USA > Illinois > History of the 112th Regiment of Illinois Volunteer Infantry, in the great war of the rebellion, 1862-1865 > Part 13
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39
149
MAJOR DOW'S LETTER.
wounded exchanged. I can add nothing to the above in rela- tion to this sanguinary fight; to lose one-third killed and wounded is saying all that can be said. We again lay upon the field, in our new position, the night of the 18th and until ten o'clock of the 19th, when we were relieved and did no more fighting during the siege. We occupied a hill, which we strong- ly fortified, and no one molested us. The morning of Dec. 5th we received orders to "boot and saddle", and with the other cavalry regiments to follow the enemy. We have followed to this place ; some skirmishing every day."
CHAPTER XIII.
THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.
ASSAULT ON FORT SAUNDERS-RELIEF OF THE GARRISON.
There was considerable sharp skirmishing and some artille- ry firing on November 20th. but no serious fighting. Long- street's army could be seen going into position on the hills and ridges north of the river, and it was expected that he would make an attack as soon as his divisions were well up in posi- tion. Heavy details from all the Union regiments were at work on the fortifications, day and night : and the works were being strengthened and extended as rapidly as possible, in an- tieipation of an early assault. The troops, although wearied by three days constant marching and fighting, worked with a will upon the rifle pits and bastions, being assistel by many of the citizens of the place, the loyal people showing a great desire to lend their aid in defense of the city. "Contrabands" were also pressed into service, and by a united effort much was accomplished. In front of one position on the north side of the town the chevaux-de-trise was composed in part of a large number of sharp pikes-said to be over two thousand- which were captured from the enemy at Cumberland Gap ear- ly in the fall. They were stuck and firmly secured in the ground at an angle of about forty-five degrees, and formed a barrier not easily surmounted.
The 112th Illinois moved out on the street, on foot, early in the morning, and was held in reserve all day, with orders to be in readiness to move quickly and without a moment's de-
151
IN THE STREET AND IN THE RAIN.
lay, in case of an attack, or any serious demonstration by the enemy The regiment remained in line until evening, an.l then moved into the beautiful front yard of a fine private resi- dence and bivouacked for the night. A heavy detail from the regiment patrolled the streets all night, to preserve order and prevent fast driving or a stampede, in case of a night attack. The 112th was selected for this duty by order of Gen. Burnside himself-a high compliment to the courage and morale of the regiment. Several fine residences just outside the skirmish line, southwest of town, were burned during the evening to pre- vent rebel sharpshooters from occupying them. It commenc- ed raining about nine o clock and continued to rain all night and the next day. The 112th passed an uncomfortable night, without tents, and early in the morning sought shelter from the storm in some old buildings in the neighborhood, with headquarters in a carpenter shop on Main Street : but the men had only time to wring the water from their clothing when the regiment was again ordered to its old position in the street, and stood in line, in a pelting storm, all day and the night fol- lowing, under orders to move at a given signal, on a double quick. The rain ceased on the morning of the 22d, and it was then more comfortable; but the regiment remained in posi- tion, awaiting orders, until evening, when, with several other mounted regiments, all in command of Col. Wolford, it pro- ceeded up the river on a night reconnoissance ; returned at 11 o'clock, and again bivouacked in the front yard of the same private residence.
All the supplies for the Army of the Ohio had been hauled in wagons over the mountains from Kentucky. by way of Cum- berland Gap. Gen. Burnside had not anticipated a siege, and consequently had not provided a surplus of stores ; in fact he could not have provided a sufficient quantity had he expected a siege, as it taxed his transportation trains to the utmost to supply the army from day to day. But the line of supplies was now cut off. and the whole Union army was reduced to half rations-horses and mules to less.
Knoxville is situated on a bend of the Holston, and the course of the river at that point is nearly from east to west. Longstreet's army encircled the town north of the river, but
152
HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
as yet he had no considerable force on the south side; and torage trains were daily sent across, on a pontoon bridge, ae- companied by strong guards, usually two or three companies of mounted troops. to search the country for grain and "rough forage" for the horses and mules. Sometimes they would be gone all day without meeting the enemy : at other times they would hardly pass the picket lines before encountering squads of rebel cavalry, and would be compelled to fight their way in- to the country or return to eamp; and upon more than one occasion the rebels attacked the trains, and came near cap- turing train, guard and all. The 112th was frequently called upon to furnish companies or details for this service, and al- most every day some company or detail was in the country as train guard, and frequently engaged in severe skirmishing with detachments of the enemy, often narrowly escaping cap- ture.
After dark in the evening of the 23d, the cavalry division crossed the river and occupied a position on the south side. Longstreet was gradually, but surely, contracting his lines : and it was feared he might gain possession of the hills south of the river, overlooking the city on the north bank, and by plant- ing artillery, expose the Union lines to a plunging enfilading fire.
During the evening the enemy made an attack on the picket line of a division of the 9th Corps, north of the city, and drove in the pickets. As the pickets fell back they set fire to all the buildings on the ground, for the double purpose of pre- venting rebel sharp-shooters from occupying them, and so they would not obstruct the view of the movements of the enemy from the Union lines. The arsenal, machine shops, round- house near the depot, and several other large buildings were burned to the ground, making an extensive conflagration and lighting up the city and surrounding country as bright as day The next day the rebels were driven back and the Union lines reestablished.
Longstreet's army had outnumbered Burnside's from the beginning ; and within a few days after he reached Knoxville Longstreet had been reinforced by detachments under Gen- erals Jackson, Carter, Jones and Williams, respectively. and he now felt confident of his ability to capture the whole of
153
CONFEDERATES CROSS THE RIVER.
Burnside's little army and reestablish Confederate authority in East Tennessee.
He effected a crossing of the Holston, below the city. extend- ed his lines across the river, and gained possession of a hill and planted artillery, preparatory to advancing his lines and driving the Union force on that side back across the river.
At nine o'clock in the evening of the 24th, Lt. Col. Bond was directed to move his brigade. under cover of the darkness, down the river, and take possession of, and fortify, a hill or ridge, and in case of an attack to hold it at all hazards. He occupied the hill without difficulty, and that night the men lay on their arms. At daybreak on the 25th work was commenc- ed on the fortifications, and pushed rapidly all day and the succeeding night, and until noon the next day. when it was deemed safe to pause and take breath. The position was a strong one-well nigh impregnable against attack, but ex- tremely weak against starvation. It was designated "Bond's Hill" -- after the brigade commander.
Col. Cameron, with a brigade of infantry of the 23d Corps, occupied an adjacent hill ; and in the afternoon of the 25th the rebels made a furious attack upon his position, and at first gained some advantage ; but they were finally repulsed, after a desperate struggle, and driven back to their works.
While the Confederate forces occupied several strong posi- tions south of the river, vet their lines were not continuous ; forage trains continued to dodge out between them, and scout- ing parties also ranged through the country, but always attend- ed with great danger of capture.
On the night of the 26th, Lieut. T. E. Milchrist, with part of his company (G), of the 112th Illinois, by direction of Col. Wolford, moved down the river, eluded the rebel pickets, pass- ed through their lines, and proceeded to Marysville, in quest of information as to the position and movements of troops in that direction. It was a perilous undertaking, but was suc- cessfully accomplished. They passed so near the rebel pickets that they could hear their conversation and when they cross- ed the bridge, muffled their feet to prevent being heard. They returned towards morning, and Lieut. Milchrist immediately proceeded to Col. Wolford's head-quarters to report the result
154
HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
of his observations. Col. Wolford deemed the information of great importance, and directed Lieut. Milchrist to report the sme without delay to Gen. Burnside, and sent a staff officer with him to the general's headquarters. Gen. Burnside was highly pleased with Lieut. Milchrist & report, and compliment- ed him and his men for their courage and fidelity in the un- dertaking, and tor successfully accomplishing the object of the secret reconnoissance.
A torage train attempted to pass up the south bank of the river into the country, on the 27th, but it was attacked by the enemy and driven back within our lines.
There was heavy skirmishing and artillery firing all day : and in the evening all the troops were directed to be extremely cautious and watchful, and every precaution was taken to guard against surprise, or a sudden attack.
Each regiment was divided into three reliefs, and one-third of the men kept on guard all the time, night and day-two hours on and four hours off. One man in every four, of those not on guard, kept awake and on the alert, to wake his three comrades in case of an attack, and those who slept lay with their accoutrements on and their guns within reach, ready to spring into action at an instant's notice.
The siege had now continued ten days. During that time neither army had been idle. On the Union side earthiworks had been extended and strengthened, ditches deepened, bat- teries planted in position, and everything possible done to as- sure a successful defense. On the Confederate side batteries had been placed in position and protected by strong earth- works ; the infantry were strongly intrenched in each new po- sition, and approaches had been made toward the Union lines ; and the cavalry were scouring the country for food, forage, horses, mules, and other army supplies.
But the Union army was getting painfully short of supplies. The rations had been reduced from one-halt to one-third, then to one-fourth-and even at that rate all would be exhausted- the last mouthful eaten-on the third of December, and it was now the 28th of November-only five days more of grace, and then what ? The cavalry and artillery horses and train mules had already actually stripped the trees of small limbs and bark
155
THE TROOPS NEVER DISCOURAGED.
had caten them bare -and what would they cat next?
The rebel pickets did not console the hungry Union boys to any great extent. They said they were paying us off for Vicks- burg. Inquired how we relished mule meat. Advised us to study Lincoln's proclamation : proposed to trade tobacco for sugar and coffee ; and boasted of their intention to capture the whole Union army and march it in a body to Andersonville. But the I'nion boys replied with spirit to their raillery, chal- lenged them to try the strength of our works, and predicted that within a week the rebel army would find itself in a trap, and be compelled to run or surrender.
The Union troops never became discouraged ; they liad faith in the military wisdom and plans of Gen. Grant and Gen. Burnside, and were contented to bide their time. Gen. Burn- side was kind, generous and humane, to citizens and soldiers alike ; he won the profound respect of all, and imparted con- fidence and courage to all.
After the terrible struggle at Chickamauga, in which Rose- crans' army was defeated and driven into Chattanooga, and was only saved from complete destruction by the indomitable courage and stubborn resistance of the heroic Thomas and his- grand division, the Army of the Cumberland was practically besieged. With but a single line of communications, nearly surrounded-Bragg's victorious army looking down upon it from the impregnable heights of Lookout Mountain and Mis- sionary Ridge -- the mountain sides bristling with cannon-it was apparently at the mercy of the Confederate commander. Then it was that Bragg, feeling secure in his position, had de- tached Longstreet and his veterans from the Army of Virginia, and sent them to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee, and redeem it from National dominion. But Longstreet had hard- ly crossed the Hiawassee, when Gen. Grant arrived at Chatta- nooga, and, as Commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, assumed command of the three great armies in the West, and at once restored order and confidence where all had been confusion and discouragement. One of his first steps was to cause the removal of Gen. Rosecrans from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and the appoint- ment of Gen. Thomas as his successor. His next step was
156
HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
to reinforce the army at Chattanooga ; and Gen. Sherman, with part of the Army of the Tennessee, and Gen. Hooker, with How- ard's 11th Corps and Slocum's 12th Corps, from the Army of the Potomac, were soon en route to the scene of operations.
He then communicated with Gen. Burnside, in command of the Army of the Ohio, and the result was that Longstreet was permitted to advance as far as the Tennessee River without serious resistance. Here he was held in check as long as prac- ticable, and then allowed to cross. Gen. Burnside was com- pelled to make a stand at Campbell's Station to save his trains, and to gain time to prepare the defences of Knoxville. It also deceived Longstreet into the belief that the Union army would stand its ground until driren back, and compelled him to bring forward his whole available force to dislodge the Union army.
Then he was lured to Knoxville, more than a hundred miles from Bragg-far beyond supporting distance-where he laid siege to the city and threatened to starve the garrison into surrender. By the 23d of November his whole force had been brought forward and placed in position. He had been rein- forced by other detachments, which had been assigned places in his lines of investment ; his batteries, were frowning upon the beleaguered city ; and he had promised his soldiers that they should eat their Thanksgiving dinner within the defences of Knoxville.
But on the 23d, Gen. Grant commenced a succession of bril- liant movements and hard fought battles, in which he scaled the rugged sides of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, routed Bragg's great army from its fortified heights, and hurl- ed it into the valleys below, from whence, crushed and defeat- ed, it sought safety in rapid retreat to Northern Georgia, closely pursued by the victorious veterans of Sherman and Thomas and Hooker.
In accordance with Gen. Grant's instructions, Gen. Sherman moved to the east, and placed his command between Bragg's army and Longstreet's, and thus cut off all communication between the two rebel armies.
In the meantime Longstreet had been actively at work on the ridge north of Fort Saunders, connecting his batteries with lines of rifle pits, and preparing to open a vigorous bombard-
157
THE ASSAULT ORDERED.
ment of the fort. But the news of the engagement between Grant and Bragg nad reached him and hastened his plans. Longstreet undoubtedly knew of Bragg's defeat, but neither his soldiers nor his subordinate officers were informed of the fact. He now saw his fatal mistake and determined to redeem himself while there was yet time.
On the 28th of November he directed Gen. McLaws to double his pickets and reserves, and advance and occupy the line of the Union pickets, and at the same time make arrangements to assault as soon as the weather lighted up enough for the ar- tillery to play upon the Union position. He directed the as- sault to be made after ten minutes brisk artillery firing by all their batteries. Gen. Jenkins was ordered to advance his picket line in the same way, and advance to the assault, fol- lowing McLaw's movements; and Gen. Johnson, with two brigades, was ordered to support MeLaws and Jenkins.
Upon the receipt of the order Gen. McLaws addressed to Longstreet the following note :
"HEADQ'RS DIVISION, NOV. 28, 1863.
"LIEUT. GEN. J. LONGSTREET :
"It seems to be a conceded fact that there has been a serious engagement between General Bragg's forces and those of the enemy, with what result is not known, so far as I have heard. General Bragg may have maintained his posi- tion, may have repulsed the enemy, or may have been driven back.
"If the enemy has been beaten at Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point ?
"If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault here ?
"If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, our communica- tions must be made with Virginia.
"We cannot again combine with General Bragg, even if we should be successful in our assault upon Knoxville. If we should be defeated or unsuccessful, and at the same time Gen- eral Bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in a condition to force our way back to the army in Virginia ??
"I present these considerations, and, with the force they
158
HISTORY OF THE 12TH ILLINOIS.
have on my mind. I beg leave to say that I think we had bet- ter delay the assault until we hear the result of the battle at Chattanooga. The enemy may have cut our communications to prevent this army reinforcing General Bragg, as well as to prevent General Bragg trom reinforcing us, and the attack at Chattanooga favors the first proposition.
"Very respectfully.
"L. McLAWS, "Major General"
To which Gen. Longstreet replied as follows :
"HEADQUARTERS, NOV. 28, 1863.
"GENERAL :- Your letter is received. I am not at all conti- dent that General Bragg has had a serious battle at Chatta- nooga, but there is a report that he has fallen back to Tunnel Hill. Under this report, I am entirely convinced that our on- ly safety is in making the assault upon the enemy s position tomorrow at daylight : and it is the more important that I should have the entire support and cooperation of the officers of this command, and I do hope and trust that I may have your entire support, and of all the force you may be possessed of, in the execution of my views. It is a great mistake to suppose there is any safety for us in going to Virginia it Gen- eral Bragg has deen defeated, for we leave him to the mercy of his victors, and with his army destroyed our own had bet- ter be also-for we will not only be destroyed but disgraced. There is neither honor nor safety in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered.
"Very respectfully
"J. LONGSTREET; "Lient. Gen., Commanding. "To MAJ. GEN. L. MCLAWS.
"P S. The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be made with a determination that will insure stir- J. L."
Gen. MeLaws gives the following description of the opera- tions preceding the assault upon the fort, which took place at six o clock on the following morning, Sunday, November 29.
159
GEN. McLAWS' ACCOUNT.
After referring to the delay in attacking the Union picket lines, he says :
"After this I proposed to Gien Longtsreet that if he would delay the assault until daylight the next morning, the 29th, I would drive in the enemy's pickets and occupy a line with my sharpshooters which would command the enemy's works, going beyond the line occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters, if such was found to be necessary in order to obtain eligible positions. He assented, and the assault was put off until daylight of the 29th. I then addressed the following circular to my brigade commanders :
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
' GENERAL : The operations discussed to-day will take place tomorrow morning. I wish you to make the necessary prep- arations and advance your skirmishers to-night, so as to occu- py the line of rifle pits now held by the enemy and make them tenable for your men, so that your sharpshooters can open fire on the main rifle pits of the enemy, and, firing into the em- brasures of the main work, prevent them from using their can- non with effect when the main assault is made : and if an op- portunity is offered, which may happen, we may dash at the main works. Further instructions will be sent if any are thought necessary. If any brigade commander is not fully informed, he is requested to make proper inquiries at once.'
"Copies of this circular were delivered to each brigade com- mander.
"The brigade commanders assembled at division headquar- ters, and it was agreed that the attack upon the Union picket line should take place at moonrise, which occurred at about ten p. m. The signal agreed upon for the assault was the op- ening of fire from Leyden's battery, which had been sunk in pits on the advanced line of Kershaw s brigade, near the Arm- strong house, to be followed at daylight by a continuous firing by the sharpshooters from their advanced position.
"I ordered the assault in two columns, because there was considerable felled timber and much broken ground between the positions of Humphrey's brigade and that of Wofford's, and, besides, I thought that the spirit of rivalry between the
160
HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
two brigades leading the assault-one being from Georgia, and the other from Mississippi-united to their previous well-tried gallantry, would urge them to their work with accelerating dash and vigor, I had been previously informed by Col. Alex- ander, of General Longstreet's staff, that there was no ditch at the northwest angle of the work that offered any obstacle to the assault, and by General Longstreet himself that there would be no difficulty in taking the work so far as the ditch was concerned."
The author has clipped the following from a newspaper art- icle on the "Siege of Knoxville." The name of the writer is unknown, but as the situation is correctly described, the auth- or has taken the liberty to use these extracts :
"The existence of a ditch in front of the northwest angle, where the assault was made, was entirely unknown to the Con- federate officers. No scaling ladders were prepared, partly be- cause it was supposed that none were needed, and partly be- cause there were no tools with which to construct them. Longstreet says : 'Something was said about fascines ;small branches of trees in bundles:, and I said they might be useful to protect the men from bullets in their approach, but I did not consider them essential in crossing the diteh.'
"The immediate vicinity of the fort had been jealously guard- ed from close observation, and was a terra incognita to citizens as well as Confederates. The deep and impassible ditch in front of Fort Saunders was as much a surprise to Longstreet's assaulting columns as was the "sunken road" to Napoleon's Imperial Guard as it made its last desperate charge at Water- 100.
"MeLaws claims that the necessity for any appliance with which to reach the summit of the parapet was scouted by Col. Alexander; that he did not think of them himself; but as there were 'no tools or material with which to make anything' he did not mention them, as 'to do so, and not to have them, would create hesitation and detract from the dash and deter- mined purpose so necessary to succeed,' although he did not consider them essential.
"On account of the dense fog which hung over the river banks, obscuring the movements of both armies, the advance
161
SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.
upon the Union picket lines was delayed until about 11 p. m., when they were carried by a dashing charge, many of the pickets being captured in the rifle pits. This brought the Con- federate picket line under the guns of Fort Saunders, and suf- ficiently indicated the movement about to take place. Skirm- ishing continued during the night, and a slow cannonading was kept up from Alexander's batteries, directed principally upon Fort Saunders, which was believed by the Union officers to be the real point of attack.
"If tlie Confederate commander had designed to give his an- tagonist timely notice of his intended assault, he could not liave done so more effectually than by prefacing it by the mid- night assault upon the picket line. General Burnside at once sent Reilly's brigade, which had been really in reserve during the siege, to reinforce Ferrero's line at the fort. The weather had been most unfavorable for movements of troops during the week that had past. Rain fell on the night of the 27th, and the mercury fell below the freezing point. Ice formed on the water in the ditch, and the almost perpendicular walls of the ditch and parapet were as smooth and slippery as a wall of marble.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.