USA > Illinois > History of the 112th Regiment of Illinois Volunteer Infantry, in the great war of the rebellion, 1862-1865 > Part 21
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The defeat of Sherman, they believed, would strengthen the peace party and aid it in carrying the election, in which event they expected a termination of the war upon terms favorable to themselves. They had hoped to check Sherman's advance, and hold him on the line of the Chattahoochee until after the election ; but tailing in that, they next determined to hold At- lanta, at whatever cost of men and money.
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, who was removed from the com- mand of the Confederate army because of his failure to pre- vent Sherman from crossing the Chattahoochee, is a compe- tent and credible witness upon this point. In his "Narratives of the War" he says :
"The importance to the Confederacy of defeating the enter- prise against Atlanta was not to be measured by military con- sequences alone. Political considerations were also involved, and added much to the interest of that campaign. The North- ern Democrats had pronounced the management of the war a failure, and declared against its being continued, and the Pres- idential election, soon to occur, was to turn upon the question of immediate peace or continued war.
"In all the earlier part of the year 1864, the press had been publishing to the Northern people most exaggerated ideas of
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
the military value of Atlanta, and that its capture would ter- minate the war. If Sherman had been foiled, these exaggera- tions would have caused great agitation in consequence of his failure-would have strengthened the peace party greatly-so much, perhaps, as to have aided it to carry the Presidential election, which would have brought the war to an immediate close."
But if the people in the North were discouraged, Sherman and his soldiers were not. Atlanta was taken, and the peace party buried in its ruins.
Jeff Davis visited Hood at his headquarters, on the 25th of September, and together they discussed and matured a new campaign.
Atlanta had been lost. But it Hood, by bold, rapid move- ments, could destroy Sherman's line of communications, they believed he would be forced to abandon Atlanta and all North- ern Georgia, and place his army north of the Tennessee.
If Sherman did not follow him, but should seek a new base of operations on the Gulf or on the sea coast, then Hood would march north, capture Nashville, recover Tennessee, invade Kentucky, and push his operations north to the Ohio River ; and he even dreamed of crossing the Ohio and carrying the war into the Northern States.
Shermen's line of communications extended north to Louis- ville and Cincinnati.
Gov. Vance of North Carolina, in a letter written only three days before Jeff Davis' visit to Hood, stated that with a base of communications five-hundred miles in Sherman's rear, through their own country, not a bridge had been burned, not a car thrown from its track, not a man shot by the people whose country he had desolated.
The people, he said, seemed every where to submit as soon as the Confederate armies were withdrawn.
It was Hood's purpose to destroy this line-except where necessary for his own use-to subsist his army as far as pos- sible upon the country and captured supplies, to arouse the secessionists of Tennessee and Kentucky to activity, recruit his army by volunteers and a vigorous enforcement of the Con- federate conscription laws, and sweep north to the Ohio River.
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IN PURSUIT OF HOOD.
He began his march on the first day of October. His caval- ry forces were sent forward in advance, witli orders to move rapidly and strike the railroad north of the Chattahoochee ; and he followed with his infantry and artillery and pushed rapidly toward Dallas. The cavalry destroyed the railroad and twenty miles of telegraph in the vicinity of Big Shanty, north of Marietta, and then hastened toward Allatoona Pass, where one million rations were stored, guarded by the 93d Il- linois Volunteers.
Sherman waited until satisfied of Hood's intentions, and then started in pursuit. He had no thought of transferring the theater of operations north of the Tennessee, nor of loosening his hold upon Atlanta. On the 3d of October the order of march was issued. The 20th Corps was to hold Atlanta and the Chattahoochee bridge, and the rest of the army move to Smyrna Camp Ground, near Marietta.
Gen. Thomas was at Nashville making combinations to head off Forrest and Wheeler, who were threatening a cavalry raid into Middle Tennessee, and the Army of the Cumberland was in command of Gen. Stanley. Gen. Schofield was at Knox- ville, looking after the business of his department, and during his absence Gen. Cox commanded the Army of the Ohio, and Gen. Reilly the 3d Division. Gen. Howard was in command of the Army of the Tennessee.
The 23d Corps moved at daylight on the morning of the 4th, inade a long detour in order to cross Peachtree Creek, on ac- count of a bridge having been carried away, crossed the Chat- tahoochee on pontoons near the railroad bridge, and thence proceeded seven miles up the river and bivouacked on the Pace's Ferry and Marietta road-having marched eighteen miles.
On the 5th marched up through Marietta to the old rebel works north of Kenesaw, twelve miles. The Army of the Ten- nessee covered the line to the Chattahoochee.
Hood with his principal force was in the direction of Dallas. He sent French in the night of the 4th to capture Allatoona. Sherman signalled Gen. Corse at Rome to reinforce the garri- son at Allatoona, and the latter arrived there with three regi- ments, by rail, just in time, for he had hardly placed his men
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
in position on the morning of the 5th, when French, with a di- vision of infantry and artillery, surrounded the place and op- ened a vigorous cannonade. After two hours cannonading he demanded a surrender in five minutes, "to spare unnecessary effusion of blood." Corse refused to surrender, and informed the Confederate general that he could commence "the effusion of blood" as soon as he pleased. The result is well-known. French made a furious assault upon the works, but was gal- lantly repulsed. Again and again he repeated the charge, on- ly to increase the "effusion of blood" in his own ranks.
From the heiglits of Kenesaw, eighteen miles away, Sher- man anxiously watched the unequal contest. The 4th and 14th corps were on Pine Mountain, and the 23d Corps moved out rapidly on the Burnt Hickory road to strike the rear and flank of the rebel division ; and Sherman signalled to Corse that little message, celebrated in song and story, "Hold the fort, for I am coming !" Quickly the little flags waved back Corse's reply-brief, but brave and determined. It satisfied Sherman, but is not mentioned in the Sunday School books.
French withdrew trom Allatoona and beat a hasty retreat, leaving his dead and wounded upon the field.
The 23d Corps continued its march, and arrived at Allatoo- na at sunset on the 8th, and remained there until the 10th.
French moved rapidly upon Resaca, but Sherman sent for- ward a division by rail to reinforce the garrison, and by a forced march brought his army to Kingston, within support- ing distance, and the rebel general retreated toward Rome.
Hood was south of the Coosa, and he now crossed the river with his main force and threatened Rome. Sherman pushed forward a division by rail to reinforce the garrison, and follow- ed by rapid marches with the rest of his army.
The 23d Corps arrived at Rome on the evening of the 12th, and at daylight the next morning broke camp and crossed the Coosa, in support of the cavalry, on a reconnoissance to as- certain the position of Hood's principal force; and learned that he had removed his pontoons and taken them north with him, and given out that he was going to Tennessee. The cav- alry captured two guns and a hundred prisoners of his rear guard. The corps returned to Rome in the evening.
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HOOD'S PLANS COME TO NAUGHT.
Hood's movement against Rome proved to be but a feint ; he was already moving rapidly, by forced marches, upon Re- saca, which he meant to reach and carry by mere force of numbers before Sherman could discover what he was about. Moving into position before Resaca, he demanded an immedi- ate surrender, threatening that he would take no prisoners if compelle I to make an assault. Gen. Baum, in command, re- fused to surrender. Hood hesitatel. Sherman had discov- ered the movement and was in close pursuit. The 23d Corps moved from Rome at daylight on the morning of the 14th, and reached Resaca on the 15th. The rest of the army was in ad- vance.
Hood destroyed twenty miles of railroad north of Resaca, and retreated through Snake Creek Gap, blockading the gorge behind him by felling the timber, so as to delay Sherman's pursuit. Sherman endeavored to entrap him in the gap, and sent Stanley over the hills to head him off, while Howard and Cox cleared out the road and followed him in rear ; but he made his escape. Sherman followed him down the Oostanaula Val- ley to Shipp's Gap, and thence to La Fayette, when Hood re- treated to Gadsden in Alabama.
The 23d Corps marched from Snake Creek Gap to Sugar Valley, fifteen miles, on the 16th, and rested on the 17th, awaiting orders.
Moved at daylight on the 18th, and marched by the way of Villanow and Dirt Town, over the mountain by Grover's Gap, to Summerville, and thence crossed the State line into Alaba- ma, at 10 o'clock on the 20th, and proceeded to Gaylesville, arriving there on the 20th, and camped on the Chattooga River -having marched nearly sixty miles in the three days. The Armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee marched down the Chattooga Valley, and arrived at Gaylesville the same day.
Sherman was wearied of the wild-goose chase which Hood had led him, and determined to end it then and there. Hood was checkmated for the present, and Sherman decided to halt for a few days in the heart of the rich valley of the Chattooga, abounding in food, and while watching the enemy, rest his men and subsist upon the country.
From the 4th of October his army had rested but three days
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
-every other day in motion. It had marched over two hun- dred miles, in almost continuous autumnal storms. The hour of reveille was 4:30, and at dayliglit every morning the col- umns had been in motion. The men, although in excellent spirits, needed rest ; and while resting they feasted upon the beef and pork and mutton, the sweet potatoes, peaches, and milk and honey of Northern Alabama.
The Army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gayles- ville ; the Army of the Tennessee was advanced to Little River, to support the cavalry watching Hood; and on the 25th the Army of the Ohio moved to Cedar Bluff, on the Coosa River, from which point detachments reconnoitered toward Center and Blue Mountains.
About the last of October Hood moved his army westward toward Decatur, with the evident purpose of decoying Sher- man from his position; but, instead of following, Sherman concentrated his army at Rome and Kingston. Hood evident- ly expected that his movement would cause Sherman to con- centrate his army at Nashville, to oppose the threatened inva- sion of Tennessee, but in this he was disappointed.
Sherman had no notion of abandoning the fruits of a year's campaign. Gen. Thomas was at Nashville, watching Hood's movements, and making preparations to contest his march northward, if he attempted it, or pursue him if he followed Sherman toward the sea.
Two divisions of the 4tli Corps were at Pulaski, eighty miles south of Nashville, and fifty-four miles north of Decatur, Al- abama, observing Hood's movements, and prepared to march north or south, as necessity might require.
The 23d Corps had expected to accompany Sherman on his "March to the Sea," but at the request of Gen. Thomas it was detached from Sherman's army, and ordered to report to Thomas at Nashville.
Sherman then returned to Atlanta, and burning the bridges behind him, plunged out of sight into the enemy's country.
President Lincoln said of him : "We know where he went in at, but no one can tell where he will come out at."
He mowed a swath forty miles wide through the heart of Georgia, and thence north through the Carolinas; and when
253
ORDERED TO NASHVILLE.
he "came out" at Goldsboro, N. C., in March, 1865, the 23d Army Corps-and the 112th Illinois with it-was there to meet him.
Sherman's "March to the Sea" was a grand pic-nic ; but it proved the hollowness of the Confederacy-developed its weak- ness, and hastened the inevitable end of its existence.
Sherman had said to some of the officers of the 23d Corps, in parting with them at Rome : "If there's any fighting, you'll have it to do ;" and the sequel proved that he was right.
The 23d Corps broke camp at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 30th of October and marched eighteen miles to a point three miles east of Rome. Here Lieut. Col. Bond rejoined the 112th Illinois and took command of the regiment, having re- covered from the wound received at Utoy Creek. The next day marched nineteen miles, and camped near Calhoun ; on the first day of November marched through Resaca to Tilton Station, twelve miles, and on the 2nd marched to Dalton, ar- riving there at noon. On the 3d the 2nd Division, in com- mand of Gen. Joseph A. Cooper, accompanied by Gen. Scho- field, started for Nashville, by rail, and on arriving there, two brigades were sent to Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River, nearly west of Nashville, and one (Strickland's) to Columbia on Duck River, south of Nashville, on the railroad leading to Pulaski. Cox's division remained at Dalton, waiting for trans- portation, until the 6th, when it was ordered to strike tents and be prepared to take the cars at 10 o'clock in the evening.
The division moved down town to the depot in the evening and stood in the streets all night, in a pelting storm, waiting for cars. At 8 o'clock on the 7th the division was loaded, and the train pulled out and ran to Chattanooga, arriving there at dark ; waited there until 8 o'clock, and then ran out ten miles and side-tracked, and waited until 8 o'clock the next morning for a down train to pass; reached Stevenson, Alabama, at 2:30 in the afternoon, and arrived at Nashville at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 9th ; remained there until noon, and then ran south twenty-one miles, to Franklin ; remained there un- til noon of the 10th, and then six miles south, to Thompson's Station, and unloaded and went into camp to wait for a brok- en bridge to be repaired.
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
On the 12th the division was ordered to proceed on foot to Pulaski; and on the 13th(Sunday) marched fifteen miles, to Columbia ; on the 14th marched nineteen miles, to Lynnville, and on the 15th marched ten miles and went into camp near Pulaski.
Gen. Schofield was in command of the forces in the field. He now had at Pulaski the 4th Corps, in command of Gen. Stanley, and Cox's division of the 23d Corps, and a small force of cavalry in command of Gen. Hatch.
Major Dow had been detailed on the first of November and was now acting as Assistant Inspector General on the staff of Gen. Cox, a position he held until April 22, 1865, when he was appointed by the President Inspector General of the 23d Army Corps, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and served as such until the close of the war.
For several days the weather had been miserable-a cold, driving rain storm, and the camp was a vast body of mud and water. The rain, accompanied by sleet, continued, with the exception of but a single day (the 17tli), until the 22nd of November.
Col. Henderson had been attacked with chills and fever, and was so ill that he was compelled to turn over the command of his brigade, temporarily, to Col. Stiles, but he remained with the command, riding in the ambulance when it moved, until the 25th, when he again assumed command, although then sick enough to be in bed.
Hood was on the south side of the Tennessee, at Florence, and it was yet uncertain what course he would pursue, althoughi it was believed he would cross the river and attempt to march north and capture Nashville ; and then, if successful, continue his march northward in accordance with his original plans. But, as the sequel will prove, he was doomed to disaster, de- feat, disappointment and disgrace.
CHAPTER XXI.
HOOD CROSSES THE TENNESSEE-SCHOFIELD'S RETREAT TO COLUMBIA-ACROSS DUCK RIVER-SPRING HILL. HOOD NAPPING-FORCED NIGHT MARCH TO FRANKLIN. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE.
Hood had been delayed by bad roads and want of transpor- tation, but he crossed the Tennessee River at Florence, on the 20th of November, and on the 21st his whole army was in rap- id motion, on the Lawrenceburg Pike, towards Columbia, in the attempt to get in rear of Schofield before the latter could reach Duck River.
On the 21st Cox's division was ordered to be ready to move at a moment's notice, with three days rations packed in haver- sacks, and the next morning marched back to Lynnville, to cover the cross roads at that place, where it was joined in the evening by Wagner's division of the 4th Corps ; and on the 23d Cox moved ten miles further back to Hurricane, where the division bivouacked in line of battle ; and that night the men slept on their arms. The rest of the 4th Corps moved back from Pulaski, the same night, and joined Wagner's division at Lynnville. But Forrest was making a determined advance upon Columbia, on the Mount Pleasant Pike, driving Hatch's cavalry before him, and before daylight on the 24th the whole Union force was moving rapidly towards Columbia. Cox's di- vision having less distance to travel, was the first to approach the town. Forrest was driving Col. Capron's brigade of cav-
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
alry rapidly into town, and as Cox approached the firing on the other road was heard, and the division marched by a cross-road two miles from town, and interposed a heavy skirmish line, composed in part of Companies A, F and D of the 112th Illinois, moving at double-quick, between the contend- ing cavalry forces. A brisk fire from the skirmishers and a few well-directed shots from the battery soon checked For- rest's advance. A line was formed and light works thrown up behind Bigby Creek. Schofield's whole force moved into Columbia before noon and occupied a strong position, and by the 25th Hood confronted him with his whole army.
It had been Gen. Thomas' intention to meet and give Hood battle south of Duck River, but three divisions of the 16th Corps, under Gen. A. J. Smith, which had been promised him, had been delayed, and his cavalry had been scattered and many of tliem dismounted ; and he instructed Gen. Schofield to de- lay and obstruct Hood's advance to the last moment, while he awaited Smith's arrival and concentrated other troops in his command.
Gen. Schofield was met at Columbia by Gen. Ruger with one of the brigades of the 2nd Division, from Johnsonville, part of which was scattered at several points on the river, to protect the crossings and fords on the right flank.
The other brigade had moved from Johnsonville to Centre- ville, on the river twenty miles west of Columbia, to prevent Forrest's cavalry from crossing at that point. Gen. Wilson joined Schofield and took command of the cavalry, and be- tween the 25th and 30th this arm of the service was consider- ably reinforced.
There was considerable sharp skirmishing and artillery fir- ing on the 25th, but Hood did not risk an attack.
Gen. Schofield became convinced that Hood would attempt to turn his position, and prepared an interior and shorter line to which he could retire part of his forces and send part north of the river ; and during the night of the 25th the 1st and 2nd brigades of Cox's division crossed to the north side and occu- pied and fortified a position covering the pontoon bridge.
Henderson's brigade and Strickland's brigade of the 2nd Di- vision and the 4th Corps remained on the south side, and oc-
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CROSSING DUCK RIVER.
cupied the interior line of works. Henderson's brigade cover- ed the Mount Pleasant Pike and Wood's division of the 4th Corps the Pulaski Pike.
The enemy advanced a heavy line of skirmishers and at- tempted to drive in our skirmish line, on the morning of the 26th, with the evident purpose of ascertaining the strength of the line; but they were repulsed with considerable loss. This was repeated several times with the same result. Two men of the 112th Illinois were slightly wounded, but the author has been unable to obtain their names or company.
The indications of Hood's purpose to divide the army, and force a crossing of the river above with his principal force, while the remainder kept up a demonstration in front, were so plain, that, during the night of the 26th the 4th Corps was moved across the river, and the lines of Henderson's and Strickland's brigades were stretched to cover the whole front.
The enemy made frequent demonstrations on the 27th, but the attacks were evidently made for the sole purpose of keep- ing the line occupied, and to cover the movements of Hood's troops to his right.
Our forces ran out of ammunition, and it seemed as if they would be compelled to retire ; but fortunately Lieut. Milchrist, of Col. Henderson's staff, found two wagons loaded with am- munition, which had remained there, not having received or- ders to move, and the men were supplied just in time to pre- vent the enemy from taking advantage of our empty cartridge boxes.
Gen. Schofield and Col. Henderson were in constant com- munication by means of signal flags, and Col. Henderson in- formed him of the fact that Hood was moving his main force to the right with the evident purpose of crossing the river above and striking the line of retreat to Franklin.
Gen. Schofield directed the remainder of the forces on the south side to cross the river in the night of the 27th, and at seven o'clock the movement commenced. Strickland's brigade was the first to cross.
Col. Henderson, with his brigade, covered the movement and brought up the rear.
-17
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HISTORY OF THE 112TH ILLINOIS.
At 4 o'clock in the morning the whole command had cross- ed, and the railroad bridge was partly, and the pontoon bridge wholly destroyed. The latter was of heavy wooden boats, for which there was no transportation.
Columbia is situated on high ground, on the south bank of Duek River, on a deep bend of the river. in the shape of a horse-shoe. The ground on the north side, within the bends of the river, is low and flat, and completely commanded by the hills on the south side. Two brigades of Cox's division were in position on the north side, fronting south across the tongue between the two bends in the river, and at daylight on the morning of the 28th Henderson's brigade joined them-having marched east to the Nashville road and then back towards Columbia, a distance of seven miles.
Forrest forced a crossing with his cavalry eight miles east, and pushed forward towards Spring Hill, on the pike half way between Columbia and Franklin.
Hood left all his artillery and two divisions of infantry, of Lee's corps, at Columbia and with the rest of his army laid pontoons five miles east in the night of the 28th, crossed the river early in the morning of the 29th, and marehed rapidly in support of Forrest. He pushed Cleburne's division ahead, with instructions to hurry forward and attack whatever force he should find at Spring Hill.
In the meantime Stanley, with the 4th Corps, hurried for- ward, and leaving Kimball's division in position at the cross- ing near Rutherford Creek, four miles below Spring Hill, pro- ceeded with Wagner's division to the latter place. The wag- on trains had been sent back and were all at Spring Hill, and Stanley arrived there just in time to save them. The rebel cavalry had driven the Union cavalry in, and were already in the outskirts of the town.
Cleburne came up with his infantry, followed closely by Cheatham with two more divisions of cavalry and infantry, and rushed furiously upon Stanley's command, and made charge after charge upon his lines ; but he held his position, repulsed every assault, and saved the trains and the line of retreat, until darkness put an end to the contest.
Hood hurried forward his columns, and ordered Cheatham
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AT COLUMBIA.
to throw his corps across the pike and thus completely cut off Schofield's line of retreat ; but Cheatham failed to comply with the order, and Hood's army went into bivouac in line of battle parallel to, and less than half a mile from the pike, with a picket line less than a hundred rods from the pike.
Gen. Cox still remained in position north of Columbia. At daylight on the morning of the 29th the rebel artillery in Col- umbia, from the hills around the whole bend of the river, op- ened fire upon the division, but the traverses and angles in the line saved it from serious loss.
The Union rifled cannon replied with vigor, and the rebel gunners were compelled to run back their pieces out of range. The artillery firing was continued at intervals during the day, and in the afternoon the rebel infantry made several unsuc- cessful attempts to force a crossing.
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