USA > Massachusetts > Worcester County > Worcester county; a narrative history, Volume II > Part 48
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"The risk of punishment was much greater then when Ward assumed the leadership than when Washington took hold. Behind Ward and the early leaders of the Revolution, were only the forces of New England-indeed, at the first challenge, only the forces of Massachusetts. When Washington was appointed he had the patriot element of thirteen colonies at his back.
"On Ward's arrival in Cambridge he took command of the besieging forces and called a council of war-the first Revolutionary council of war. General Ward, who took his place at the head of the council table was a man of moderate height, clean shaven, of prominent features; too stout for his
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forty-seven years and at the moment showing the effects of his recent illness, but well enough nevertheless to apply himself conscientiously to the duties to his hand. Dressed in the manner of the time-hair in a powdered wig; a long coat with silver buttons ; a figured neckcloth surmounting a ruffled shirt ; a long waistcoat with big pockets ; knee breeches, and riding-boots. A 'God- fearing' man, strongly believing in and living up to the religion he pro- fessed ; quiet, thoughtful, and rather over-stern in demeanor ; somewhat slow in speech and with a biblical turn to his conversation ; inflexible in his ideas, and fully convinced that the Massachusetts Bay Colony was the land most approved by Providence, and that those of Massachusetts were the Chosen People."
Something more than the methods of the trained soldier were required in the commander of this Yankee army, and of this General Ward's biog- rapher gives a convincing analysis, as follows :
"It was the good fortune of Massachusetts (and of the Revolution) that the chief command of this restless, seething army was in the hands of a man whom the troops esteemed and respected. Had Ward held less of their respect and affection, the much discussed 'disorder' might have become dis- aster.
"It had been the sound judgment of the Provincial delegates which had placed Ward above all of the general officers except Preble (who declined service). His attributes had not included seniority-for he was the youngest of the general officers who had seen service; but neither was he appointed because of greater possible activity-for by that standard Thomas would have outranked him. His military record, though not from any personal fault, was less brilliant than that of Pomeroy, or Thomas, or Whitcomb. And he had neither wealth nor high position to enhance his standing. But he had been tested and tried in the political storms of many years, and he stood as a recognized champion of the patriot cause and, as such, an inspiring com- mander for the Patriot army.
"He was not a 'regular general,' nor blessed with a great political follow- ing, but for a full twenty-four years he had been in the closest contact with the typical Massachusetts life; meeting his home neighbors and those of greater distance throughout Worcester County as justice of the peace and judge of the Court of Common Pleas ; as selectman and church moderator, as representative and councilor, and as militia officer-and he thoroughly understood the men and their manner of thought. The molding of his char- acter and the ripening of his experience during those twenty-four years now stood his country in good stead.
"Some there were who thought him over-lenient to offenders, and that he held the reins too loosely; but when the point was raised, both friend and
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enemy among the leaders of Massachusetts realized that to put another in his place might overnight destroy the Province. It was not possible to enforce rigid discipline, and until a regularly constituted government could be reëstab- lished there was always the danger that the army might get out of hand no matter who was in command, but Ward filled his most difficult post with so substantial a degree of dexterity that even his most bitter detractor-James Warren, of Plymouth-feared the result of making a change and, in the fol- lowing month, testified 'we dare not supercede him here.' A severe or arbi- trary or unpopular general would have been defied, and the defiance might have kindled the flames of armed anarchy. An ambitious general might have torn authority from the Congress and set up a military standard. Either calamity would have alienated the sympathies of the other colonies and, rous- ing and confirming their dormant suspicions of Massachusetts, would have destroyed the Revolution in its cradle. And either would have brought a grim aftermath to the patriots of Massachusetts; with confiscation and hang- ings to mark the penalty for unsuccessful rebellion.
"There were other able men in Massachusetts, with more military experi- ence, and, some of them, with stronger ideas of military discipline, but there was none other whom Ward's contemporaries dared to trust at the helm while there threatened a return to elemental passions."
Ward was the central figure of command, but until the Provincial Con- gress or the Committee of Safety should act, he was without authority to enlist the men around him, or to pay them, or to hold them in any way. On April 23 he wrote the Provincial Congress imploring immediate action : "My situation is such that if I have not enlisting orders immediately, I shall be left all alone. It is impossible to keep the men here, expecting something be done. I therefore pray that the plan may be completed and handed to me this morn- ing, that you, gentlemen of the Congress issue orders for enlisting men." Thus prompted, the Congress declared for the raising of an army of 13,600. But a clumsy system of recruiting was put into effect, and the regiments were slow in filling up and in getting their officers. The besieging lines were at their leanest in the early days of May, for most of the men had returned to their homes --- "some to get additional clothes and to arrange farm and family affairs because they had enlisted or intended to; others, because they had decided that camp life was not to their taste."
"Always incessantly, increasingly imperative was the need for gunpowder. Letter after letter by Ward calls for it. Especially impressive in its extreme earnestness and courageous confidence is the address to the Continental Con- gress that he signed on June 4, together with Joseph Warren, as chairman of the Committee of Safety, and Moses Gill, as chairman of the Committee of Supplies. They convincingly set forth the danger to which the Province is
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exposed by the scarcity of ammunition, but they dwell on the bravery of the New England troops, 'whom we think we can without boasting declare are ready to encounter every danger for the preservation of the Rights and Liberties of America.' They ask only for arms and ammunition-feeling that thus supplied, even if otherwise unassisted, they may 'with the common blessing of Providence baffle the designs of the enemy,' and be greatly instru- mental in bringing our present dispute to happy issue."
During these weeks various reports were received that the British were planning to seize and fortify Bunker Hill and Dorchester Heights. General Ward and his council of war on several occasions planned to establish a fort on Dorchester Heights, but each time the project was deemed premature, for one reason because of lack of cannon. In the meantime, however, the organ- izing of regiments began to run more smoothly and efficiently, and the army began to take military form. It must not be supposed that during these weeks the troops had been idle. The American positions had been better established, and various skirmishes had been fought. These were feverish weeks.
WARD AND BUNKER HILL.
"Then quickly approached 'in early June' a climax to all the threats and counter-threats. The English had received the greater part of the reinforce- ments for which they had been waiting. Well equipped, well disciplined, well officered, and headed by a galaxy of famous generals, they felt that their turn had come, and they decided that the time was ripe to raise the siege. Their first move was to be-on Sunday, June 18-the seizure and fortification of Dorchester Neck. This to be succeeded by the occupation of the Charlestown peninsula, for it "was absolutely necessary that we should make ourselves masters of those heights,'" wrote General Burgoyne to Lord Stanley, and his words were confirmed in a letter from General Howe to his brother, Lord Howe.
"News of the English decision reached the besiegers. A crisis impended. With the English army moving out of the town, no man could certainly fore- tell the issue if, unchecked, it should push forward over either or both penin- sulas to an attack upon the American lines. A successful English onslaught might break up the only American army and throw the colonies and their cause into confusion and helplessness. For the safety of America the Eng- lish must be held in Boston.
"The Committee of Safety, June 15, addressed the Provincial Congress, pressing for an immediate augmentation of the army, an immediate remedy- ing of the deficiency in arms, an immediate commissioning of additional officers, and the ordering of all the militiamen in the Colony to 'hold them-
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selves in readiness to march on the shortest notice'; and made the session historic by passing its famous 'Bunker Hill resolution':
"'Whereas, it appears of Importance to the Safety of this Colony, that possession of the Hill, called Bunker's Hill, in Charlestown, be securely kept and defended ; and also some one hill or hills on Dorchester Neck be likewise Secured. Therefore, Resolved, Unanimously, that it be recommended to the Council of War, that the above mentioned Bunker's Hill be maintained by sufficient force being posted there; and as the particular situation of Dor- chester Neck is unknown to this Committee, they advise that the Council of War take and pursue such steps respecting the Same, as to them shall appear to be for the Security of this Colony.'"
"All histories have it that the result of the action of the council of war on this resolution of the Committee of Safety was Ward's order to fortify Bunker Hill-and the resolution and order have been variously interpreted ; as a step of almost blind recklessness, a desperate hazard, occasioned by the urgent necessity to do something to check the British plans to raise the siege ; as a move to offset the British intention to take Dorchester Neck; as an act of defiance calculated to bring on a general engagement ; as the first step in the contemplated expulsion of the English from Boston.
"But the determination at which the council of war of June 15 actually arrived was of a character much bolder-no less than a sudden tightening of the lines around the British forces by the simultaneous fortification of both Bunker Hill and Dorchester Neck.
"At earlier meetings, Ward and Joseph Warren had opposed the fortifica- tion of Bunker Hill until the American forces could be better equipped. But the English onslaught, long threatened, long deferred, was at last imminent, and resolve ran high to drive boldly forward to block it.
"The supply of powder was still very low, but the army had been acquir- ing regimental form as company after company filled up, and it had achieved a little military experience in the skirmishes of the preceding weeks; so now that the Committee of Safety had placed the issue before them, recommend- ing the occupation of Bunker Hill, but leaving the matter of Dorchester Neck to their discretion, the council of war with true New England courage unani- mously decided on occupying both.
"I have no quarrel with those who criticize either the conception or the execution of the battle. There is room for honest disagreement on both, and hindsight can always find points on which to hang or by which to bolster an argument.
"Some of the questions which have long engaged writers and controver- sialists can now be laid to rest, settled by the publication of new contem- porary evidence and the better consideration of old. Of these are the view-
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points of the American military leaders at Cambridge concerning both the Bunker Hill project and the possibility of occupying Dorchester Neck; the original plan for the relief of the detachment; and lesser. items, as the supply of 'drinking water.' Some others must still remain largely a matter of indi- vidual opinion.
"Questioning the fundamental policy of the expedition, one may ask with much sapience why the Americans thought it necessary to occupy the Charles- town peninsula, when egress from Boston by that route could have been blocked, or checked, with much less risk by works on the mainland side of Charlestown Neck.
"It was, perhaps, a move foolishly reckless, but it was also a move of high moral courage-and was rewarded by success far beyond all expectations ; beyond, if you will, all merit! It had been projected to prevent the enemy from moving out of Boston onto the mainland, and it resulted in driving them out of Boston into the sea !
"If the battle had not been fought, the English would, as their least exploit,-and at little, if any, cost-have taken possession of Dorchester Neck within the next twenty-four hours. Quickly following would have come their occupation of the Charlestown peninsula. And thereafter, even should they have found it impossible to make any further advance, they could have safely and easily maintained the town and harbor as a base for operations against both New England and New York.
"One comes next to Ward's judgment against large early reinforcement of Prescott's detachment, and his determination to hold his center in full strength until the enemy had displayed his choice of attack.
"Whether we agree or disagree with him, the contingency upon which he based his judgment was at all events no fallacy, for the letters of General Howe-soon to replace Gage as English commander-in-chief-tell us that Cambridge was the main objective in his plan for raising the siege.
"It was impossible for Ward,-or anyone else in the American camp-to divine what proportion, if any, of the British strength would be sent over the Charlestown peninsula in the face of the American entrenchments, and what proportion by way of Lechmere's Point or Willis Creek.
"An attack by way of Lechmere's Point or Willis Creek was a very real peril. Washington also so regarded it when, nine months later, the American forces undertook the occupation of Dorchester Neck. We find him carefully avoiding the danger of unduly weakening his center, though the American lines had by that time been greatly strengthened and Lechmere's Point had been converted into a strongly fortified position, equipped with some of the heavy Ticonderoga guns.
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"There was a deplorable amount of confusion among the troops on the Charlestown peninsula and in the vicinity (excepting always those holding the battle line), but Ward, necessarily remaining in Cambridge until the land- ing of the English reinforcement had completed the disclosure of his oppo- nent's plan of action, could not have reached the field in time to have changed conditions there-even if (which is doubtful) he, or any other man, could have changed them to any great degree. And if he had left headquarters before the English commander had displayed his intention, he would have been taking an entirely unjustifiable hazard.
"All of which seems very plain, yet apparently some of Ward's critics would have liked to see him put the last keg of powder in a coach and drive over to the Charlestown peninsula in order to make a complete show for the spectators in Boston."
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND.
Washington, on taking over the command, continued the three-division plan of the army. On July 22 he assigned the largest division, that of the right wing, to Ward; the left wing to Charles Lee; and the center, under his personal supervision, to Putnam. Ward, three days later, rode over to Rox- bury to assume his new command. The occasion was made one of ceremony. Five regiments were "marched towards Cambridge" to meet him and "wait upon" him into Roxbury. The right wing comprised the Roxbury positions and their "southern dependencies." The division under the new alignment was manned by twelve regiments of Massachusetts and Connecticut men, in two brigades under Generals Thomas and Spencer."
While only incidental to this narrative, the circumstances of General Ward's life during this period are interesting.
"Roxbury was at that time still 'a suburban village,' with a single narrow street, and dotted with farms, many of which were yet held by the descend- ants of the original proprietors. The business of the town was concentrated in Roxbury Street, the sole thoroughfare to Boston, through which (in normal times) as through a tunnel, crowded all the surplus produce of the country.
"Ward's headquarters, was in the mansion 'built about the year 1723, by Col. Francis Brinley, upon the estate of eighty acres formerly Palsgrave Alcock's,' and styled by its owner 'Datchet House,' having been modelled after the family seat of the Brinleys, at Datchet, England. It was at the time known as the Brinley Place, or 'Pierpont Castle,' deriving its latter name from its purchase in 1773 by Robert Pierpont, a Boston merchant. There is much vivid description of it in a little volume entitled 'Fannie St. John,' by Emily Pierpont Delesdernier.
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"It was situated," she wrote, "in the midst of a large domain of park and wooded hills, and presented a picture of grandeur and stateliness not common in the New World. There were colonnades, and a vestibule whose massive mahogany doors, studded with silver, opened into a wide hall, where tessel- lated floors sparkled under the light of a lofty dome of richly painted glass. Underneath the dome two cherubs carved in wood extended their wings, and so formed the center, from which an immense chandelier of cut glass depended. Upon the floor beneath the dome there stood a marble column, and around it ran a divan formed of cushions covered with satin of Damascus of gorgeous coloring. Large mirrors with ebony frames filled the spaces between the grand staircases at either side of the hall of entrance. All the paneling and woodwork consisted of elaborate carving done abroad, and made to fit every part of the mansion where such ornamentation was required. Exquisite combinations of painted birds and fruits and flowers abounded everywhere, in rich contrast with the delicate blue tint that prevailed upon the lofty walls. The staterooms were covered with Persian carpets, and hung with tapestries of gold and silver, arranged after some graceful artistic foreign fashion."
The "wide hall," forty-four feet in length and twenty-two feet in width, occupied the entire ground floor of the center of the house and opened into two large wings to left and right. In the right was the reception room in which Ward and his staff held council.
THE ESTRANGEMENT WITH WASHINGTON.
"The closing months of 1775 were marked by the birth and growth of the estrangement between Washington and Ward. No light was ever shed upon its original cause by either man, but indirect evidence points to a mutual lack of cordiality as having existed from their first meeting. There are three probable explanations : first, James Warren ; second, Charles Lee; and third, Washington's biting comments on both officers and privates of the Massa- chusetts troops.
"James Warren had conceived and expressed the idea that the failure to hold Bunker Hill, the lack of discipline, and pretty nearly every other trouble, was Ward's fault. Washington had not anticipated the conditions he encountered in the American camps and he apparently adopted James War- ren's line of thought and hastened to the conclusion that the disorder he found was due to laxity in Ward's methods.
"Next on the list we have Charles Lee, still smarting from the two wounds to his pride-the twice passing of his name in the selection of those to com- mand the Revolutionary Army. Under the circumstances one would not expect 'Boiling Water' (as the Indians had nicknamed Lee) to appreciate a
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provincial general who had little to say for himself, who was a judge by pro- fession instead of a soldier, and who had established Cromwell's practice of the troops' daily attendance at prayers-'Deacon Ward,' Lee styled him ; and one would expect Lee, never sparing in criticism of people whom he disliked or who might be in his way, to pass many sneers to Washington concerning Ward. We also know that until the battle of Monmouth (June 28, 1778) Washington held a very high opinion of Lee's military judgment and ability.
"The third surmise-Washington's harsh criticisms of New Englanders ; his impugning of their personal habits, courage, intelligence, and morality -- was probably a fertile cause of the continuance and growth of the ill feeling, for General Ward strongly resented disparagement of Massachusetts by Southerners.
"General Ward's health had declined to a somewhat alarming extent dur- ing the first months of 1776. He had made no complaint while the outcome of the siege of Boston remained in doubt, but after the successful occupation of Dorchester Heights he felt compelled to retire from army life. Dorchester Heights had shifted the principal site of the struggle. The next step was to be a fight to hold New York against the enemy, and he was physically unequal to the responsibilities of his position in a province and under conditions alike unfamiliar to him.
"He waited until the enemy had evacuated the capital and then he wrote to Washington tendering his resignation, for 'to eat the Continental bread & not do the duty is what I am much averse to.' He accompanied his letter to the commander-in-chief by one in similar strain to Hancock as President of the Continental Congress.
"Washington was apparently glad to receive Ward's resignation as first major-general but he requested him (March 29) to take the command in Boston and, following, the general Continental command in Massachusetts after the main army's departure for New York. High and peculiar respon- sibility would attach to the post, but it did not involve the rigors of a march- ing campaign, and Ward accepted the charge until some other general could be spared to take it over-continuing to place the public service above all personal consideration.
"It will be noted that neither Washington nor Ward permitted his per- sonal sentiments to affect his sense of duty. Washington did not hesitate to ask, nor Ward to give.
"Regiment after regiment from the American camps around Boston was now marching toward New York, and on April 4, 1776, Washington himself set out."
On the same day Ward formally assumed the command in Massachusetts of both the land forces and the heterogeneous little fleet in the continental
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pay. He held this post until he was relieved by General Heath on March 20, I777.
Following are Washington's letters which Ward and his friends deem offensive, and stories which were built on the estrangement :
WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS ON WARD'S RESIGNATION.
To Joseph Reed, April 1, 1776: "Nothing of importance has occurred in these parts, since my last, unless it be the resignation of General Ward and Fry, and the reassumption of the former, or retraction, on account as he says, of its being disagreeable to some of the officers. Who those officers are. I have not heard. I have not inquired. When the application to Congress and notice of it to me came to hand, I was disarmed of interposition, because it was put upon the footing of duty of conscience, the General being persuaded that his health would not allow him to take that share of duty that his office required. The officers to whom the resignation is disagreeable, have been able, no doubt, to convince him of his mistake, and that his health will admit him to be alert and active. I shall leave him until he can determine yea or nay, to command in this quarter."-Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed.
To Charles Lee, May 9, 1776: "General Ward, upon the evacuation of Boston, and finding that there was a probability of his removing from the smoke of his own chimney, applied to me, and wrote to Congress for leave to resign. A few days afterward, some of the officers, as he says, getting uneasy at the prospect of his leaving them, he applied for his letter of resignation, which had been permitted to my care; but, behold! it had been carefully forwarded to Congress, and as I have since learnt, judged as reasonable (want of health being the plea) that it was instantly complied with." (This statement is inaccurate, for the letter of resignation referred to-that of March 22-was never accepted by Congress. It was not until Ward repeated his request for permission to retire that Congress, a month later, took action.) -Lee Papers.
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