History of Louisiana, the Spanish domination, Part 38

Author: Gayarre, Charles, 1805-1895. cn
Publication date: 1867
Publisher: New York : W.J. Widdleton
Number of Pages: 676


USA > Louisiana > History of Louisiana, the Spanish domination > Part 38


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Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49


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496


MR. MADISON'S DESPATCH TO LIVINGSTON.


" Mr. Monroe will be the bearer of the instructions under which you are jointly to negotiate. The object of them will be to procure a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States ; and consequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana."


Previous to these instructions, Mr. Livingston had, on the 10th of January, sent a note to the Minister of Exterior Relations, in which he proposed that France should cede to the United States West Florida, New Orleans, and a certain portion of the territory of Loui- siana : " These propositions, with certain accompani- ments," said Mr. Livingston, in a despatch to Mr. Madi- son of the 18th of February, "were well received, and were some days under the First Consul's consideration ; I am now lying on my oars in hopes of something expli- cit from you. From the best accounts I can receive from Holland, the armament (destined for Louisiana) will be detained there till about the last of March, so that you will,not have them in New Orleans till June ; a precious interval, of which you may think it prudent to avail yourselves."


On the 27th of February, Mr. Livingston submitted to the First Consul a memoir detailing the reasons for which he urged the cession of a portion, at least, of Loui- siana by France to the United States. "That France," said he, "will never derive any advantage from the colo- nization of New Orleans and the Floridas, is fairly to be presumed, from their having been possessed, for more than a century past, by three different nations .* While the other colonies of these nations were increasing rapidly, these have always remained weak and languid, and an expensive burden to the possessors. Even at this mo-


* The French, the English, and the Spaniards.


497


LIVINGSTON'S PROPOSITIONS TO TALLEYRAND.


ment, with all the advantages that New Orleans has derived from foreign capital, and an accession of inhabit- ants from the United States, which has brought its free population to about seven thousand souls, the whole of the inhabitants east of the Mississippi does not more than double that number ; and those, too, are for the most part poor and miserable ; and there are physical reasons that must for ever render them inadequate to their own support, in the hands of any European nation. These provinces are, however, important to the United States because they contain the mouths of some of their rivers, which must make them the source of continual disputes. The interest that the United States attach, Citizen First Consul, to your friendship, and the alliance of France, is the principal cause of their anxiety to pro- cure your consent to their accession of that country, and to the sacrifices that they are willing to make to attain it. They consider it as the only possible ground of col- lision between nations whom so many other interests unite. I cannot, then, Citizen First, Consul, but express my doubt of any advantage to be derived to France from the retaining of that country in its whole extent; and I think I could show that her true interest would lead her to make such cessions out of them to the United States as would at once afford supplies to her islands, without draining the money of France, and rivet the friendship of the United States, by removing all ground of jealousy relative to a country of little value in itself, and which will be perpetually exposed to the attacks of her natural enemy, as well from Canada as by sea."


On the 2d of March, Mr. Madison forwarded to Messrs. Livingston and Monroe their credentials to treat with the government of the French Republic on the subject of the Mississippi and the territories eastward thereof and without the limits of the United States. "The


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498


CREDENTIALS TO MONROE AND LIVINGSTON.


object in view," said he, " is to procure, by just and satis- factory arrangements, a cession to the United States of New Orleans and of West and East Florida, or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with." The principles and outlines of the plan on which the ministers were authorized to treat were an- nexed to their credentials.


In the meantime, Mr. Livingston was very pressing in his endeavors to obtain from Bonaparte the recognition of the right of the Americans to use New Orleans as a place of deposit, and, on the 16th of March, he addressed an energetic note on that subject to the Minister of Exterior Relations :


" The First Consul," said he, " has done me the honor, through you, to inform me that he proposes to send a minister to the United States to acquire such informa- tion as he may deem necessary, previous to his taking any measure relative to the situation in which the acquisition of Louisiana will place France with respect to the United States. If, Sir, the question related to the formation of a new treaty, I should find no objection to this measure. On the contrary, I should readily acqui- esce in it, as that which would be best calculated to render the treaty mutually advantageous. But, Sir, it is not a new treaty for which we now press (though one mutually advantageous might be made), but the recog- nition of an old one, by which the United States have acquired rights, that no change in the circumstances of the country obliges them to relinquish, and which they never will relinquish but with their political existence. By their treaty with Spain, their right to the navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and a right of depôt granted, with a provision, on the part of the King of Spain, to revoke this right, if, within three years, he found it prejudicial to his interests, in which case he is


499


MR. LIVINGSTON'S ENERGETIC ADDRESS.


to assign another equivalent establishment. The King of Spain has never revoked that right ; but, after having made the experiment of its effects upon his interests for three years, he has continued it. The United States have, by this continuance, acquired a permanent and irrevocable right to a depôt at New Orleans, nor can that right now be called in question, either by Spain or by any other nation to whom she may transfer her title. Even the assignment of another equivalent establish- ment cannot, at this day, be forced upon the United States, without their consent. The time allowed by Spain has passed, and she has preferred to have the depôt at New Orleans to placing it elsewhere ; and I will venture to say, that, in so doing, she has acted wisely ; for New Orleans derives its whole value from its being the market for American produce, and their principal port of entry ; and, if this consideration was important to Spain, it is infinitely more so to. France, the produce of whose agriculture and manufactures will then find a ready exchange for the raw materials of the United States. Under these circumstances, at the very moment that Spain is about to relinquish the possession of that country to France, she violates her treaty with- out any apparent interest, and leaves the country with a stain upon her character.


" In what situation, Sir, are we now placed ? An ar- mament is about sailing for New Orleans; that port has been shut by the order of Spain; the French command- ant will find it shut. Will he think himself authorized to open it? If not, it must remain shut till the Envoy of France shall have arrived in America, and made the necessary inquiries, and transmitted the result of those inquiries to the First Consul. In the meanwhile, all the produce of five States is left to rot upon their hands. There is only one season in which the navigation of the


500


MR. LIVINGSTON'S ENERGETIC ADDRESS.


Mississippi is practicable. This season must necessarily pass before the Envoy of France can arrive and make his report. Is it supposable, Sir, that the people of the United States will tranquilly wait the progress of nego- tiations, when the ruin of themselves and their families will be attendant on the delay ? Be assured, Sir, that, even were it possible that the government of the United States could be insensible to their sufferings, they would find it as easy to prevent the Mississippi from rolling its waters into the ocean as to control the impulse of the people to do themselves justice. Sir, I will venture to say, that, were a fleet to shut up the mouths of the Che- sapeake, Delaware and Hudson, it would create less sensation in the United States than the denial of the right of depôt at New Orleans has done, &c. I can never bring myself to believe, that the First Consul will, by deferring for a moment the recognition of a right that admits of no discussion, break all those ties which bind the United States to France, obliterate the sense of past obligations, change every political relation that it has been, and still is, the earnest wish of the United States to preserve, and force them to connect their inte- rests with those of a rival power; and this, too, for an object of no real moment in itself. Louisiana is, and ever must be, from physical causes, a miserable country in the hands of an European power."


Whilst these negotiations were going on, war was on the eve of breaking out again between Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the hollow peace of Amiens, and, on the 2d of April, Mr. King wrote from London to the Secretary of State at Washington: "In a late conversation with Mr. Addington, he observed to me, if the war happen, it would, perhaps, be one of their first steps to occupy New Orleans. I interrupted him by saying, I hoped the measure would be well weighed


501


MR. KING AND MR. ADDINGTON.


before it should be attempted; that, true it was, we could not see with indifference that country in the hands of France; but, it was equally true, that it would be contrary to our views, and with much concern, that we should see it in the possession of England; we had no objection to Spain continuing to possess it; they were quiet neighbors, and we looked forward without impa- tience to events which, in the ordinary course of things, must, at no distant day, annex this country to the United States. Mr. Addington desired me to be assured that England would not accept the country, were all agreed to give it to her; that, were she to occupy it, it would not be to keep it, but to prevent another power from ob- taining it; and, in his opinion, this end would be best effected by its belonging to the United States. I ex- pressed my acquiescence in the last part of his remark, but observed, that, if the country should be occupied by England, it would be suspected to be in concert with the United States, and might involve us in misunder- standings with another power, with which we desired to live in peace. He said: If you can obtain it, well, but if not, we ought to prevent its going into the hands of France, though you may rest assured, continued Mr. Addington, that nothing shall be done injurious to the interests of the United States. Here the conversation ended."


On the 11th of the same month, Mr. Livingston, whose exertions were incessant, wrote from Paris to the Secre- tary of State at Washington. " My notes will tell you how far I have officially pressed the government on the subject of Louisiana. I have omitted no means, in con- versation, of eradicating their prejudices in its favor ; and I informed you that I had reason to think that I had been successful with all, unless it was the First Con- sul, to whom I addressed myself in the letter and essays


502


LIVINGSTON'S DEALINGS WITH TALLEYRAND.


that you have seen, and which were attentively read by him, as well as several informal notes to his brother (Joseph). I had reason to think that he began to waver; but we had nothing to offer but money and commercial advantages: of the latter, I did not think myself entitled to be liberal; and of the first, I found in them a certain degree of reluctance to treat, as dero- gatory to the dignity of the government. The affair of New Orleans gave me two important strings to touch : I endeavored to convince the government that the Uni- ted States would avail themselves of the breach of the treaty to possess themselves of New Orleans and the Floridas ; that Britain would never suffer Spain to grant the Floridas to France, even were she disposed, but would immediately seize upon them as soon as the trans- fer was made; that, without the Floridas, Louisiana would be indefensible, as it possesses not one port even for frigates; and I showed the effect of suffering that important country to fall into the hands of the British, both as it affected our country and the naval force of all Europe.


" These reasons, with the possibility of war, have had, I trust, the desired effect. M. Talleyrand asked me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him, no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Flo- ridas ; that the policy of France should dictate (as I had shown in an official note) to give us the country above the river Arkansas, in order to place a barrier between them and Canada. He said that, if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value; and that he would wish to know 'what we would give for the whole.' I told him it was a subject I had not thought of, but that I supposed we should not object to twenty millions, provided our citizens were paid. He told me


503


LIVINGSTON'S DEALINGS WITH TALLEYRAND.


that this was too low an offer, and that he would be glad if I would reflect upon it, and tell him to-morrow. I told him that, as Mr. Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure of introducing him. He added, that he did not speak from authority, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason, however, to think that this resolu- tion was taken in council on Saturday. On Friday, I received Mr. Ross's motion. I immediately sent it to Mr. Talleyrand, with an informal note, expressive of my fears that it would be carried into effect ; and request- ing that General Bernadotte* might not go till some- thing effectual was done. I also translated it and gave it to General Bernadotte, and pressed upon him the necessity of asking express instructions, in case he should find the island in possession of the Americans. He went immediately to Joseph Bonaparte. These, I believe, were exciting causes to the train we are now in, and which I flatter myself we shall be able, on the arrival of Mr. Monroe, to pursue to effect. I think, from every appearance, that war is very near at hand; and, under these circumstances, I have endeavored to impress the government that not a moment should be lost, lest Britain should anticipate us."-Mr. Livingston added in a postscript : " Orders are gone this day to stop the sail- ing of vessels from the French ports ; war is inevitable ; my conjecture as to their determination to sell is well founded. Mr. Monroe is just arrived here."


On the 13th, Mr. Livingston, returning to the same subject, said in a despatch to the Secretary of State : " By my letter of yesterday (he means his letter of the 11th), you learned that the Minister (Talleyrand) had asked me whether I would agree to purchase Louisiana,


* General Bernadotte had received the appointment of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to represent France at Washington.


504


TALLEYRAND SHRUGS HIS SHOULDERS.


&c., &c. On the 12th, I called upon him to press this matter further. He then thought proper to declare that his proposition was only personal, but still requested me to make an offer ; and, upon my declining to do so, as I expected Mr. Monroe the next day, he shrugged up his shoulders and changed the conversation. Not willing, however, to lose sight of it, I told him that I had long been endeavoring to bring him to some point, but, unfor- tunately, without effect ; that I wished merely to have the negotiation opened by any proposition on his part ; and, with that view, had written him a note which con- tained that request, grounded upon my apprehension of the consequence of sending General Bernadotte without enabling him to say a treaty was begun. He told me he would answer my note, but that he must do it evasively, because Louisiana was not theirs. I smiled at this assertion, and told him that I had seen the treaty recognizing it ; that I knew the Consul had appointed officers to govern the country ; and that he had himself told me that General Victor was to take possession ; that, in a note written by the express order of the First Consul, he had told me that General Bernadotte was to treat relative to it in the United States, &c. He still persisted in saying that they had it in contemplation to obtain, but had it not. I told him that I was very well pleased to understand this from him, because, if so, we should not commit ourselves with them in taking it from Spain, to whom, by his account, it still belonged ; and that, as we had just cause of complaint against her, if Mr. Monroe concurred in opinion with me, we should negotiate no further on the subject, but advise our government to take possession. He seemed alarmed at the boldness of the measure, and told me he would answer my note, but that it would be evasively. I told him I should receive any communication from him with


505


BARBE MARBOIS'S WALK IN THE GARDEN.


pleasure, but that we were not disposed to trifle; that the times were critical, and, though I did not know what instructions Mr. Monroe might bring, I was per- fectly satisfied they would require a precise and prompt notice ; that I was very fearful, from the little progress I had made, that my government would consider me as a very indolent negotiator. He laughed, and told me he would give a certificate that I was the most importu- nate he had met with.


"There was something so extraordinary in all this, that I did not detail it to you till I found some clue to the labyrinth, which I have done, as you will find, before I finish this letter ; and the rather, as I was almost cer- tain that I could rely upon the intelligence I had received of the resolution to dispose of the country


"This day Mr. Monroe passed with me in examining my papers ; and while he and several other gentlemen were at dinner with me, I observed the Secretary of the Treasury (Barbé Marbois) walking in my garden. I sent out Colonel Livingston to him ; he told him he would return when we had dined. While we were taking coffee, he came in ; and, after being some time in the room, we strolled into the next, when he told me he heard that I had been at his house two days before, when he was at St. Cloud ; that he thought I might have something par- ticular to say to him, and had taken the first opportunity to call on me. I saw this was meant as an opening to one of those free conversations which I had frequently had with him. I accordingly began on the subject of the debt, and related to him the extraordinary conduct of the Minister (Talleyrand), &c., &c. He told me that this led to something important that had been cursorily mentioned to him at St. Cloud (where the First Consul was then residing) ; but, as my house was full of com- pany, he thought I had better call on him any time


506


THE STRUGGLE OF THE DIPLOMATISTS.


before eleven that night. He went away, and I followed him a little after, when Mr. Monroe took leave. He told me that he wished me to repeat what I had said in re- lation to Mr. Talleyrand's requesting a proposition from me as to the purchase of Louisiana. I did so ; and con- cluded with the extreme absurdity of his evasions of that day, and stated the consequence of any delay on this subject, as it would enable Britain to take possession, who would readily relinquish it to us. He said that this proceeded upon the supposition of her making so success- ful a war as to be enabled to retain her conquests. I told him that it was probable that the same idea might sug- gest itself to the United States ; in which case it would be their interest to contribute to render her successful ; and I asked him whether it was prudent to throw us into the scale. This led to long discussions of no moment to repeat. We returned to the point : he said, that what I had told him led him to think that what the Consul had said to him on Sunday, at St. Cloud (the day on which, as I told you, the determination had been taken to sell) had more of earnest than he thought at the time ; that the Consul had asked him what news from England ? As he knew he read the papers attentively, he told him that he had seen in the London papers the proposition for raising fifty thousand men to take New Orleans (Mr. Ross's proposition in the Senate). The Consul said he had seen it too, and had also seen that something was said about two millions of dollars being disposed among the people about him, to bribe them, &c., and then left him ; that afterwards, when walking in the garden, the Consul came again to him, and spoke to him about the troubles that were excited in America, and inquired how far I was satisfied with his last note.


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"He (Marbois) then took occasion to mention his sorrow that any cause of difference should exist between


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507


WHAT IS LOUISIANA WORTH ?


our countries. The Consul told him in reply : Well ! you have the charge of the treasury ; let them give you one hundred millions of francs, and pay their own claims, and take the whole country. Seeing by my looks that I was surprised at so extraordinary a demand, he added that he considered the demand as exorbitant, and had told the First Consul that the thing was impossible ; that we had not the means of raising that. The Consul told him we might borrow it. I now plainly saw the whole business : first, the Consul was disposed to sell; next, he distrusted Talleyrand, on account of the business of the supposed intention to bribe, and meant to put the nego- tiation into the hands of Marbois, whose character for integrity is established. I told him that the United States were anxious to preserve peace with France ; that, for that reason, they wished to remove the French possessions to the west side of the Mississippi; that we would be perfectly satisfied with New Orleans and the Floridas, and had no disposition to extend across the river ; that, of course, we would not give any great sum for the purchase ; that he was right in his idea of the extreme exorbitancy of the demand, which would not fall short of one hundred and twenty-five millions of francs ;* that, however, we would be ready. to purchase, provided the sum was reduced to reasonable limits. He then pressed me to name the sum. I told him that this was. not worth while, because, as he only treated the inquiry as a matter of curiosity, any declarations of mine would have no effect. If a negotiation was to be opened, we should (Mr. Monroe and myself) make the offer after mature reflection. This compelled him to declare, that, though he was not authorized expressly to make the inquiry from me, yet if I could mention any sum


* On the supposition that the claims of American citizens against the govern- ment of France amounted to twenty-five millions of francs.


508


WHAT IS LOUISIANA WORTH ?


that came near the mark and that could be accepted, he would communicate it to the First Consul. I told him that we had no sort of authority to go to a sum that bore any proportion to what he mentioned; but that, as he considered the demand as too high, he would oblige me by telling me what he thought would be rea- sonable. He replied that, if we would name sixty mil- lions, and take upon us the American claims, to the amount of twenty more, he would try how far this would be accepted. I told him that it was vain to ask anything that was so greatly beyond our means, &c. &c.


" He frankly confessed that he was of my sentiments ; but that he feared the Consul would not relax. I asked him to press this argument upon him, together with the danger of seeing the country pass into the hands of Britain. I told him that he had seen the ardor of the Americans to take it by force, and the difficulty with which they were restrained by the prudence of the President ; that he must easily see how much the hands of the war party would be strengthened, when they learned that France was on the eve of a rupture with England. He admitted the weight of all this. But, says he, you know the temper of a youthful conqueror ; everything he does is rapid as lightning; we have only to speak to him as an opportunity presents itself, per- haps in a crowd, when he bears no contradiction. When I am alone with him, I can speak more freely, and he attends; but this opportunity seldom happens, and is always accidental. Try, then, if you cannot come up to my mark. Consider the extent of the country, the ex- clusive navigation of the river, and the importance of having no neighbors to dispute you-no war to dread. I told him that I deemed all these to be important consi- derations, but there was a point beyond which we could not go; and that fell far short of the sum he mentioned.




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