After their return from New Mexico, these officers never allowed an opportunity to pass for discrediting and injuring the "Preacher Colonel," and after the battle of Sand Creek they never tired of re- ferring to it as an evidence of his unfitness.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan had been a profes- sional newspaper correspondent before entering the army, consequently, he had no trouble in filling the Eastern publications with exaggerated and distorted accounts of the battle. In his crusade he had the active aid of Major Wynkoop, of S. G. Colley, the Indian agent at Fort Lyon, and of all the Indian traders, interpreters, half- breeds, and others of similar character congre- gated around the Indian agency. He also had the support of the Indian Bureau at Washington, which usually took the sentimental side of every question affecting the Indians.
Prior to 1864 Indians who had been on the war- path during the summer were permitted to make peace in the fall, remain unmolested during the winter, receive annuities, rest up, and accumulate ammunition for the coming summer's raids; but
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The Battle of Sand Creek
in that year the overtures of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were rejected, except upon the con- dition that they deliver up their arms and sub- mit to the military authorities. This they not only refused to do, but continued their depre- dations at places convenient to their winter camps, and received from Colonel Chivington's command the punishment they so richly deserved. Naturally this meant great financial loss to the Indian agents, traders, and hangers-on around the Indian agency; and, as a result, these people actively joined in the attack upon Colonel Chiv- ington.
This crusade resulted in two Congressional in- vestigations of the battle, and also in a hearing by a military commission. Before the Joint Special Committee of the two Houses of Congress the principal witnesses were Major Wynkoop, Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, two Indian agents, two Indian traders, two half-breeds, and one interpre- ter to sustain the accusations, and only Governor Evans and three minor officers of the Third Col- orado regiment for the defense. Aside from Governor Evans and the three minor officers just mentioned, the witnesses were extremely hostile to Colonel Chivington and were ready to go to any length in their testimony in order to blacken
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his reputation and that of the Third Colorado. In the investigation before the Joint Special Com- mittee, neither Colonel Chivington nor Colonel Shoup was present or represented in any way. In the hearing before the Committee on the Con- duct of the War, Colonel Shoup was not repre- sented, and Colonel Chivington only by means of a deposition. As a result of these partial and one- sided investigations, both committees condemned Chivington and pronounced the battle a massacre. The most unjust and absurd investigation of all was that made by the military commission, which was composed of three officers of the First Col- orado Cavalry, all subordinates of Colonel Chiving- ton, headed by his inveterate enemy Lieutenant- Colonel Samuel F. Tappan.
The accusation made at each hearing was that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians attacked by Colonel Chivington's command at Sand Creek were not only friendly to the whites, but were under the protection of the military authorities at Fort Lyon, and that the battle was, by the consent, if not by the direction of Colonel Chiv- ington, an indiscriminate massacre. All of this I believe is proved to be untrue, to the satisfaction of any reasonable person, by the facts related in my account of the battle, and of the hostilities
Hon. John Evans Governor of Colorado, 1862-1865
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in El Paso County and elsewhere preceding it. In corroboration of my statements as to the hostile character of the Indians punished at Sand Creek, and to show the conditions existing elsewhere in the Territory previous thereto, I quote from Governor Evans's reply to the report of the Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War, dated August 6, 1865.
In the Territorial days of Colorado, the Gov- ernor was ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Af- fairs. At the time of the Sand Creek battle, the Hon. John Evans, formerly of Illinois, was Governor of Colorado, and had held that office since the spring of 1862. Governor Evans was a personal friend of President Lincoln, and had been ap- pointed Governor because of his high character, great ability, and efficiency in administrative affairs. (Governor Evans's supervision of Indian affairs in Colorado during 1862, 1863, and 1864 made him a better qualified witness as to the conditions existing among the various tribes during these years than any man living. The following extracts from his reply to that part of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, which, under the heading, "Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians," refers to his responsi- bility in the matter, tells of the attitude of the
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Indians towards the whites during that period and of his own strenuous efforts to avert. hostili- ties.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND SUPERINTENDENCY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, C. T.
DENVER, August 6, 1865.
TO THE PUBLIC :
I have just seen, for the first time, a copy of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, headed, " Massacre of Cheyenne Indians."
As it does me great injustice, and by its partial, unfair, and erroneous statements will mislead the public, I respectfully ask a suspension of opinion in my case until I shall have time to present the facts to said committee or some equally high authority, and ask a correction. In the meantime, I desire to lay a few facts before the public. The report begins:
"In the summer of 1864 Governor Evans, of Colo- rado Territory, as acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs, sent notice to the various bands and tribes of Indians within his jurisdiction, that such as desired to be considered friendly to the whites should repair to the nearest military post in order to be protected from the soldiers who were to take the field against the hostile Indians."
This statement is true as to such notice having been sent, but conveys the false impression that it was at the beginning of hostilities, and the declaration of war. The truth is, it was issued by authority of the In- dian Department months after the war had become general, for the purpose of inducing the Indians to
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The Battle of Sand Creek
cease hostilities, and to protect those who had been, or would become, friendly from the inevitable dangers to which they were exposed. This "notice" may be found published in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, page 218.
The report continues :
"About the close of the summer some Cheyenne Indians, in the neighborhood of the Smoky Hill, sent word to Major Wynkoop, commanding at Fort Lyon, that they had in their possession, and were willing to deliver up, some white captives they had purchased of other Indians. Major Wynkoop, with a force of over one hundred men, visited these Indians and recovered the white captives. On his return he was accompanied by a number of the chiefs and leading men of the Indians, whom he had brought to visit Denver for the purpose of conferring with the authori- ties there in regard to keeping the peace. Among them were Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the Cheyennes, and some chiefs of the Arapahoes. The council was held, and these chiefs stated that they were friendly to the whites and always had been."
Again they say :
"All the testimony goes to show that the Indians under the immediate control of Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the Cheyennes, and Left Hand of the Arapahoes, were, and had always been, friendly to the whites, and had not been guilty of any acts of hostility or depredations."
This word, which the committee say was sent to Major Wynkoop, was a letter to United States Indian Agent, Major Colley, which is published in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, page 233, and is as follows:
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"CHEYENNE VILLAGE, August 29, 1864.
"MAJOR COLLEY :
"We received a letter from Bent wishing us to make peace. We held a council in regard to it. All come to the conclusion to make peace with you, providing you make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapa- hoes, Apaches, and Sioux. We are going to send a messenger to the Kiowas and to the other nations about our going to make peace with you. We heard that you have some [prisoners] in Denver. We have seven prisoners of yours which we are willing to give up, providing you give up yours. There are three war parties out yet, and two of Arapahoes. They have been out some time, and expected in soon. When we held this council there were few Arapahoes and Sioux present.
"We want true news from you in return. This is a letter.
"BLACK KETTLE and the other Chiefs."
Compare the above extract from the report of the committee with this published letter of Black Kettle, and the admission of the Indians in the council at Denver.
The committee say the prisoners proposed to be delivered up were purchased of other Indians. Black Kettle, in his letter, says: "We have seven prisoners of yours, which we are willing to give up, providing you give up yours." They say nothing about pris- oners whom they had purchased. On the other hand, in the council held in Denver, Black Kettle said :
"Major Wynkoop was kind enough to receive the letter and visited them in camp, to whom they
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delivered four white prisoners, one other (Mrs. Snyder) having killed herself; that there are two women and one child yet in their camp whom they will deliver up as soon as they can get them in; Laura Roper, 16 or 17 years; Ambrose Asher, 7 or 8 years; Daniel Marble, 7 or 8 years; Isabel Ubanks, 4 or 5 years. The prisoners still with them [are] Mrs. Ubanks and babe, and a Mrs. Norton who was taken on the Platte. Mrs. Snyder is the name of the woman who hung herself. The boys were taken between Fort Kearney and the Blue."
Again: They did not deny having captured the prisoners, when I told them that having the prison- ers in their possession was evidence of their having committed the depredations when they were taken. But White Antelope said: "We (the Cheyennes) took two prisoners west of Kearney, and destroyed the trains." Had they purchased the prisoners, they would not have been slow to make it known in this council.
The committee say the chiefs went to Denver to confer with the authorities about keeping the peace. Black Kettle says: "All come to the conclusion to make peace with you providing you will make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Apaches, and Sioux."
Again the committee say :
"All the testimony goes to show that the Indians under the immediate control of Black Kettle and White Antelope, of the Cheyennes, and Left Hand, of the Arapahoes, were, and had been friendly to the whites, and had not been guilty of any acts of hostility or depredations."
,
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Black Kettle says in his letter: "We received a letter from Bent, wishing us to make peace." Why did Bent send a letter to friendly Indians, and want to make peace with Indians who had always been friendly ? Again they say: "We have held a council in regard to it." Why did they hold a council in regard to making peace, when they were already peaceable? Again they say: "All come to the con- clusion to make peace with you providing you make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Apaches, and Sioux. We have seven prisoners of yours, which we are willing to give up, providing you give up yours. There are three war [not peace] parties out yet, and two of Arapahoes."
Every line of this letter shows that they were and had been at war. I desire to throw additional light upon this assertion of the committee that these In- dians "were and had been friendly to the whites, and had not been guilty of any acts of hostility or depredations"; for it is upon this point that the committee accuses me of prevarication.
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