USA > Indiana > Marion County > Cumberland > History of the 11th Indiana battery : connected with an outline history of the army of the Cumberland during the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65 > Part 3
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August Ist, General Thomas and Sheridan came through here with their staffs and headquarter trains. On the 3d, Lieutenant Williams, with horses for the Battery, also pass- ed through here. In the afternoon we were paid off again by Major Henry for four months.
On the 6th, the posts stationed at Tantalon and Anderson getting relieved, struck out the next morning for their respective commands at Stevenson; we arrived at our bat- tery camp at 1:00. On the 8th, the 24th Wisconsin and 21st Michigan, with our Battery, started for Bridgeport, Ala. Our Battery took position as follows:
First section at the right and second section at the left of the railroad bridge, over the Tennessee river; the third sec
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tion some distance to the right of the first section. The river here forms an island, the main stream flowing between Bridgeport and the island, the smaller arm on the east of the island. On this island the rebel pickets were stationed yet; over the smaller arm also a railroad bridge crossed, behind which the rebels had a blockhouse for their guards. On the 12th, the writer and Lieutenant Williams, the latter having been relieved from duty as A. D. C., with General Van Cleve, rode over to Stevenson to be mustered out as second Lieutenant and mustered in as first. This duty per- formed they came back to Bridgeport in the evening again feeling a mile bigger over their advance. On the 13th, first Sergeant Scott and Quartermaster Sergeant Ehlers went through the performance of being installed as second Lieutenants. In the night of the 14th the rebel pickets left the island and set the bridge on fire which connected the island with the main land on the east. The first section gave them a few farewells in the shape of shells. From the 16th to the 20th several flags of truce came in from the rebels in front, the import of which. of course, was none of our business.
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CHAPTER VIII.
e HATTANOOGA being the objective point of our campaign as the cen- ter of future operations and the gateway of the south, two plans only were admissible to bring it into our possession. The first, over a rough mountainous country, where it would be almost impossible to trans- port by wagons enough to maintain the army, and then probably by a long seige and great loss of life gain possession. This route lay through Sequatchee valley and over Walling's ridge, to the north of Chattanooga. The second plan was to cross the Tennessee river at various
points and move to the south and threaten the communica- tion lines of Bragg. The second was the most hazardious one, but in case of success the shortest for the accomplish- ment of the object. Rosecrans decided in favor of the second. On the 29th of August the engineer corps arrived here to superintend the construction of the pontoon bridges, and Gen'l Sheridan was nearly the whole day consulting with them. Up to the 3Ist, forty-one pontoons had arrived ·at Bridgeport. Where the crossing was to be made the river was very shallow over half the width, and over that part a bridge was constructed out of trestles connected with planks, and for the balance the pontoon bridge was used. On the 2d of September, at noon, the bridge was done and our Division crossed at I o'clock p. m. A pontoon bridge also was laid over the small arm of the river and our ( Lytle's ) brigade was the first over. Our route took us through "Hog Jaw" valley, across Racoon mountain to Trenton, and on
78011
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the 4th, in the afternoon, we encamped one mile from it in the fairgrounds. On the 6th we ascended Lookout Moun- tain. We kept on this mountain, crossing from one spur to another, until the IIth when we descended into Alpine valley. This mountain march cost us several good horses; the heat and dust was, to say the least, terrible, and water very scarce, To mislead Bragg as to our movement south, Rosecrans ordered General Crittenden to move through Sequatchee valley, appear at the north of Chatta- nooga, and threaten the town. As this kept Braggs atten- tion for a while, there was hardly any resistence offered by the rebels at any of the crossings of the river. But as Bragg found out the real intention of Rosecrans, to save his line of communication, he left Chattanooga and opposed the movements in his rear. General Negley was at that time in Steven's Gap with his division, and had it not been for the tardiness of some of Bragg's corps and division commanders in executing the orders given by Bragg, Gen- eral Negley's troops would have received the best whipping they ever got. But Negley got out of the way and took "feeling" with General Baird, who was at Dug Gap. This on the 9th of September. On the same day a mounted in- fantry regiment, which had been sent on Lookout Moun- tain to observe what was going on in the rebel camp, saw the rebels evacuating Chattanooga. This regiment, 92d Ill. Inf., entered the town as the rear guard of the rebels left it. On the 10th General Bragg's army was located at Lafayette, Ga.
As soon as Chattanooga was evacuated by the enemy and taken possession of by our troops, the army was ordered to concentrate on to Crittenden's corps, who at this time had taken possession of Rossville, Dalton, and the roads around Lookout point. On the 13th our corps left Alpine valley and remounted the mountains, again on the 14th, and travel- ing on and taking different directions, descended the moun- tain on the 17th, in the evening, at Steven's Gap, into McCorning's Cove. Here during the night, being in the
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vicinity of the enemy, we formed a line of battle. The de- scent from the mountain at Steven's Gap was very steep and we had to keep on the lockchains on the carriages and wagons, and at one point in the road we had to let them down by the prolong ropes.
At 5 o'clock in the morning, on the 18th, we continued our line of march about three or four miles and then "formed line of battle." In the evening at S o'clock we continued our march and marched all night until 3 o'clock in the morning on the 19th. About 9 a. m. we resumed our march, heavy cannonading going on in our front all the time. At 3 p. m. we were ordered to "double quick" to near Crawfish Springs, the infantry receiving ammunition as they went, and in a few minutes they were, with a hurrah, in action. We took several positions with our Battery, but came not in conflict with the rebels. The ground here was very un- favorable for artillery, only here and there a small open space where we could plant our guns, but had no view in front. As night came on we took position at Lee & Gor- don's mills, awaiting what was to come on the morrow. .
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CHAPTER IX.
HE battle of Chicamauga was one of the fiercest contested battles in the army of Cumbertand. Even the southern "brave" there, had to admit against their former boasting, that "a Yankee could fight as well as a Southerner." Had not General Longstreet, on the 19th, arrived with his 20,000 veterans, reinforcing Bragg, his army would have been in a bad "fix" fight- ing the army of the Cumberland. If on the 19th, Bragg had been better informed of the positions of our isolated corps and divisions, and his division com- manders had been more energetic and not so lax in obeying his orders, he could have done great harm to our army, divided as it were, but since it was consolidated again, even with Longstreet's reinforcements, their success was doubtful.
On the 20th, in the morning, our division left Lee & Gor- don's mill and took up their position in line of battle at Widow Glenn's house, where Rosecrans had his headquarters. In front of our position was a cleared field, east of that woods. Had we been allowed to keep this position, when Longstreet attacked, it would have proven a sorry attack for him. On the morning of the 20th a heavy fog prevailed so that we could not see twenty paces ahead. About 8 a. m. the firing commenced at our extreme left, at General Thomas' corps, and successively came down the line. On the left of our division was General Wood's division, and just at the crisis, his division, by some blunder of somebody was ordered away and the gap left open. Longstreet coming to attack Wood's division, found the "gap," and to
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prevent him breaking our army in two, our division was thrown against him. In the excitement of this move, Long- street having about three times our number, our division was overrun and badly cut up. The ground being unfavor- able for the manouvring of the artillery, our battery got divided and each section commander selected a position for his own section and began operations. The writer with the first section started into the first open field, unlimbered and began throwing shells at the enemy; but as our troops soon got between us and the enemy we had to cease firing. Here James E. Webster, No. 2 of No. I gun, was killed instantly by a minnie ball, shot through the heart. The second sec- tion got in such a position that it could not do much execu- tion, and therefore had but comparatively light losses. Cor- poral Chas. Dudley, severely wounded, fell into the rebel hands and died in prison ; A. J. Cothrill slightly wounded. The third section, commanded by Lieutenant Williams, got into a regular "hornet's nest" and sustained the greatest losses.
The following is a sketch of this section during the fight from the pen of Lieutenant Williams :
Remarks of Henry M. Williams, First Lieutenant, Commanding Third Section Rodman guns :
COMRADES :- To the faithful and interesting history of the Battery, by Lieutenant Otto, I am requested to add some- thing especially covering the part taken by the third section, under my command, at the battle of Chicamauga, on the memorable 20th of September, 1893.
As an introduction, I can not do better than to read to you the remarks of the famous General Longstreet, one of the ablest of all of the rebel Generals, (probably second only to General Lee, ) in a recent interview on the subject of the battle of Chicamauga. General Longstreet's troops, fresh from Virginia, were posted directly opposite our corps on the morning of the 20th. We also were under able Gen- erals, General Phil. Sheridan commanding our division and
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General Lytle, of Cincinnati, our brigade. It was probably owing to the death of General Lytle that our guns were lost, as in the confusion following his death, the order for retreat was not given us at all. The sudden departure of our infantry support, first on the left and then on the right, being our first intimation that our position could not be held. This was a fatal omission for us as the enemy were by that time close upon us, not 200 feet distant, and it was then to late, with no cover from the infantry against so heavy a fire to limber up and save the guns.
General Longstreet on Chicamauga: "I moved my troops into position for the assault with great care. I massed five brigades in column by brigades, at half distance, and sent them forward under Hood. In other words, Hood had my whole force, with the exception of Buckner's reserves, against the federal position. I felt great interest in our winning the battle of Chicamauga. I had promised Gen- eral Lee that I would do my share toward gaining a victory here, and I never remember· to have taken greater chances in a battle than in directing this charge against Rosecrans. He and I had graduated in the same class at WestPoint, and were friends in our boyhood and early army life. He was a good soldier and a good man. I have read in his report, as well as in the stories of this battle, that have been written from time to time, that my success in breaking his lines and driving McCook and Crittenden from the field, is attributed to Wood's action in withdrawing his two brigades from the federal line about the time I started forward to the assault. The success of my attack on Rosecrans did not, by any means, depend upon Wood's mistake. The number of our men and the peculiar formation of the force I sent against the federal line in this battle could, and would have carried any position, except a strongly fortified one. The action of his subordinates and the movement of Wood in and out of the line may have made the victory easier; but Rosecrans' line could never have withstood the force of the assault I sent against it that day, no matter how well his plans had
1
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been observed or his orders obeyed. No line of battle out- side of fortifications ever yet successfully resisted the charge of troops in such numbers and formation. Our as- saulting column was five brigades deep, each within easy supporting distance. Hood led them with great spirit and gallantry. If one brigade faltered another was there to take its place. I have been a soldier all my life ; served in the Mexican war as well as the late war, and I never yet saw a body of soldiers not protected by fortifications, that could stand the onset of troops in formation such as Hood led against Rosecrans' lines that September Sunday."
General Longstreet also honored himself in thus paying noble tribute to the worth of his gallant opponent, Rose- crans.
From the "History of the Army of the Cumberland, by General Henry M. Cist, I quote as follows : "Just at this time the order of battle on the enemy's line had reached Longstreet's command, who using this gap (vacated by Wood), ordered his troops, formed in heavy columns, to ad- vance. Into this gap poured Steward's, Hood's, Kershaw's, Johnson's and Hindman's divisions, dashing impetiously forward, with Preston's division as support. On finding the rebel troops pressing through the space vacated by Wood, McCook ordered Lytle and Walworth to change front and return to assist in repelling the enemy. The tide of battle then struck Lytle and Walworth, who contended nobly against the overpowering enemy on their immediate front. The rebel troops swarming in turned the left of these brigades, and they were compelled to withdraw to escape being surrounded. At this point the gallant Lytle was kill- ed. Here our army lost several thousand prisoners, forty guns and a number of wagon trains."
It was into this gap that the IIth Indiana Battery was ordered in the greatest haste with Lytle's brigade, to at- tempt to stay the furious onslaught of the enemy. The third section of the battery advanced into the woods with the infantry, and here our active work began. The enemy
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being at very short range, the gunners were ordered to use only cannister, and after the exhaustion of the cannister shells were used, although the distance was too short to do good execution. But all was going well and we were con- gratulating ourselves upon the effective work, which was being accomplished, when suddenly and to our great amaze- ment, the infantry to the left of us retired (we know now that they were ordered to retreat, but did not know it then ) and the enemy not having far to come, were soon taking the places of our infantry, almost touching elbows, so to say. Lieutenant Williams quickly dismounted from his horse, turned one gun upon them, and as the result of a few enfiling shots, we had the pleasure to see the enemy re- treating even more quickly than they had advanced. Ex- pecting now our own infantry to resume their former posi- tion, the gun was turned back to the front, when to our further surprise, our infantry on the right was seen to be in full retreat. It was now evident that the movement was general and we also must retire, without an order if not with one if we would save our guns. The result proved that it was now to late for this; the enemy being close upon us and with no infantry as support against a galling fire, rapid- ly cutting down men and horses, the guns were lost. After giving the command to retreat and whilst remounting his horse, Lieutenant Williams was shot through the right wrist. Corporal May walking by his side, kindly offered to apply a bandage to check the flow of blood; but while pre- paring to undertake his good samaritan work, he was mor- tally wounded. Through the loss of blood I lost my horse, which Corporal Vordermark in the kindnessof his heart attempted to capture for me, but was himself captured by the rebels and spent a year in Libby prison in consequence; a very expensive horse hunting experience. A year in prison for a moment of kindness, is hard work, it must be admitted, but comrades will risk it for each other, say what we may. It shall be my constant charge in the future in civil life, to watch Jno. Vordermark when he rides on horse-
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back, and if he faints and falls off from loss of blood, or from too much blood, as is more likely, if I can't catch the horse, I shall at least catch John and assure him there is no enemy around-no Libby prison near.
How I got off that battlefield I can't tell-will have to refer you to Edward Shell. Shell is responsible for getting me off with his own horse (Shell was our Blacksmith) not with the one Vordermark didn't catch.
The loss in the third section was very heavy, about 60 per cent. in killed, wounded and prisoners-one of the exam- ples of the extra heavy losses which helped to make the average loss of the entire army at Chicamauga about 30 per cent .- a large average.
Thus it was that forty guns were captured (thirty-eight besides our own two beloved Rodmans) on this eventful day, by the interpid and dashing Longstreet. Such is fate. And yet we cannot but regret that in our case a better fate had not prevented some one from blundering, and that we might have been informed of the order of retreat at least as early as the infantry, although even earlier is the well defined rule in caring for the artillery. How many lives were uselessly sacrificed by only the grosser blunders of the late war, it is impossible to estimate. But comrades, though our right wing of the army of the Cumberland was driven back -- routed we may say-by Longstreet's impetious onslaught, bi yet, the battle of Chicamauga was not a de- feat in its results. It is an old saying, that "Bragg is a good dog, but Holdfast is better;" and as- at the battle of Stoneriver, some of us engaged there found this well ex- amplified (General Bragg there also being opposed to our Rosecrans, and the victory remaining with us although our right wing was badly routed, ) so at Chicamauga, the well trained soldiers of the Union army under "Thomas the firm" and "Steedman the fiery," proved to be the better dog. General Bragg exhausted himself in fruitless charges, but Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, was captured and retained.
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I quote from General Cist : "All things considered, the battle of Chicamauga, for the forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the rebellion. Hindman, who fought our right at Horse Shoe Ridge, says in his official report, that he had "never known federal troops to fight so well," and "never saw confederate soldiers fight better." On page 215 he says, "Taking all the sur- roundings into consideration, the campaign from the western slopes of the Cumberland mountain, ending in the battle of Chicamauga, was the most brilliant one of the war, made as it was in the face of the strong column of the enemy, whose business it was to watch every movement, and so far as possible to retard and cripple the advance of the union army. Rosecrans, with his masterly manouvering, in every instance deceived his opponent down to the withdrawal of Bragg from Chattanooga.
HENRY M. WILLIAMS.
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CHAPTER X.
IEUTENANT OTTO, with the first sec- tion, when he saw the infantry retreat- ing, waited not for the order "to re- treat," but had his guns limbered up and retreated to the next hill in his rear. By limbering up one of the guns von G the horses got so excited that it was impossible for the cannoneers to "limber up." When the limber stopped the men would take the gun forward, trying to put the trail of the gun on the limber hook, but just at that moment the horses would start again. Repeated trials failed and so we came to the end of the field, where it went down a decline into the road. On this bank or declivity stood a sapling about six inches thick, and the men in their endeavor to limber up had not seen this tree and all at once the gun hung suspended, the tree catching between the wheel and cheek of the trail. It was impossible for the men to lift the gun off this tree. Some of the infantry passing to the rear, saw the predicament we were in, came to our help, took hold of the gun, and with the exclamation of "get along Liza Jane," pushed the gun back, got free of the tree and limbered up, not any too soon however, as the whiz, whiz from the front showed us the rebels not over 150 yards off. The hill in our rear was climbed in a hurry and on top we unlimbered again, but the rebels did not follow us any further and molest us any more; probably they had as much of our iron and lead as they cared for at present. During the next hour General Sheridan reorganized the re- treating forces and marched them then on the Dry Valley road to Rossville and reported to General Thomas. The second section with whom Captain S. was, also retreated in time to be safe.
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Our new line of battle was formed from Rossville south, covering the road into Chattanooga, between 8 and 9 in the evening.
LOSSES ON THE 20TH OF SEPTEMBER.
First Section-James E. Webster, killed.
Second Section-Corporal Chas. Dudley, severely wound- ed and taken prisoner; died in prison. A. J. Cothrell and Adolph Lamont slightly wounded.
Third Section-Sergeant Pfunder, killed; Corporel May, killed; James M. R. Snyder and Henry Blase severely wounded and left on the battlefield.
Not severely wounded-Lieutenant H. M. Williams, Cor- porals Krieg and Drewes. Privates Hahn, Eger, Philip, Miller, Jeff. Thompson, Adam Phillabaum, Kirchner and Bowers.
Captured- John Vodermark and the two Rodman guns.
On the 21st we awaited the rebels on our new line of bat- tle. During the night we had gathered rails, piled them up in front of us and thrown some dirt against it-better than nothing at all-but we waited in vain, the enemy did not make its appearance; even in Thomas' front the firing · slackened. During the afternoon and evening caissons, ammunition wagons, and other transportation wagons were sent to Chattanooga. At midnight the troops commenced the evacuation of their lines to take up positions north of Chattanooga creek, a slow flowing stream with steep mirery banks. The right of our army was posted on the north of the confluence of this creek with the Tennessee river-right below Lookout point. Our battery was the farthest to the right, right close on Tennessee river. As soon as the troops got their positions pointed out, they at once began to use their shovels to throw up rifle pits and breastworks. The line extended from the right on Tennessee river, opposite Moccassin point, in a curve to Orchard Knob, and from there to a place on the Tennessee river above Chattanooga. On the morning of the 22nd, about S a. m., the new line was
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established. The same morning, after the fog rose, the pickets stationed yet on the Rossville line, saw the rebels approaching cautiously; when they came to our abandoned breastworks of the 21st, they felt surprised that they were not welcomed in the usual way. Our pickets retreated slowly, followed by the enemy, and arrived about 3 p. m. on the south side of Chattanooga creek, where they then received their welcome. The firing lasted till dark. A fort had been in process of construction here that commanded the approaches from Chattanooga valley into the town- The bridge which connected the north with the south side of Chattanooga creek, and which was of considerable length, was in line with this work, and made the approach of the enemy on this road to the town very dangerous. On the 24th the enemy made an attack on this fort, but were hand- somely repulsed. We worked the whole night on our breastworks to strengthen them. In the last couple of days the whole line of defence was so strengthened, that all things considered, we felt safe enough. This first line built was from now used only as a picket line, and other interior lines were in course of construction. On the 25th, in the morning, we moved further towards the town, on a little elevation, where we built breastworks, one for each section.
For several nights the enemy had attacked our lines some- where; also on the night of the 25th and 26th. The attack- ing party were South Carolineans, who attacked our center; cur troops took quite a number of them prisoners.
On the 28th we put up camp in the rear of our breast- works. On the 2d of October the writer with his section went on picket.
As the road to Stevenson, where our supplies were, was · very mountainous and rough, it was impossible to get enough forage and provisions here ; therefore, all the horses and mules that were not necessarily needed here were ordered to be sent to Stevenson; all of ours, except twenty-three, were sent.
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