USA > Illinois > Illinois in 1818, 2nd ed > Part 3
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Another important service rendered by the Indian agents was the distribution of presents, which was of the utmost impor- tance as a means of securing the attachment of the savages. The lavish distribution of presents by the British agents at Malden and at Drummond's Island dictated a similar policy on the part of the United States, for the Indians usually bestowed their favor upon the party which bid highest for it. The an- nuities were divided among the different villages of the various tribes in proportion to their numbers, while the presents were usually bestowed upon the principal chiefs and other influential individuals. Those familiar with the state of affairs upon the
13Indian Office Papers, Letter Book, D (1817-1820) :326 et seq.
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ILLINOIS IN 1818
frontier were almost unanimous in advocating a liberal distribu- tion of presents as the most effective and the cheapest means of controlling the savages. Governor Edwards in 1816 recom- mended that presents be distributed to the Indians of the Illinois river and vicinity with a free hand, for a few years at least ; "nothing less," he said, "can wean them from British influence to which they more than any other Indians in those territories have long been devoted."14 The giving of presents may also be regarded as the price of peace along the frontiers, and of free- dom from petty annoyance, such as cattle and horsethieving. A threat to withhold presents was a much more effective argu- ment with the Indians than any appeal to their higher sensibil- ities. It was also considered necessary to distribute presents in order to give dignity and prestige to the agent himself. In- voices sent out by Thomas L. McKenney, superintendent of the Indian trade, in 1818, indicate that merchandise to the value of two thousand dollars was destined for Kaskaskia for distribution among the Indians, while equal amounts were sent to Peoria and Prairie du Chien.
Besides the presents which were distributed among the Indians each year, it was also customary to feed those who visited the various posts from time to time for business or other purposes. It took nearly as much food to supply the visiting savages as the regular garrisons. Governor Cass described the situation in the following words: "A long established custom, a thousand wants real or imaginary, and the restlessness and impatience of their mode of life send them in upon us. They come with trifling articles to barter, they come to get their arms repaired, to get their farming utensils, to enquire about their annuities, to com- plain of injuries from some of our Citizens and messages of every kind from their chiefs. It would [be] equally trouble- some for me to enumerate and for you to read the various causes which influence them to make these visits. They gener- ally bring with them their women & Children, and they are so
14Letter of Ninian Edwards, September 24, 1816, in Chicago Historical Society manuscripts.
NABU-NAA-KEE-SHICK, OR THE ONE HALF OF THE SKY, A CHIPPEWA CHIEF Painted at the Treaty of Fond du Lac by J. O. Lewis [From the Lewis Portfolio, owned by Chicago Historical Society
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importunate in their applications, and their necessities so obvi- ous, that an Agent must frequently yield to them."15
The agents of the Indian department also performed a num- ber of small services, often trifling in themselves, but important for the maintenance of friendly relations. They received all visiting Indians, endeavored to secure such information from them as might be of value to the United States; attempted to prevent the introduction of liquor into the Indian country, and in fact did anything which might operate to secure the good will or promote the welfare of the Indians. Blacksmiths were some- times maintained at the agencies to repair the tools and weapons which the savages brought in from their villages and hunting grounds. In 1820, Pierre Menard, sub-agent at Kaskaskia, ex- pended thirteen dollars "for ferriage of the Delaware chief and his party over the Mississippi;" nineteen dollars and fifty cents "for supper and breakfast furnished thirteen Indians, corn and hay for their horses;" and twenty-three dollars "for four hun- dred pounds of beef, and making a coffin for a Delaware Indian who was accidentally killed."16 In the performance of their various duties the agents usually had the assistance of inter- preters, whose knowledge of the languages and intimate associa- tions with the Indians enabled them to secure information of value to the department.
One of the most important functions of the Indian agents was the supervision of the fur trade and the enforcement of such regulations as the president or congress might prescribe from time to time. In 1816, congress passed an act excluding for- eigners from engaging in the fur trade unless granted special permission by authority of the president. The power of deter- mining who were to receive licenses was delegated by the presi- dent to the Indian agents, inasmuch as they were in a better position to decide what foreigners might with propriety be allowed to trade within the limits of the United States. Since
15 Indian Office Papers, Michigan Letter Book, 3 (1818-1822) :105.
16 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 2:302.
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the American capital employed in the industry was not suffi- cient to supply the needs of the Indians, it was not thought wise at this time to exclude foreigners entirely, but the agents were allowed to grant passes only "under such regulations as shall subject them [the traders] to a strict observance of the laws of the United States upon this subject; secure their exertions in maintaining peace between the Indian tribes, and this govern- ment, and between themselves; and present additional induce- ments to respect the laws against smuggling." More strin- gent regulations were prescribed in 1818, when the president gave orders that no foreigners were to be licensed to trade with the Indians, nor were American traders to be allowed to take with them foreign engagés. But as it was almost impossible for American traders to dispense with the services of the French- Canadian voyageurs and interpreters, there was later a slight relaxation from this strict ruling, and permission was given to employ foreign engagés under certain conditions, one of which was that none should be employed who were obnoxious to Amer- ican citizens by reason of their conduct during the war of 1812. The various agents did not hesitate to refuse licenses to foreign- ers on occasion. In 1816, Charles Jouett, agent at Chicago, announced that he had refused to one Beauveaux a license to trade because of "his having held up to odium those Indians who are remarkable for their attachment to the American Gov- ernment."18 In the following year, Governor Ninian Edwards, believing that the hostility of the Winnebago and other Indians living along the Mississippi was due to the influence of British traders, declared his intention of refusing all British traders per- mission to enter Illinois territory. The regulations looking to the exclusion of foreigners, however, do not appear to have been very effective. Licenses were taken out in the names of Amer- ican citizens, but often as soon as the outfit in question entered the Indian country, a foreign trader who was nominally an engagé in the expedition took charge and directed the commerce with the Indians.
"Wisconsin Historical Collections, 19:406.
18Indian Office Papers, Michigan Letter Book, I (1814-1817) :395.
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THE INDIANS AND THE FUR TRADE
As a means of destroying the influence of the private traders, particularly the British, and of attaching the Indians to the Amer- ican government, the United States placed great confidence in a system of government trading factories which had its origin as far back as 1795. These factories were not intended to be money-making enterprises but were designed rather to supple .- ment the Indian department in the administration of the frontier. Certain provisions of an act of 18II, which was still in force in 1818, will serve to illustrate the general nature of the plan. The president was given authority to establish factories at such places on the frontier as he might deem most convenient and to appoint a superintendent of Indian trade who should manage the busi- ness on behalf of the government. The agents appointed to take charge of the various factories were to be responsible to the superintendent and render their accounts to him. The prices of the goods employed in the trade were to be regulated in such a manner that the original capital stock furnished by the United States should not be diminished, no effort being made to secure a profit in the conduct of the business. The furs, skins, and other articles obtained from the Indians in the course of trade were to be sold at public auction under the direction of the presi- dent at such places as should be deemed most advantageous.19
In 1818, the United States maintained four factories in the northwest, at Chicago, Green Bay, Prairie du Chien, and Fort Edwards. Before the war of 1812, there had been government trading houses at Mackinac, Chicago, Fort Madison, and San- dusky; but during the course of hostilities all were lost to the British, together with their buildings, supplies, and furs. In 1816, shortly after the close of the war, factories were estab- lished at Green Bay and at Prairie du Chien, both of which places were within Illinois territory, and at Chicago. This last was placed under the supervision of Jacob B. Varnum. Matthew Irwin and John W. Johnson were appointed factors at Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, respectively. A trading house was built at Fort Edwards in 1818, as a branch of the establishment at Prairie du Chien, with Robert Belt as the assistant in charge; but the next year this was made an independent establishment. It
"Statutes at Large, 2:652.
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ILLINOIS IN 1818
was designed to supply the tribes between Prairie du Chien and St. Louis, and to drive out the unprincipled private traders oper- ating in that quarter, who, the superintendent of trade declared, had during the past two years supplied the Sauk and Fox Indians with no less than fifty barrels of whiskey.
The goods used at the government factories were all purchased under the direction of the superintendent of Indian trade, Thomas L. McKenney, who had his headquarters at Georgetown, Dis- trict of Columbia. The articles designed for Fort Edwards and Prairie du Chien were generally sent to Pittsburgh to be shipped down the Ohio to St. Louis. There they were received by James Kennerley, who acted as forwarding agent and sent them up the Mississippi to their respective destinations. The peltry received from the Indians at Fort Edwards in 1818 included deer, bear, beaver, otter, raccoon, and muskrat. A por- tion of the goods was also traded for lead, obtained by the Indians from the mines below Prairie du Chien, and for beeswax, tallow, and Indian mats. These furs and other goods were sent to Kennerley at St. Louis and forwarded by him up the Ohio to Pittsburgh. The trade at Chicago and Green Bay was conducted in a manner very similar to that at Fort Edwards and Prairie du Chien, with the exception that the goods were forwarded to the factories and the returns shipped back by way of the great lakes. Not all the goods received at the trading houses in the northwest were exchanged directly with the Indians by the factors. At times some of them were made up into outfits and sold to private traders, who carried them out into the interior. Sometimes the factors at the government houses sold the peltry which they received to private traders, but in December, 1818, strict orders were issued by the superintendent that it was all to be forwarded to the Indian trade house at Georgetown. The furs from the posts in the northwest were generally disposed of at Georgetown by means of annual public sales.20
In so far as the object of the government in establishing the factory system was to destroy the influence of the private trader and attach the Indians to the United States, the plan must be
20 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 2:335.
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THE INDIANS AND THE FUR TRADE
pronounced a failure. The power of the private trade. increased rather than diminished, while the tribes of the northwest still regarded the United States with suspicion and distrust. The system was likewise a failure from a business point of view. Taking into consideration the cost of maintaining the factory at Chicago, the trade there was conducted at a loss estimated, by March 31, 1818, at nearly two thousand dollars. In December of that year the factor reported that he had hardly done suffi- cient business that season to clear the wages of his interpreter.21 Two years later the superintendent of trade, in a letter to the secretary of war, wrote, "I conceive it proper to make known to you for the information of the President that the u. s. factory at Chicago has ceased, almost to do business."22 The trade at Fort Edwards in 1818 was somewhat more prosperous than that at Chicago, but even there the returns in furs and skins obtained by the government factor were probably insignificant in compari- son with those secured by the private traders who operated in the region.
Many reasons for the failure of the government factories in their competition with private traders were advanced by persons supposedly familiar with the situation. The factories were so few in number and so widely scattered that it was often neces- sary for the Indians who wished to deal with the government agents to make long journeys with their furs. The private trader, on the other hand, went out into the wilderness, carrying his goods to the Indians at their hunting grounds or villages. The government factors, moreover, were not allowed to give credit in their dealings with the Indians. When cold weather approached, the savages were usually without money or furs but it was necessary for them to secure many articles, such as guns, ammunition, traps, kettles, and blankets, before they could set out for their wintering grounds. Since these articles could not be obtained at the factories, the Indians were obliged to resort to the private traders, who were more than willing to supply their needs on credit. The obvious result was that the private
21Morse, Report on Indian Affairs, 46.
22Indian Office Papers, Trade Letter Book, E (1818-1820) :496.
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trader obtained by far the larger share of the returns of the win- ter's hunt. Furthermore it is certain that the private traders were able to evade the vigilance of the government agents and make extensive use of liquor in their trading operations, and this gave them a decided advantage over the factors, although it was in the long run injurious to the trade as a whole. The Indian would give up everything he possessed, including furs and even clothing itself, for a little whiskey. In spite of the fact that it was not the intention of the government to derive any profit from the trade, it appears that the goods supplied by the factors usually sold at prices higher than those charged by the private traders and were often of inferior quality. Thus, notwithstand- ing the benevolent intentions of the government in establishing trading houses, the Indians could derive no advantages from dealing with the factories.
Factors and agents alike complained frequently and loudly of the evil influence of foreign traders until one is almost tempted to believe that the British were made the scapegoats for all the misfortunes which attended the efforts of the United States to regulate Indian affairs and to carry on the fur trade. Referring to the Chicago factory in 1820, the superintendent of trade wrote: "The causes which has so successfully prostrated the once flourishing hopes of this establishment, is so notorious, as hardly to need refering to. It lies deep in the influence (prin- cipally British,) which is spread so generally over that region; and in the combinations which have been entered into to do away, from amongst the Indians inhabiting that Country, what- ever controll the u. s. may essay to acquire over them, either by the Factory or any other system."23 There is no direct evidence, however, that the British traders were any more active than the American traders in prejudicing the minds of the Indians against the government factories. It was the American Fur Company, in fact, which finally gave the death blow to the factory system.
A most important reason for the failure of the factories to accomplish their purposes is to be found in the attitude of the Indians themselves toward them. Governor Cass, as early as
23Indian Office Papers, Trade Letter Book, E (1818-1820) :496.
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SHABBONA [Negative owned by Illincis State Historical Library]
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THE INDIANS AND THE FUR TRADE
1814, wrote: "Our trading factories, and our economy in presents have rendered us contemptible to them. The Govern- ment should never come in contact with them but in those cases where its dignity, its strength or its liberality will inspire them with respect or fear."24 In fact, the savages seem to have mis- conceived entirely the nature of the factory system and the pur- pose of the government in inaugurating it. Major Marston, who commanded at Fort Armstrong, on Rock Island, revealed the attitude of the Indians living in that vicinity. If mention were made to them of their Great Father, the president, supply- ing them with goods, they would reply, "You are a pash-i-pash- i-to, (a fool) our Great Father is certainly no trader; he has sent those goods to be given to us, as presents; but his Agents are endeavouring to cheat us, by selling them for our peltries."25 Needless to say, this attitude was fostered by the private traders who did everything in their power to drive the factories out of existence. In this opposition the lead was taken by the Amer- ican Fur Company, and its influence was strong enough to nullify all efforts to strengthen the system, and finally brought about its abolition in 1822.
The government factories are of interest chiefly from the political rather than from the commercial point of view, for it was in the hands of the private concerns that the fur industry attained its highest development. The Indian trader in Illinois had a long and varied career and the story of his picturesque wilderness traffic constitutes an alluring phase of the history of the state. For over a century the smooth-flowing streams of Illinois were disturbed by the paddle of the French-Canadian voyageur and the hills on either side reëchoed his melodious songs, while during part of that period the prairies and forests recognized the semi-feudal authority of a great fur company. Controlled in turn by the French, the English, and finally by the Americans, the fur trade, as it was carried on in Illinois in 1818, bore traces of both the French and the British régimes. The
24Indian Office Papers, Michigan Letter Book, I (1814-1817) :7.
25 Blair, Indian Tribes, 2:177.
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ILLINOIS IN 1818
engagés who performed the menial labor connected with the in- dustry, as well as many of the traders who bartered with the Indians, were, in some instances, descendants of the coureurs de bois who had come while the fleur-de-lis still waved over the region of the great lakes and the Mississippi valley. The influ- ence of the British period, on the other hand, may be traced in the business organization of the trade.
It is difficult for the present inhabitants to realize the extent to which wild game once abounded in the state, and the enormous quantities of peltry which were annually exported. The valley of the Illinois river was, at the close of the territorial period, one of the important fur bearing areas of the northwest. In 1816, the furs sent out from the various posts upon the Illinois river included ten thousand deer, three hundred bear, ten thousand rac- coons, thirty-five thousand muskrat, four hundred otter, three hundred pounds of beaver, five hundred cat and fox, and one hundred mink. The total value of this peltry was estimated at $23,700. The merchandise imported into the region during the same year was estimated to be worth $18,000. Chicago was an important trade center, and the furs exported thence in the same year were estimated to be worth more than $8,000.26 In consid- ering the Illinois fur trade, it should be remembered that it con- stituted only one part of an industry of enormous proportions, covering the great lakes region, and extending westward far beyond the Mississippi, an industry which at one time or another has made its influence felt in almost every part of the North American continent.
By far the largest and most important of the trading concerns operating in Illinois and the northwest in 1818 was the Amer- ican Fur Company. At the close of the war of 1812, a large part of the trade of the great lakes region was in the hands of two associations, the Northwest and Southwest companies. The former was a British concern, in which were included a number of the most powerful trading firms of Montreal, but it had sev- eral posts south of the boundary line, within the territory of the United States. The Southwest Company was owned by John
26The exports from the Illinois river in 1816 also included ten thousand pounds of maple sugar.
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Jacob Astor and certain Montreal traders, Astor having a two- thirds interest in the trade carried on within the United States.
The act of congress of 1816 excluding foreigners from the fur trade unless specially licensed made it difficult for the Canadian firms to operate their trading posts upon American territory. Immediately upon the passage of this act, Astor, who cherished the design of obtaining control of the entire fur trade within the limits of the United States, formed a concern which he called the American Fur Company and purchased not only the interest of the Montreal merchants in the Southwest Company but a num- ber of posts of the Northwest Company on American soil as well. Besides the posts, Astor was able to secure the services of a large number of traders and engagés formerly attached to them who would otherwise have been thrown out of employment. The act of 1816 was interpreted so as not to exclude foreign engagés, and thus it was possible for the new company to make use of the services of these British subjects, without whose assistance, indeed, success in an enterprise of such magnitude as was con- templated would have been almost impossible.27 In order that the manner of conducting the business might have an appearance of legality, licenses were taken out in the names of young American clerks, while the actual conduct of the trade was in the hands of those who had formerly been in the service of the British mer- chants, and who possessed the necessary experience.
The American Fur Company began operations in 1817, and in the following year its trade covered a wide range of territory, stretching from the eastern shores of Lake Huron to the Missouri river and from the Canadian boundary to the frontier line of settlements in Illinois and Indiana. Traders supplied by Astor's company were to be found along the shores of Green Bay, in the valley of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers, and also upon the upper reaches of the Minnesota river, then called the St. Peter's; they coasted along the shores of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior, trading with the Indians from such posts as Milwaukee and Fond du Lac; they descended the Mississippi from Prairie du Chien,
27Chittenden, American Fur Trade, 1:310, 311; Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, 1:513. Chittenden says that Astor was largely instru- mental in securing the passage of the law referred to.
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ILLINOIS IN 1818
exchanging goods for furs with the Indians living in Illinois and Missouri territories; and every year their brigades visited the Illinois and Wabash rivers, to reap the rich harvest of peltry in their valleys.28
Astor and his agents entered upon the conduct of the north- west trade with the avowed intention of driving all competitors from the field. Such a task necessarily required some time, but the spirit of this undertaking is revealed in the words of Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart, agents of the company who wrote to Astor in the summer of 1817: "Next year our exertions must be more general and efforts must be made to embrace every section of the trade and not leave the [m] [the competitors] a corner to repose in-this summer it was impossible to effect every- th[ing.]"29 The following season, Stuart was able to report that his colleague had, after much effort, secured the services of nearly every good trader in the whole region in the interests of the com- pany. He added that while their rivals had carried on a vigor- ous competition in every section of the interior, there was good reason to believe that they were secretly disheartened. In 1819, Astor was considering the advisability of contracting somewhat the range of the company's operations but Crooks advised against it, pointing out that victory over their rivals was almost within their grasp and that to yield any ground at that particular time would strengthen the opposition by just so much.30
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