USA > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > East Boston > History of East Boston; with biographical sketches of its early proprietors, and an appendix > Part 35
USA > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > East Boston > History of East Boston : with biographical sketches of its early proprietors, and an appendix. > Part 35
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New York was supposed to be the destination of the British fleet ; and immediately after its departure, Washington left Cambridge for that city with the greater part of the American army. He left a few troops for the protection of Boston under General Ward, who was ordered to repair the forts already con- structed, and to strengthen his defences to prevent the recap- ture of the town, and in all his proceedings to consult the civil authorities.3 Washington was requested by the general court
1 Gordon's Hist. Am. Rev. Vol. II. p. 197; Barry's Hist. Mass. Vol. III. p. 83 and notes.
2 Lossing's Field-Book of Rev. Vol. I. p. 581.
: Bradford's Hist. Mass. Chap. XIX. ; Barry's Hist. Mass. Vol. III. pp. 123,
392
HISTORY.
[1776.
to leave six regiments for the defence of Boston and vicinity, under the apprehension that the British might return after the American troops were withdrawn ; but the necessities and sup- posed immediate danger of New York were so great that only three of his regiments could be spared, and consequently three more were subsequently raised by the general court, with six companies of artillery, for self-protection.
It was the general opinion, that the evacuation of Boston was only a feint, and that the British would soon return. The people of Rhode Island thought that their maritime situation exposed them to imminent danger, while many of their citizens were absent on service, and in a long petition they prayed for a body of continental soldiers. So various were the applications for troops, and so numerous the calls for arms, that some de- cided action became necessary to prevent the little army and the deficient stock of public stores from being so divided and distributed as to be insufficient for the defence of any one place.1
In compliance with his instructions, General Ward immedi- ately commenced the necessary repairs, and on the 4th of May reported that the forts on Fort hill in Boston, Charlestown point, and Castle point, were almost completed, and mounted with heavy cannon. A fortification was in good progress on Noddle's Island, and a detachment of the army was at Castle island, repairing the batteries which the enemy had breached.2 The regiments which had been ordered by the general court were organized, and stationed on Noddle's Island, the castle, and at Nantasket, to prevent the landing of the British troops, or an approach to the town, should the enemy return.
After the evacuation of the town, a portion of the British fleet, consisting of five vessels, still lingered in the harbor, and were soon afterward joined by seven transports filled with High- landers.3 The presence of these vessels naturally excited the
124 ; Lossing (Field-Book Rev. Vol. I. p. 583) says that five regiments were left for the protection of Boston, and the minuteness of his description would lead to the belief that he wrote from good authority.
1 Ramsay's Am. Rev. p. 262 (Dublin ed. 1795).
2 Barry's Hist. Mass. Vol. III. p. 124.
3 Lossing, Vol. I. p. 583 ; Gordon's Hist. Am. Rev. Vol. II. p. 266.
393
NODDLE'S ISLAND FORTIFIED.
1776.]
alarm of the inhabitants of Boston, who were under great apprehension of Howe's return. The American troops had .principally gone to New York, and the people felt their defence- less condition, inasmuch as the fortifications then existing were wholly insufficient if an effort should be made to enter or fire the town. This feeling increased in Boston and the vicinity, and the sight of the armed vessels of the enemy, and the con- stant expectation of the arrival of others, made them more and more dissatisfied with their situation. With characteristic promptness of action, the danger was no sooner really perceived than measures were taken to put the harbor in a state of de- fence, and to be in readiness for the anticipated return of the enemy.
This apprehension was not a groundless one; for, subse- quently to this, it excited the serious attention of Washington and his generals, and all the admirable foresight and critical observation of the commander-in-chief were required to enable him to provide for the safety of the seaboard, as well as to carry out his plans to prevent the proposed junction of the two divisions of the British army, one of which, under Burgoyne, was already marching down from the north, in order to meet the other, with which it was to unite at or near Albany.1
Noddle's Island, from its situation in regard to the city and harbor, seemed to be peculiarly appropriate for the site of a fort ; it was selected as such without delay, and the work imme- diately commenced. The adaptation of the Island for such a purpose arises from the fact that it is so situated, that, properly fortified, its guns can sweep the whole upper harbor, and no fleet can remain long enough before the city, under a fire from the Island batteries, to do any considerable damage. This im- portant, indeed invaluable, consideration, determined the Island as the site of the fortress for the protection of the city and to drive the enemy's vessels from the harbor, and, under the sense of present danger, the work was commenced without delay.
This was in the early part of May, 1776. Individuals sub- scribed towards this object ; many flocked in from the adjoining towns, and the whole community was awake to the importance
1 Irving's Washington (octavo ed.), Vol. III. pp. 126-7, etc.
1
394
HISTORY.
[1776.
of the object. All classes of people united their efforts in erect- ing a fort on the heights of the Island. Both the clergy and laity volunteered their services, working with the pickaxe and shovel, and aiding until the work was finished, while the poorer class were compensated for their labors.1 One desire actuated all, - to protect their city from the enemy. During the whole of our contest with England, there is nothing which reflects brighter lustre on our cause than the disinterested pa- triotism of the people. Private interests, property, prospects, indeed every thing, was willingly sacrificed pro bono publico, and the people in every rank and station labored with equal zeal, with the pen, the sword, or the spade, in the study, the battle field, or in the trench, whether without pay or supported by government. The highest and purest motives guided their actions. The sword was taken up from necessity, and then used with the power which a just cause, a patriot's heart, and a valiant arm, will always wield.
The community was wide awake to the importance of prompt and persistent action ; and the energy with which the work was carried on until finished, affords abundant evidence of the spirit of the times. Every measure was employed to call the atten- tion of the people to the subject. A notice, signed by Joseph Russell, clerk, appeared on the 6th of May, calling upon the subscribers for fortifying the harbor to meet, and the thanks of the citizens of Boston were expressed to the gentlemen from the country who had voluntarily assisted in the work.2 A sim- ilar notice appeared in the Chronicle on the 23d of the same month. The fortification on the Island was prosecuted with great zeal, and, with the volunteer labor from Boston and the neighboring towns which sympathized with the city, the work rapidly progressed. The strongest motive, self-preservation, urged the people to work ; the vessels of the enemy were in full sight, and might any day be reinforced, and the siege re- newed. The spirit of the times is shown in the newspapers. Says one, "Almost every able-bodied citizen of this place has volunteered to work two days a week for six weeks on the for-
1 Gordon's Hist. Am. Rev. Vol. II. p. 265, etc.
2 Boston Gazette, 6th of May, 1776.
395
THE FORTRESS ON NODDLE'S ISLAND.
1776.]
tifications."1 The same paper continues, "They began to fortify Noddle's Island last week, since which, they have been joined by several of the neighboring towns." There seems to have been a general determination, not only within the limits of the city, but in the adjoining country, to protect Boston from any further attack ; and the readiness and zeal with which the people labored on the defences show the earnest interest felt in the issue at stake. The newspapers urged the inhabitants to the work, and kept the community informed of the progress made. A third notice appeared in the papers, calling upon those who had subscribed for fortifying Boston harbor to fulfil their sub- scription by personal appearance, or by providing substitutes. This notice also says, " It is thought four hundred men for three days will finish the grand fortress on Noddle's Island. A great number of gentlemen have agreed to go to-morrow and Satur- day next, and it is hoped that the inhabitants of the town who are able to work will appear on the floor of the Town house at one half past seven, to-morrow the 7th instant."2 This notice (dated on the 5th of June) appears to have been made under direction of a committee of the general court. From all that can be learned, it is evident that this was an important and large fortification, and the incidental allusions in the different notices quoted, support this idea. The Island appears to have been the point universally selected as the one most suitable for the end in view ; and the number of men employed, and the length of time consumed in the work, show that no small for- tress rose from the heights.
In some respects a fort should -be like a fire-engine, " always ready, but never wanted," and this fortress was an instance in point. The British fleet did not return, and the inhabitants were not called upon to defend the city ; but now, relieved from acting upon the defensive, they immediately began to act upon the offensive.
The numerous alarms in May and June, and the fears enter- tained of the return of the enemy, gave great uneasiness to the
1 Chronicle, 9th May, 1776.
2 Continental Journal, 6th June, 1776.
396
HISTORY.
[1776.
people along the sea-coast of Massachusetts ; and hence the gen eral court, then in session, on the 11th of June, determined, if possible, to drive all the enemy's vessels from the bay. Said John Adams, in a letter to Samuel Cooper (dated 30th May, 1776), " I shall never be happy until every unfriendly flag is driven out of sight, and the Light-house island, George's, and Lovell's islands, and the east end of Long island, are secured." 1 The fortifica- tions on Noddle's Island having been successfully built, and the city thus protected, Gen. Benjamin Lincoln proposed a plan for freeing the harbor of the British vessels. His scheme was sanc- tioned and accepted by the Massachusetts assembly, and put in execution on the 13th of June. Detachments from the regiments of Colonels Marshall and Whitney, and a " battalion of train," under Colonel Crafts, provided with cannon, ammunition, and provisions were mustered on Long wharf at the beat of drum, and there embarking in boats, they went down the harbor to Pettick's island and Hull, where they were joined by more troops and sea-coast companies, so as to make nearly six hun- dred men at each place. Militia from the towns along the harbor shore, with a detachment from the " train " and some field-pieces, took stations on Moon island, Hoff's Neck, and Point Alderton ; while a detachment, commanded by Colonel Whitcomb, from the regular troops under Gen. Ward, with two eighteen-pounders, a thirteen inch mortar, and intrenching tools, took post at Long island. The morning of the 14th nearly dawned before the various bodies of troops were all stationed. In a few hours, defences were thrown up on Long island and at Nantasket, and cannon were mounted, and began to play upon the ships, the first shot being fired from Long island. Commo- dore Banks, perceiving the perilous situation of his little fleet, made signals for weighing anchor, and after blowing up the light-house, a deed unworthy of humanity, set sail and went to sea, leaving Boston harbor and the vicinity entirely free from the enemy.2
Several English store ships, which arrived soon after, not
1 Works of John Adams, Vol. IX. p. 381.
2 Gordon's Hist. Am. Rev. Vol. II. p. 266 ; Ramsay's Am. Rev. pp. 234-5 ; Lossing, Vol. I. pp. 583; Barry's Hist. Mass. Vol. III. pp. 127-8.
397
FORTIFICATIONS IN 1812.
1812.]
being apprised of the evacuation of the port, sailed into the harbor and fell into our hands. In this way, Lieut .- Col. Camp- bell and seven hundred men were made prisoners in June.1
From this time until the close of the war in 1783, Boston, which had suffered so severely in the commencement of the contest, was comparatively free from military disturbances within her own limits. Through the whole war, however, she contributed her full share, and much more, to the general cause ; and on every battle field north or south, some of her gallant sons have bled and died. The thirteen united colonies fur- nished for the regular service of the revolutionary army, besides militia, 231,779 men, an average of 17,830 each. Of these, Massachusetts furnished 67,907, or 29 per cent. of the whole ; 35,968 more than any other state, and 50,077 more than, or nearly four times, her equal proportion. And she poured out her treasure for the outfit and support of her sons in the regular and militia service, and for the support of their families which they left behind, and for other public purposes, in nearly the same proportion, and with the same noble and liberal spirit as she did her physical force and her blood.
May we who enjoy the blessings of that inheritance, acquired for us by the labors and sufferings of six generations of noble ancestors, perpetuate it in all its strength, beauty, and purity to those who shall follow us!
III.
Fortifications in the war of 1812. - The war with England in 1812 was emphatically a war of the democratic adminis- tration. The federal party was opposed to it. In New England, and in Massachusetts particularly, the opposition was strong and open. The government found it difficult to fill their ranks with soldiers, and encountered a firm public opinion at every step. Caleb Strong was then the governor of Massachusetts ; 2 a man of sterling character, and possess-
1 Lossing's Field-Book of the Revolution, Vol. I. pp. 583, etc .; Gordon's. Hist. Am. War, Vol. II. p. 268.
2 IIe held the office of governor of Massachusetts from the year 1800 (being
34
398
HISTORY.
[1812.
ing the confidence of the people, he was a firm support on which the federal party leaned in its opposition to the anti- constitutional measures of the administration. The grand object of the dominant party was to take Canada, thinking that in this way England could be most easily and most materially affected. It was thought by the democratic leaders to be utter nonsense to attempt to meet the enemy on the ocean, and that, to secure even a chance of success, the war should be carried on by land-forces; and consequently Canada was the main object in view. The New Englanders were opposed to this measure. The Canadians were their neighbors, and peaceful ones ; no ill feeling existed between the States and the prov- inces, intermarriages had taken place between them, and it was repugnant to their noblest feelings to fight against their un- offending neighbors, especially to carry the war into their own territory. It was contended also, that if war must be waged at all, it should be with France, as she was the first transgressor.
When requisition was made upon Gov. Strong for troops from Massachusetts, he denied the right of the president on constitutional grounds, and upon this basis of action refused his assent, and stood aloof from the contest.
The first requisition upon Gov. Strong by authority of the president was through General Dearborn, who had recently been appointed superintendent of the military district No. 1, which was composed of Massachusetts, of which Maine then formed a part, and Rhode Island. It was made on the 22d of June, 1812,1 and was for a detachment of forty-one companies of artillery and infantry, eight of which were to be marched to Rhode Island, and the remainder stationed in different parts of Massachusetts. The governor made no reply to this requisition, believing that the exigency had not occurred which, under the constitution, justified the president in calling the militia into the active service of the United States; and, following his own
the immediate successor of Gov. Sumner) until 1807, and again from 1812 to 1816, and his administration embraced years which will ever be memorable in the history of Massachusetts and of the country.
1 Letter Book, Vol. XI. p. 149, etc.
399
COURSE OF GOVERNOR STRONG.
1812.]
convictions of duty, and with the approbation of high legal authority, he did not answer the requisition.1
Gen. Dearborn's call was renewed (26th of June), and again the governor declined calling out the militia ; but, under his own authority as commander-in-chief, he issued a general order on the 3d of July, requiring the militia to be in readiness to march at the shortest notice to any place of danger. A letter was also received by the governor from the secretary of war (27th July), urging him to order out the militia in compliance with the request of Gen. Dearborn ; but the governor declined.
In a message to the legislature, the governor justified his course on the ground, that he "presumed, if this state was in danger, the regular troops would not have been ordered to the north-west frontiers; and, if they were so ordered, the militia were not liable to be called into service, and stationed in the forts of the United States to do garrison duty when no danger of invasion appeared." He continued : " I have been fully dis- posed to comply with the requirements of the constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and sincerely regret that a request should have been made by an officer of the national government with which I could not constitutionally comply. But it appeared to me that this requi- sition was of that character; and I was under the same obliga- tion to maintain the rights of the state as to support the con- stitution of the United States." 2
Although Gov. Strong thus emphatically declined answering demands which he considered unconstitutional, he was ready
1 Bradford's Hist. Mass. A committee appointed to take into consideration the requisition were unable to perceive that any exigency existed which would render it advisable to comply, and advised that the opinion of the supreme court be asked on the questions, whether the commanders-in-chief of the states had a right to judge of the exigeney ; and whether, when either of the exigencies specified in the constitution did exist, the militia could be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the' militia. An answer to these questions, signed by Theophilus Parsons, Samuel Sewall, and Isaac Parker, was returned, in which the opinion was given, that the commanders-in-chief were to decide of the exigeney, and that the militia could be lawfully commanded only by offi- cers of the militia. - Council Records, Vol. XXVI. pp. 99, 106.
2 Speech of Gov. Strong, Mass. Resolves, 1812. See also his message of the 28th May, 1813, which gives a summary of war proceedings, preliminary and actual.
400
HISTORY.
[1812.
to adopt every measure which the safety of the state demanded, and to accede to all requests from the national government which would be justified by his constitutional obligations. This is evinced in the fact, that, on the 5th of August, at the request of Gen. Dearborn, and by order of the president, he issued gen- eral orders to direct a portion of the militia detached under the orders of the 25th of April,1 to march to Passamaquoddy for the defence of the ports and harbors on the eastern border of the state.2
Orderly Book, Nov. 1811 to Feb. 1818, pp. 56, 57.
2 The General Orders of the 5th of August are quoted from the Orderly Book, Nov. 1811 to Feb. 1818, pp. 96, 97, as they serve to illustrate the course pursued by the governor : -
" Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
" General Orders. Head-Quarters, Boston, August 5, 1812.
" By the General Order of the 3d of July last, Major-General Henry Sewall is appointed to command the Eastern Division of the Militia which was de- tached under the order of the 25th of April last, consisting of all the detached militia in the District of Maine.
" The Commander-in-Chief having been requested by Major-General Henry Dearborn, by order of the President of the United States, to direct a part of the militia, detached under the said order of the 25th of April, to march to Passamaquoddy for the defence of the posts and harbors on the eastern bor- ders of the Commonwealth, and considering that that part of the State is in a peculiar manner in danger of invasion, and that disorderly persons may attempt to disturb and annoy the peaceable inhabitants in that neighborhood, and endanger their lives and property, has thought fit to order, and doth hereby order, that three full companies of Infantry of the Eastern Detached Division of Militia be designated by Major-General Sewall; and after being completely armed and equipped, ordered to march as soon as possible to East- port, in the District of Maine, which is appointed the place of rendezvous.
" The said three companies will form a battalion under the command of a detached Major to be designated by Major-General Sewall, who will also de- signate an Adjutant and Quarter-Master, and order the whole to march with- out delay to the place of rendezvous.
" The Major commanding the battalion will see that provision is made for the subsistence of his troops, from the places from whence the companies march until their arrival to the place of rendezvous, in the manner prescribed by law, and for the transportation of their baggage. Major-General Sewall, in desig- nating the companies to march, will, as far as may be, take them from the nearest counties and districts, and from places the least exposed to the enemy.
" The Major-Generals and the officers of the local militia from which any part of the said battalion may be drawn, will afford their aid in completing the
- -
401
MASSACHUSETTS LEFT UNDEFENDED.
1812.]
The course of conduct pursued by Gov. Strong was sus- tained by the whole voice of New England ; but it brought upon the State the immediate frown of the national government. Hull, who, in the words of a living writer, was subsequently made a " scape-goat to carry off the sins of the administration," had been sent to Detroit, and Dearborn to Niagara. In seeming vengeance upon the independent course of Governor Strong, the most of the soldiers were taken away from the forts along the coast of Massachusetts, so that they were wholly in an insecure condition. This act of the national govern- ment left the harbors and extended coast undefended. Still, the New Englanders thought, that, as they were well known to be opposed to the war, it would be bad policy for the enemy to drive them into the contest, and compel them to fight against their inclination. But this supposition was ultimately falsified. The Adams frigate (Capt. Morris) ran a gauntlet through the
companies, and will see that the men are armed and equipped as the law directs. The Commander-in-Chief expects that this order will be obeyed by his fellow-citizens of the drafted militia with promptitude, and when marching to the place of their destination, as well as afterwards, that they will preserve good order, and render due obedience to the commands of their officers. He would remind them that they are not only called forth to defend the frontier against any invasion of a foreign enemy, but to prevent the depredations of any lawless banditti who may be disposed to rob and plunder, whether they belong to our own territories or those of the enemy. Although war is de- clared between the United States and Great Britain, it is to be carried on only by the order of the government. It is the duty of the inhabitants of the towns and villages bordering on the British line to endeavor to repel any invasion of our own territories, but they have no right to make incursions into the territories of the enemy. Lawless plunderers, either by sea or land, and as well in time of war as in peace, are pirates and robbers, and their depreda- tions ought, as far as may be, to be prevented or punished ; they only occasion distress and misery to the exposed inhabitants, and have no tendency to pro- duce an equitable peace, which is the only justifiable object of war. The offi- cers will be careful to inculcate upon their men the necessity of discipline, and a sacred regard to the rights of their fellow-citizens. The soldiers of a free government should view with abhorrence any attempt to assume power by the use of the sword, or to invade the rights of those whom it is their duty to pro- tect.
" By order of the Commander-in-Chief. WILLIAM DONNISON, Adjutant-General." 34 *
402
HISTORY.
[1814.
British vessels which were " laying off and on " the coast, and, being pursued up the Penobscot, went as far as Bangor, where the militia defended her as well as they were able ; but, after a vigorous resistance, she was burned to the water's edge. The enemy now had the eastern ports of the State open to their men of war; and the fleet of Sir John Sherbrook of Halifax anchored in Castine Bay, from which any town upon the coast was easily accessible. The whole seaboard coast of the Penob- scot was declared to be in the possession of the enemy. A gen- eral alarm spread through the community. Each seaport town felt itself in danger, and a common interest demanded that some immediate action should be taken. From the course then recently pursued by the United States government, it seemed clear that no aid could be expected from that power ; and if the coast was to be defended, it must be by the State itself relying upon her own resources. The question was, Shall this be done? and the pride and patriotism of the peo- ple echoed the affirmative the whole length of the seaboard.
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