USA > New Hampshire > The Third New Hampshire and all about it, pt 2 > Part 9
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Can any one wonder that, if powder exploded by accident caused such injury, that Gen. Butler or any one else should arrive at the conclusion that the same effect substantially would be produced if any large quantity of powder should be exploded intentionally? We trow not. The information of that famous explosion was her- alded all over the world, and commented on by all, more particularly by scientific men. Is it strange that any man with common sense - and Gen. Butler has been considered so endowed - should wish to experiment where the chances of success were almost certain? He talked the matter over with inen of sense, -men of war, with Grant himself, - and was permitted to try it. It failed; but why? Let us see, and at same time see whether the Government was committed to the experiment.
23 Nov. 1864, there assembled, in the evening, at Washington, at the residence of Capt. Wise : Gen. Dyer, Col. Maynadier and Maj. Benton, of the U. S. Army; Lieut .- Comdr. Aulick, Lieut .- Comdr. Jeffers and Lient .- Comdr. Ives, of the U. S. Navy. They disenssed the powder-boat proposition ; and it was unanimously decided that, taking into consideration the great importance of the question, and the advantage to be derived from a successful result as compared with the outlay of means necessary to make the experiment, the effort should be made by exploding a mass of 300 tons of gunpowder in a vessel as near the earthworks on Federal Point as it might be possible to go. Powder for the boat was brought from as far away as Boston, Mass., on the Steamer George Shattuck, which stopped at
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Brooklyn to take an additional supply. From reading the various telegrams for supply of powder, the writer has fully ceased to doubt that the Government was in earnest about getting it ready.
[NOTE .- 10 Jan. 1893 : At this point in the reading of the printer's proofs by the writer, the press announces the sudden death of Gen. Butler. This par- ticular story of Fort Fisher was written some three years ago and prior to the announcement by Gen. Butler that he would soon issue a book contain- ing the story of his life. That book the writer has not yet read. - D. E. ]
The powder-boat left Beaufort Landing the morning of 18 Dec. 1864; but although ready 24 hours before, she had been delayed by a heavy swell, etc., and arrived off Fort Fisher just after dark of the 18th. The boat was known as the Louisiana, and was an iron pro- peller of 295 tons, 150 ft. long, 22 ft. beam, 8 to 83 ft. draught when laden, and was formerly in the Atchafalaya cotton trade. The masts were removed. There were three clocks and six slow matches arranged in nine different places. The officer who arranged the fuses and clocks (Lieut .- Comdr. Jeffers) said that results of no value would be obtained by an explosion primarily caused by setting the vessel on fire; and he is of the opinion that the explosion was so caused, and argues that the three successive explosions heard were those of the deck-house, the after holds, and, lastly, the berth deck. He also says a part of the programme was to have the vessel grounded ; but it was at anchor. It must be borne in mind that those who prepared the vessel did not have charge of the explosion of it - in fact more powder was put in after the exploding prepara- tions were completed. Lieut .- Comdr. Jeffers met the other party ; and the whole arrangement was explained and drawings furnished. The vessel had 185 tons on board when it left Norfolk ; but more was added at Beaufort. Maj. T. J. Rodman, of the Ordnance Depart- ment, who had charge of the slow matches, fully agrees with Lient .- Comdr. Jeffers in his theory and explanation of the three explosions.
The " Gomez" fuse was used: a thin tape-like strip, through which it was calenlated fire would pass with the rapidity of lightning, say a mile in four seconds, so as to explode the whole mass at once, by clock-work. etc. It was said that the whole cargo of 215 tons was not exploded at once, but by successive discharges, and a large proportion blown away without actually igniting, and that the fire set to the vessel actually set off the powder, instead of the nicely- arranged clock-work and fuse.
As to the explosion, the officer in charge of it said the explosion took place 22 minutes after the time had expired for the clock to set it off, and that he heard four distinet explosions, while another officer (Capt. Breeze) says he heard but two.
If one desires to see a list of the volunteer crew of the Louisiana he may find it in " Porter's Naval History," page 695.
Fort Fisher was the subject of Congressional investigation, being referred to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 12 JJan. 1865. They were to " inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition," ete. At that date, reference could only be as to what
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was known as the first expedition, under Gen. Butler. The Com- mittee, however, could not have got to work ere the second expedition had been successful (15th) ; and as the two expeditions were so closely connected as to almost defy any attempt to set aside particu- lars as to the latter, the Committee embraced both and so reported.
The Committee gathered and, later, diffused a deal of valuable information, obtained as testimony. It appears that the scheme of capturing Fort Fisher was talked of as early as 1862, by the Navy Department; but the military anthorities did not think the army in such condition as would warrant the sparing of the necessary troops, until the summer of 1864. Gen. Grant thought he would be able by the first of October to furnish whatever was necessary. Vice-Admiral Farragut was selected for the naval force, but his ill-health prevented ; and Rear Admiral Porter was substituted, being transferred from the Mississippi squadron to the North Atlantic blockading squadron for that purpose. Gen. Gillmore was the first choice of the War De- partment; but Gen. Grant objected ; and Gen. Weitzel was assigned to the command of the army force.
The original intention was to assemble the fleet and forces at Port Royal, to deceive the rebels into a belief that the force was aimed at Charleston ; but that intention never took form, as the entire assembling was done at Hampton Roads. They remained there so long that even the rebels themselves knew all about it, and the " sur- prise " that Gen. Grant desired was wholly out of the question.
The Committee, after hearing the testimony of Gen. Butler himself, that of Gens. Grant, Comstock, Weitzel, Admiral Porter, Fleet-Capt. Breeze and others, said : " . . .. In conclusion, your Committee would say, from all the testimony before them, that the determination of Gen. Butler not to assault the fort seems to have been fully justified by all the facts and circumstances, then known or afterwards ascertained."
Gen. Weitzel appears to have differed with Gen. Butler in only one particular, and that was that had he seen the instructions sent to Gen. Butler by Gen. Grant, he would have so construed them as to be required to remain on shore and intrench. Gen. Butler, on the other hand, says he effected no landing. He considered the landing of a part of his troops was not in effect a landing, as they could have very easily been driven off, or in the event of a storm his source of supply would have been driven to sea. In his official report he says Gen. Grant's instructions did not contemplate a siege, as his force was not supplied either with siege trains or supplies for such a contingency.
Gen. Butler attributes the non-success of the expedition chietly to the delay of the navy, and consequent opportunity to reinforce by Hoke's division from Bermuda Hundred, the unsuccessful explosion of the powder-boat, the declination of Porter to run a gunboat or two by the fort and up into the river. « la Mobile, a la New Orleans. Even Gen. Weitzel says Gen. Grant said to him, that it was to be another Mobile affair.
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GEN. WHITING'S ANSWERS.
Gen. Butler's twenty-four. questions to Gen. Whiting, and the replies thereto, are so valuable that, at the risk of being considered prolix, the writer gives below the substance of the more important replies. Gen. Whiting was mortally wounded, in hospital at Fort Columbus, N. Y., and nigh unto death, passing away a few days later. His letter is dated 28 Feb. 1865. Gen. Butler obtained these replies for a purpose, and that purpose was to prove himself justified in not staving on shore and intrenching. Lieut. Davenport of his Staff was the medium of correspondence. These questions and answers were submitted to the Committee, and in their report they quoted freely from them.
The force in the fort on the 16th, 17th and 18th December con- sisted of five companies of the Thirty-sixth North Carolina and Adams' Light Battery: 667 in all. The other five companies of the Thirty-sixth North Carolina had been sent South. There were about 800 reserves at Sugar Loaf, five miles away. Hoke's division arrived at Wilmington and pushed on to Sugar Loaf during the (first) attack.
The casualties (Confederate) were as follows: First day - killed none ; wounded : 1 mortally, 3 severely, 19 slightly : total, 23. Five gun carriages disabled. Second day - killed, 3; wounded : 9 mortally, 6 severely, 28 slightly : total. 46. The damage done was but slight, including 1 10-inch, 1 8-iuch and 2 32-pounder carriages and 1 10-inch gun disabled, all of which were repaired during the night. The garrison was in no instance driven from its guns, and fired slowly 662 shot and shell. Was able to rest and recruit at night by cessation of bombardment. Reinforced on 23d by 110 veteran artillery men of the Tenth North Carolina, 50 sailors, and the Seventh Battalion, Junior Reserves : in all about 250.
When Union skirmish line was in front (under Curtis) the guns and defences of the land front were in perfect order, except two guns disabled on the left; nineteen guns were in position, the pali- sade in perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having been cut. It was not possible for a force of 3,000 or 6,000 men to take the fort by assault. The garrison was in good spirits and ready, and would have had no difficulty in reinforcing or provisioning by the river.
The force of second assault was nearly double that of the first, but not of so good material. It is a matter of grave charge against Gen. Bragg that he did not capture the whole landed force on 26th Dec.
The difference between the two bombardments was that the first was a general bombardment not calculated to effect particular dam- age. The second had the definite object of destroying the land de- fences, and the ships were so placed as to destroy by direct and enfilading fire: On that front and the northeast salient the whole enormous fire was poured without intermission. until the slope of the northeast salient was practicable for assault. Not a gun re-
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mained in position on the approaches, the whole palisade was swept away, communication with the mines cut off, rendering them useless, and the men unable to stand on the parapet during the fire. In the second attack, the fire was continuous through the night, though not so heavy as during the day ; but enough to prevent repairs and keep the garrison from rest and food. The land guns were all disabled, and the field pieces, only. were left to depend upon.
Neither attack was practicable in the presence of the supporting force, provided that force had been under a competent officer. The first force landed ought to have been captured entirely. As for the second, although deriving much greater advantages from the different mode of attack, by the fleet, and though pressed with great vigor, it is due to the supineness of the Confederate general [he refers to Bragg] that it was not destroyed in the act of assault.
It will be remembered that Admiral Farragut had originally been selected to command the naval force in this expedition. His instructions were given him 5 Sept. 1864; but on account of his illness, the same instructions were transferred to Porter. The preparations went on so far as the navy was concerned, and under date of 10 Sept. Gen. Grant wrote Asst. Sec. Fox of the Navy De- partment that he would, as soon as could be spared and the navy ready to co-operate, send a sutlicient force silently down the coast, not even allowing the command, except the commanding officer, to know where they were going.
On the 19th Sept., having been North a few days to New Jersey, Gen. Grant writes again to Asst. Sec. Fox that he has heard that an expedition is being fitted out, that Gillmore is to command it, and thinks it very strange. Also says he learns that the rebels know more about the expedition than he does, or the North either. Says he will be ready for 15 Oct. (high tides and full moon) .
Gen. Weitzel, on being informed by Gen. Grant that he had been selected to command the expedition, in place of Gillmore, went down to Fort Fisher about the 27th or 28th of Sept. in the army gunboat Chamberlain, and lay off there about three days with the blockading fleet, studying the location and getting information.
Sec. Welles addressed the President, 28 Oct., concerning the delay, saying, among other things, that the autumn weather, so favor- able for such an expedition, was fast passing away, that the public expected the attack, and the country will be distressed if it be not made. To procrastinate longer, said he, will be to imperil its suc- cess.
THE FIRST ATTACK.
We are about to set before the reader the particulars of the first attack, on Christmas Day, 25 Dec. 1861. The forces were as follows : -
First Brigade, Brevet Brig .- Gen. N. M. Curtis : On the Steamers C. Thomas and Weybosset. Of this brigade there landed first, say 500 precipitately, and the rest later and more deliberately. The
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500 consisted of the One Hundred and Forty-second New York, and about 50 of the One Hundred and Twelfth New York. It was a portion of this brigade that was left on shore till the 27th. The landing was made about three miles north of Fort Fisher, and was under charge of Brig .- Gen. Graham's Naval Brigade.
Second Brigade, Col. Galusha A. Pennypacker : On Steamers Perrit L. Moore and Idaho. Landed.
Third Brigade, Col. Louis Bell : On Steamers Baltic and Hace. Landed.
Sixteenth New York Battery, Capt. Lee : On the Starlight.
THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
We now give the reader the official reports of this first attack ; and as Gen. Butler has been assailed, we give him the first place in the list of such reports.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA.
ARMY OF THE JAMES, IN THE FIELD, Jan. 3, 1865.
General : On the 7th Dec. last. in obedience to your orders. I moved a force of 6,500 efficient men, consisting of Gen. Ames' division of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and Gen. Paine's division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, under command of Maj .- Gen. Weitzel, to an encampment near Ber- muda. On the sth the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe. On the 9th (Friday) I reported to Rear Admiral Porter that the army portion of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed. We waited there till Saturday the 10th, Sunday the 11th, and Monday the 12th. On the 12th, Rear Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail on the 13th, but would be obliged to put into Beanfort to take on board ammunition for the monitors. The expedition having become the subject of remark, and fearing lest its destination should get to the enemy, in order to divert from it all attention, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, at 3 o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Matthias Point. so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northen neck, and to retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles.
Having given the navy 36 hours start, at 12 o'clock noon of the 14th, Wednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry and put to sea. ar- riving at the place of rendezvous off' New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Thursday. We then waited for the navy Friday the 16th, Saturday the 17th and Sunday the Isth, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea. On the evening of the Isth Admiral Porter came from Beanfort to the place of rendezvous. That evening the sea became rough, and on Monday the 19th the wind sprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land troops; and by the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet. being coaled and watered for 10 days, had already waited that time. to wit : from the 9th, the day on which we were ready 10 sail, to the 19th.
On the 20th (Tuesday), 21st (Wednesday). 22d (Thursday), and 23d (Friday). it blew a gale. I was occupied in coaling and watering the trans- port fleet at Beaufort. The Baltic, having a larger supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place of rendezvons with a brigade on board of 1,200 men ; and Gen. Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co- operate with him.
On the 23d I sent Capt. Clark of my Staff from Beaufort on the fast- sailing armed Steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter, to inform him that on the evening of the 24th I would again be at the rendezvous with the
CAPT. HENRY C. HANDERSON.
LIEUT. MARQUIS L. HOLT.
LIEUT .- COL. JOSIAH I. PLIMPTON.
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LIEUT. LEMUEL N. JJACKMAN, Adjt.
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transport fleet, for the purpose of commencing the attack, the weather per- mitting. At four o'clock on the evening of the 24th I came in sight of Fort Fisher, and found the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder ves- sel having been exploded on the morning previous, about one o'clock. Through Gen. Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the landing under cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next morning, if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half Moon and Flag Pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the shore some two or three miles above Fort Fisher. Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the fort into Cape Fear River; and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboats (the Tallahassee being seen in the river ;. It is to be remarked that Admiral Farragnt even had never taken a fort except by running by and cutting it off from all prospect of reinforcement, as at Fort Johnson and Fort Mor- gan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by naval fire during the war. That if the Admiral would put his ship's in the river, the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do Farragut at Fort St. Philip. That, at least, the blockade at Wilmington would be thus effectual, even if we did not capture the fort. To that the Admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he attempted to run by. He was reminded that the army might lose 500 men by the assault, and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view, for a moment with the lives of the men. The Admiral declined going by, and the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success.
At 12 o'clock, noon, of the 25th (Sunday), Capt. Glisson, commanding the covering division of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced and his vessels in position to cover onr landing. The transport fleet, following my flag-ship, stood in within 800 yards of the beach and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the recon- noitring party just landed could hold the shore, I determined to land a force with which an assault might be attempted. Brevet Brig .- Gen. Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, capturing the Half Moon Battery and its men, who were taken off by the boats of the navy. This skirmish line advanced to within 75 yards of the fort, protected by the glaeis, which had been thrown up in such form as to give cover, the garrison being completely kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, which was very rapid and continuous, their shells bursting over the work with very considerable accuracy. At this time we lost ten men wounded on the skirmish line by the shell's from the fleet. Quitting my flagship I went on board the Chamberlain and ran in within a few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible. It appeared to be a square-bastioned work of very high relief, say 15 feet, surrounded by a wet ditch some 13 feet wide. It was protected from being enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort to the sea on one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear River to the salient on the other. No material damage to the fort as a defensive work had been done. Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy by traverses 8 or 10 feet high, which were undoubtedly bomb-proof shelters for the garrison. With the garrison kept within their bomb-proofs, it was easy to maintain this position; bnt the shells of the navy. which kept the enemy in their bomb-proofs, would keep my troops out. When those ceased falling. the parapet was fully manned. Lieut. Walling, One Hundred and Forty-second New York, pressed up to the . edge of the diteh and captured a flag which had been cut down by a shell from the navy. It is a mistake, as was first reported to me, that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile from the fort and his horse taken.
In the meantime the remainder of Ames' division had captured 218 men and 10 commissioned officers of the North Carolina Reserves, and other prisoners. From then I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigades of Hoke's division had left the front of the Army of the James, near Richmond,
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and were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their skir- mishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the march, if they had not already arrived. I learned also that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the 20th. Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me, outside of the works, larger than my own. In the meantime the weather assumed a threatening aspect. The surf began to roll in so that the landing became difficult. At this time Gen. Weitzel reported to me that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of experienced officers of his command, who had been in the skirmish line, with any prospect of success, was impossible. This opinion coincided with my own; and much as I regretted the necessity of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. Not so strong a work as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war; and I had to guide me the experience of Fort Hudson, with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed assault, and the double assault on Fort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher. after it had been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire. And in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force, in its rear, as I had, an army of the enemy larger than itself. I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should re-embark. While super- intending the preparation for this, the fire of the navy ceased. Instantly, the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry, grape and canister swept the plain over which the column must have advanced and the skirmish line was returning, Working with what diligence we could, it was impossible to get the troops again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarkation, or even the sending of supplies on shore, impossible. I lay by the shore until 11 o'clock the next day (Monday the 20th), when, having made all proper dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders for the transport fleet, as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress Monroe, in obedience to my instructions from the Lieutenant-General.
I learned from deserters and prisoners captured, that the supposition upon which the Lieutenant-General directed the expedition, that Wilmington had been denuded of troops to oppose Gen Sherman, was correct: that at the time when the army arrived off Wilmington, there were less than 400 men in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than 1,000 within 20 miles. But the delay of three days' good weather .- the 16th, 17th and 18th, -- waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further delay of the terrible storm of the 21st. 22d and 23d, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three divisions of which were either there or on the road. The instructions of the Lieutenant-General to me did not contemplate a siege. I had neither siege trains nor supplies for such a contingency. The exigency of possible delay. for which the foresight of the Commander of the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit : the larger reinforcement of the garrison. This, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the Army of the James.
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