USA > Indiana > Marion County > Cumberland > History of the 11th Indiana battery : connected with an outline history of the army of the Cumberland during the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65 > Part 5
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The commander of the confederate army anticipating the necessity of retreating to a new line, had such a line or lines prepared always before hand. His chief engineer, Colonel Prestman was always on the lookout for a new position to be ready, when the former position had to be given up. He was aided in this work by the Georgia militia and' negros. The new line into which Johnston retired was about six miles in the rear of New Hope church, from near Powder Springs to Lost mountain, Pine and Kenesaw mountains.
On the Ist of June, Stoneman, with his cavalry, had taken possession of Allatoona and the pass, and the repairs of the railroad from Kingston to the Etowah river were immedi- ately begun. On the 2d, Schofield, with the 23d corps, were in motion, crossing the Allatoona road with that from Burnt Hickory to Marietta. Of course the rebels contested every foot of the ground; but Schofield pressed on. Near the crossing of Allatoona creek with the Ackworth road, Schofield came upon the intrenched line of the enemy again.
On the 6th our Battery moved about two and a half miles, and as there was no immediate forward movement on hand we took the horses to a pasture close by, which treat they greatly enjoyed.
I have forgotten to state that on the 28th of May, Lieu- tenant Mckinley, who had been sent from Kingston to Chattanooga for horses, arrived with horses and mail.
On the 7th of June our ammunition and forage wagons arrived, and the former were transferred into our limber and caisson chests immediately.
During the whole time of our fighting at Dallas, New Hope church, etc., there was hardly a day without rain, and the roads, especially in the valleys, were in a bad condition, and it took considerable flesh off of our animals to move the battery and the train. Up to the 9th, inclusive, we had our animals in pasture every day and it did them much good.
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On the 10th, at 7 a. m., we moved forward again and arrived at Big Shanty between 3 and 4 p. m. Here our troops were in line of battle about one-half mile in front of us but no immediate attack was expected. On the 12th, the construction train arrived here, and as the whistle sounded the boys-took up the sound on the whole line. On the 13th, railroad trains arrived with provisions, forage and ammuti- tion.
The line of defence, into which the enemy had retreated, was in a line from Brush mountain, a few miles south-east of Big Shanty, to Lost mountain, near east of Marietta and south-west of Big Shanty, with a salient or detached work at Pine Mountain. This whole line was to cover Marietta, a depot of the confederate army on the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad. The right wing of the enemy was at Brush mountain. Between this and Kenesaw mountain the railroad and wagon road had their beds. These two points, naturally strong positions, were fortified in such a way that they were made impregnable, as will be seen later on when Sherman assaulted these positions with his best troops and failed. The Union army in following Johnston developed his line, first crowding him off from Pine mountain, and our right, steadily crowding the rebel left, and secured Lost mountain also. The rebels successively fell back from one position into another with their left and center, that their line in the latter part of June wasin a line south from Brush mountain, across Kenesaw and along Noses creek, their left refused to Olley's creek. But from Sherman's base of supplies, Big Shanty, it proved a very hazardious undertak- ing to supply his army with rations on account of the inces- sant rains which had nearly drowned the country; the streams, during other seasons dry beds, were full and over- flowing, making seas of mud out of the valleys, so that it proved nearly an impossiblity to supply the troops with their needed hardtack. Meat on the hoof was transported to the different commands and killed and distributed. The intention of Sherman was to crowd with his right around
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the rebel left and get across the railroad south of Marietta, but the roads, in the condition they were, made it impossible for him to stretch out his right still further. When Sherman had invested Johnston's lines, on the 13th of June, he sent a dispatch to General F. P. Blair, who was at Kingston with two divisions of the army of the Tennessee, to come up forthwith as he (Sherman) was going into Marietta on the 15th. But it proved two very long days.
On the 14th of June the left of the army of the Cumber- land were straddling the railroad at Big Shanty, their front toward Brush mountain, and their left covering Pine moun- tain, pressing the rebel lines east in the direction of Kene- saw mountain. As the army was reversed in the lines around Marietta, McPherson now was on the left wing and Schofield on the right. As the positions were made secure by breastworks, the troops were stretched more and more toward the right. On the 16th we moved about two miles to the right with our battery. This day, Captain Simonson, of the 5th Indiana Battery was killed at Fine mountain, On On the 19th, we moved our position again near Kenesaw mountain. The next day, the 20th, in the early afternoon, the first section was ordered into action against a battery on Kenesaw mountain. In this action, Lieutenant Otto was wounded by a piece of shell, striking the belt plate and abdomen below. Some of the boys carried him to a tobacco shed near by and summoned a physician, but when that worthy saw the rent the piece of iron had made, he gave the Lieutenant a drink of whiskey and left him, pro- bably he thought to die. Not long after, the stretcher men came and took all the wounded into a log house a little to the rear of our position. This room by evening got pretty well crowded with wounded soldiers. That this was not a very safe place is shown, as it was struck several times dur- ing the firing in the afternoon by cannon balls. In the evening all the wounded were taken to the Ist brigade, 2nd division, 4th corps field hospital. I will give here a little hospital experience as far as I can recollect. When we
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arrived at the hospital, twigs from the trees were gathered and put on the ground in the tent, on this a blanket was stretched and a bed for the wounded was ready. Each of us got a cup of coffee that night and laid down to rest. In the morning the same diet was given us with the addition of a hardtack; at noon a little soup and at evening again a cup of coffee and a cracker. This was our diet as long as I remained there. During the first forenoon, cots were made for the inhabitants; four crutches with poles across, some twigs on top of those, covered by a blanket-all that could be expected in a field hospital. I was not wounded seriously, the belt plate taking the force off from the piece of iron, causing only a severe and painful contusion; after the swelling went down somewhat, I was able to be up and bathed my hurt with cold water which kept out inflamma- tion. But there were others who did not get off so easy; amputations were necessary in many instances. The patient was laid on a table and the knife and saw set in operation. The groans and shrieks ot those so treated were almost unbearable and several died under the hands of the manipulators. As soon as I was able I went outside the hospital under the trees in the shade and fresh air as much as possible.
On the 22d the hospital moved further to the right to be near the division to which it belonged, as this had moved two miles further to the right. On the 26th all the slightly wound- ed in hospital who could walk were taken to Big Shanty to make room for others, as there was a general assault to be made on the Kenesaw lines the next day. On the 27th, 6 a. m., all the artillery, of the Cumberland and Tennessee armies opened on the rebel lines in front for fifteen minutes, after which the assault of the infantry was made, in four columns, but none of the columns gained the main breast- works of the enemy. The slaughter was great but the gain was nothing of any importance. The enemy was too well established in its fortifications. On the right in front of Schofield's and Hooker's line some strategic points
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were captured from the enemy. On the 28th the hospital got so crowded that I resolved to go to the battery. I sent notice to Captain S. to send a wagon over after me, which he did, and I left the hospital in the hope never to enter one again. Of course I was not able to perform duty, but I was with my own "family" anyway. When on the march I spread my blanket in one of the wagons, ambulance we had none, and traveled along.
Almost every day the position of the troops and the bat- tery were changed, and by this time we were quite well versed in building breastworks and fortifications.
As it was clear now in Sherman's mind that with direct assaults against Johnston's position at the Kenesaw, nothing could be gained, and as the rains had somewhat ceased and roads dried up so that the supplies of the army could be car- ried by wagons, he reverted to his old plan again to move by the right around Johnston's left, determined to get him out of his impregnable position on Kenesaw. It was ascertained from some of Schofield's advanced positions, that already on the 29th moving trains on the road across the Chattahoo- che river could be heard, and Johnston, no doubt, prepared himself already to evacuate Kenesaw. The whole army be- gan stretching out their lines toward the left; Garrard's cavalry on the left to cover the rail and wagon roads to Marietta. During the night of the 2d of July, the rebels evacuated their works on the Kenesaw, with our advance again on their heels pressing them hard. At 8 a. m. we were on the march to Marietta, where we arrived about 10. Since we had left New Hope church, we received our orders directly from General Thomas, and consequently were always near his headquarters on the march. When we ar- rived at Marietta, Thomas established his headquarters in town, and we were left here with him. The rebels had made another stand about five miles from Marietta, south. On the 4th enough firing was done there to make believe a battle was raging again; but it is my belief that Johnston made this stand only to get all his "duds" over the river;
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and true enough, on the morning of the 5th his lines were vacated.
On the 6th we took up our march to the front and arrived within one and a half miles of the Chattahoochee river, where we went into camp. Quite a number of prisoners were taken here (300) and were taken to the rear.
IITH INDIANA BATTERY.
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CHAPTER XV.
NE branch of the service, without which General Sherman would or could not have been successful, I have hitherto neg- lected to mention. It was the railway repair service, under the management of Colonel Wright, a civil engineer, with a corps of 2000 men. I cannot give a better description of this particular branch of service than is given in Jacob D. Cox's History of the Atlanta Campaign. Page 62, he says:
"The efficiency and skill of this branch of the service was beyond praise. The ordinary wooden bridges of the rail- way were reconstructed where destroyed, of a standard pat- tern or truss, of which the parts were interchangeable, and the prepared timbers were kept in stock at safe points in the rear. By this means a bridge could be renewed as by magic, and perhaps nothing produced a more moral effect upon the enemy than hearing the whistle of the locomotive in the rear of our lines within a few hours after they had received reports that the railway had been broken so thoroughly as to cause us great delays. But the triumph of energy and mechanical skill came when, as at the Chatta- hoochee, great trestle bridges, hundreds of feet long, and nearly a hundred high, were flung across a chasm with as little delay or trouble as an ordinary pioneer corps would make in bridging a petty stream. The construction corps and the railway transportation department. under Colonel An- derson, worked in complete accord, and at no time during the campaign was there the slightest anxiety about sup- plies, whilst a reduction of the ration was very rare." The comrades are all acquainted with the workings of the signal
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corps, with their flags waving from any commanding hill or tree top. The key of their code was changed occasionally to prevent the enemy from reading their dispatches.
As stated before, Johnston on the 5th of July, in the night, evacuated his entrenched lines (at Nickajack valley ) and fell into those prepared for him at Chattahoochee river. This position was to guard the fords and ferries leading to Atlanta; but our cavalry with the right and left wing had already taken possession of some of the ferries across that stream. Garrard with his men had occupied Roswell, about twenty miles up the river, and Stoneman had taken posses- sion of Turner's ferry, about eight miles down stream from the railway bridge crossing, and at both places preparations were made by the troops to cross the river in force. When we came into our present position, one and a half miles from the railroad bridge, a work was thrown up for our bat- tery, and on the 9th we moved our four 20 pound Parrots into it, and began to shell the rebel position in our front. During the night the rebels vacated their position on the north of the bridge and fell across the Chattahoochee, burning bridges and ferry boats. On the IIth we moved forward to the river. At night a fort was constructed at the bridge head, into which, the next day, we moved the first section and began firing at the rebel works on the opposite side of the river. For several days we kept up our fire every day. On the 16th the 18th Indiana battery went into a fort on our left. On the 17th our first section and the 18th battery opened a slow fire at the rebel's position, but the latter, who only had light guns could not do much execu- tion, and a rebel battery in front of them made it quite warm for them. They had four of their men wounded and consid- erable damage done to their works. Also one man of our section from No. 2 gun (Sam. Kelker) was slightly wounded on the head. On the 18th we resumed our fire again; toward evening a rebel wagon train was sighted, which we shelled. This made their sharpshooters mad and they went for us, but done us no damage; our fire was kept up till the 2It,
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when it was found that our front was clear, the rebels hav- ing left.
Sherman, during these days, had his headquarters at Vining's station, about five miles from the railroad crossing over the Chattahoochee. Near this station was a hill from which Atlanta and the rebel camps could be discovered, and the outlook on this hill discovered on the 9th quite a com- motion in the rebel camps.
Schofield had made a reconnoisance of the river between Pace's ferry, (a little above the crossing of the railroad bridge) and Roswell, for suitable fords and ferries, and on the 8th, in the afternoon, effected a crossing near the mouth . of Soap creek, about six or seven miles above Pace's ferry. Very little resistence by the enemy was made. A few cavalrymen, with one piece of artillery only opposed the movement from a ridge in the immediate front of the mouth of the creek. A single cannon-shot was fired, but before another shot could be fired at the crossing columns, the gun was in our hands and the few cavalrymen galloped away to convey the news to their command.
Before dark on this day, at this place, a bridge was com- pleted and a second one under construction. The fortify- ing of the hill south of the crossing was immediately begun and a trestle bridge built at the side of the one burnt.
McPherson on the right, at Turner's ferry, was ordered to keep up a lively front at this crossing to prohibit Johnston sending reinforcements to the right of his line.
On the 12th Thomas was ordered to build a pontoon bridge at Power's ferry during the night.
On the 13th McPherson was ordered to join the left and only Blair's corps was left at our right to await the return of Stoneman from his raid, destroying bridges and boats at Campbelltown and Landtown, and then also report to the left.
Having his whole army over or at the crossings of the Chattahoochee, Sherman ordered Schofield to move by way of Cross Keys toward Decatur. McPherson on the left of
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this with Garrard's cavalry on his flank cutting and destroy- ing the railroads between Decatur and Stone mountain. Thomas crossing at Pace's and Philip's ferries, marched toward Atlanta, his left to reach Buckhead, and with his line from east to west, facing south, march on to Atlanta. Schofield and McPherson reaching the line of the Georgia railroad to turn south also, and envelop the city from the east to the southeast. Thomas in his position had in his front Peachtree creek, with a wooded, uneven country. Johnston had posted his lines about two miles south of Peachtree creek from the west, leaning against the railroad near Mont- gomery chapel, to a place called Peyton's Plantation, and from there running south to the Georgia railroad, on the east of Atlanta. But at this point Johnston's work with the army was done. At Richmond it was thought that a more dashing and daring commander would better the condition of the rebel army and retrieve its losses. Hood was the one selected, and how well he done his work, or failed to do it, the future campaign will disclose.
Johnston had been very cautious in all his movements from Ringgold to the Chattahoochee river, and not a single weak point was found in his lines, and in all his retreat never lost anything of much consequence. Now .aggressive movements could be expected from his successor, and an end of the campaign could be foreseen. As Thomas work- ed his army soutward, crossing Peachtree creek on the 19th, it was attacked on the 20th by Hood's army in such an im- petious manner that he, Hood, lost that day over 6000 killed, wounded and prisoners; two corps of the army of the Cum- berland, Howard's to the left and Hooker in the center, were attacked by the enemy, and after a fearful slaughter the enemy were repulsed and fell back.
The two corps on the extreme left, Schofield's and McPherson's, on this day came down on the Georgia rail- road and country roads, pressing Wheeler with his cavalry so hard that he sent couriers to Hood for support, or else would be driven into the fortifications of Atlanta. Cleburne
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from Hardee's corps was ordered to the support of Wheeler, but that weakened the already weakened lines by the day's battle, that it cast a cloud on the army contending with Thomas.
On the 21st the union armies were drawn closer around the fortifications of Atlanta, and intrenched themselves from the west of Atlanta around the north to the south- east.
Hood also was not idle. He retired from the Peachtree intrenchments during the night of the 20th, and on the north some advanced lines of the fortifications of Atlanta were laid out, and the troops, negro and citizens, were set to work on them. A similar line was laid out on the south of Atlanta in front of McPherson's lines. These lines were completed during the night of the 21st, and occupied by the enemies troops, except Hardee's corps, of four divi- ยท sions, which was to be employed elsewhere.
Hood was certain that his army in the fortifications in Atlanty would by and by be starved out; at present he only had two lines, viz : The Atlanta and Westpoint and the Macon and Western, but they would soon be in the hands of the union armies and then he would be cut off from all communications outside. He determined, with Hardee's corps, to get in the rear of McPherson, roll him upon Scho- field and then with the rest of his army drive the army of the Cumberland from their position and drive the whole union army northward. Such was the plan, how far he suc- ceeded we shall see.
Hardee was withdrawn from his line two and one-half miles north of Atlanta, marched through the city and out at the south of it, took a road leading along Entrenchment creek, which he crossed at Cobb's mill, then turned north- east toward Decatur to within about two miles of that place. Wheeler's cavalry was to help him. As soon as day- light set in the union army discovered the entrenchments in . front of Thomas and Schofield vacated, and a general ad- vance ordered. As they came within close proximity of
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the rebel works they selected their positions and intrench- ed; batteries were put in positions and Atlanta invested from Thomas' right covering the Chattanooga railroad to McPherson's position on the south-east of Atlanta. McPherson had also been drawn closer in on the fortifica- tions in his front from the position he held the day before.
About noon on the 22d the attack commenced. As the country was heavily wooded and broken, nothing could be seen or heard that an enemy was going to strike the rear of McPherson. Walker and Bates' divisions were in the ad- vance of the rebels, and Dodge's corps, of McPherson's army, was struck first. As soon as the firing commenced the corps and division commanders immediately went to the front of their commands and assisted in the fight. McPher- son went from corps to corps in his command to see that everything was in good shape for the fight. As he left Dodge's corps for Blair's corps he ran full into the skirmish line of Cleburne's advancing division. They called to him to surrender, but he wheeled about to gallop away when a volley was fired at him and he fell mortally wounded. No one was with him but an orderly, who was also shot and captured.
The battle raged with terrible carnage for more than two hours, our men often fighting on both sides of their in- trenchments; but at last the assault was repulsed in spite of the repeated attacks of the rebel generals, who only increas- ed their loss without seriously imperilling the position of McPherson's army, which after the killing of McPherson, was commanded by John A. Logan. As night came on Hardee withdrew his troops to the ridge between Entrench- ment and Sugar creek.
Here we might ask : Where was the cavalry of Garrard? Why were they absent from the left flank, enabling Hardee to approach the rear of McPherson without warning? The reason for the absence of Garrard was this: Sherman had received repeated warnings from Grant that the enemy was expecting to reinforce Hood by the Augusta railroad. On
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account of this warning Sherman had sent Garrard east- ward on the road to Covington to burn bridges, and destroy the railroad track. This was Garrard's work during his ab- sence from the left wing.
a The losses of this battle were as follows:
Union Army-3521 killed, wounded and missing, with ten pieces of artillery.
Confederate Army-1000 dead delivered to flag of truce from one division in front of Blair's corps; 422 were buried in front of Dodge's corps; 700 in front of Logan's corps, and Blair estimated the number in front of his other divisions as many as those delivered under the flag of truce, making a total of 3200.
2000 prisoners were taken of whom one-half were wound- ed; with these data, no ingenuity of figuring can reduce the enemies total loss below the 10,000, at which Logan put it.
On the 21st our battery was ordered out of its breast- works at the Chattahoochee, where it had been left with some infantry to guard the crossing there, and early on the 22d it was on the move toward Atlanta, crossing the stream at Pace's ferry. We were about midway between Atlanta and the crossing, (the distance from the crossing to Atlanta is nine miles) when the firing at the east end of the city commenced. We, with the other troops were halted on the road, where we were for about two hours, to await the results of the fighting, and here we were informed of the death of General McPherson. Toward evening we resum- ed our march and went into camp about two and one-half miles north of Atlanta, our guns were put in position about one-half mile further south, and threw up intrenchments. Our position was about one-half mile east of the Chatta- nooga-Atlanta Railroad.
a Cox's History of the Atlanta Campaign.
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1
CHAPTER XVI.
HERMAN having done all the damage on the Augusta railroad to the east towards Richmond that it was possi- ble for him to do, and not intending to hazard his communications by go- ing by the way of the east of Atlanta to the south of it in his purpose to de- stroy the last line of railroad left for Hood, he recalled the left wing of his army, moved it around the army of the Cumberland and extended his lines on the right of the army of the Cumberland, from the Chattanooga railroad to Ezra church and trying from there to straddle the Atlanta and Westpoint railroad. Hood, de- termining the purpose of Sherman, did not like the idea so awfully well to get cooped up in Atlanta and therefore pre- pared for another slaughter.
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