USA > Maryland > An historical view of the government of Maryland : from its colonization to the present day > Part 48
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54
4
2
470
ORGANIZATION OF THE
[Hist. Viw.
note the degree of our participation in the government, they are the mere instruments by which our civil liberties are secured and protected. We cede a portion of our natural rights, and out of these ceded portions we form a government: only, that through its instramentality, we may secure to ourselves the full and effi- cient enjoyment of our rights of person and property. Hence, in republican governments, the power which is to be exercised for the benefit of the people, is made to spring from them: because thence to derive it, is to insure its most beneficial exercise in the accomplishment of the objects for which it was instituted, And whilst it in the main accomplishes these objects, it is useless to jeopard the substance by wrangling about the forms. There may have been moments, in which the rich and various resources of the city of Baltimore and the larger counties have been pecu- liarly operated upon by State taxation: yet in the most of these cases, the tax was not peculiarly imposed upon them, but be- came peculiar in its operation only because the narrow resources of other sections denied to them the possession of such objects of taxation. Discrimination in taxation will always be the result of the most uniform and impartial system, where wealth is so un- equally distributed: and at last it will be found, that those who contribute most to the support of government, are those who en- joy most of that security which it imparts to the possession of pro- perty. In the recent encouragement and aid given by the State to the city of Baltimore, in the stupendous work of improvement which she has projected and is now conducting with such vigor and success, we have an earnest of good feeling, which deserves to be cherished in remembrance. And if we look through the mass of legislation peculiar to her, we shall find her favoured in ali her institutions. Under such circumstances, a course of gene- rous concession and forbearance on all parts, will probably rid us, in a few years, of those sectional jealousies, and heart- burnings, which have so long infested our State: and she will "become what she should be, one and indivisible, in the great work of self-improvement. And to the city of Baltimore, whose in- terests are bound up with those of the State, it especially belongs, to remember the rule of policy-
"Be to her faults a little blind, And clap the padlock on her mind."
Chạp. VIII.]
HOUSE OF DELEGATES.
471
In passing from this subject, it will be proper to advert to the peculiar organization of the Senate, as one which will of necessi- ty be remodelled, if the representation of the House should ever .. be based on population. The Senate consists of but fifteen mem- bers, who are chosen by the electoral college from the State at large. By consequence, out of the nineteen counties and two cities, there must always be at leat six without any represen- tation whatever in the Senate : and as the electors or the Se- nate (as the case may be,) may always choose from the State at large, there is no constitutional security for any county or city, that she shall be represented in that body. Now, it will be con- ceded, that cach county ought to be assured of a representation in some one branch of the legislature; and that having different resources, different wants, and distinct county interests, she ought not only to be represented, but her representation should be of such a character, as to explain her wants and interests, and to sus- tain her rights against the unjust aggressions of other counties. The approved principle with regard to the constitution of a lc- gislature, seems to be, that where the several members of a com- munity, whether counties as in the State Governments, or States as in the General Government, are unequal in territory, wealth, population, and all that constitutes influence, and are clothed with distinct interests; there should be lodged in some branch of the legislature, a checking power, for the protection of the smaller members. Our legislature presents anomalous features. The county representation, and the checking power for the pro- tection of county interests, exist only in the house of delegates ; and if its present organization were changed, it would infallibly lead to a change in that of the Senate, so as to give a senator to cach county and city. The results of this amended system would not, therefore, vary very materially from those of the present ; and so far as the city of Baltimore and the larger counties are concern- ed, it may well be questioned, whether they would gain by the change. The magnanimity of the State has generally accorded to the city of Baltimore two senators, so that in that body she has two-fifteenths of the whole power : which is nearly the proportion her population bears to that of the State. And this power is more valuable in 'this small body, than a similarly proportioned power
.
11
472
*
ORGANIZATION, &c.
[ITist. View.
: would be in a body so numerous as the House of Delegates ; and can there be exercised most advantageously for her protection.
(7) Tenure and compensation of the office of delegate.
The office of delegate endures for one year from the time of election : if not sooner vacated, by death, resignation, removal out of the State, or some of the constitutional causes of disquali- fication already described. As a suitable compensation for his necessary expenditures, each delegate is entitled to receive from the public treasury, four dollars per day for each day's attendance as such at the seat of government, and a fixed allowance for itin- erant charges, resting upon usage cotemporaneous with the go- vernment. (52)
(52) Acts of 1796, chap. 41, and 1811, chap. 156. The itinerant charges given to the delegate by usage, consist in the allowance of a per diem, for every twenty miles of travel from the seat of government to the seat of justice of his county as computed at the time at which the usage was established, and also of a small and fixed allowance for the expenses of ferriage.
...
.
CHAPTER IX.
E
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.
IN examining the organization of the Senate, we shall consi- der -- (1) The election of the electors of the Senate-(2) Their proceedings in the choice of a Senate-(3) The qualifications for the office of Senator -- (4) The mode of filling vacancies in the Senate-(5) The tenure and compensation of the office of Sena- tor-(6) The nature and tendencies of the present structure of the Senate.
.(1) The election of the Electors of the Senate.
The Senate of Maryland is not chosen directly by the people, but by an electoral college, consisting of forty members, of whom two are chosen by cach of the counties, and one by each of the cities of Annapolis and Baltimore. The Electors must have the qualifications necessary for delegates; and are elected by those only, who are entitled to vote for del- egates. The elections are held on the first Monday of Sep- tember in every fifth year, reckoning from the first Monday of September, ISOG. (1) They are held at the same places, in the same manner, and by the same judges, as the delegate elections : and all the preceding remarks, as to the manner of opening and con- ducting the latter elections, the duties of the judges and clerks, · the provisions to secure the purity and freedom of elections, and the manner of ascertaining the result at each poll and the aggre- gate result in the county or city, are here applicable, varying the proceedings only so as to designate the purpose of the election. There is a special form of return for the election of electors : but it is substantially the same with that for the delegate elections, except as to the time and purpose of the election. (2) In the
(1) Const. art. 14, and 1805, chap. 97, sect. 9th. ,
(2) 1805, chap. 97, sect. 15th, and supra, 455 to 463. 60
:
,
+
474
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE. " [13 1,@
counties and Annapolis, the right to their electors is given s? ... lutely : but that of the city of Baltimore endures only as los. . >> her right to elect delegates, which, as we have seen, ceases, when- ever her inhabitants shall have so decreased, that the number of her voters for seven successive years shall be less than one-half of the number of voters in some one county of the State, but returns as soon as her voters shall have again increased to the! - number. (3)
(2) Their proceedings in the choice of a Senate.
6
The Electors thus chosen are required to meet at the city of Annapolis, or the place of the Assembly sessions, wherever that may be, on the third Monday of September next ensuing their elec- tion, to proceed to the election of the Senate. (4) Any twenty- four of them constitute a quorum, and may go into the election : but before the elector's can act as such, they must qualify in the manner prescribed by the constitution. (5) If there be any doubts or contest as to the election of any person returned or ap- pearing as an efector, these must be determined before the col- lege goes into the election of the Senate; and when such con- tests arise, the college is the exclusive judge of the qualifications and election of its own members, and shall admit, as clector, the person qualified and appearing to them to have the greatest num- ber of legal votes. (6)
.
When the members have qualified, and all cases of contro- verted elections are determined, the college must then proceed to elect fifteen senators, of whom nine shall be residents of the Western, and six of the Eastern shore: but this distribution being respected, they are subject to no other restriction, in choosing amongst persons qualified for the office of senator. The sena- tors are chosen for shores, without respect to counties or other
(3) Const. art. 14th, and supra.
(4) Const. art. 15th.
(5) This qualification consists in taking the oaths of office, and the test declaration. Their oath of office is prescribed by the constitution, as amended by the act of 1822, chap. 204. The test declaration consists in making and subscribing a declaration, of belief in the Christian religion, or, if a pro- fessor of the Jewish religion, of a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments .- Const. 55, and act of 1824, chap. 205.
(6) Const. art. 17th.
.. .............
1
-
1
*
475
Chap. IX.] THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.
civil divisions ; and the college may, at its pleasure, select all the senators for either shore, from any one county. The distri- bution of them amongst the several counties of either shore, is regulated entirely by its discretion. They are even permitted to select the senators from amongst the members of the electoral college. The election is by ballot; and the senators must all be ballotted for at the same time. Upon the ballot, out of those proposed and ballotted for as senators, the nine amongst the resi- dents of the Western shore, and the six amongst the residents of the Eastern shore, having the greatest number of votes, shall be declared and returned duly elected. If, on the first ballot, two or more persons have an equal number of votes, and it is neces- sary to exclude some of them, a second ballotting shall be had as between these candidates only, before the electors separate; and if on the second ballot there is still an equal vote, the elec- tion must be made by lot. The election being completed, the electors must then certify their proceedings under their hands, and return them to the Chancellor. Their duties then cease; and with them, their offices. (7)
(3) The qualifications for the office of Senator.
The original qualifications for this office, relative to age, pro- perty, and residence, required that the senator elect should be above the age of twenty-five, should have resided in the State for three years next preceding his election, and should have real or personal property within it above the value of one thousand pounds. (S) The property qualification was abolished in 1810; (9) those as to age and residence are still requisite.
The causes of disqualification for this office are the same in all respects, except as to age and residence, with those which exclude from the office of delegate; and it will therefore be suf- ficient to refer, for these, to the preceding remarks upon the qualifications for the latter office. (10)
(4) The mode of filling vacancies in the Senate.
Vacancies in this body arise by death, refusal to serve, resig- nation, removal out of the State, or from some of the causes of
(7) Const. art. 16th.
(8) Const. art. 15th.
(9) 1809, chap. 198 ; and 1810, chap. 18.
(10) See page 448.
:
476
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE. [Hist. The.
disqualification already alluded to. When they occur, the right to fill them devolves upon the Senate; which shall, immediately after they occur, or at its next meeting, elect by ballot, in the manner prescribed for elections by the original electors, another qualified person for the remainder of the senatorial term. (11)
(5) The tenure and compensation of the office of Senator.
.
The Senators are chosen for five years, but are liable to re- moval for the causes of disqualification already described. We have remarked upon these, as constituting original qualifications for the office of Senator or Delegate; and their effect and man- ner of operation in vacating these offices, when they attach upon their incumbents after election and qualification, will be fully examined in one of the following chapters.
- The compensation of the Senator is the same as that allowed to the Delegate. (12)
(6) The nature and tendencies of the present structure of the Senate.
-
In every well organized government, it has always been a car- dinal object with its framers, so to constitute its legislature, that whilst it is the ever ready organ of the well ascertained and well regulated will of the people, it is yet, to a certain extent, above the reach of those momentary prejudices and passions, and hasty and short-sighted views, which at times pervade every communi- ty. To place the popular will as embodied in acts of legislation above such influences, is one of the most prominent and useful designs in the delegation of legislative power to representative bodies. In extended republics, this is necessary, because of the inability of the people generally to attend in person to its exer- cise : yet it is recommended by the additional consideration of its tendency to purify the public will. Even in small republics or democracies, such as were some of those of antiquity, where there was no such inconvenience in the exercise of this power by the people in person, it was yet found salutary to delegate it to a select assembly. The utmost excesses, and the wildest anarchy, were found to flow from the exercise of it, by the com- munity in mass. The effects of such a mode of legislation are
(11) Const. art. 19th.
(12) See 472.
.
-
Chap. IX.]
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE . SENATE.
477
4
strikingly exemplified in the Ecclesia or general Assembly of the Athenian people; which, being invested by Solon with the su- preme powers of government in the last resort, deprived the government, by its irregularities, of every thing like uniformity or consistency in the public operations. Some checks were in- terposed, by the creation of the Senate, and the revival of the Areopagus: yet although its tendencies were thus, in some mea- sure, counteracted, they have always been reckoned amongst the most prominent causes of the downfall of that republic. Histo- f.ry is full of illustrations of the truth, that the people, for whose benefit government is instituted, find great advantage in distri- buting its powers amongst responsible agents, each having a few specific duties to perform, and each constituting a check upon the others.
In the creation of a representative body for the purposes of legislation, there is then a two-fold design. The one is to ob- viate the inconveniences of a personal discharge of this power by the people; and the other, to filtrate it, and give it a judicious direction. But the mere delegation of this power is not consi- dered sufficient for the latter purpose. It has now become al. most an axiom in the constitution of a legislature, that it should consist of two branches, the one of which is more permanent and less responsible than the other; and this principle has been adopted in all the best forms of government. Without going at large into the reasons upon which this doctrine of constitutional law rests, it may be proper to advert to a few considerations, which come home to every understanding. Every well organized government is but a system of checks and balances of power. Men cannot safely be trusted with absolute power; nor can a community safely commit themselves even to their own uncon- trolled discretion. The great object in the constitution of go- vernments, is to make their leading powers so many antagonist muscles, each in a certain degrec independent of the others, and each drawing against a preponderance of power in the others. Hence they have been subdivided into the three great branches of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; and the endeavor is made to preserve their distinct existence, as far as possible, by confiding their exercise to separate agents. Thus each branch is made to watch over and to check the encroach-
-
-
478
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE. [Hist, View.
ments of the others. The same objects are had in view, in the separation of the legislature into two branches. There is no power of the government which requires so much caution in its exercise as the legislative. The executive and the judiciary, have in general prescribed and definite duties to perform. The legis- lative, within its range, has no guide but its own discretion ; and it is therefore of the utmost importance, that this should be a well regulated discretion. Experience has shown, that nothing con- .„duces so much to this, as its separation into two branches. Each branch is vigilant and scrutinizing as to the acts of the other ; and would be useful in this respect, even if the branches were similarly organized.
But their utility is greatly enhanced by giving to them, not only a separate, but also a peculiar existence. The will of the people should always be fully and distinctly communicated to the legislature, and should be brought to bear fully upon it. Hence the necessity of a popular branch composed of members, who are elected directly by the people; who are elected by dif- ferent'sections of the community, and therefore fully understand and represent the various wants and interests of these sec- tions ; and who are elected for short periods, and must soon re- turn to the people to account for the deeds done in their office. To give a judicious and steady direction to this will, and to guide it by the lights of experience, another branch has been consider- ed necessary ; whose members do not so immediately represent sectional interests, and are therefore less likely to be swayed by these to the prejudice of the community at large; are not so numerous as those of the popular branch, and are therefore se- lected with more caution, and act under a more concentrated responsibility; are elected for a longer period, and are therefore less likely to be swayed in the discharge of their public duties by considerations personal to themselves. Besides, by the dura- tion of their office, the members of such a branch must necessa- rily acquire an intimate knowledge of their duties, an acquain- tance with the constitution and laws, a familiarity with the forms and objects of legislative proceedings, fixed and uniform princi- ples of action, and, in the general, an aptitude for the discharge of their official duties, which can never be possessed by those, who are suddenly called together from the pursuits of private
479
- Chap. IX.]. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.
life for the purposes of legislation, and can scarcely become fa- miliar even with its forms, before their official character has ceased.
These lines of demarcation indicate, what should be the dis- tinguishing characteristics of the two branches of the legislature. Some have contended that the one ought to represent property, and the other the people; but besides the objection to such a distinction, as long since repudiated by our constitution, and as foreign to the nature of all our institutions ; it would manifestly accomplish but few of the objects of the division into branches. These are to be effected, not by a change of the object repre- sented, but by the duration of the office, and the change of re- sponsibility. The only benefit which would result from separate branches, varying only as to the basis of representation, would result from the dominion of different influences, operating as checks upon each other, and producing a legislation compounded of the proper influence of both. But the separation of the legis- lature into two branches has a higher aim. It seeks to impart to. it, a full knowledge of the wants and interests of the people; capacity to discern the measures by which these may be relieved or promoted, and wisdom and moderation in their application ; freedom from all partial, temporary, or selfish influences ; and an intimate acquaintance with the forms of proceeding. Such designs could not be effected by a mere change of the basis of represen- tation.
In the State of Maryland, there are some peculiar reasons for the existence of such a branch as the Senate. It is scarcely pos- sible to constitute a legislative body, which, unchecked, would be more liable to hasty, capricious, mutable, and inefficient legis- lation, than our House of Delegates. The defect is not in the members, but in its ever varying constitution. There is no check in the Executive, which is the creature of the legislature, and has no veto. Hence has, in some measure, resulted the very peculiar character of our Senate: which renders it the most aristocratic legislative body known to the Union. There was no checking power elsewhere; and it was perhaps deemed proper, for that reason, to infuse more of it into the Senate, than exists in similar bodies, where there is the further check of the executive veto. A contrast of the characteristic differences of the two branches will exhibit, in strong relief, their different structures and tendencies.
450
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.
[Hist. View.
The Delegates are chosen annually : the Senators for five years. The Delegates are chosen directly by the people : the Senators by an electoral college, constituted upon the same principles as the house of delegates. The Delegates are elected for, and as the representatives of counties: the Senators are chosen from the State at large. Delegates to fill vacancies, are elected in the same manner as those originally elected: Senators to fill vacan- cies, are chosen by the Senate itself. Hence it appears that in their separate organization, the elective power is different; the tenure of the office is different; and the object immediately re- presented is different.
There is no part of our State government which has been so much the theme both of censure and applause, as the organiza- tion of the Senate. If a popular anecdote may be received as true, its form when first proposed, elicited the unbounded admi- ration of the distinguished Samuel Chase, who is said to have pro- nounced upon it the very forcible eulogium, ""Tis virgin gold." Abroad and at home, it has been more commended than any similar body known to the States of the Union. Nor have these commendations been founded merely upon speculative views of its tendencies, but also upon its practical results. By the late Dr. Ramsay, its organization was considered one of singular excellence. "Ten of the eleven States, (he remarks,) whose legislatures consisted of two branches, ordained that the members of both should be elected by the people. This rather made two co-ordinate houses of representatives, than a check on a single one by the moderation of a select few. Ma- ryland adopted a singular plan for constituting an independent Senate. By her constitution, the members of that body were elected for five years, whilst the members of the house of dele- gates held their seats only for one. The number of Senators was only fifteen, and they were elected indiscriminately from the in- habitants of any part of the State, excepting that nine of them were to be residents on the west, and six on the east side of the Chesapeake Bay. They were elected, not immediately by the people, but by electors ; two from each county, appointed by the inhabitants for that sole purpose. By these regulations, the Senate of Maryland consisted of men of influence, integrity, and abili-
4
481 1
Chap. IX.] THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE.
ties, and such as were a real and beneficial check on the hasty proceedings of a more numerous branch of popular representa- tives. The laws of the State were well digested, and its interests steadily pursued with a peculiar unity of system : while elsewhere, it too often happened in the fluctuation of public assemblies, and where the legislative department was not sufficiently checked, that passion and party predominated over principle and public good." (13)
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.