USA > Georgia > The history of Georgia, Volume II > Part 30
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1 He is described by General Moultrie as an illiterate, stupid, noisy blockhead. ( Memoirs of the Revolution, vol. i. p. 203, note. New York. 1802.) His name also appears as Scovil, and sometimes as Sco-
phal, and his adherents were denominated Scopholites, Scophalites, or Scovilites.
2 See McCall's History of Georgia, vol. ii. p. 135. Savannah. 1816. Moultrie's Memoirs, etc., vol. i. p. 203. New York. 1802.
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CHAPTER XV.
GOVERNOR HOUSTOUN AND GENERAL HOWE PLAN AN EXPEDITION AGAINST EAST FLORIDA. - COLONEL ELBERT CAPTURES THE HINCHINBROOKE. McGIRTH'S RAID. - CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AT FORT HOWE. - DISPO- SITION OF THE ENEMY. - LETTERS OF COLONEL C. C. PINCKNEY, GENERAL MOULTRIE, AND GENERAL HOWE. - GOVERNOR HOUSTOUN AND GENERAL HOWE AT VARIANCE. - AFFAIR AT ALLIGATOR CREEK. - COLONEL CLARKE WOUNDED: - JEALOUSY OF THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICERS. - ILOWE'S INEFFICIENCY. - A COUNCIL OF WAR, HELD AT FORT TONYN, DE- TERMINES TO ABANDON THE EXPEDITION. - FAREWELL ORDER OF GENERAL HOWE. - THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPEDITION CRITICISED.
EAST FLORIDA, with its king's forces, Scovilites, outlaws, and subsidized Indians, was a thorn in the side of Georgia. St. Au- gustine, as the military hive whence these predatory bands swarmed to the annoyance of the dwellers between the Alatamaha and the St. Mary rivers, was an object of constant disquietude and hatred. Its destruction was a favorite scheme with the Georgia authorities. What General Lee and Governor Gwin- nett had failed to accomplish Governor Houston was ambitious to achieve. Invested by the executive council with powers little less than dictatorial, he desired to inaugurate and conduct an expedition which would render his administration famous, and minister to the security of the State over which he presided. Since their repulse before the walls of Fort Moultrie the British forces, save in a desultory manner, and then only along the south- ern frontier, had not been directed against either Georgia or Car- olina. Strengthened by a recent accession of Tories from the heart of South Carolina, the Floridians were preparing for an- other and a formidable incursion into Georgia. Of this fact Governor Houstoun was informed, and his desire was not only to push back this hostile column, but to follow up his advantage even to the investment and occupation of St. Augustine.
Advices of the hostile intentions of the enemy were confirmed by James Mercer, who, sailing from St. Augustine on the 17th of April, reached Savannah four days afterwards. Ile deposed before Attorney-General William Stephens that General Prevost had set out with a detachment for the Alatamaha ; that a body
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of Indians from the Creek nation was on the march to join him there ; that three hundred loyalists had arrived at St. Mary's, under the command of Colonel Brown, who expected to be reinforced by seven hundred more ; and that the object of these combined forces was the conquest of Georgia.1
Upon a conference with General Robert Howe, who was then in command of the Southern Department with his headquarters at Savannah, it was resolved to concentrate the military strength of Georgia for repelling the threatened attack and for the sub- sequent invasion of Florida. Of the militia of the State Gov- ernor Houstoun proposed to take and retain personal command. When summoned to the field they did not aggregate more than three hundred and fifty men, many of whom were poorly armed and badly disciplined. The continental forces within the limits of the State numbered only about five hundred and fifty. These were supplemented by two hundred and fifty continental infantry and thirty artillerists, with two field-pieces, drawn from South Carolina and commanded by Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinck- ney. The Carolina militia, under Colonels Bull and William- son, were ordered to rendezvous at Purrysburg, on the Savannah River. Fort Ilowe, on the Alatamaha, was designated as the point of concentration.
On the 6th of April Colonel Samuel Elbert, with all the men of the third and fourth battalions of continental infantry fit for duty, took up the line of march from Savannah for Fort Howe. Thirty-six rounds of ammunition, three spare flints, and two days' rations of cooked provisions were carried by each soldier. A re- serve of " one hundred rounds of powder and ball to the man" accompanied the command.
At Midway Meeting-House, on the 9th, Captain Melvin was detached with twenty-four men to proceed to Sunbury. There he was to embark on board the galleys and advance to the Ala- tamaha River where he was ordered to take charge of a large flat and boat, filled with army stores, and conduct them to Fort Howe. On the 14th, Colonel Elbert reached that post with his. command.
The next day, learning that the enemy's vessels were lying. at Frederica, he detailed three hundred men of his command with fifty rounds of ammunition, six days' provisions, and no baggage except blankets, to proceed to Darien and there, going on board the galleys, to attempt their capture. The destination
1 See MeCall's History of Georgia, vol. ii. p. 137. Savannah. 1816. VOL. 11. 10
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of the expedition, led by the colonel in person, was Pike's Bluff, about a mile and a half distant from Frederica.1 What subsequently transpired in connection with this affair had best be told in the language of Colonel Elbert, who, in a letter to General Howe, acquaints us with the following interesting de- tails : -
" FREDERICA, April 19th, 1778.
" DEAR GENERAL, - I have the happiness to inform you that about 10 o'clock this forenoon, the brigantine Hinchinbrooke, the sloop Rebecca, and a prize brig, all struck the British tyrant's colors and surrendered to the American arms.
" Having received intelligence that the above vessels were at this place, I put about three hundred men, by detachment from the troops under my command at Fort Howe, on board the three galleys, the Washington, Captain Hardy, the Lee, Captain Brad- dock, and the Bullochi, Captain Hutcher ; and a detachment of artillery with two field pieces, under Captain Young, I put on board a boat. With this little army we embarked at Darien, and last evening effected a landing at a bluff about a mile below the town, leaving Colonel White on board the Lee, Captain Mel- vin on board the Washington, and Lieutenant Petty on board the Bulloch, each with a sufficient party of troops. Immediately on landing I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Ray and Major Rob- erts, with about one hundred men, who marched directly up to the town and made prisoners three marines and two sailors be- longing to the Hinchinbrooke.
" It being late, the galleys did not engage until this morning. You must imagine what my feelings were to see our three little men-of-war going on to the attack of these three vessels, who have spread terror on our coast, and who were drawn up in order of battle ; but the weight of our metal soon damped the courage of these lieroes, whe soon took to their boats ; and as many as could, abandoned the vessel with everything on board, of which we immediately took possession. What is extraordinary, we have not one man hurt. Captain Ellis, of the Hinchinbrooke, is drowned, and Captain Mowbray, of the Rebecca, made his es- cape. As soon as I see Colonel White, who has not yet come to us with his prizes, I shall consult with him, the three other officers, and the commanding officers of the galleys, on the ex- pediency of attacking the Galatea now lying at Jekyll."
The success attending this adventure emboldened Colonel 1 See MS. order book of General Elbert.
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Elbert to attempt the capture of the Galatea, anchored at the north end of Jekyll Island. For this purpose he manned the Hinchinbrooke and the sloop. Pending his preparations, the Galatea took counsel of her fears and departed. This gallant exploit inspired the troops and was hailed by General Howe as a good omen of the success which would crown his demonstra- tion against Florida.
On board the Hinchinbrooke were found three hundred suits of uniform clothing intended for the men of Colonel Pinckney's command. The Hatter, freighted with clothing for the 'conti- nental troops in the Southern Department, had been captured off Charlestown harbor by a British privateer, and these suits formed a portion of her cargo. From the prisoners taken Colonel Elbert learned that General Prevost's objective point was Sunbury, which he confidently expected to capture, and that the military suits on board the Hinchinbrooke were intended for Brown's regiment of rangers.
While the detachments were rendezvousing at Fort Howe Colonel McGirth, with a party of loyalists, penetrated as far as the Midway settlement. Being there opposed and learning of the concentration of the continental troops on the Alatamaha, he rapidly retreated to the St. Mary River.1
Informed of the movements of the Americans, General Prevost paused in his advance and busied himself with repairing certain defenses on the rivers St. Mary and St. John, with mounting cannon at Fort Tonyn, and in maturing plans for the protection of the province of East Florida.
On the 10th of May the first, third, and sixth continental battalions from South Carolina, on duty at Fort Howe, were formed into a brigade and placed under the command of Colonel C. C. Pinckney. The artillery from Carolina and Georgia were associated under Major Roman. Colonel Elbert acted as briga- dier-general and announced John Jones, Esqr., as his aid-de- camp with the rank of major. John Hamilton, Esqr., was ap- pointed brigade major to Colonel Pinckney.2
General Howe did not reach Fort Howe' until the 20th of May.
The following letter from Colonel Pinckney to General Moul- trie familiarizes us with the situation of affairs as then under- stood : -
2 See MS. order book of General El- p. 140. Savannah. 1816.
1 McCall's History of Georgia, vol. ii.
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THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA.
" CAMP AT FORT HOWE ON ALATAMAIIA, May 24th, 1778.
" DEAR GENERAL, - Here we are, still detained by the con- founded delay of the South Carolina galley and provision schooner who are not yet come round to this river, and the reasonable and candid gentry of this State are throwing a thousand reflections on the General and the army for not marching to attack the enemy and storm lines without provisions and without ammunition. The whole army, except a very small garrison to take care of our sick and secure our retreat, will however march from hence to Reid's Bluff, three miles lower down and on the other side of the river, to-morrow afternoon, or next day at farthest; and as by that time our ammunition and provision will have come round to this river, we shall proceed with all possible expedition for St. Mary's where we shall have some amusement by the attack of Fort Tonyn. Notwithstanding any reflections which may be cast on the propriety of the present expedition at this season, it is now incontrovertible that the movements in Carolina, the capture of the Hinchinbrook and the other vessels, and the proposed expe- dition have proved the salvation of the State of Georgia. How- ever, I cannot help lamenting to you (and I owe it to candor and our friendship) that you have been much too parsimonious in your fitting us out for this expedition. What can be more cruel than crowding eight, ten, and twelve men into one tent, or oblige those who cannot get in to sleep in the heavy dews? What is more inconvenient than to have only one camp kettle to ten, twelve, or fifteen men? and in this hot climate to have one small canteen to six or eight men ? We think no expence too great to procure men, but we do not think, after we have got them, that we ought to go to the expence of preserving their health.
" Having thus freely given you my sentiments concerning the articles we are in want of, I own I could wishi, and the General requested me to desire you to send round in a boat, or small schooner, 500 canteens, 100 camp kettles, and 35 or 40 tents. I am sure they cannot be better employed, even if the State should lose them all. But I apprehend that cannot be the case, as they ought to be a Continental charge.
" There has been a number of desertions from White's battal- ion of British deserters. I enclose you a plan of this curious fort and encampment. It is badly planned and wretchedly con- structed.
" By intelligence from St Augustine the enemy's forco is as follows: 300 Regulars at Fort Tonyn, on St Mary's: 60 at St
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John's : 320 at St Augustine : 80 to the southward of St Au- gustine, with some Florida Rangers, a few Indians, and some Carolina Tories. Nothing could be more fortunate than such a division of their force.
"I am this moment informed that the Governor of this State has ordered from us to the militia two hundred barrels of rice. He likewise ordered the galleys 30 miles higher up the river than this place, when, on account of the shallowness of the water, they cannot come within 10 miles as high up as we now are. Excel- lent generalship ! If you send a boat, the General would mean that the boat should come to Sunbury where they will receive orders. . We are very badly supplied with medicines. These articles not being sent will not prevent our going on, but it will occasion the sickness of many, and render us less useful than we should otherwise be." 1
In a communication addressed to the Honorable Henry Lau- rens, president of congress, dated Charlestown, June 5, 1778, General Moultrie says : " I yesterday received a letter from Gen- eral Howe, dated Fort Howe, Alatamaha, May 23d. He does not inform me what number of men he has with him. We have sent him 600 Continentals from this State, and Col Williamson is gone from Ninety Six with 800 Militia, and there are between 6 and 700 Continental Troops belonging to Georgia, and some Militia. With these he intends to proceed to St Mary's to dis- lodge the enemy from a strong post they have established there. He says it is absolutely necessary or Georgia may as well be given up."
The army moved from Fort Howe on the 27th of May and en- camped at Reid's Bluff. Ilis further purposes are thus disclosed by General Howe in a communication to General Moultrie dated Camp at Reid's Bluff, June 12, 1778: -
"DEAR GENERAL, - I have just a moment to inform you I am setting off instantly upon my march to St Mary's, where the enemy seem to expect us, and where I had long since been had not ten thousand disappointments arisen, a few of them from ac- cident, but more from the operations of this State, happened to prevent and detain me. I have been waiting several weeks for tho Militia, which were to have proceeded rapidly, but are not yet arrived, except 400 that are encamped about 4 miles in my rear waiting to be joined by the Governor, who is behind, as we are informed, with a large body : but from him I have
1 Moultrie's Memoirs, etc., vol. i. p. 212. New York. 1802.
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not directly heard for a long time, though I have written to him often upon very important subjects. He has, I believe, exerted himself to spirit up the people, and I fancy has been greatly perplexed. I wished to see him before I moved, but I fear I shall not, unless he comes within half an hour. The brigade under Elbert . I advanced to St Illa to take possession of the river, and, by works thrown up upon both sides, to facil- itate the advance or cover the retreat of the army, either of which may be requisite as soon as I join him which will be (if nothing happens more than I expect) the next day after to- morrow. I shall proceed to St Mary's where we shall meet Commodore Bowen with the fleet at an appointed place, and if the enemy favor us so much as to make face, we shall en- deavor to treat them with the attention they deserve and we so ardently wish to bestow." 1
On the 22d of June General Moultrie sent an express to Gen- eral Howe informing him that Captains Bachop and Osborne, who had sailed from St. Augustine on the 12th, had been cap- tured, with their sloops, by a Connecticut vessel of eighteen guns, and brought into Charlestown. From them he learned that the enemy, to the number of twelve hundred, had marched out of St. Augustine to oppose the advance of the Americans, and that they were accompanied by a detachment of Creek Indians. Two galleys, with 24-pounder guns and other heavy cannon on board, had been sent to protect the entrance into the St. John River. John Glass, a deserter from the first regiment, commu- nicated the additional intelligence that the enemy's force con- sisted of 800 regulars, 100 men under Colonel Brown, 150 mi- litia, 300 Scopholites, and Indians variously estimated at from 95 to 200.
" This force," continues the general, "with two field pieces is to dispute your passage over St. John's river, and perhaps meet you sooner. I would therefore humbly recommend the keeping of your little army together, and not to move them by brigades or divisions, as it may be of dangerous consequences in marching through such a country as you are now in. . . . I was told yesterday that Williamson with his militia was not above 9 miles from Savannah, and that the Governor with his Georgians was about Sunbury. If this be the case, for God's sake, when will you all join ? If you still continue moving from each other, nothing but Augustine castle can bring you up.
1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 223. New York. 1802.
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Would it not be best to halt the front, and let them secure themselves and wait till they all come up, then you may go on slow and sure."
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He further notifies General Howe that the inhabitants of St. Augustine were greatly alarmed at the prospect of an attack, and were hastily transferring their valuables on shipboard ; that the outer line of defense for the protection of the town was en- tirely out of repair, and the interior line quite feeble ; that only a few pieces of cannon were mounted at the gate; that negroes were being pressed to work upon the fortifications ; that all de- tachments had been called in from the river St. Mary ; that the castle was defended by walls twenty-five feet high upon which were mounted one hundred and ten guns and two mortars ; that although the garrison of the castle was well supplied with pro- visions, the population of the town was in want; that there was no war vessel in the harbor of St. Augustine ; and that the best method of approach was by the Musquito road, thus taking the town in reverse.
Neither at St. Mary nor at Fort Tonyn did General Howe meet with any resistance from the enemy who, withdrawing his forces into the interior of Florida, was covering the approaches to St. Augustine. Delays, disagreements, disappointments, and illness were sorely demoralizing the army and dissipating all the sanguine hopes which had been formed at the inception of the campaign.
In this sad strain does General Howe unburthen himself to General Moultrie : -
" FORT TONYN, 5th July, 1778.
"DEAR GENERAL, - I have been waiting for the galley first, and, after her arrival, a tedious while for the Militia of this State and for the long expected coming of Col Williamson and our countrymen with him. In short, if I am ever again to depend upon operations I have no right to guide, and men I have no right to command, I shall deem it then as now I do, one of the most unfortunate accidents of my life. Had wo been able to move on at once, and those I expected would have been foremost had only been as ready as we were, a blow might have been given our enemies which would have put it out of their power to have dis- turbed us, at least not hastily, and perhaps have been attended with consequences more important than the most sanguine could have expected. But delayed beyond all possible supposition, and embarrassed, disappointed, perplexed, and distressed beyond
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expression, the utmost we can now achieve will be but a poor compensation for the trouble and fatigue we have undergone, ex- cepting we may be allowed to suppose (what I truly think has been effected) that the movements we have made have drove back the enemy and prevented an impending invasion of the State of Georgia which would otherwise inevitably have over- whelmed it, and also a dangerous defection of the people of both States. This good, I am persuaded, has resulted from it, and this is our consolation.
" The enemy were 2 or 3 days since at Alligator Creek, about 14 miles from this place. Their forces, by all accounts, are at least equal either to the Governor's troops or mine, and we are on contrary sides of the river and not within 8 miles of each other. Ask me not how this happened, but rest assured that it has not been my fault. I believe, however, that the Governor will encamp near me tonight, and if the enemy are still where they were, which I hope to know tonight or tomorrow morning, we shall probably beat up their quarters."
To dislodge the enemy from their position on Alligator Creek, General Howe ordered forward a detachment of three hundred men with instructions to reconnoitre, and to attack the foe if not in too strong force or securely fortified. The camp of the enemy proved to be defended by an intrenchment impeded in front by logs and brushwood. It was believed at first that it might be successfully assailed, and Colonel Elijah Clarke, with a detach- ment of mounted men, was ordered to penetrate at what ap- peared to be the weakest point and throw the camp into con- fusion. Such impression having been created, the main body was to advance rapidly in front and storm the works. Although his detachment acted with great gallantry, Colonel Clarke found it impossible to execute the movement. Entangled among the outlying logs and brushes, his horses with great difficulty forced their way through. Arrived at the ditch it was so wide that the animals could not leap over it, and so deep that they could not be ridden through. In this dilemma men and horses were saluted with the fire of the enemy and by loud huzzas before which they retired in confusion. In this assault three of Clarke's troopers were killed and nine wounded. The colonel himself was shot through the thigh and narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. This preliminary movement having failed of the anticipated results, no attack was attempted on the part of the main body. Finding that the enemy could not be dis-
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lodged, and reinforcements appearing, the Americans retreated and joined the army at Fort Tonyn.1
Governor Houstoun, with the Georgia militia, did not reach St. Mary until the 4th of July, and Colonel Williamson, with his troops, did not form a junction until the 11th. When they did appear existing confusion became worse confounded. Hear what Colonel Pinckney 2 said of the situation : " After we have waited so long for the junction of the Militia we now find that we are to have as many independent commanders as corps : Governor Houstoun declaring that he would not be commanded ; Col : Williamson hinting that his men would not be satisfied to be under Continental command or indeed any other command but his own : and Commodore Bowen insisting that in the naval department he is supreme ; with this divided, this heterogeneous command, what can be done? Even if the season and every other military requisite were favorable, (but that is far from being the case) the Continental troops have been so violently attacked by sickness, and the desolation made by it is so rapidly increasing, that if we do not retreat soon, we shall not be able to retreat at all, and may crown this expedition with another Sara- toga affair in reverse. But the many reasons which ought to induce us to return I cannot now enumerate. Some of the prin- ciples I herewith enclose you. From thence you will learn that we have the strongest grounds to imagine that the enemy mean not to fight us seriously on this side of St. John's. Skirmish with us they may, perhaps hang upon our flanks, and harass our rear, and, if we would give them an opportunity, attempt to sur- prize us ; but to fight on this side of St. John's would be the most imprudent thing they possibly could do, and all their move- ments show they have no such intention."
A malarial region, intense heat, bad water, insufficient shelter, and salt meat so materially impaired the health of the command that the hospital returns showed one half the men upon the sick list. Many had been left at Fort Howe, incapacitated by dis- ease. Through lack of forage thirty-five horses had perished, and those which remained were in such an enfeebled condition that they were unable to transport the cannon, ammunition, provisions, and baggage of the army. Dispirited and distracted were the soldiers. The command was rent by factions, and there
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