USA > Indiana > A history of Indiana from its exploration to 1850 > Part 10
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43
110
HISTORY OF INDIANA
was seen. The shots roused the rest of the Indians, who filed in small bands in different directions. The main body of the warriors, however, under the Little Turtle, who had planned the ambuscade of two days before, was stationed under the high banks of the Maumee at the ford a short distance below the junction. Here as the regulars under Major Wyllys attempted to cross, the Indians fell upon them and killed nearly all of them, including the com- mander. Most of the men fell in the stream, then very low, and their blood reddened its waters for a great distance. Excepting a small squad of cavalry under Major Fontaine, who fell at the first fire, the militia, 200 of whom were near the ford, took no active part in the fight, returning hastily but unmolested to Harmar's camp as soon as they realized that the regulars were annihilated. When the frightened militia reached the main camp there was almost a panic. Hardin urged the commander to lead his whole army forth- with against the Indians. This perhaps would have been the best thing to do had the commander been a more ener- getic soldier, but, considering the jealousy among the offi- cers, the ill-feeling between the regulars and militia and the insubordination of the army as a whole, General Har- mar certainly did the wise thing in getting them out of the Indian country.26
In the meantime Major Hamtramck with a force of 400 men moved up the Wabash to the Vermillion Towns, which he destroyed. Meeting with no Indians, he returned to Fort Knox, having accomplished nothing. In explanation of his failure it should be said that Major Hamtramck de- pended on Major Whitely of the militia to bring supplies from the Falls. The latter started with ninety-six beeves and arrived with twenty, having lost or sold during the same time 200 of his horses. The year's campaign closed with all the prestige of victory with the Indians. They had, indeed, been despoiled of their houses, their corn and beans,
26 St. Clair Papers, I, 167-170. A good map of the campaign is given in the Northwest Under Three Flags, Charles Moore, 346; American State Papers, Military, I, 20. The record of the court of inquiry held September 15, 1791, at Fort Washington, is there given.
111
INDIAN WARS
fruits of the toil of their squaws and children. The In- dians later gathered together hastily, and built huts to face the cold and famine of the long northern winter, while on the other hand the exposed settlers awaited in dread the vengeance of the tribesmen, which they knew the unsuc- cessful expedition would draw down upon them.
In this expectation they were not mistaken. A long list of murders and robberies followed, beginning January 2, 1791, with the massacre at the Big Bottoms of the Mus- kingum. The outlying squatters, the women and children, the man in the field, the lone travelers on road or river, going to church or to the mill, above all, the immigrants on the upper Ohio, all felt the hardships of this merciless war. It was reported that 300 white persons were lost on the Ohio river alone. The Indians in bands of twelve or fifteen lay concealed about the stockades or settlements until an opportunity offered to kill or capture without dan- ger to themselves, after which they made off at the rate of forty miles a day with scalps or captives. Pursuit or punishment was impossible except by the old Indian hunt- ers who outrivaled the warriors themselves in deeds of cunning murder.27
The Americans had learned a few things by the failures of the year 1790. The policy of employing regulars and militia together had proven a mistake, but it seemed noth- ing less than a national disaster would convince some of the old army officers of it. Petitions were presented to the President asking him to entrust the defense of the frontier to the militia and offering to raise a sufficient force to conquer the country at once. On the other hand intelligent observers recognized the uselessness of retalia- tory expeditions in ending the war. December 2, 1790, Major Hamtramck wrote St. Clair that, judging from the experience of years of Indian warfare, the Americans would never be able to end the war as long as the British held the northern posts; that if the Indians offered peace in the spring it ought not to be granted as it would only
27 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 83, seq .; also 107 seq., where is given the correspondence concerning northwestern Indians.
112
HISTORY OF INDIANA
be a ruse of the mischief-making British; that Indians could not be subdued by burning their houses and destroy- ing their corn, damages most easily repaired, since they live indifferently well on the game from the forest; that they could not be decisively beaten in a general engagement for they would not fight except at a great advantage and when hard pressed would scatter into the forest where pursuit was impossible; that the only way to end the war was for a regular army to establish a line of forts from Vincennes to Lake Erie, overawe the British and dictate peace to the Indians.28 It might be pointed out that this was the policy carried out by Gen. Anthony Wayne. Noth- ing has caused more wrong to the Indians than humoring them in council with the silly fiction that they were the equals of the white men.
But the Kentuckians loved vengeance as the Indians loved war. Each party had suffered great cruelty at the hands of the other, and neither was disposed to listen to reason. In order to gratify the Kentuckians and at the same time keep the war in the Indian country while St. Clair recruited a regular army, President Washington authorized General Charles Scott with the Kentucky mi- litia to attack the Wea Towns.29 The expedition was to consist of 500 men equipped and paid by the national gov- ernment, to start about the first of May, and to be out twenty days. The object of the raid was to get some cap- tives, especially women and children, to hold as hostages. On visiting Lexington, May 5, to see how preparations were going forward, St. Clair found 750 men ready to go. These volunteers were to meet at Frankfort on May 15, 1791, and thence proceed down to the mouth of Kentucky river, where they would find powder and lead. On May 19, the force was at the place of rendezvous ready to start, but were kept waiting four days by St. Clair who was expecting a report from Col. John Proctor, then on a fruitless mis- sion of peace to the hostile tribes.30
28 St. Clair Papers, II, 136, 197.
29 Dillon, History of Indiana, 262.
30 St. Clair Papers, II, 205.
113
INDIAN WARS
On May 23, the army set out from the Ohio, and headed straight for the Wea Towns. Its way led through the un- broken forest across the branches of White river. Rain fell in torrents accompanied by storms of wind and light- ning. The rivers were high and each skirted by a swamp four to six miles wide, making the course a succession of quagmires. The muddy paths wore down their horses and the rains spoiled their provisions. In eight days the troops reached the prairies south of Lafayette, coming upon an Indian scout from the villages, but being unable to overtake him. The guide, Col. John Hardin, who had volunteered for this service, was not sure of the location of the main Indian town. All pushed forward as eagerly as their jaded horses would carry them, however, until one o'clock when they came upon two villages. Ordering Captain McCoy and Colonel Hardin with one company to attack the villages, the others hurried toward the main town, about five miles away, concealed by a grove. On turning the corner of this grove the Americans came suddenly upon the Indian town. A few warriors had remained in a house at the edge of the town to delay the Kentuckians. These were quickly killed or brushed aside and the whole force charged into the town. The Indians had been warned by the sentinel and were crossing the Wabash in great confusion when the Ameri- cans reached the bank. The soldiers, dismounting, dashed down to the water's edge in time to destroy five canoes, killing or capturing the occupants.31
Col. James Wilkinson was ordered to lead a detachment of 200 men mounted on the freshest of the horses up to the ford two miles above for the purpose of crossing and in- tercepting the retreating fugitives, but on account of high water did not cross. A company, under Captain Barbee, succeeded in crossing just below, some soldiers finding canoes and others swimming, in time to cut off a few strag- glers, but the larger part escaped unmolested.
During this time Hardin was busily engaged. He suc-
31 General Scott's instructions, and his reports are given in Ameri- can State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 129, also in St. Clair Papers, I, 129, scq.
114
HISTORY OF INDIANA
ceeded in surprising the villagers, taking 52 prisoners and killing six warriors before a relief party, under Captain Brown, arrived with aid. By sundown all the troops had gathered in the Wea Village. This was a town of seventy substantial houses, some of which were well finished. Sev- eral French families lived with the Weas and had intro- duced more advanced cultivation than was to be found in neighboring towns. Books, papers, and written documents made it evident they were in close connection with the Brit- ish at Detroit. A large stock of corn, household goods, and peltries was burned.
Early in the morning General Scott ordered Colonel Wilkinson with 500 men to attack the town of Kethtipe- canunc at the mouth of Eel river, but an examination showed that the horses were too much worn for the long, hard ride of eighteen miles through the swamp country. In this dilemma 360 men volunteered to undertake the march on foot. Starting from camp at five thirty in the afternoon, they reached the town by forced marches at ten forty p. m. and lay on their arms till daylight the next morning. An attack was made, but the Indians had quietly slipped across Eel river and scattered to the woods. After destroying the town the party hastened back to the camp, which they reached at one p. m., having marched thirty-six miles. June 4, while the army rested, General Scott sent sixteen captives, old squaws and children, with a letter to the Indians, telling them that if they would return and surrender he would spare their town, but he received no answer. Next day, after destroying everything, the troops set out for the Falls of the Ohio, where they arrived June 14, without the loss of a man and with fifty-eight prison- ers.32 The expedition was creditable to its leader, both from a military and humane standpoint.
As soon as General Scott's troops returned, St. Clair de- cided to send out another expedition. He accordingly noti- fied the Kentucky military board to call out 500 men to ren- dezvous at Cincinnati. The board placed Gen. James Wil-
32 The names of these prisoners are given in Scott's report referred to above.
115
INDIAN WARS
kinson in command. Gathering his forces together hastily that officer marched away from Fort Washington, near Cin- cinnati, August 1, 1791, holding his course for three days directly toward the Miami Towns. On August 4, when about seventy miles from Cincinnati, he turned to the north- west, floundering in the swamps and swollen streams till August 6, when he struck a broad trail that led him to the Wabash five miles above the mouth of Eel river. Although it was five o'clock in the afternoon the soldiers pressed on and, two and one-half miles further, came unexpectedly upon the village home of the Miami chief, Little Turtle. Seeing the Indians fleeing to the woods the troops charged across the shallow stream, and succeeded in killing six war- riors and taking thirty-four prisoners. Various stories were told by the captives concerning the whereabouts of the warriors, but Captain Caldwell, who scoured the neigh- borhood with a detachment of troops, was unable to find a single one. The village, situated about six miles from the mouth of Eel river on its northwest bank, was in the midst of an impenetrable thicket of brambles, black jacks and hawthorns.
Next morning, after hastily destroying the growing corn, the troops set out for the Kickapoo towns on the prai- rie, thirty miles to westward. After floundering through swamps the greater part of the way they reached the town, but their horses were thoroughly worn out. For this rea- son the commander decided not to go on to the principal Kickapoo town, and, after destroying again the growing corn at Ouaitanon, turned homeward by the same route which Scott had followed, arriving at the Falls of the Ohio August 2.
Nothing of value was accomplished by these expeditions. The Indians of the upper Wabash, confirmed in the belief, as taught them by the English, that the Americans would be satisfied with nothing less than their destruction, now rallied to a man for the war. They were also more success- ful in their plea to the Lake Indians, by telling them that the Americans would not stop when the Miamis were driven away. On the other hand the Americans were lulled into a
116
HISTORY OF INDIANA
false notion that the conquest of the Indians was an easy matter.33
As soon as the news of the defeat of General Harmar reached President Washington at Philadelphia, prepara- tions were begun for a new campaign. It was felt that all the moral effects of a victory remained with Little Turtle and his warriors. The Secretary of War advised the Presi- dent as early as January 15, 1791, that it was necessary to attack the Indians at once with overwhelming force, to establish a fort at the head of the Maumee, and not only to overthrow the Miamis but to curb the Ottawas and Chip- pewas. The number of soldiers on the frontier was entirely inadequate for this, and he recommended a new regiment. Col. John Proctor was sent on a peace mission, though noth- ing was hoped for from it. Military preparations went on steadily. The expeditions of Scott and Wilkinson were in- tended merely as a mask for the larger operations. One new regiment of regulars was to be added to the First, which was commanded by Hamtramck. These regiments, forming the basis of the army, were to be strengthened by two regiments of United States levies enlisted for six months and all the militia that could be profitably used. At the head of this force (never an army) was placed Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory. Second in command was Gen. Richard Butler, who seemed half-hearted in the matter from the first. Col. Charles Scott, of Kentucky, was appointed to command the militia. It is not necessary to follow the details of this mis- guided, mismated, misordered, misdirected affair. The ex- pedition was intended to rendezvous at Fort Washington ' July 10, but it was September 7 before General Butler and the quartermaster arrived. As soon as Butler arrived a jealousy between him and General Harmar sprang up over criticisms of the previous campaign. A courtmartial was demanded and several days of valuable time spent in taking evidence concerning a misfortune which all knew was due
33 General Williamson's official report is in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 133. His report to St. Clair is given in St. Clair Papers, II, 233.
117
INDIAN WARS
to undrilled, disobedient militia. The only man that pro- fited by that unfortunate experience was General Harmar, who after vainly pointing out to some of the officers that another calamity was approaching from the same cause, withdrew from the army and retired to Pittsburg.
In spite of commendable exertions on his own part, St. Clair had nothing like an army. Supplies were not on hand, guns and ammunition were defective, the militia as well as the levies were uncontrollable and wandered about regard- less of orders. Colonel Hamtramck, with the First Regi- ment-the only disciplined troops in the west-was sent on to build a fort on the Great Miami, twenty-three miles northwest of Cincinnati. The militia were already desert- ing and the Indians were stealing the horses from under the walls of the fort. The militia were passed on to Fort Hamilton as fast as they arrived in Cincinnati. With noth- ing to do and with the fall rains pouring down incessantly they soon became discontented and began again to desert. There were not enough regulars to prevent this, and it con- tinued in increasing numbers. Parties of ten, twenty and even one hundred openly took the trail for Cincinnati and home. The disaffection rapidly spread to the raw levies, who claimed their terms of enlistment had expired. Parties of hunters, formed in defiance of orders, were cut off by savages who hung on the flanks of the army and noted every move. Provisions were obtained with great difficulty, being transported on horseback from Cincinnati. It was October 20 before the last company of the Second Regiment arrived at the latter place. The main division was about fifty miles on the march by this time, though straggling recruits and deserters were coming and going all along the way. On October 31 a full company of militia marched off for home, declaring their intentions of stopping the pack horses on the way to obtain provisions. For fear of trouble the entire First Regiment was sent back as far as Fort Jefferson to protect the supply train against these muti- neers.
The army continued at a snail's pace in the direction of Miamitown. The continual rains made the whole coun-
(9)
118
HISTORY OF INDIANA
try an almost impassable swamp. Five miles were con- sidered a good day's march. As they proceeded, the In- dians, in large bands, were seen prowling around.
On October 3 the army marched about nine miles, reach- ing camp after dark. Marching was difficult in the swampy country, and the men were so tired when they arrived that no attempt at fortifications was made. The camp lay on the side of a small creek twenty yards wide. The high ground was barely sufficient for the regulars to huddle to- gether on, and the militia had to pass on about three hun- dred yards beyond the stream. This was supposed to be a branch of the Miami, but it proved to be the headwaters of the Wabash.
The sentinels were restless all night. Their frequent firing at what they took to be Indians kept the camp dis- turbed and the officers alarmed. Skulking Indians were re- ported seen by the guards. About ten o'clock General But- ler sent out a captain and thirty men to make a reconnois- sance. This officer reported an Indian army in the neigh- borhood, but the report did not find its way to the com- mander, St. Clair.
The fact was that an Indian army had been following St. Clair for several days. It seems that the Indians had feared Major Hamtramck and the First Regiment. Now that these old experienced Indian fighters had been sent to the rear, it was decided to make an attack. All night Little Turtle's forces had been taking position for the early battle. The American troops had been paraded as usual at daylight October 4, and had been dismissed for breakfast just as the Indian warwhoop gave the signal of attack. At the first volley the frightened militia rushed for the camp, three hundred yards away. Their stampede threw the front lines of the regulars into confusion so that at first the Indians met with slight resistance. There was no surprise worth speaking of, for all the regulars were under arms and in . line before the Indians reached them. The attacking In- dians spread to either flank and soon had the regulars sur- rounded and crowded back on the high ground. The militia, huddled together in the center, added to the confusion, and
119
INDIAN WARS
interfered with the artillery. The fighting grew warm on the left flank and the American lines gave way. But no sooner had the Indians advanced to the open ground than they in turn were driven back. One battalion after another raised the savages with the bayonet but no advantage was secured from these charges. The advanced line could not be held, and the Indians always followed closely the re- treating soldiers. They were adepts in hiding and flitting from tree to tree until within a few yards of the whites. They appeared only when routed from cover with the bayo- net. They soon had most of the officers picked off and the gunners killed. Not an officer of the artillery was left when the few gunners remaining around the battery spiked the guns and abandoned them. The troops were rapidly becoming an ungovernable mob when the order for a re- treat was given. The few officers left gathered together and led the way. As soon as the road was gained a precipitate flight began. The wounded were abandoned, arms were thrown away, and all semblance of organization disap- peared. The Indians did not follow the rout far, but turned to plunder and scalp.
St. Clair did all he could with the troops at hand. The militia were of no service whatever. Time and again the regulars drove the Indians at the point of the bayonet, but the riflemen refused to take their places in the line and hold them back. When the retreat started they lost all sense of disgrace, and ran over the wounded in their haste. Many never stopped to eat a meal till they were nearly to Cin- cinnati.
The defeat left the frontier unguarded, but fortunately the First Regiment was unharmed, and the defeated re- cruits and militia were largely made up of the riff-raff of the frontier. Their death was little loss. Thirty-seven officers and 593 men were killed or missing; 31 officers and 252 men were wounded. St. Clair was not in uniform nor on a horse and that alone no doubt saved him. Winthrop Sargent and John Gibson, both well known in early Indiana history, were officers and both were wounded. All told,
120
HISTORY OF INDIANA
the loss was 913. General St. Clair reached Cincinnati on November 8.34
ยง 21 A YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE END OF THE WAR
GOVERNOR ST. CLAIR'S shattered army reached Fort Washington November 8. December 26, 1791, Secretary Knox laid before the President a plan to end the Indian War. This plan called for a well-appointed, seasoned army of 5,188 men. These men were to be collected and thorough- ly drilled before being led into the Indian country. The prep- arations of the previous year had been masked by militia expeditions, but now, in deference to the wishes of Wash- ington, an earnest effort was to be made during the year 1792 to settle the Indian trouble by negotiations. Pending these negotiations the army was to be organized on the frontier. Rufus Putnam, superintendent of Indian affairs for the Northwest, was entrusted with the work of obtain- ing peace. Early in the spring there were, accordingly, dis- patched to the hostile Indians three flags under a man named Freeman, Maj. Alexander Trueman, a gallant sol- dier of the First Regiment, and Col. John Hardin, of Ken- tucky. These men were all sacrificed in this futile attempt at peace. Major Hamtramck was directed to get in com- munication with the Wabash tribes and prepare them for a council at Vincennes in the autumn. These Indians, since the raid of the previous year, were inclined to be reasonable. The Weas grasped the opportunity of sending a delegation to visit Scott's prisoners then held at Cincinnati. The leader of this delegation, the Wea chief, Jean Krouch, who had been intrusted by his tribe with large powers for treaty making, died in Cincinnati, but Putnam was so im- pressed with the sincerity of the broken-hearted visitors who had hoped that their chief would succeed in rescuing the prisoners, that he placed prisoners, visitors and a
34 The official reports and other papers concerning this expedition are in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 136. Many details are given in St. Clair Papers, I, 117; II, 233. For a detailed account of St. Clair's Defeat see McMaster, A History of the People of the United States.
121
INDIAN WARS
goodly store of presents on boats and set out for Vincennes. A treaty was concluded there September 27, which ended the hostilities of the Wabash tribes and restored to the tribesmen about 100 women and children captured the year before. After sending a letter from the missionary, John Heckewelder, to the Delawares, Putnam left for the east with sixteen Wabash chiefs whom he had persuaded to ac- company him on a visit to Philadelphia. All efforts to get the hostile Miamis into council were unavailing. The white men who attempted to reach them were murdered, and the advice of Joseph Brant and Captain Hendrick, two Iroquois chiefs, whose mediation the President had secured, was un- heeded by the victorious Indians, now completely under the influence of the British.
The military preparations were not yet far enough ad- vanced to risk another campaign, and it was decided to try diplomacy yet one time more. The Indians, to the number of 2,000, were assembled on the Maumee. Here, in the neighborhood of the British traders, and easily accessible from Detroit, provisioned and counseled by the British offi- cials, they lay feverishly watching every movement of the army under Wayne. Word was sent them by Chief Hen- dricks that American commissioners would meet them at Sandusky when the buds opened in the spring. For this mission the President selected Beverly Randolph, Benjamin Lincoln and Timothy Pickering. These men spent the sum- mer of 1793 around Lake Erie vainly trying to secure an audience with the Indians, but the English succeeded in preventing it. The Indians remained firm in their demand for the Ohio River boundary. The last hope of a peaceable settlement passed, and the blame for the failure must rest on the head of Governor Simcoe and his fellow officers of Canada.35
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.