USA > New Hampshire > The Third New Hampshire and all about it, pt 2 > Part 13
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Lieut .- Comdr. Parker's force in part reached the point marked "B" on the plan, and there remained, sheltered by the palisades, until darkness permitted their retreat. Only five of Parker's force advanced a few paces beyond " B" (see plan).
Lieut .- Comdr. Breeze, after trying in vain to rally the retreat- ing sailors and marines, returned almost alone to the two sand hills marked "C" on the plan, where he remained but a short time, and then coolly followed the retreating naval force. He says that pris- oners told him the rebels thought the naval contingent was the main assaulting column.
It was intended the men should assault in line, the marines act- ing as sharpshooters ; and the different lines were to charge over them. It was also intended that the attack of the naval force and the army force should be simultaneous, the former taking the cue from the latter. When the army was found to be moving to the
A
A
100yds __
FORT FISHER
PALIS
-B ADES
Two
SMALL
IT
PREISAND
HILLS
PALISADES.
ATLANTIC
D
DOTTED LINES SHOW UNE OF MARCH OF THE NAVAL COLUMN.
OCEAN
RIFLE- PITS BY LT. PRESTON'S PARTY.
RIFLE-PITS.
D
BOATS
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LANDING
Plan to illustrate the Report of It. Comdr. Jas. Parker concerning Naval assault .ou Fort Fisher Jan. 15. 1865
(607)
TRAVERSES
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THIRD NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.
[Jan. '65.
assault, the naval column was too far away to reach the works as early as the army, if the original plan was pursued, so Capt. Breeze ordered them to advance by flank; and they were so advanced, in a compact column, and they assaulted up to within fifty yards of the parapet, which was lined with the garrison, who played sad havoc with the navy boys. The marines failed to take the posi- tions and parts assigned. The few sailors with their Sharpe's rifles and the marines opened fire, but of no avail. Finding the rear of the line retreating, Capt. Breeze hastened toward them to direct them to cover, and from there use their rifles; but they were too rapid and distant, and he then returned to the other, near the works, reaching which, all fled precipitately, except about sixty, among whom were Lieut .- Comdrs. Parker, Cushman, Selfridge and Sicard, and Lieuts. Farquhar and Lamson and others. These men sought the best cover available, and there remained till dark, when a demon- stration was made on them and they rushed to the rear, nearly all escaping. Lieuts. Preston and Porter were killed early in the assault, the former being occupied in carrying orders from Capt. Breeze, after he had served with the men with shovels and picks. Capt. Breeze says the failure of the naval column was principally due to lack of organization, formation, etc. They had never been so or- ganized before, and therefore had never drilled : and this condition led to confusion and was not indicative of want of valor.
Capt. Breeze thinks the enemy was entirely thrown off their guard, and quite disconcerted, at this assault, on the supposition that it was the main assault. They rushed their men to meet it, when, looking back, they discovered the army coming in to assault in another and distant quarter. Capt. Breeze estimates his loss at about 65 killed and 200 wounded. Lieut. Cushing rallied and com- manded the men who occupied a part of Terry's line in the evening. Capt. Breeze landed with the sailors and marines about 10 A.M., within a mile of the fort, and intrenched. The arrangement was that the marines should take the advance (Porter differs from him in this), clear the parapet by the fire of musketry, and then the sailors were to rush up with revolver and cutlass.
The reports and statements all substantially agree that the sailors and marines were "done up" in about fifteen minutes. One account says about 200 of them staid near by and dug holes, remaining till darkness covered their complete retreat. About 3 o'clock this force moved up nearer, say within 600 yards of the fort. Seeing the army moving (both were to move at the same time), Capt. Breeze says he moved the sailors up to within 50 yards; but the marines failed to keep up and proteet the sailors. Many, he says, were killed and wounded on the spot, and finally all turned and ran. He further says that in the evening some of the sailors and marines served on a part of Terry's line of pickets, at his request, temporarily. Some of the sailors had Sharpe's rifles, and others had well-sharpened cutlasses and revolvers. Porter says there's no stopping a sailor if he doesn't succeed at the first rush.
Jan. '65.]
THIRD NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.
609
THE DEFENCE.
From Col. Lamb's statement we learn that he got about 350 men as reinforcements on the 15th Jan. from Bragg, of Col. Graham's brigade, ria Battery Buchanan, where they landed from a steamer. He had about 1,550 before. At 6 P.M., Friday the 13th, his losses to that time were 2 killed and 41 wounded. On the 14th the casualties were more than double the previous day ; and more than ten per cent of his garrison had been killed or wounded by 2 P.M., Sunday the 15th. He wired Bragg at 1.30 P.M., Saturday the 14th, that he (Bragg) ought never to have allowed the enemy to extend his lines to the river bank; and if permitted to remain there the reduction of the fort was only a question of time. Before the assault, every gun save one 10-inch Columbiad was destroyed, the use of all but one Napoleon rendered impracticable, every wire leading to the mines ploughed up, and the palisade such a wreck as actually to offer a protection to the assailants. On the 13th he had 20 guns bearing on the beach, supplemented by one mortar and four Napoleons ; a pali-
INTERIOR OF FORT FISHER.
sade in front, pierced for musketry and constructed in irregular lines, and numerous sub-terra mines capable of blowing up the beach from river to sea for more than a hundred yards in front of the works. At 1.25 p.M. 15th Jan., Col. Colquitt was assigned to the com- mand of Fort Fisher; and " will go there tonight," said the dispatch order. Gen. Whiting was ordered to report in evening to Bragg's headquarters for conference. Colquitt, according to reports. arrived within one mile of Fisher at 10.30 r.M., and says he found everything in confusion ; hundreds of men without arms, and many of them drunk, etc. This is all denied by Col. Lamb, who says he had no liquor at the fort except what was in the hospital; and that was captured by sailors from the fleet. who got drunk and wandered into the reserve magazine the morning after the battle : and they caused the explosion. Col. Lamb says Colquitt reported after the fort had been taken : and he ( Lamb) tokt him even then the fort could be re-taken if Bragg could land a fresh brigade, as the enemy was more or less demoralized by the resistance they had met. Colquitt immediately withdrew.
Previous to the attacks Col. Lamb's command extended 20 miles, from New Inlet to Masonboro, and had been noted for sobriety. Ile took command of the works 4 July 1862. When he fell he
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[Jun. '65.
turned the command over to Capt. Munn. "The reinforcements of the 15th were of the Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth South Carolina, who arrived just previous to the assault. They were placed in a bomb-proof 100 feet to rear and left of the central sally-port. When the steam-whistle sounded for the charge, he ordered the reserves to man the parapets, and the South Carolina regiments (reinforcements) to double-quick to rear of left salient, between which and the river shore there was a space of some 60 feet, protected only by a shallow ditch, the remnants of a palisade and one Napoleon gun. I went to meet the column assaulting my northeast salient, the success of which would have been fatal, as it would capture the center of my work ; and I sent my Aide, Capt. Blocker, with the South Carolina regi- ment to report to Maj. Riley on my left . . . . I had about 500 men with me on and near the redan on northeast salient, repulsing the sailors and marines. This heroic column from the fleet strug- gled with us full thirty minutes or more, and did not retreat till about 300 were killed and wounded. There were in the western salient (which was an unenclosed battery) about 250 men. The South Carolina men would have made 600; but they did not move up promptly, and did not reach the work. The 250 had to withstand the shock of Ames' two brigades, say ten to one."
Col. Lamb's officers claim they twice repelled the assault on the parapet, and that all the original detachment at the Napoleon were killed or wounded, and that Capt. Brady detailed men from his com- pany to take their places. These were killed, wounded or captured at the gun, whose carriage was riddled with bullets. When Capt. Melvin surrendered, the survivors, some 200, were enveloped by Curtis' brigade in front, and Pennypacker's brigade in the rear; and besides, the two guns at Battery Buchanan had begun to fire at this salient, killing and wounding friend and foe. "There were three lines of mines in front of the work; and I intended at the moment of assault to explode one of them, and thus paralyze the assailants, giving me time to man the parapet with all my reserves. At the final rush I gave the signal; but there was no response, the tremen- dous fire of the fleet having ploughed up all the connecting wires and rendered the mines harmless.
As that was their main defence, and it failed, I rather expected the men would be disheartened ; but they fought with redoubled vigor. As soon as the sailors and marines retreated, I moved the whole of my available infantry, some 800 men, to dislodge the enemy. who had captured the left salient, two gun chambers adjoining, and were busy intrenehing inside my work. The heroic Whiting [General] who had rushed to the parapet and encouraged the troops to repel the naval brigade, now led the van ; and receiving two wounds in endeavoring to reach a Federal standard bearer, was carried to the rear. A hand-to-hand fight on the para- pet and over a traverse ensued; while in the work, from behind everything that would yield the slightest protection to my men, a rapid fire was poured into the advancing three brigades. The eneiny halted in the face of our desperate assault. I then had the two heavy guns on the monnd, and two from another battery on the sea
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THIRD NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.
Jan. '65.]
face, turned on this column ; and these, with the two guns of Battery Buchanan, seemed to have a demoralizing effect, as their fire slackened and their flags disappeared from the tops of the traverses . Believing that Gen. Bragg . would now attack, I felt that a determined charge on our part . .
would cause a retreat by the enemy and we could regain the work. I passed down the lines, and officers and men, with the wildest enthusiasm, promised to follow me. As I sprang forward to lead them I was shot down, several of my gallant officers falling with me. The forward movement stopped with my fall, and afterward, the enemy, having been strongly rein- forced, began an advance, which though stoutly and even recklessly resisted for five hours (until all the aminnnition had been expended), resulted in the capture of the whole work . . . . my appeals to the officers and men to continue the struggle after I had fallen . was because Gen. Lee had sent me word that the fort was necessary to keep open the gateway to supply his armny with food and clothing from abroad ; and I desired to prolong the resistance so long as there was any chance for Bragg to come to our assistance and recall the enemy to its own defensive line."
MOUND BATTERY - PART OF FORT FISHER.
Gen. Whiting and Staff arrived at the fort on Friday afternoon, the 13th, in the midst of a terrific bombardment. To the charge of Bragg, that the garrison of Fort Fisher had a pecuniary interest in the blockade running business, Col. Lamb, after denying the charge, says at one time he was notified that ten bales of cotton was at Liverpool subject to his order, and he immediately ordered it sokl and the proceeds to be used in buying two 130-pounder Whitworth rifled guns, and ammunition for same, for Fort Fisher. He got part of the ammunition ; but the guns only got as far as Nassan. After the repulse of Butler, he asked Bragg for hand grenades, and for sub- marine torpedoes to place where the fleet bad anchored, neither of which he ever got. During the sixty hours of continuous battle his men were unable to provide a single meal, but subsisted on uncooked rations and corn-meal coffee. They had lost their blankets and over- coats at the Butler attack, by the destruction of their quarters, and requisitions for their replacement were unheeded.
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THE FORCES ENGAGED.
3,300 from Second Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, under Gen. Ames. 3,300 from Third Division, Twenty-tifth Army Corps, under Gen. Paine.
1,400 from Second Brigade, Ist Divison. Twenty-fourth Army Corps, under Col. Abbott. (Third and Seventh New Hampshire and Sixth and Seventh Connecticut. )
The Sixteenth New York Independent Battery, with 4 3-inch guns.
Light Battery E, Third U.S. Artillery, with 6 light 12-pounders.
Ames' division was selected for the assault. Paine's division and Abbott's brigade were with the defensive line. (Abbott's bri- gade was withdrawn from defensive line and put into the fight at the critical moment and completed the victory.)
The assaulting column was as follows: 1. Curtis' brigade ; 2. Pennypacker's brigade; 3. Bell's brigade; skirmishers : 60 of Thir- teenth Indiana and 40 of Curtis' brigade, under Lieut .- Col. Lent of the Thirteenth Indiana.
One account says : " About the time that it was evident that the naval attack was not to succeed, there emerged from the scrubby wood north of the fort the troops destined to assault the place. These were veterans from the Army of the James. Rough looking, with frowzy clothing and dishevelled hair and beards, after long and hard experience on the transports, these soldiers had their arms clean and bright and cartridge boxes filled with forty rounds, while they aligned and dressed in line of battle as coolly and precisely as if on parade. Probably not a man among them who had not been 'in' a dozen times before. There was but little fuss about it, and no noise of either bugling or verbal commands. Then suddenly, at a 'right shoulder shift' and a ' double-quick,' the line swept across the sandy plain."
The Third New Hampshire was commanded by Capt. Wm. H. Trickey, in this memorable fight of 15 Jan. 1865. The follow- ing is a synopsis of his official report sent to the Adjutant-General of New Hampshire, written within a few days after the fight : "The Third New Hampshire had 6 officers and 80 men. Started about 4.30 P.si., arriving in front soon after dark: fired an hour; with 20 men by orders took and held a traverse. then the others took two more. While holding these three, the Sixth and Seventh Connectient came and took the others. Casualties : 1 killed, 5 wounded." (For full report see his Personal Sketch. )
. As Capt Trickey elaborated upon the above, and the same has fallen into the hands of the writer, it is here given : -
CAPT. TRICKEY'S ACCOUNT.
Landed say $,000 troops Jan. 13th. On the 14th onr brigade formed on the right of Paine's division. next the beach. Gen. Curtis' brigade moved past ns to the front, toward Federal Point and Fort Fisher, capturing a small steamer, lying at Craig's wharf on the Cape Fear River and within 900 yards of Fort Fisher. Then Curtis' men pushed on to within 500 yards of the fort, taking possession of an outer work. Gen. Terry, with two Aides and Col. Comstock of Gen. Grant's Staff, then made a thorough
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THIRD NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.
Jun. '65.]
reconnaissance 200 yards in advance of the point held by Gen. Curtis. As that beau ideal of a soldier (Terry ) obtained a full view of the gigantic pro- portions of that, the strongest work the world has yet recorded as taken by direct assault, what must have been his feelings as he made his decision ! It is his own decision, as the question of assault is not mentioned in Grant's instructions - indeed, a siege was to be inferred. Gen. Beauregard, per- haps the ablest engineer in the Confederate army, inspected the work ten days previous, and pronounced it absolutely impregnable. Terry kept his own council. Late that night he met Porter on board the flag-ship. The next day, 15th, was Sunday ; but not for us, as early we sce portentous signs, and soon know the day is big with fate to all that is human on Federal Point.
For forty-eight hours the navy had been engaged in such a bom- bardment as the world had never before known. It was a grandly magnifi- cent spectacle at night, to witness that continuous line of fiery meteors from the mouths of 400 cannon on the ships, to that one doomed spot on shore. When the firing was the fiercest, more than 200 shells per minute were hurled into as brave a garrison as ever attempted the defence of an unrighteous cause. And yet the fort itself was not seriously injured. We learned here, as at Wagner, that a sand fort cannot be demolished : it must be dug into or climbed over. The parapets of Fort Fisher were 20 feet high and 25 feet thick.
The hour for the assault-3 p.M. - has arrived. The navy is sig- nalled to change the direction of its fire. Curtis' brigade bounds forward with a rush and a cheer. Coming up to the moat, those on the left of the bridge leading to the sally-port find it (the moat) impassable, and are obliged to change line of battle to column of fours. They impetuously crowd over the bridge against the stockade, under a most terrific fire, both direet and enfilading. In the stockade, which they expected to find battered down, they only find jagged holes, made by our shells. Through these, though it seemed certain death, Curtis struggled with a few daring ones : others soon followed and took possession of the west traverse. But a mere foothold is gained, however, and the brigade halts. Leading officers are struck down, and the men falling fast around them. Immediate help, or annihilation will result. At this critical moment, with the force and rush of a cyclone, the chivalrous and noble-hearted Pennypacker, with his invincible brigade. swarms through the stockade, sweeping the enemy from it to the river, capturing 200 prisoners and getting possession of the sally- port and opening it from the inside. The two brigades then move along eastward along the land face, carrying each traverse against desperate opposition. A hand-to-hand fight stops them at the eighth traverse. In the meantime the gallant Col. Louis Bell, with his veteran brigade, cross the bridge, enter the fort through the sally-port and charge down toward the sea face and to the left on the reverse to the land face.
Thus the fighting went on, with the ferocity of gladiators. Both were of the same blood and equal in valor. Night was now closing around them. Curtis, Pennypacker and Bell have fallen - the latter died next morning; the others are thought to have received their mortal wounds. The commander of nearly every regiment is killed or wounded. The deso- lation among the heroes in the ranks is frightful. Fighting ceases for a moment from mere exhaustion. Reinforcements are now the one thing needful, and speculation as to the result without that important element will do no sort of good. Terry is equal to the emergency. With the sailors and marines, he relieves on the right of Paine's line his old brigade, veterans of twenty bloody battles and four desperate assaults {the brigade referred to is composed in part of the Third New Hampshire]. This brigade enters the fort by the postern gate just as darkness is shutting down. The Third New Hampshire is ordered to the extreme front traverse held by our men. to reach which position we crawl through bomb-proofs and traverses, clambering over the dead, wounded and dying, -literally piled one upon another, -and arriving there we open fire at once with our Spencers [seven-shooters], soon sileneing the enemy in our immediate front. We then charged and drove them from one traverse to another.
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until nine more are in our possession. The brigade was now placed in proper positions and charged the whole line, with a momentum no power could stop. Gen. Ames' whole force, cheered by the presence of fresh troops, rallied once again, made a general advance, and the stronghold was ours, with 2,000 prisoners and 85 guns. The stars and bars go down. and the stars and stripes are raised on high. At ten o'clock Terry signalled Porter the glorious news, and
" The rockets' red glare And bombs bursting in air. Gave proof thro' the night That our fiag was still there."
Capt. Trickey mentions seeing in the armament of the fort an . elegantly mounted Armstrong gun, the gift of merchants of London, the carriage being of rosewood and mahogany. The Captain soon after this memorable fight received a commission as Major. His official report will be found in full in his Personal.
(LAND FACE OF FORT, IN THE DISTANCE)
SIDE OF TRAVERSE
15 cm
TIGHTAN
SLACKEN
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150P 5 9
SIR W.C. ARMSTRONG &CO NEWCASTLE-UPON -TYNE NO. 19
NEWCA
PREP SOOL B W.C. ARM
STRONG TYNE
No.19
(ENLARGEMENT TO SHOW MAKER)
(ENLARGEMENT TO SHOW MARKS)
THE 150 POR. ARMSTRONG GUN CAPTURED AT FORT FISHER. THIS GUN WAS 2200 FEET FROM POINT REACHED BY NAVAL COLUMN.
When the Third New Hampshire arrived near the palisades, they were at once ordered by Col. Abbott to the extreme front, to occupy the most easterly traverse then in our possession. The process of getting there has been fully described by Capt. Trickey, their brave commander. Having arrived there with his handful of men, he at once ordered them to open upon the enemy, firing
WC INT
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THIRD NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.
Jan. '65.]
sufficiently slow after the first few minutes as not to actually waste ammunition. This continued for some little time, when Col. Abbott appeared and asked Capt. Trickey whether he couldn't make a for- ward movement, -a fierce onslaught, - and thus create a diversion ; and by so doing assist the other regiments of the brigade to gain advantage of time and position. To this Capt. Trickey replied that his little band was ready to obey orders, whatever they were; but incidentally mentioned that the men were running short of ammuni- tion and their Spencers were bayonetless. The forward movement was ordered and executed, Capt. Trickey and his men bravely climb- ing up the traverse in their immediate front and thence down its opposite side, pouncing upon the enemy and driving them out, over and around the next traverse, behind which they again took refuge and made another stand, only to be driven again to the next; and so on. This process continued substantially to the end, the other regiments of the brigade joining.
In summing up, it may be said of the Third New Hampshire : That it belonged to a fighting brigade, and that brigade had as a rule been successful; that the brigade had to be brought say a mile and a half to the fort; that its special mission was to reinforce com- pletely exhausted troops; that the regiment was immediately put into the fore-front, grappling at once with the enemy; that the assault and successful advance of the regiment had a potential influence upon the assaulting column, which at once moved forward with renewed courage and enthusiasm, and with an impetus that carried it to complete victory. And who shall say that, had the heroic remnant of the oldl Third New Hampshire failed to drive the enemy, or had themselves been driven back, that the assault as a whole may not have failed? The influence of the regiment's success- ful work at Fort Fisher is beyond estimate. The survivors are proud today that they were in the fore-front of the particular battle that practically decided the contest between the United States and the Confederates.
Another account, by M. L. Holt, Sergeant-Major, written in a diary soon after the fight, is of sufficient value to be inserted herein. Ile says : -
Immediately on entering the fort, marched to the last traverse taken, and opened on the enemy. I stopped with the colors. Had not been there long when a shell from the navy struck the parapet in the center of our regiment and demoralized the boys badly. I was immediately sent by Capt. Edgerly to Col. Abbott, with orders to have him if possible cause the fire of the navy changed to a point further to the left so as not to injure onr own men. I failed to find Col. Abbott, but delivered the message to Gen. Ames and returned to the regiment. Was soon sent again by Capt. Edgerly with word that our cartridges were giving ont, and to find out what could be done. After searching for some time and failing to find Col. Abbott. I again returned to the regiment. Upon this return, I found my brother, for whom I had searched, to be all right. He had just stopped firing, as his gnn had given ont and he had given his cartridges all away. Laid in this traverse till the firing ceased, when we gave three cheers for the capture of the fort, and three for Gen. Terry, who just at this moment came up to the regiment. After this we formed the regiment and marched down into the fort and went to collecting the prisoners and driving them out of the
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