USA > New York > Dutchess County > Address delivered Wednesday, 28th November, 1866 : in Feller's Hall, Madalin, township of Red Hook, Duchess Co., N.Y. > Part 11
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About 33 a staff officer from General SYKES (Lien- tens. INGHAM) came to me with orders for me to march to the battlefield, following the Second Division of my corps. He had no orders to conduct mein person. The Second Division lay in my front among the rocks and ravines of Wolf's Hill. I had recon- noitered the position and had found a by-road leading around the left of Wolf's Hill. It led through the
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woods and struck the road along which the Second. Division was marching. When the head of my col- umn struck the road I halted to allow the Second Division to pass. Before it could pass, it halted, facel about, and returned ; its new route leading away from the field. I could get no information, but, dis- patching a staff officer to General SYKES, I awaited his return.
About a mile in my front and to the southwest the battle was raging fiercely, and in a few moments, a staff officer, named Captain MOORE, came to me in a state of great excitement and begged me to go at once to "those hills," as the enemy had driven our men back and were trying to get the hills and if they did, the Army could not hold its position. He said he was an aide of General MEADE's, as I understood him, and that General SICKLES had directed him to get any as- sistance he could, and to order any command there he could find. . The following colloquy then took place : . General CRAWFORD-" I am perfectly willing to go with you at once if you cin give me the proper orders. I have heard the firing, and am anxious to get to the field. If you are an aide of General MEADE yon can give me his order."
He then interrupted me-"I am not an aide of General MEADE but of General SICKLES, and he ordered me to take any command I found."
General C .- "I cannot take orders from General SICKLES. You must go to General SYKES, who has already ordered me to join him on the field-or if you can find any general officer commanding here who will . give me orders, and. I believe General SLOcum is near, and will say to him that I think I should go at once to that point, I will accompany you."
Captain MOORE galloped down the road to General Stocty's headquarters at Wolf Hill on the right of our line, saw him, and returned with the order to me, and I moved at once across the fields and by cross roads toward the Round Tops. We pushed, on and in passing through a piece of woods not far from the Taneytown road I met a large company of officers and inen coming back with a wounded general. As my. march was impeded, I rode forward, and in di- recting them to turn off the road until my command passed, I asked why so large a number of men were. going to the rear with one wounded officer. An officer replied it was General SICKLES, and that he had lost a leg. I asked if General S. had directed so large a party to accompany him, and was told he had. I pass- ed on, crossed the Taneytown road, on a cross road leading into the Emmettsburg road, at a peach orchard.
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This road led along the right of Little Round Top across a ravine, deep and wide, traversed by a marshy run and through a wheat field, gradually rising, skirt- ed by a stone wall toward the ravine, and bounded on the right and left by open woods.
Shortly after crossing the Taneytown road. I rode forward, and turning into a field on the right met General SYKES, who complimented me for arriving so promptly on the field (I had arrived at the same time with the Second Division), and who directed me to. mass my division in that field and await orders from him. I had not massed one brigade, when I received orders to cross the road, forin in line of battle and be prepared to support the troops fighting in front. in case they were compelled to fail back. I mnade the movement at once, but it was not completed, and iny rear brigade was marching into position, when I again received orders from General SYKES to send a brigade to the support of General . BARNES (as the staff officer stated), who had been fighting on my immediate left. in the gorge between the Round Tops. This order was very unnecessary. VINCENT's brigade had already repulsed the attack and he had lost his life. General RICE was commanding. General BARNES who was temporarily commanding GRIFFIN's Division ( First of Fifth Corps) was not on that part of the field. I sent Colonel FISHER, commanding my Third Brigade, to RICE's support. Before he could move ont, the firing in front became more and more continuous and determin- ed, as well as closer. The enemy were ad- vyncing rapidly. He had broken SICKLES at the Peach Orchard. and was advancing directly on the right flanks of the brigades to the right of the cross road above spoken of, and driv- ing them in. with great loss. Zook, BROOKS, and finally AYRES, with his division of Regulars, all were retreating. The space in iny front. the ravine and the woods were filled with fugitives. Seeing the condition of things I sent Captain Louis LIVINGSTON, one of my aides, to General SYKES, reporting that our men were all breaking, and asking him for orders. He brought ine a message from General S. to the effect that " Gen- eral CRAWFORD was on the ground, and must judge - what to do for himself." My command was drawn up on the slope of . Little Round Top, and was about half way between the cross road and the crest. WHEATON'S Brigade (Sixth Corps) had come up, and was drawn up nearly in prolongation of my line, crossing the cross road to the right. Meantime AYRES had crossed iny front in retreat, and the enemy had followed him, driving the troops in his front, down through the woods and wheat field to the stone wall.
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Here the eneiny re-arranged his line, crossed the stone wall, and was coming in line of battle across the ravine, toward the Round Tops. Riding in front of my line, I ordered a forward movement, directing Captain. LIVINGSTON and Captain AUCHMUTY to assist me in leading on the inen. The entire command inoved at once. I found myself in the front line and beside the colors of the First Pennsylvania Reserves. Captain, now Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, LIVINGSTON, was on one side of me, and Captain, now Brevet Lientenant-Colonel, AUCHMUTY, my Acting Adjutant- General, on the other, both engaged in animating the men. The color sergeant of the First Regiment had been shot in the hand. and the colors were being car- ried by a corporal (SwoPE). I leaned over, and seizing the flag, lifted it above and called "Forward Reserves!" and away we went down the slope, across the small branch and on toward the stone wall. Between the stone wall and the branch, we met the enemy's skir- mishers, drove them back with a run on their line of battle, which we encountered just in rear. My whole line opened on ir with great enthusiasm and shouting. Recrossing the stone wall, the enemy endeavored to resist our approach, but on we went, when the enemy hastily retreated, leaving a stand of colors and many prisoners in our hands. In crossing the stone wall Colonel TAYLOR of the Pennsylvania Rifles (Buck- tails) was killed at the head of his regiment, shot through the heart. We had crossed into the wheat field. when finding myself without support. and the enemy holding a ridge in my front as well as the woods on iny left, I refused my left and establish- e ' iny entire command behind the st ne wall, skirting the woods. General SYKES having declined to send mle support. my left was thrown along Houck's Hill. My skirmishers were thrown forward into the wheat field, but a severe fire was kept np on their left flank, and in visiting the skirmish line at midnight, crawling carefully out to it with Captain AUCHMUTY, I found it within pistol shot of the enemy, who had establish- ed himselt in front, on a ridge beyond, and who en- tiladed my skirmish line from the left. Seeing this. I directed the brigade commander to draw his skirmish- ers closer and consolidate his com .nd behind the stone wall. At daylight the enemy seeing my pori- tion opened with musketry, but failed to make any impression. BARTLETT'S Brigade or Division of the Six h Corps was now moved up to my right and rear toward Trostle's house.
When General MEADE had the disaster of SICKLES reported to him, he directed WILLIAMS' Division of Twelf h Corps (Stocox) from the extremne right, with
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somne troops from the First Corps (NEWTON, centre) to proceed at once to the Round Tops, which were reported lost, and to retake the ground. They were met with the report that we had already driven back the enemy, and they were ordered back to their own works, into which EARLY's troops had pene- trated on Culp's Hill.
Meantime FISHER had moved with his brigade to the left, crossing the top of Little Round Top in rear of the batteries (WEED) and joining VINCENT's Brig- ade, now RICE's. The enemy under Hoop had endeav- ored to penetrate the gorge between Round Top and Little Round Top. HOOD's Division was on the ex- treme right of the Rebel line, and this attack was part of the general movement in following up the attack on SICKLES. HOOD was repulsed. and FISHER arrived with my Third Brigade just after the enemy bad fallen back. Wedid not, at that moment. hold Round Top proper. The troops under FISHER and RICE faced tow- ard it. About dusk an aide-de-camp from Colonel FISHER came to me with a report from the Colonel that the enemy were on Round Top, and asking permission to take it. I rode to the spot and me Colonel FISHER and gave him the order in person to take the hill. He and RICE moved up the hill in line of battle; the Twentieth Maine being deployed as skirmishers in their front. A few shots were fired. and a few stragglers of the enemy taken prisoners. . Heavy breastworks were thrown up from the top of Round Top, down its slope and across the gorge tow- ard Little Round Top.
Thus ended Thursday's fight on the left. The Sixth Corps. under SEDGWICK, had not participated, and were now massed in the rear of our left, now secure against attack.
OBSERVATIONS.
That the movement above described saved the Round Tops from seizure by the enemy, I have no donbt. That the enemy could and would have taken them is to ine unquestionable, and because-
1. They were the key of onr position, and it was his second attack upon them, and once in his poses. sion our trains and depots at Westminster, were exposed to capture, and we would have been obliged to fall back.
2. Because our own troops, on and about the Round Tops (we had none on Round. Top proper). were shaken by the repulse, and were not in a condition to resist unless the Sixth Corps could have been made available, and. even then, the enemy would have been in possession of the ridges before it could have been sup- poretd. The artillerists on Little Round Top had given
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up hope of saving their guns, and were about moving their horses to the rear when my movement was made.
3. Night was so near that any repulse or disaster could not have been retrieved, and although we might have retaken the hill, it would have required daylight.
4. The question is not one of infinite probabilities, but what force actually repulsed the enemy. This has been shown above.
. Friday, July 3 .- After PICKETT's charge and attack and subsequent repulse. General MEADE, with WRIGHT, SEDGWICK and others, came to Little Round Top. Struggling Rebels were seen going toward their lines, which, on their extreme right. were still held by HOOD, whose troops held the woods on my left flank, as well as Houck's Hill in front of Round Top. His sharp- shooters were so annoying, that no one could show themselves near any of the rocks on Little Round Top, without drawing their fire. Seeing my command in position near the stone wall, General MEADE asked whose it was. General SYKES replied that it was CRAW- FORD'S. General MEADE then directed that I should take my command and " clear those woods," pointing to the woods opposite to the Round Tops. Said he, "I do not know what force you may find there, but if you find they are too strong for you, you can come back." 1 joined the command and directed the move- inent. I moved the whole command to the right until it was parrallel to the cross road skirting the wheat field. The moment the movement was begun, the enemy opened from a battery on the ridge, throw- ing grape and cannister. Fortunately the woods screened ' my command from view, and, under their cover, I detached a regiment to move cautiously tow- ard the battery and throw forward skirmishers to control its fire. and if it should not be supported to charge upon it and take it. The regiment moved as di- rected, and after a few shots, the section, which was not supported, liurbered up and fled. I then directed the brigade commander (Colonel MCCANDLESS) to move forward in line of battle and clear the woods in his front. This order was sent by Captain LIVINGSTON, and in conveying it he had to pass over the most exposed part . of the field. . He conveyed it coolly amid the enemy's fire, and returned under the same fire to me. I did not expect he would escape. When MCCANDLESS moved I directed General BARTLETT, who was order- ed to support ine, to advance two of his regiments to the stone wall, and to hold the position. while another regiment was sent toward Trostle's House to relieve the regiment previously sent to silence the battery on the crest. MCCANDLESS moved into the woods, but inclined too much to bis right, when I sent a staff
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officer to change his direcion. This was done, and changing front to rear, his men, with a loud shont. came upon the flank of a brigade of HooD's Division. who were entrenched in the woods on the left flank of my previous position and at right angles toit. After a short fight the enemy retreated, running over one of his own brigades, who were massed in the rear of the command. entrenched in the woods. They were in a deep hollow, perfectly protected and were sup- plying the sharpshooters at work on Houck's Hill. who were firing on the Round Tops. They ran. with- out firing a shot, abandoning their arms, etc. Another brigade of Hoop, uuder BENNING. who were further to the right, also hastily . retreated. HOOD's whole Division were by this movement surprised and driven from the field. The woods were cleared and the eneiny retreated a mile distance, where he strongly entrenched himself.
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Nearly 200 prisoners. 2 guns and 3 caissons, and over 7,000 stand of arms were recovered by this movement. Many of these arms belonged to our own men, and the Rebels had piled them in huge heaps, ready to burn them.
A question has arisen whether this was not the mome t to move with a large force, from our lett. upon LEE'S shaken forces. The Sixth Corps were fresh and we could have sent a large body, and LEE's extended lines were very thin. (See HANCOCK's.testi- inony before the " Committee on the Conduct of the. War.")
This closed my fighting at Gettysburg. On Sunday : I went out with the skirmish line and found the enemy had retreated before day.
The conduct of Captain LIVINGSTON and of Captain - AUCHMUTY was highly creditable to them. . They were untiring in their efforts, and did very much to contribute to the success of my operations on both Thursday and Friday.
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In an interview with the Rebel General J. B. HOOD, of the late Confederate Army, and his Adjutant-Gen - eral Colonel SELDEN, on December 2d 1866, Major- General S. W. CRAWFORD elicited the following facts in regard to the battle of Gettysburg ..
HOOD said he had early perceived the importance of the Round Tops, and had urged an attack upon the ยท Union flank from the Rebel right ; their forces to be massed in the plain, South of the Round Tops, on Thursday, July 20, 1863. General LONGSTREET, how- ever, his corps commander, would not assume the re- sponsibility. Thiswas carly on Thursday. Again, after Hoop was wounded in the general attack on SICKLES, Colonel SELDEN urged General LAW (who) commanded HooD's Division, after HooD was wounded)
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to push on to the Round Top after McLAWS' attack. but he. likewise, would not take the responsibility. Ile was afterwards reproved by LONGSTREET. who was entirely convinced of the importance of the movement. Colonel SELDEN was earnest in urging the ocenparcy of Round Top, on Thursday, and said that PICKETT's division would be up by night, and they . would have plenty of men. It was ordered that McLAWS should attack simultaneously with HOOD. McLaws was s'ow. in fact he was an hour behind hand in coming to the field. M.cLAWS' led LONGSTREET'S Corps, and should have been on the right and in front. He was so slow in his movements that HOOD was ordered to pass him, and thus was on the right of the whole Rebel Army. In the attack on SICKLES, McLAw did not attack until after Hoon's repulse ; in the latter's attempt to get between the Round Tops.
HooD's o. ders were for him to move up the Emmetts- burg Road to cross it. and swing round, with right toward the Round Tops, and move towards Gettys- Intrg. He. at once, explaine I the peril ofso doing ; that his right # nk and rear would be very much exposed, if notpositively endangered ; but LONGSTREET insisted that this was the movement ordered by General LEE, and again directed it to be carried out. Hoon then asked LONGSTREET to come in person and look at the position. He did so. and the order was then modified, so as to combine a direct attack upon the Round Tops. - McLAws then drew back on Thursday evening, and retired beyond the Emmettsburg road.
On Friday. LAW, with part of his old brigade, JENNINGS' brigade, and ROBERTSON's brigade was in the woods, opposite to the Round Tops, beyond Houcks' Hill. ANDERSON's brigade and the First Texas Regiment were down the Emmettsburg Road watching the Union cavalry, whither they were posted by Colonel SELDEN, the Adjutant-General of HOOD's Division. There was no connection between this force and the main body in front of the Round Tops. The Union Cavalry came in on the left of the First Texas, and passed through their lines. RILEY now opened with his battery, which had no sup- ports or force with it, and they were thrown into con- fusion.
Colonel SELDEN then detached the Second Georgia, which deployed and opened on the Union Cavalry; when they retreated.
HOOD spoke of LEE, as saying, before Gettysburg, .' The enemy (Union) are here and if we do not whip him. he will whip us." Previous to this, his former confident assertion used to be " The enemy are here and we must (or will) whip him." HOOD spoke of the value of moving down the mountains to Emmettsburg,
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as the movement the Rebels should have made, and was of opinion they should not have fought at Gettys burg. (The features of that battlefield prove that LEE, if he was the general, Rebels and sympathizers and panegyrists made him out to have been, was either not himself upon this occasion, or as is most likely, one of the most over estimated phantasms mili- tary annals describe. ) HooD's opinion as to moving on Emmettsburg, rather than fighting at Gettysburg, led to the remark of LEE, with which this paragraph opens. Never before had he shown such lack of con- fidence, or seemed to be so shaken in his conviction of what the result was to be. Hoop spoke of the Rebel at- tacks from EWELL's Corps on their right, along their whole line. as being like (the see-saw on the swingle- tree, neither corps pulling together, or applying its force simultaneously) that of a balky team. ( In this as' in many other particulars, there is a great similarity to the French aggressive, &c., at Waterloo likewise in the respective attitudes of the Rebel and Union and the French and British armies). He said there was nothing done in unison. LO. GSTREET, who did not wish to attack on Thursday until PICKETT came up, expressed ex ctly this want of military simulta- neousness when he said, " He did not want to walk with one boot off."
Captain RICHARD TYLDEN AUCHMUTY, mentioned in General CRAWFORD's narrative, was one of the most distinguished staff officers who emerged from civil life to discharge the duties of a soldier. In 1861-'2, par- ticularly during MCCLELLAN'S "Campaign on the Peninsula," he served on the staff of Major-General MORRELL. At Chancellorsville, 1863, he was attached to the Staff of General GRIFFIN, but was among those at the Chancellorville House, during the hottest fire, by which the Commanding General suffered so severely. At Gettysburg. and whenever and wherever he was on duty, in the field, his conduct was unex- ceptionable. Brevet d Lieutenant-Colonel United States Volunteers, for distinguished service, he only left the Army when the Rebellion was subdued. He is the grand-nephew o. the famous Sir SAMUEL AUCH- MUTY, who distinguished himself in the British Campaign against Buenos Ayres in 1806-'7, when he captured Monte Video, and by his ability redeemed the incapacity of his superior, General WHITELOCK. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel AUCHMUTY's father was a Captain of Marines in the United States Naval service, and among other cruises was in the Mediter- ranean in 1816, whon CHAUNCY dictated terns to the . Dey of Algiers. As Brevet Lieutenant Colonel RICH- ARD TYLDEN AUCHMUTY was born and bought up at
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the country seat now owned by JOHNSTON LIVINGSTON, Esq .. next south of Tivoli, he may be claimed as another one of those sons of Red Hook, who did honor to their birth-place by their patriotism and military conduct, and, as such. he is enti led to this notice in an Addr ss dedicated to the soldiers of that town, whose exploits are the pride and property of its citi- zens, especially of the "immediate neighborhood " of TIVOLI and MADALIN.
NOTE 6 TO PAGE 25, 7TH LINE FROM BOTTOM, TEXT, 128TH N. N. V.
On the 12th of August, 1862, a War Meeting was held at the village of Madalin, which resulted in mus- tering in nineteen Volunteers, of a better class than those who generally respond, upon the spot, to an invitation to enlist
Their names, worthy of commemoration, are as fol- lows. They are set down in the order in which they offered themselves to their country :
1. BENJAMIN H. COOPER, 19, Tivoli, a highly intel- ligent and active youth (educated at General DE PEYSTER's Fr e School), whose acquirements soon led to his detail, although against the promptings of his spirit, to Bureau Service.
2. GEO. A NORCUTT 18, Tivoli, who evinced upon all occasions, a d especially before Port Hudson, a . gallantry of the highest type. See pages 40-41.
3. LEWIS W. CASHDOLLAR, 19, Tivoli. He was with his regiment at Port Hudson, on the Red River, and in the Shenandoah Valley. In the charge of the One Hundred and Twenty-eighth upon the Louisiana Tigers, in which the Rebel General YORK lost his right arm. he was hit at the upper edge of the middle third of the right leg. The ball penetrated six inches along the 'ibula bone, thence to the tibia, and descend- ed to the ankle joint. A portion of the lead was found in his shoe, and the same shot knocked off the heel. He lay on the field until 7 p. M., and was six hours in the hands of the Rebels. They did noth ng for him except to give him a drink of water. This was little enough, since they stole his canteen, panta - loons and shoes Finally two dismounted United States cavalrymen came along and gave him their shelter tents, but left him. Afterwards he saw HUGH MCGUIRE, One Hundred and Fifty-sixth N. Y. V., from Sauger ies, just opposite Tivoli. with whom he was well acquainted. McGUIRE stopped three other soldiers and the four carried him a mile and a half from the battle-ground to the Sixth Corps Field Hos- pital. The surgeons, at this point. would have nothing to do with CASHDOLLAR, as he belonged to the Nine- teenth Corps. McGUIRE and a Dr. McLAWRY; of the
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One Hundred and Fifty-sixth. then pu CASHDOLLAR in an ambulance, which transported him to the Sixth Corps Hospital, four miles further on. Her CASH- DOLLAR refused to be taken ont, as he wanted to get on to his own surgeon, Dr. ANDREWS, of Poughkeepsie. He lay in the ambulance from 8 to 11 p. M. He was then driven 3 miles to the Nineteenth Corps Hospital, which he reached about midnight. Next day, about 11 A. M .. his leg was amputated below the knee ; about 5 p. M. he came to, from the effects of chloro- forin ; at 6 p. M. he was put in an ambulance and driven nine miles to Winchester. On the way thither secondary hemorrhage came on; the stump had .o be cut open and th- arteries again taken up. At Win- chester the accommodations for the sick were very defective in the way of sinks. A soldier shot through the hips, fell, from want of attention on the part of his nurses, and in falling, to save himself, caught CASHDOLLAR's stump and burst the flap. so that the bone protruded three inches. The surgeons had to cut or rasp the edge of the bone off and allow the rest to slough. From Winchester, CASHDOLLAR was trans- ferred to Martinsburgh ; thence, in a Cattle car. to Baltimore ; thence to Philadelphia ; thence to Chestar. Penn., to receive his discharge. This seems to be a wonderful case of endurance and recuperative power, and attests a constitution such as few possess.
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