USA > Kansas > Shawnee County > Honor roll : Shawnee County, Kansas > Part 4
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He reformed again and, still in column of bat- talions, moved forward and dug in just back of his skirmish line at nightfall.
On the night of September 26 the division lay in a fairly cohesive line, from a point a little south of Very to a point a little south of La Forge, on the Aire River. Sentries were posted, and patrols working to the front found the enemy at various distances away, nowhere very near.
The men of the 35th were tired, and the most of them slept, although the enemy artillery fire never ceased.
Out on the battlefield the tangled units lay in seeming order, organized for defense or quick attack. Besides the prowling patrols there was little movement
among the infantry except where an officer would succeed in finding a lost platoon or squad and would take it back to its parent company.
THE GIGANTIC TANGLE IN TRAFFIC.
But back of the lines, still in the darkness, for one dared not show a light, on every road for twenty miles there was the tangle of vehicles trying to get up with supplies, and the counter current of ambulances trying to get back with the wounded. The roads were bad in the territory captured that day, and our system of traffic control was not good. Immense numbers of negro troops, turned into labor battalions, worked constantly to repair the roads. In the tangle of traffic they plugged away. Bound northward toward the battle line were heavy guns and light guns, horse or motor drawn, and in some instances 75s were mounted on trucks that they might be carried with greater dispatch. There were automobiles of all kinds, and innumerable motor trucks carrying everything used in war, there were wagons, rolling kitchens, water carts, limbers, ambulances, ammunition wagons, machine gun carts, staff cars and, mixed between horses' feet and truck wheels, were the motor cycle orderlies shooting through every crack in the traffic jam.
There was an endeavor to keep horses off the motor roads, and motors off the roads for horse-drawn equip- ment, but it was not effective until later.
WOUNDED WAITED ON THE GUNS.
It is a cruel necessity of war which requires, under conditions such as existed that first night, that am- bulances taking wounded to the rear must be held up to let the guns and ammunition go forward. Hour after hour the long trains of ambulances lay in the congested roads, some of the wounded singing in de- fiance, some moaning in pain, some would become silent for a while and some became silent forever. One of the few advantages of a regular battle is that there is no restriction on noise. You may talk, sing or shout, curse or pray and nobody cares. Occasionally a man of the Salvation Army, the Y. M. C. A., the K. of C., or some other service, would work his way through, giving cigarettes to the wounded, but usually it was the ambulance drivers who supplied their pas- sengers with smokes.
FIRST DAY BRILLIANT FOR 35TH.
The first day for the 35th had been brilliantly successful, the artillery had done its work magnificently well, our machine gunners were effective even beyond their own expectations, while the backbone of the division, the infantry, had proved itself the equal in skill, address and bravery of the enemy, and they had shown a big superiority in the dash and boldness which gives spring and vivacity to an attacking army.
The first prisoners taken were from the 2nd Landwehr Division and from the 15th Landsturm. But then came captives from the 1st and 5th Divisions of the Prussian Guard. From prisoners it was learned that the 53rd line Division, one of the best, was in reserve, and the grim work in the offing was clearly seen.
ATTACK LED BY 140TH.
The first day of the Argonne battle had gone well on the whole field. Each of the nine divisions had advanced on its territory and the forward movement along the 16-mile front, attended by varying fortunes in the various areas and at a stiff cost everywhere, showed that our troops could go through the defenses of the Hindenburg line.
ARGONNE FOREST TWO MILES TO LEFT.
On the left of the 35th Division, between a mile and two miles away, was the Argonne Forest. The original battle plan was to have the artillery constantly Page 50
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pile gas into the forest so as to tie up enemy activity there and for the troops outside the forest to advance on either side of it, uniting at Grand Pre, at the northern tip of the forest. The 77th Division, in whose sector the most of the forest lay, would then have only the task of mopping up a surrounded territory. These things were all incident to the main object of the advance, which was to get to the enemy's railroads at Mezieres.
Between the 35th and the forest was the 28th Division, formerly Pennsylvania National Guardsmen. On the other side of the forest was the French 4th Army, which also was meeting desperate resistance.
The artillery had worked all day of the 26th and all that night getting forward, for the infantry would, of course, attack again to follow up its success of the first day and it must have artillery support.
ATTACKED WITHOUT ARTILLERY.
Divisional command and staff of the 35th got all reports possible from the artillery before issuing the orders for the second day's fighting and decided that 8:30 a. m. was the earliest moment at which the guns could be relied upon to be in position where they could give a preparation for an attack or a barrage of sufficient strength to be effective. Orders were issued that the infantry was to attack at 8:30 a. m., after a brief artillery preparation, and the troops were to advance behind a rolling barrage.
After this order had been sent out to the brigades on the field, General Traub, about midnight, received imperative orders from the corps commander to attack on the whole divisional front at 5:30 a. m. New orders were hurriedly prepared, countermanding the preceding ones, and dispatched to the infantry.
The divisional headquarters knew just how costly such an advance would be at that hour, with no artillery to beat down the opposition, and they knew the artillery would not be in position in time. Gencral Traub's conception of the duty of divisional commander is to obey the orders he receives from corps or army commanders.
ONE ARTILLERY BATTALION, NEEDED 14.
At 4 a. m. one battalion of the 128th Field Ar- tillery went into position near Cheppy and was the only unit of artillery which was able to assist the in- fantry, which could have used two brigades (fourteen battalions) on its task. The 129th Field Artillery was in position by 7 a. m. and the 130th Regiment took its place at 4:30 in the afternoon. Throughout the day of September 27 the entire brigade threw less than 1,200 shells, against more than 40,000 fired the preceeding day.
The orders were for the regiments of the 70th Brigade, the 139th and the 140th Infantry, to leapfrog over the regiments of the 69th Brigade, the 137th and the 138th, and to attack. The 69th Brigade was to follow the advance at a distance of 1,000 meters.
[It should be remembered that the 140th Infantry (Kansas City's old Third and the old Sixth) together with the 139th Regiment, formed the 70th Brigadc.]
The danger of misunderstanding of orders was alarming to divisional headquarters. One order, directing an attack at 8:30 a. m. had been sent out, and close behind it another ordering an attack three hours earlier. If the second order failed to reach the commanders of the infantry in time, or if it went astray, there was a possibility of a fatal mixup. If the regiments on one side of the divisional front advanced, and the regiment on the other side did not, there would then be one regiment projected into the enemy linc with at least onc of its flanks entirely unprotected.
THE PROBLEM BEFORE TRAUB.
General Traub knew that he would have no ar- tillery to support the attack at the early hour. Nothing was farther from his desire than to lose troops or to Page 51
sacrifice men, but he did not feel that he was justified in taking the matter in his own hands and delaying the hour for the attack to 8:30.
In the early morning-about 1:30-he left his headquarters on Mamelon Blanc back of the original line and went forward himself with some of his staff in an endeavor to see brigade and regimental com- manders to make sure the orders were understood, and, to quote the words of his report, "thus assu-ing liaison and co-ordination."
ORDER TO 140TH TO ATTACK.
Colonel Delaplane of the 140th, on the right, received at 5:05 a. m. his order to attack at 5:30. This hardly gave him time to send word to his battalion commander. The orders said a 5-minute artillery barrage would precede the attack. He passed his regi- ment through the 138th, and was ready approximately on time, but the artillery was silent. In the growing daylight the enemy's fire was becoming stronger and more accurate each minute, both artillery and ma- chine guns playing on the ground over which the regiment was to advance. Delaplane decided it was uesless to sacrifice men waiting for our own artillery to open, so he ordered the advance without it.
How vital the artillery is to the infantry was made clear as soon as the 140th began to move over the high open ground which lay between them and the enemy. Unhampered by fire from our guns, German machine guns apparently in great numbers laid a withering fire across the flat top of Hill 218. Char- pentry and the road leading to the northeast out of the town seemed alive with enemy gunners and guns.
140TH HEROES PAY FEARFUL PRICE.
The heavy artillery fire and the more accurate fire from anti-tank guns made it impossible for the tanks to advance. The 140th was paying a fearful price for the little ground it was gaining and the advance slowed up and stopped. Orders were to dig in and hold the ground gained.
The 138th was hardly moved by the morning attack, as they were to follow at a distance of 1,000 meters, and the advance of the 140th did not seem to exceed that. A steady fire from artillery fell on the position they held, and with it a constant attrition of dead and wounded. The dressing station was up with the troops and an endeavor was made to evacuate all casualties immediately, but it was not entirely suc- cessful.
RISTINE THOUGHT PRICE TOO HEAVY.
On the other half of the field, Ristine's orders to advance seem to have been changed to 6:30 a. m., probably as a sort of compromise between the first order for 8:30 and the second order for 5:30. I do not know how he managed to get the extra hour, but he did, and postponed the attack to 6:30 in order to have artillery support.
Up to 6:30 the artillery was silent. Ristine noti- fied brigade headquarters of this, and also that he was ready to attack as soon as the artillery opened.
He received no reply from the brigade and there was no sound of any important artillery fire except from the enemy, and the hour had passed, so he at- tacked without it, as Delaplane had done an hour beforc. His formation caught the full fire of the enemy artillery and machine guns.
Ristine was able to advance, but as he saw the swaths the opposing fire was making in his ranks, he decided the price was too heavy. He halted his regi- ment, ordered them to dig in, and sent a message to brigade headquarters that he could not advance further without artillery support.
The passage of lines necessary to permit the 70th Brigade to attack was not required on the left, for Colonel Ristine had made it the day beforc. The
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formation of the attack was with two battalions of the attacking regiment in the front line and one in support. The regiments of the 69th were to form in column of battalions.
TANKS HELPED IN ATTACK.
A machine gun company was attached to each front line battalion, and the 128th Machine Gun Battalion was attached to the 69th Brigade. Tanks were assigned to the attacking brigade of infantry, to be used as the brigade commander, Col. Kirby Walker, thought fit.
THE PRICE TOO GREAT.
The situation at 10 o'clock on the morning of September 27 was about like this:
The troops started out under General Traub's orders. The price paid for the ground gained was too great. It was an unprofitable commerce. By command of their regimental commanders they stopped and dug in.
Approximately a thousand meters behind the regiments of the 70th Brigade (the 139th and the 140th) were the 137th and the 138th of the 69th Bri- gade. They were in support, but there was such a profusion of German fire that each of them was con- stantly taking casualties.
Although badly tangled by the fighting through the fog on the first day, the infantry had attacked on the morning of the second day while still in the spirit of victory. The morning was cold and cheerless, threatening with rain, but the spirit of the division was not of the volatile kind which would change be- cause of the weather. The men were uplifted and upheld by a conviction that they could whip the Ger- mans, given an even break in big gun fire, aerial obser vation and the other side lines of battle.
ARTILLERY ADVANTAGE WITH ENEMY.
They advanced the second day along the whole divisional front, without artillery preparation or a barrage, or, at best, with a very thin one. The enemy was strengthened at every point and he had brought fresh troops, especially machine gunners, to stop the American advance. It was not a common line of Ger- man troops, battered by a thorough artillery pounding, against which the 35th moved the second day. It was a rebuilt line of thoroughly tried troops, nearly all machine gunners, equaling the best men in the German Army. The artillery advantage was with the enemy.
It is a distressing thing for troops to lie under fire, and wait for aid. It was impossible to reorganize under conditions such as existed on the morning of the 27th, and while little additional intermingling of units resulted, the mixing done the day and night preceding was not remedied.
Ristine heard of tanks in his rear, sent for them and at noon tried to move forward again. He placed the tanks on his right and formed his right wing behind them. That part of the line moved faster than his left, but the artillery and anti-tank fire was too heavy, so the tanks turned and retired from the field. This left Ristine's right well ahead of his left, but the troops dug in again and held the crooked line.
STILL NO WORD FROM ARTILLERY.
Our guns were beginning to open occasionally, and noting this, Ristine sent word to brigade head- quarters that if it would give him thirty minutes' destructive fire in Charpentry and Baulny, and a barrage in front of that part of his line which was cast of the road, he could move forward. It was out of Banlny and Charpentry that the heaviest opposing fire was coming. Ristine feared to move his left for- ward because of the artillery fire which came from across the river in the sector of the 28th Division.
It was apparent that the 28th had not advanced as far as the 35th, and this left the 35th's left flank exposed to the enemy.
Receiving no word as to artillery support, Ristine pulled his right back to the line of his left, ordered the men to dig in and called a meeting of battalion and company commanders to see how he stood. Then, at 5 p. m. he received orders to attack at 5:30.
The attack for 5:30 was ordered by divisional headquarters when it became apparent that the morn- ing attack had failed of its purpose. The corps and the army demanded an advance. The division had tried, but was stopped and held in its tracks. The other eight divisions were attacking with varying results, but for the success of the operation, all must go ahead. Officers and men of the 35th believed it was one of the best divisions in France. At 5:30 the division stood upon its feet amidst the dead and prepared to advance, to show whether it was as good a fighting outfit as it believed it was.
NINE TANKS TO LEAD ATTACK.
Just before the hour of the attack nine tanks, probably the same ones which had fought so well before Cheppy, came chugging over the road from Very, through the position of the 138th and out onto the front of the 140th. The infantry attacked with them. That was on the right of our line. On our left, Ristine gave orders quickly to his officers in conference, and sent them hurriedly back to their commands. There was less than half an hour for preparation.
Guiding well to the left and attacking Charpentry and Baulny almost from the south, the 139th came out of its foxholes like war dogs off the leash. They took a singeing fire full in the face, charged over the machine guns and stamped them out like nests of rats, and had taken both Charpentry and Baulny before stopping to count the cost. The line they could not breach in the morning was no weaker. It did not crumble. But it was as if our men had gathered strength as they lay waiting through the day, and in the afternoon the Germans could not stop them.
RISTINE WENT FAST.
Ristine thought he could prevent his regiment from mixing more than it was already if he was well to the front, according to his statement, so he accom- panied the advancing line. Rieger and the other battalion commanders were to handle the rest of the regiment as it was disposed for battle.
They went forward fast, once the stiff crust of the German position was cracked. The 2nd Battalion, Rieger's, pulled up near to Montrebeau Wood. Ristine went even faster, too fast altogether, as will be shown as soon as the work of the other regiments is related.
The 137th had started to advance in the morning behind the 139th, had halted when the leading regi- ment halted, and had lain all day on the west field, under shell and indirect machine gun fire.
At 5:30 p. m. Major O'Connor of the 137th re- ceived orders to attack at 5:30, and at the same time he was advised that Colonel Hamilton was "out," whether by wound, sickness or orders not being explained, and that Major O'Connor was in command of the regi- ment. O'Connor set his troops in motion and hurried to regimental headquarters to get the staff and learn just what the situation was. Near there he met the brigade commander, who ordered him to advance with the troops.
He hurried ahead and caught up with his outfit just as the 1st Battalion was advancing against Baulny O'Connor got together a scratch detachment, including part of L Company of the 139th, and went through Baulny, probably as early as Ristine's men did. There was some fighting in Baulny, twenty prisoners were taken and O'Connor pushed ahead.
With his outfit he pressed on in the darkness for probably four kilometers which would have carried
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him into the outskirts of Fleville, meeting no oppo- sition anywhere. The Germans seemed to him to be withdrawing.
INDICATIONS OF GERMAN RETREAT.
His scouts found no other elements of the 35th on either side, so he decided that he must be well ahead of the others, and that it would be wise to get back in liaison. On both sides of his detachment he heard working parties, and the rumble of wheels, in- dicating that the Germans were retreating.
On the way back he found part of the 139th Machine Gun Company, and he also ran across Colonel Shannon of the general staff, who had come up to observe the action. Shannon returned to the line with Major O'Connor.
They heard a voice in the woods yelling, in German, "Oh, Gus." O'Connor had one of his men who spoke German to shout a reply. In this way they drew the German up to them and captured him. He said he had left the retreating troops to try and find his "bunkie" who had become lost from the main body.
O'Connor's detachment returned to the estab- lished line north of Baulny. He found it was com- posed of most of the 1st Battalion of the 137th, and the machine gun company of the 137th and three com- panies of the 139th and the 139th machine gun com- pany. Into these were mixed, and badly mixed troops of several other companies. The whole bunch was in a little hollow, too much crowded. Major O'Connor thought, and badly organized for resistance. He tried to improve the disposition for resistance, but did not essay to redistribute the units, which would have been a hopeless task in the darkness. It was after mid- night, so there they dug in, and lay for the rest of the night.
140TH WAS SURGING AHEAD.
The late afternoon attack on the right was meet- ing almost as much success. Behind the tanks, Dela- plane's 140th went surging ahead, cleaned the machine gun nests which had held them up, took a battery of artillery, and rested on the edge of the hill to the north, when renewed violence of artillery met them. The first battalion of the 140th went well beyond Charpentry, and was out of touch with the regiment until the following day.
The 138th advanced behind the 140th. It had been under fire all day, held in its place, suffering casualties, and unable to return a blow. The machine guns felt out the enemy positions, but there was nothing of the winning action of the day before.
When the advance came at 5:30, the 138th moved up behind the 140th, and its position when it dug in was not far from that occupied by the 140th during the day. The fire which daylight observation permitted the enemy artillery to put on this section continued through the night.
While our troops were digging in along a fair sort of a line, Ristine and his little party were digging in under other circumstances.
He had moved with his forward detail entirely too fast for the main body of the regiment to keep up, and near the Chapentry Cemetery he ran into a small body of German troops and was halted for a while. After a fight the enemy dispersed, and he moved ahead again. He met up in the darkness with a lieutenant and five men from the 137th Regiment, and was told that the lines were moving forward in a northwesterly direction. Ristine proceeded forward, bombing dugouts and cutting wire, until in what he judged from the map to be the neighborhood of Camp Drachen.
NOT OUR MEN, BUT GERMANS.
In the gloom, he observed many troops moving, and presuming that they were our own, called to them. Page 53
He discovered that they were retreating Germans. Very soon other retreating Germans came up behind him, and he hastily retired to a large shell hole, or- ganized it for resistance, and waited for the troops to come up.
In the darkness he only got further into the German lines, and before daylight it was apparent that he was well involved. With the approach of dawn and the dispersal of the darkness which had been his protection, Ristine came across a German officers' quarters, with the equipment all laid out for packing and departure. He took the overcoat and later picked up a German helmet, and in this disguise spent the next day in the German lines. He would doubtless have been executed at once as a spy if he had been captured, but luck was with him. He gathered infor- mation on battery positions and ammunition dumps, which he turned in with the map co-ordinated as soon as he got in touch with our artillery again, which was not until the night of the next day, the 28th.
When the men finally dug in for the night, the main mass of the troops were beyond Baulny, and some of the more dashing elements probably were as far advanced as Montrebeau Wood.
There was a fairly distinct line, but the mixing of elements was growing worse. Every regiment, in its space, doubtless had elements of every other regi- ment. Detachments were strung along back toward Cheppy, and there was a determined but seldom successful effort by all commanders to get up rations from Cheppy.
WATER SCARCE ON SECOND DAY.
In all four regiments on the second day, there was a scarcity of water. The water carts had not come up, and virtually every available source of water on the field was under suspicion, and its use forbidden to the men. It was supposed that the Germans, before re- tiring, had poisoned the wells and springs. Canteens had been emptied, and the men felt badly the need of water.
The men were physically tired, many of them thirsty, and some hungry, although the iron rations were not yet exhausted. But the spirit was excellent. Despite the mixing of elements and the loss of officers, the morale was high, and it was a fine, determined fighting organization that filled the foxholes which dotted the ground from Baulny eastward.
So ended the second day, September 27, with increasing casualties among the officers, only a small part of which casualties I have mentioned.
A BLOODY THIRD DAY.
The night of September 27 (the second day) was employed to the utmost on both sides of the weary battle line. Back of the Americans, the greatest effort was devoted to getting up ammunition and rations, to evacuating the wounded and in preparing for the next day's work.
The Germans seem to have assembled large re- serves, sorted them, and during the night they pushed forward to the positions in front of our lines the pick of their army, the veteran machine gunners. It is probable that additional artillery also was brought to the sector, but it is certain that the morning of the 28th found the machine guns very strongly increased. The whole front seemed to bristle with them.
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