USA > Colorado > El Paso County > The Indians of the Pike's peak region > Part 9
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For this proclamation I have no apology. It had its origin and has its justification in the imperative necessities of the case. A merciless foe surrounded us. Without means to mount or pay militia, unable to secure government authority to raise forces, and our own troops ordered away, again I ask, could any other course be pursued?
Captain Tyler's and other companies organized under it, at enormous expense, left their lucrative business, high wages, and profitable employment, and served without other pay than the consciousness of having done noble and patriotic service; and no act of impropriety has ever been laid to the charge of any party acting under this proclamation. They had all been disbanded months before the "attack" was made that the committee were investigating.
The third regiment was organized under authority from the War Department, subsequently received by telegraph, and under a subsequent proclamation issued on the 13th of August, and were regularly mustered into the service of the United States about
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The Battle of Sand Creek
three months before the battle the committee were investigating occurred.
Before closing this reply, it is perhaps just that I should say that when I testified before the committee, the chairman and all its members except three were absent, and I think, when the truth becomes known, this report will trace its parentage to a single member of the committee.
I have thus noticed such portions of the report as refer to myself, and shown conclusively that the committee, in every mention they have made of me, have been, to say the least, mistaken.
First: The committee, for the evident purpose of maintaining their position that these Indians had not been engaged in war, say the prisoners they held were purchased. The testimony is to the effect that they captured them.
Second: The committee say that these Indians were and always had been friendly, and had committed no acts of hostility or depredations. The public documents to which I refer show conclusively that they had been hostile, and had committed many acts of hostility and depredations.
Third: They say that I joined in sending these Indians to Fort Lyon. The published report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and of the Indian council, show that I left them entirely in the hands of the military authorities.
Fourth: They say nothing seems to have been done by the authorities to prevent hostilities. The public documents and files of the Indian Bureau, and of my superintendency, show constant and unremit- ting diligence and effort on my part to prevent hostili- ties and protect the people.
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Fifth: They say that I prevaricated for the pur- pose of avoiding the admission that these Indians "were and had been actuated by the most friendly feelings towards the whites." Public documents cited show conclusively that the admission they de- sired me to make was false, and that my statement, instead of being a prevarication, was true, although not in accordance with the preconceived and mistaken opinions of the committee. .
This report, so full of mistakes which ordinary investigation would have avoided; so full of slander, which ordinary care of the character of men would have prevented, is to be regretted, for the reason that it throws doubt upon the reliability of all reports which have emanated from the same source, during the last four years of war.
I am confident that the public will see, from the facts herein set forth, the great injustice done me; and I am further confident that the committee, when they know these and other facts I shall lay before them, will also see this injustice, and, as far as possible, repair it.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN EVANS, Governor of the Territory of
Colorado, and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
CHAPTER VI
A DEFENSE OF THE BATTLE OF SAND CREEK (Continued)
IF anything in addition to Governor Evans's statement were needed to prove the hostility of the Indians attacked at Sand Creek, it will be found in the admission of the Indians themselves at the council held by Governor Evans with the Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs in Denver about sixty days prior to the battle. At this council, there were present Black Kettle, leading chief of the Cheyennes, White Antelope, chief of the central band of the Cheyennes, Bull Bear, leader of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, Neva, sub- chief of the Arapahoes, and several other minor chiefs of that tribe. These chiefs admitted that their people had been, and were still committing depredations, as the following extract from the report of the council, taken down at the time, conclusively shows:
Gov. EVANS: Who committed the murder of the Hungate family on Run- ning Creek?
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A Defense of
NEVA :
The Arapahoes, a party of the north- ern band who were passing north. It was the Medicine 'Man, or Roman Nose, and three others. I am satisfied from the time he left a certain camp for the north, that it was this party of four persons.
AGT. WHITLEY :
That cannot be true.
Gov. EVANS:
Where is Roman Nose?
NEVA:
You ought to know better than me, you have been nearer to him.
Gov. EVANS:
Who killed the man and boy at the head of Cherry Creek?
NEVA :
(After consultation) Kiowas and Comanches.
Gov. EVANS:
Who stole the horses and mules from Jimmy's Camp twenty- seven days ago?
NEVA :
Fourteen Cheyennes and Arapahoes together.
Gov. EVANS:
What were their names?
NEVA :
Powder Face and Whirlwind, who are now in our camp, were the leaders.
COL. SHOUP:
I counted twenty Indians on that occasion.
Gov. EVANS: Who stole Charlie Autobee's horses?
NEVA : Gov. EVANS:
Raven's son.
I suppose you acknowledge the de- predations on the Little Blue, as you have the prisoners then taken in your possession?
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The Battle of Sand Creek
WHITE ANTELOPE : We [the Cheyennes] took two prisoners west of Ft. Kearney and destroyed the trains.
It will be seen from the foregoing, that these Indians, although pretending to be friendly, had to admit that their people stole the horses from the soldiers at Jimmy's Camp, near Colorado City, an account of which I have already given, and that the Indians who did it were in their camp at Sand Creek at the time the council was being held. They lied concerning the man and boy killed at the head of Cherry Creek, for they knew that the Kiowas and Comanches never came this far north, and that the murders were com- mitted by their own people. Neva's admission that Raven's son stole Charlie Autobee's horses proved the hostility of the Arapahoes, as Raven was the head chief of that tribe.
At the time the council was being held, General S. R. Curtis, commanding the military district, sent the following telegram to Colonel Chivington, evidently fearing that peace would be made pre- maturely.
FT. LEAVENWORTH, September 28th, 1864.
To COLONEL CHIVINGTON :
I shall require the bad Indians delivered up; re-
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storation of equal numbers of stock; also hostages to secure. I want no peace till the Indians suffer more. Left Hand is said to be a good chief of the Arapahoes but Big Mouth is a rascal. I fear the Agent of the Indian Department will be ready to make presents too soon. It is better to chastise before giving anything but a little tobacco to talk over. No peace must be made without my direction.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
On November 2, 1864, Major Wynkoop was relieved of the command at Fort Lyon, and Major Anthony, of the First Regiment of Colorado Cavalry, was appointed his successor. The reason given for the removal of Major Wynkoop was that he was inclined to temporize with the hostile Indians, contrary to the orders of his superior officers.
In a report made by Major Anthony to his superior officer from Fort Lyon, under date of November 6, 1864, he says:
Nine Cheyenne Indians to-day sent in wishing to see me. They state that six hundred of that tribe are now thirty-five miles north of here coming toward the post, and two thousand about seventy-five miles away waiting for better weather to enable them to come in.
I shall not permit them to come in even as prisoners, for the reason that if I do, I shall have to subsist them upon a prisoner's rations. I shall, however, de-
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The Battle of Sand Creek
mand their arms, all stolen stock, and the perpetra- tors of all depredations. I am of the opinion that they will not accept this proposition, but that they will re- turn to the Smoky Hill.
They pretend that they want peace, and I think they do now, as they cannot fight during the winter, except where a small band of them can fight an un- protected train or frontier settlement. I do not think it is policy to make peace with them until all per- petrators of depredations are surrendered up to be dealt with as we may propose.
This report was dated only twenty-three days before the battle of Sand Creek occurred. The Indians Major Anthony mentions as camped thirty-five miles away were those that were attacked by Colonel Chivington. That they were not, and had not been under Major Anthony's protection, and that he considered them hostile, is clearly shown by the above report as well as by the testimony given by him March 14, 1865, in an investigation of the battle of Sand Creek made by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, as is shown by the following extracts:
"You say you held a conference with the Indians. State what occurred?"
"At the time I took command of the post, there was a band of Arapahoe Indians encamped about a mile from the post, numbering, in men, women, and children, 652. They were visiting the post almost
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A Defense of
every day. I met them and had a talk with them. Among them was Left Hand, who was a chief among the Arapahoes. He with his band was with the party at the time. I talked with them and they proposed to do whatever I said; whatever I said for them to do, they would do. I told them that I could not feed them; that I could not give them anything to eat; that there were positive orders forbidding that; that I could not permit them to come within the limits of the post. At the same time they might remain where they were and I would treat them as prisoners of war if they remained; that they would have to surrender to me all their arms, and turn over to me all stolen property they had taken from the government or citizens. These terms they accepted. They turned over to me some twenty head of stock, mules and horses, and a few arms, but not a quarter of the arms that report stated they had in their possession. The arms they turned over to me were almost useless. I fed them for some ten days. At the end of that time I told them that I could not feed them any more; that they better go out to the buffalo country where they could kill game to subsist upon. I returned their arms to them and they left the post. But before leaving they sent word out to the Chey- ennes that I was not very friendly towards them."
"How do you know that?"
"Through several of their chiefs : Neva, an Arapahoe chief, Left Hand, of the Arapahoes; then Black Kettle and War Bonnet, of the Cheyennes."
"What property did they turn over?"
"Fourteen head of mules and six head of horses."
"Was it property purporting to have been stolen by them?"
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The Battle of Sand Creek
"Yes, sir."
"From whom?"
"They did not say, yet some of it was recognized; some of it was branded 'U. S.' Some was recognized as being stock that belonged to citizens. It was generally understood afterwards-I did not know it at the time that the son of the head chief of the Arapahoes, Little Raven, and I think another, had attacked a small government train and killed one man. . . ",
"Who was the chief of that band?"
"Little Raven was the chief of those I held as prisoners.
"A delegation of the Cheyennes, numbering, I suppose, fifty or sixty men, came in just before the Arapahoes left the post. I met them outside the post and talked with them. They said they wanted to make peace; that they had no desire to fight against us any longer. I told them that I had no authority from department headquarters to make peace with them; that I could not permit them to visit the post and come within the lines; that when they had been permitted to do so at Fort Larned, while the squaws and children of the different tribes that visited the post were dancing in front of the officers' quarters and on the parade ground, the Indians had made an attack on the post, fired on the guard, and run off the stock, and I was afraid the same thing might occur at Fort Lyon. I would not permit them to visit the post at all. I told them I could make no offers of peace to them until I heard from district headquarters. I told them, however, that they - might go out and camp on Sand Creek, and remain there if they chose to do so; but they should not camp
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in the vicinity of the post; that if I had authority to go out and make peace with them, I would go out and let them know of it.
"In the meantime I was writing to district head- quarters constantly, stating to them that there was a band of Indians within forty miles of the post-a small band-while a very large band was about 100 miles from the post. That I was strong enough with the force I had with me to fight the Indians on Sand Creek, but not strong enough to fight the main band. That I should try to keep the Indians quiet until such time as I received reinforcements; and that as soon as reinforcements did arrive we should go further and find the main party.
"But before the reinforcements came from district headquarters, Colonel Chivington came to Fort Lyon with his command, and I joined him and went out on that expedition to Sand Creek. I never made any offer to the Indians. It was the understanding that I was not in favor of peace with them. They so understood me, I suppose; at least I intended they should. In fact, I often heard of it through their interpreters that they did not suppose we were friendly towards them.
"This is the way in which we had been situated out there. I have been in command of a body of troops at Fort Larned or Fort Lyon for upwards of two years. About two years ago in September the Indians were professing to be perfectly friendly. These were the Cheyennes, the Comanches, the Apaches, the Arapa- hoes, the Kiowas, encamped at different points on the Arkansas River between Fort Larned and Fort Lyon. Trains were going up to Fort Lyon frequently and scarcely a train came in but had some complaint
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The Battle of Sand Creek
to make about the Indians. I recollect that one particular day three trains came in to the post and reported to me that the Indians had robbed them of their provisions. We at the post had to issue provisions to them constantly. Trains that were carrying government freight to New Mexico would stop there and get their supplies replenished on account of the Indians having taken theirs on the road.
"At one time I took two pieces of artillery and 125 men, and went down to meet the Indians. As soon as I got there they were apparently friendly. A Kiowa chief perhaps would say to me that his men were perfectly friendly, and felt all right towards the whites, but the Arapahoes were very bad Indians. Go to the Arapahoe camp, and they would perhaps charge everything upon the Comanches; while the Comanches would charge it upon the Cheyennes; yet each band there was professing friendship towards us.
"When the Indians took their prisoners (in fact, however, they generally took no prisoners) near Simmering Spring, they killed ten men. I was told by Captain Davis, of the California volunteers, that the Indians cut off the heads of the men after they had scalped them, and piled them in a pile on the ground, and danced around them, and kicked their bodies around over the ground, etc. It is the general im- pression of the people of that country that the only way to fight Indians is to fight them as they fight us; if they scalp and mutilate the bodies we must do the same.
"I recollect one occasion, when I had a fight on Pawnee fork with the Indians there, I had fifty-nine
)
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A Defense of
men with me, and the Indians numbered several hundred. I was retreating and they had followed me about five miles. I had eleven men of my party shot at that time. I had with my party then a few Delaware Indians, and one Captain Fall Leaf, of the Delaware tribe, had his horse shot; we had to stop every few minutes, dismount, and fire upon the Indians to keep them off. They formed a circle right around us. Finally we shot down one Indian very close to
us. I saw Fall Leaf make a movement as though he wanted to scalp the Indian. I asked him if he wanted that Indian's scalp and he said he did. We kept up a fire to keep the Indians off, while he went down and took off his scalp, and gave his Delaware war-whoop. That seemed to strike more terror into those Indians than anything else we had done that day. And I do think if it had not been for that one thing, we should have lost a great many more of my men. I think it struck terror to them so that they kept away from us."
"Did the troops mutilate the Indians killed at Sand Creek?"
"They did in some instances that I know of, but I saw nothing to the extent I have since heard stated."
"Did you not feel that you were bound in good faith not to attack those Indians after they had surrendered to you and after they had taken up a position which you yourself had indicated?"
"I did not consider that they had surrendered to me; I never would consent that they should surrender to me. My instructions were such that I felt in duty bound to fight them wherever I found them; provided I considered it good policy to do so. I did not con- sider it good policy to attack 'this party of Indians
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The Battle of Sand Creek
on Sand Creek unless I was strong enough to go on and fight the main band at the Smoke Hills, some seventy miles further. If I had had that force, I should have gone out and fought this band on Sand Creek. .
"You think the attack made upon those Indians, in addition to the other characteristics which it possesses, was impolitic?"
"I do, very much so. I think it was the occasion of what has occurred on the Platte since that time. I have so stated in my report to the headquarters of the district and of the department. I stated before Colonel Chivington arrived there that the Indians were encamped at this point; that I had a force with me sufficiently strong to go out and fight them; but that I did not think it policy to do so, for I was not strong enough to fight the main band. If I fought this band, the main band would immediately strike the settlements. But so soon as the party should be strong enough to fight the main band, I should be in favor of making the war general against the Indians. I stated to them also that I did not believe we could fight one band without fighting them all; that in case we fought one party of Indians and whipped them, those that escaped would go into another band that ยท was apparently friendly and that band would secrete those who had been committing depredations before. As it was with Little Raven's band; his own sons attacked a train a short distance above Fort Lyon, killed one soldier, took a government wagon and mules, some horses, and took some women prisoners. One woman they afterwards outraged and she hung herself; the other one, I think, they still hold. Some of the Indians have married her, as they call it, and
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she is still in their camp, as I have understood; not now in the camp of those who took her prisoner, but she has been sold to the Sioux and Cheyennes. The instructions we constantly received from the head- quarters both of the district and the department, were that we should show as little mercy to the Indians as possible.
In another part of his testimony, Major Anthony said referring to the Arapahoes, "I considered them differently from the Cheyennes," and when asked if they were with the Cheyennes at Sand Creek, replied, "I understood, afterwards, that some six or eight or ten lodges of the Arapahoes were there."
Major S. G. Colley, the Indian agent, said in his testimony, "Left Hand's band had gone out to Sand Creek," and when asked how many were in Left Hand's band, replied, "About eight lodges of about five to the lodge."
If there were no other evidence, the following telegrams from General Curtis, Commander of the Department of Missouri, are in themselves sufficient proofs of the hostility of both Cheyennes and Arapahoes:
Fr. LEAVENWORTH, April 8th, 1864. To COLONEL CHIVINGTON :
I hear that Indians have committed depredations
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The Battle of Sand Creek
on or near Platte River. Do not let district lines pre- vent pursuing and punishing them.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
FT. LEAVENWORTH, May 30th, 1864. TO COLONEL CHIVINGTON:
Some four hundred Cheyennes attacked Lieut. Clayton on Smoky Hill. After several hours fight the Indians fled, leaving twenty-eight killed. Our loss four killed and three wounded. Look out for Cheyennes everywhere. Especially instruct troops in upper Arkansas.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
FT. LEAVENWORTH, October 7, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff:
General Blunt came upon a party of Arapahoes and other hostile Indians supposed to be four thousand, with fifteen hundred warriors, on the twenty-fifth ultimo. This was about one hundred miles west of Larned on Pawnee fork. The Indians overpowered the advance, but the main force coming up routed and pursued them. Ninety-one dead Indians were left and we lost two killed and seven wounded. Gen- eral Blunt's force was less than five hundred. He pursued for several days.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
The place where this battle occurred was about one hundred and thirty miles east of the Sand Creek battle-ground, and probably some of the same Indians were in both encounters.
The telegrams I have quoted indicate that
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General Curtis was fully alive to the situation. Evidently he believed the Cheyennes and Arapa- hoes were hostile and was not in favor of making peace with them until they had been punished.
On account of his limited force, Colonel Chiv- ington could do little more than protect the lines of travel; consequently, all that summer and fall the frontier settlers were compelled to take care of themselves. And it was not until after the Third Colorado had been organized and equipped that he was able to strike a decisive blow. In his deposition presented at the investigation by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, among other things, Colonel Chivington has the following to say concerning the battle of Sand Creek and the conditions leading up to it.
"On the 29th day of November, 1864, the troops under my command attacked a camp of Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at a place known as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory. There were in my command at that time about (500) five hundred men of the Third Regiment Colorado cavalry, under the immediate command of Colonel George L. Shoup, of said Third Regiment, and about (250) two hundred and fifty men of the First Colorado cavalry; Major Scott J. Anthony commanded one battalion of said First regiment, and Lieutenant Luther Wilson com- manded another battalion of said First regiment.
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The Battle of Sand Creek
The Third regiment was armed with rifled muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines. A few of the men of that regiment had revolvers. The men of the First regiment were armed with Star's and Sharp's car- bines, and revolvers. The men of the Third regi- ment were poorly equipped; the supply of blankets, boots, hats, and caps was deficient. The men of the First regiment were well equipped; all of these troops were mounted. 1 had four 12-pound moun- tain howitzers, manned by detachments from cav- alry companies; they did not belong to any battery company.
"From the best and most reliable information I could obtain, there were in the Indian camp, at the time of the attack, about eleven or twelve hundred Indians; of these about seven hundred were warriors and the remainder were women and children. I am not aware that there were any old men among them. There was an unusual number of males among them, for the reason that the war chiefs of both nations were assembled there, evidently for some special purpose. . . . "
"What number did you lose in killed, and what number in wounded and what number in missing?"
"There were seven men killed, forty-seven wounded, and one was missing.
"From the best information I could obtain, I judge that there were five or six hundred Indians killed; I cannot state positively the number killed, nor can I state positively the number of women and children killed. Officers who passed over the field, by my orders, report that they saw but few women and children dead, no more than would certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in which they were. I myself passed over some portions of the field after the fight,
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