USA > Louisiana > Louisiana : its history as a French colony. Third series of lectures > Part 18
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: " With a million a year, France could keep up here a sufficient force to support the administration of this possession, and to make to the Indians the necessary presents, and she would preserve a colony, where a great attachment is felt for her, and whose commerce may be very advantageous."
It must be observed that Aubry denounced to his government a dozen of firebrands, who had become the masters of the country, and whom it was absolutely necessary to punish ; and declared that the honest administration of justice was trampled under foot by the Superior Council. If such were the sentiments of a Frenchman, whose prejudices and feelings must have been enlisted in favor of his countrymen, if such was the language of the chief of the colony, when addressing his own government, what must have been the impressions of the Spaniards, and is it to be wondered that they subse- quently pursued the course which I shall have to describe !
When Ulloa arrived at Havana, he found in that city eight hundred troops, that were preparing to come to New-Orleans, with Urissa, late consul of Spain at Bor-
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deaux, and recently promoted to the office of intendant of Louisiana. Urissa had stopped at Havana to take a . million of dollars, which the King of Spain had appro- priated to meet the payment of his intended expenses in the new domain which he had just acquired. If the eight hundred men, and particularly, if the million of dollars, a sum which the colonists had never, as yet, seen in coin in Louisiana, had arrived in time, it is - likely that there would have been no revolution. But, on being informed of the treatment inflicted on Ulloa, Urissa determined to return to Europe.
The news of the revolution in Louisiana reached Spain in forty days, and a cabinet council was held on the subject, to determine* whether Spain should retain Louisiana, on account of the extreme importance of establishing barriers to the aggrandizements of the English, or leave it in the hands of France. The council was composed of the Duke of Alba, Don Jaime Masones de Lima, Don Juan Gregorio Muniain, Don Miguel de Muzquiz, the Count of Aranda, the baron Don Julian de Arriaga and the Marquis of San Juan de Piedras Albas. It was on the 11th of February, 1769, that the Marquis of Grimaldi submitted to these gentlemen all the docu- ments relative to what had occurred in Louisiana, requesting them to give, individually, their separate opinion in writing. On the 5th of March, the Duke of Alba gave this brief and characteristic opinion. It bears the stamp of the hereditary temper of the men of that haughty and inflexible house.
" I am of opinion that the King ought to retain Louisiana, on account of the extreme importance of the river Mississippi's being the fixed and settled limit of the English possessions.
* Sobre si conviene conservar España esta posesion, por la suma importancia de poner limites á los Ingleses, o quedarse por de la Francia.
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" That his Majesty should choose a man of intelli- gence and energy, and send him with the necessary forces to subject those people, and, at the same time, with all the powers to cure such disorders, by striking them at the root.
" That the form of the government in the colony be radically changed, in order to leave no means within the reach of the malice or audacity of those people, to attempt other revolutions.
" That all the members of the Superior Council there existing, and the deputies of the commerce of Bor- deaux, be immediately transported to Europe, and also every other person that may be suspected.
" And, taking into consideration that, from the pos- session of that colony, it does not seem that any other advantage can be derived, than that of determining incontestable limits between the neighboring powers, I am of opinion that it be reduced within very narrow bounds, in order that its administration should cost the King as little as possible.
" But finally, what, to my judgment, appears to be of more importance than all the rest, is that it be seen : throughout the world, and particularly in America, that the King knows and is able to repress any attempt whatever, derogatory to the respect due to the royal majesty."*
Don Jaime Masones de Lima, Don Miguel de Muzquiz, and Don Julian de Arriaga gave their opinions on the 21st of March. Don Jaime Masones de Lima said :
"Having examined the documents submitted to my consideration, it seems to me that it would be proper
* Lo que enfin importa mas que todo, a mi parecer, es que se vea en el mundo, y en America especialmente, que el Rey sabe y puede reprimir cualquiera intento contrario al respeto que se debe á la Majestad.
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to retain possession of that colony, considering that the river Mississippi forms an already established line of demarcation between the possession of the French and of the English. I have only to add that this advantage, which is the only one .I can conceive, is not counter- balanced by the inconveniences which I foresee, as being likely to result, in the future, from retaining pos- session of that colony.
" One of them is, that the colony is entirely inhabited by Frenchmen, who are openly inimical to our govern- ment, and who are supported by the partiality of their . countrymen in France; that there is no fortified place in it (presidio) and that the quality of the soil does not admit of such works, the want of which would require a larger number of troops, to keep the colonists in sub- jection. Such being the case, it is proper to consider whether the expenses of retaining that possession, arc not liable to exceed the damages which we may suffer from its contraband trade, should it be in other hands.
" The Count of Fuentes, in the letter which was read to the council of ministers, treats this question with sufficient precision and details, and in a manner which did not fail to produce much impression on my mind.
" But I further say that, in case my opinion should not prevail, on the policy of our retaining that colonial possession, and in case, for the reasons given by the Count of Fuentes, and for the inconveniences I have pointed out, his Majesty should be inclined to leave it. in the hands of France, then, the better to provide for the future, I recommend a stipulation by which it should be understood, that France shall never cede that pro- vince, either to the English or to the colonists them- selves, without the consent of Spain, reserving its reversion to us, whenever France shall feel disposed to part with it.
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" Having done with the question of his Majesty's retaining possession of the colony, which is the one . specially presented to the council, I proceed to express what offers itself to my mind, on the offence committed by its inhabitants against the person of Don Antonio de Ulloa, as this subject is somewhat connected with the other.
" Supposing then that Spain is to retain possession of that colony according to my opinion, I consider that the crime committed by the inhabitants deserves the most severe and rigorous punishment, on account of the circumstances which accompanied its commission. But, however offensive their conduct may have been to the King and to his subjects, it remains not the less an outrage against the Majesty of the most Christian King, because, so far as we are concerned, the colonists hav- ing before them no other document than the act of ces- sion made by his most Christian Majesty, and registered by their Superior Council, and until now, Spain having not by any public act taken solemn possession of the province, the correct construction to be put on what has occurred, may be looked upon as problematical among the French, and even among us. But, consider- ing that the colonists declare themselves to be the sub- jects of his most Christian Majesty, they thus increase their culpability, on account of the notorious insolence with which they disobeyed his orders, as they could not plead their ignorance of the treaty of cession.
" For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that, whatever be the means that we may employ, to obtain satisfaction for so enormous an offence, it would be proper that we should come to an understanding with France; so that, by procuring her concurrence in the punishment of that offence, we shall avoid that any mi- litary operation, to which we might proceed by our-
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selves, be accused of being unjust, by those who con- sider the question of possession as doubtful, and who would argue that we enforce our authority, without having previously established our sovereignty, because we never made apparent and publicly known to the colonists, by any act of notoriety, the new obligation of vassalage to which they were. subjected, by virtue of the cession made by his most Christian Majesty.
" This is all that my poor abilities venture to suggest to the King, in order that his Majesty may resolve what may be most agreeable to his royal breast, as the de- termination which he will take, will certainly be the best for the occasion."
So much for the very considerate and courtier-like opinion of Don Jaime Masones de Lima. Now comes Don Juan de Arriaga.
"From the moment, said he, that France offered to cede Louisiana, it seemed opportune to me to take her, not because it might be a profitable possession to us, in a pecuniary point of view, but because of the advantage which we obtain, of securing indisputable limits between us and the English, who never stand in need of some pretext or other, to overstep them, without any open and avowed act of transgression.
" For the same reason, I persist in my former opinion ; but I recommend that proper precautions be taken in the establishment of the government of that colony, not only on account of what occurred recently, as on account of the informations we have acquired on the composi- tion of that population, which, as Ulloa says in one of his despatches, is made up of all sorts of people, without fealty, without law and without religion. It is there- fore evident that, unless we cut off and remove the most conspicuous and most vitiated portion of that popula- tion, and unless we establish for the rest new rules of
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government, not only with regard to the political, but also the religious organization of that colony, we can- not, with any security, rely on that possession, except it be through force, and with the aid of troops to bring those people to submission; the consequences of which measures would be our going into enormous expenses, and our being in a state of constant suspicion and anxiety.
" The examination of the means to be employed re- quires the most serious reflection, and calls for the most detailed information from Ulloa, because the points which it is necessary to regulate are numerous. One of the first to be taken into consideration, is the number of troops to be sent there, and the expenses it will put us to, in order to restrict them within what can be sup- plied out of the royal revenue and treasury of Mexico ; and although it is not to be hoped that the commerce of that colony can be of any advantage to his majesty, nevertheless, it is necessary to determine by whom and how it is to be carried on, it being important that there be no failure in that part of it which is relative to the Indians, with whom we must, by all means, keep on terms of amity."
As to the Marquis of San Juan de Piedras Albas, he said :
" I think that it is of extreme importance for Spain, to retain under her domination that part of the colony of Louisiana which was ceded by France, not only be- cause it is a valuable barrier and a means of protection for the provinces of New Spain and the Mexican Gulf, but also for the other reasons which were given verbally in the cabinet council, and which have convinced me in the most effective manner, that, taking into considera- tion the position of Louisiana, in no other hands than in ours can that colony, for the present and for the
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future, be as important and useful to Spain ; and, under the circumstances in which we are placed, supposing · that France persists, as she does beyond a doubt, in her disposition to ratify her voluntary donation to Spain, and is prepared, (considering that she is more particu- larly interested in resenting the insolent want of respect with which she was disobeyed by her subjects and vas- . sals,) to accomplish what, so far, she has not been able to execute, and to put Spain in quiet and peaceful pos- session of that domain, I reiterate the opinion which I have already expressed : that Spain must maintain her- self in the possession of that province, which was ceded to her in good faith, and which was not formally de- livered up to her, on account of the criminal disobedience of its inhabitants."
On the next day, the 22d of March, the Count of Aranda, who had the reputation of being one of the shrewdest and ablest statesmen of Spain, presented a somewhat more elaborate opinion than those of his col- leagues. Taken in connexion with the events which have happened on the continent of North America, and which have transformed colonies into empires, it cer- tainly is a curious and remarkable document.
" Considering, he said, the original cause of the ac- quisition of Louisiana by Spain, and the reasons which were then given for it; and whereas that colony must be looked upon as one of the dependencies of the crown, and as so much territory annexed to our Mexican provin- ces, I am of opinion that it was wisely done, to accept the donation which France made of her, and that it is indispensable to keep possession of that acquisition, at whatever cost.
" The more or less fertility and extent of Louisiana is not the principal question to be examined. But we ought to judge of the importance of that acquisition,
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. from the fact that it extends our Mexican territories to the bank of the Mississippi, a well known barrier, and a distant one from the population of New-Mexico, and that it furnishes us, through that river, with an indelible line of demarcation between our provinces and those of the English, which have been widened by their acquisi- tion of our domain of Florida ; and that it gives the oc- casion to create, at certain determined points, a chain of posts which, in time of peace, will be the evidences of our territorial rights, and will prevent usurpations and trespasses made under the plea of ignorance. Be- sides securing the notoriety and the indisputable ac- knowledgment of our sovereignty, we obtain a precious protection for ourselves, and oppose a serious impedi- ment to the progress of the English, because, in case of a rupture with them, they will have to begin their operations from afar, will be exposed to great losses before having gained much ground, and will not have the advantage to make, in anticipation, their prepara- tions, secretly, in the interior of their possessions, in order to shorten and facilitate their operations, at the breaking out of hostilities.
" In short, under this view, which is full of interest, the insurrection at New-Orleans seems to be an object of the greatest importance, not only for the reasons which have already been expressed, but on account of its consequences.
" Its situation in the Gulf of Mexico, its being already, as it were, an European town by its population, its be- ing inhabited altogether by merchants and traders, and its being converted into a free port, which no doubt would be the case, would attract thither large numbers from Europe ; and considering that a republic in Loui- siana would be independent from all the European powers, it would then become the interest of all to keep
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on terms of amity with her, and to support her exist- ence.
" The favorable circumstances in which Louisiana would then be placed, would not only increase her po- pulation, but also enlarge her limits, and transform her into a rich, flourishing and free State, in sight of our provinces, which would present the melancholy contrast of exhaustion and of the want of cultivation .*
" From the example under their eyes, the inhabitants of our vast Mexican domains would be led to consider their utter want of commerce, the extortions of their different governors, the little esteem in which they are held, the few offices which they are permitted to fill, and would weigh the great inducement which they would have to hate still more the Spanish domination and to think that they can brave it with more security, when they shall see that a weak province, compared with their extensive and populous country, can make good her position with impunity and secure her pros- perity.
"Even if by dint of efforts to meliorate as much as possible the government of the . Mexican provinces, and improve the condition of their inhabitants, we should succeed in avoiding the fatal revolution which might break out, how could we prevent the illicit com- merce of Louisiana by sea with all the harbors on our coasts, and also by land with Texas and New-Mexico, and through them to old Mexico ?
" To think of being agreeable to France by returning to her what she ceded, would be attended by the gravest inconveniences ; because, besides that in her hands, the colony, by its situation, would be a posses- sion prejudicial to our commerce, furthermore, on the first emergency, she would avail herself of that pledge,
* A remarkable prophecy !
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to cede it to the English, whom it suits exceedingly, and would use it so as to obtain better terms for peace.
"I can easily imagine the costs of fitting out the proper expedition, to retake possession of Louisiana, as well as to keep her for the future, and also the doubts which present themselves, whether, in the progress of time, the profits which might be derived from that colony, would compensate for the immediate expenses to be incurred, or, at least, meet those that would be required annually. But all these reasons, individually and collectively, cannot counterbalance, in my judg- Inent, those which militate on the other side, consi- dering that the keeping of that possession, although expensive, is necessary to preserve our principal domi- nions.
" Of what importance to us is it, that the French should retain their known limits with regard to the English, when such not being the case on the side of our territories, it will be left to their own pleasure, on their retaking possession of Louisiana, to extend their frontiers at will and to our prejudice ? So that, instead of keeping at a distance our neighboring enemy, by retaining Louisiana in our hands, we should admit between him and us another power, and that power might recognize no barriers to his own encroachments upon our possessions. Thus, for the very reason that there are no established limits between Louisiana and Mexico, the present rebels would, if they were per- mitted to remain so, have a pretext for claiming an arbitrary extension of territory, and, besides the dis- putes to which it would give rise, it would put us under the necessity of going to the expense of establishing a new cordon.
"It seems to me, therefore, that the best policy is to
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repossess ourselves of New-Orleans, with sufficient forces to prevent the possibility of any disgrace t > the King's arms ; to expel from the colony all those who were the causes of the late troubles, confiscating their property as a punishment for their rebellion ; to order that all those who are innocent, but who may not choose to submit themselves to the new domination, be transported to France, or where they please ; to send some Spanish families to Louisiana, to serve as the main root of the new population which is to rule in that country ; to limit, for the present, that population to the extent which will be sufficient to keep up, there, just enough of cultivation to make of New-Orleans a place capable of offering temporary resources, in cases of need, to the commerce and fleets of his majesty ; and, for the purpose of making known our frontiers as plainly as possible, to establish all along those of the English a chain of posts, at regular intervals of thirty miles, or at the most important points.
"I am also of opinion that we ought not to have in New-Orleans more than one small fort, to keep the people in subjection, and to cause the flag of his Majesty to be respected, in case any insult to it should be attempted by the enemies of the crown. By abstain- ing from making of that town a place of importance, we shall avoid making it an object of attack; because, if with that view, an enemy should send there a con- siderable body of troops, these very forces might ulti- mately serve to carry on further designs against Mexico, and our other domains in that part of Ame- rica.
" What is also of importance, is to ingratiate our- selves with those different Indian nations that are on bad terms with the English, because, by fomenting hostilities on the part of these Indians, we shall keep
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the northern establishments of the English in a state of alarm, and by this means, oblige them to retain there all their forces, because, should they dare to do other- wise, the Indians I have spoken of, being on their shoulders, would immediately devastate their territories by their irruptions."
On the 24th, Don Miguel de Muzquiz delivered his written opinion in these terms :
" I find inconveniences in leaving Louisiana to the French, but still greater ones, and more certain, in its being retained by Spain.
" From the moment that the French made their first settlements in that country, they have been, to the present time, imagining more than one project to approach the provinces of Texas and New-Mexico, and they have not been able to execute their plans, not only on account of the distances to be overcome, but also because they never could gain the good will of the Indians, and because they had to watch the proceedings of their English neighbors. These same obstacles still subsist for the French and preserve us from the threatened danger of their penetrating into Texas and New Mexico. ·
" The French have long been in possession of that province, where they are accustomed to enjoy a free- dom, as to their persons and as to their commerce, which our laws do not admit of; but they are obliged to suffer and tolerate the excesses which are committed by the Indians, and as these savages prefer a state of war to any other, and as they are armed, they can make sudden and fatal attacks.
" The navigation of the Mississippi is common both to the French and to the English, and, although their respective territorial limits are determined, it will be impossible for them to avoid having disputes arising
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from competition, if there be any commerce carried on, and it is better that the encountering of these difficulties should fall on the French rather than on the Spaniards. The French can easily provide for the preservation of Louisiana and keep the English in check with little expense.
" The Spaniards would have many disagreements* with the French inhabitants of Louisiana and with the Indians, because they would lack the necessary patience to manage these people, and although their submission might be secured by the strong arm of force, yet I do not conceive that the object to be attained is worth the cost.
" It is true that the French will have ingress into the Gulf of Mexico, under the pretext of going to Louisiana, and will be able to carry on a contraband trade, but, besides that it is impossible to prevent this evil, even were Louisiana ours, it does not seem to me that the injuries which we wish to escape from, would be equal to the expenses that the possession of that colony would entail upon us.
" Should we retain Louisiana, we should incur a perpetual and annual expenditure of three hundred thousand dollars, put ourselves under the necessity of increasing the number of our officers, have incessant causes of difficulties with the English, and have to encounter numerous obstacles in the administration of that possession.
"In time of war, we should have to reinforce that province, and the means employed to accomplish this aim, would be so much wanting for the preservation and .
· Ims Frpañoles tendrian muchos disgustos con los Franceses que se quedasen, y con los Indios salvajes, porque les faltaria la paciencia que se necesitaria para con- templarlos, y aunque con la fuerza se puede asegurar todo, no concibo que el objeto merezca tanto gasto.
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. defence of more essential points ; so that, weakened as we are at present, by the necessity of providing for so many scattered posts in America, we should increase our weakness by putting ourselves to the charge of maintaining and defending Louisiana, whilst, leaving her to the French, it is probable that they would protect her against the English better than we can do.
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