USA > New York > Disaster, struggle, triumph. The adventures of 1000 "boys in blue," from August, 1862, to June, 1865 > Part 4
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HAPTER
PTE V.
OLONEL THOMAS H. FORD, with the 32d Regiment Ohio Volunteers and two companies of the 39th New York had been placed by Colonel MILES in command of the heights. A few Maryland troops who had been doing duty in the eastern part of the State, had been compelled by the enemy to betake themselves to the heights, and had joined Colonel FORD's command. Incredible as it may seem, these were the only preparations for the defense of Maryland Heights, the key of Harper's Ferry, up to the 12th of September. Indeed, nothing astonishes us more, in this remarkable piece of history, than the supineness and inactivity of the commander of the post. With his railroad and telegraphic communica- tions all cut off by the enemy, he seems to have made no attempt, by spies or couriers or cavalry reconnois- sances, to learn what was going on in his vicinity.
But if the garrison was almost entirely ignorant of the movement of friends and foes, neither friends nor foes were idle ; especially was there no inactivity in LEE. On leaving Frederick, and setting out for the Shenandoah Valley, he found that our occupation of Harper's Ferry would seriously obstruct his plans. Therefore he made immediate dispositions to capture
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that post. To this end, he ordered "STONEWALL" JACKSON to proceed by way of Sharpsburg, and cross- ing the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, to invest it in the rear ; WALKER was to cross below the ferry and take possession of Loudon Heights ; while McLAWS was to proceed directly and capture Maryland Heights .* The advance was begun on the 10th, and the commanders were to be at their assigned positions on the 12th. The route of MoLAws lay through Plea- sant Valley, which, as we have said, is bounded by the South Mountain on the east; and only separated from Harper's Ferry by Maryland Heights. Both ranges of mountains break off suddenly at the Potomac on the south. MoLAWS approached Pleasant Valley by a road through a gap in the South Mountain, passing Buckettsville, three or four miles south of Crampton's gap. He could now reach Harper's Ferry by keeping the road between Maryland Heights and the river, or by crossing the heights. Knowing the importance of gaining these elevations, he did not hesitate to attempt to force their passage, although assured by the inhabitants in the neighborhood that they were guarded by long lines of batteries on their summits. KERSHAW, with his own Brigade of infantry, and BARKSDALE with his, were ordered to ascend the mountain at Solomon's gap, two or three miles north of the Potomac, and thence, by the road on the ridge, to advance southward and carry the heights. General WRIGHT'S Brigade, of General ANDERSON'S Division, was to plant two pieces of artil-
* See LEE's general order, page 40.
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lery near the end of the South Mountain, thus com- manding the railroad, turnpike and canal at Wever- ton, and preventing all escape of the Harper's Ferry garrison in that direction. Another Brigade protected the rear of KERSHAW. General COBB was to cross Pleasant Valley, and support KERSHAW if necessary. On the 11th of September, FORD, who commanded on Maryland Heights, became aware of the approach of McLAWS and BARKSDALE, by the driving in of our pickets from Sandy Hook, and sent to MILES for rein- forcements. At about ten o'clock that evening, orders were issued to the 126th New York to march at sun- rise the next day for Maryland Heights, with one day's rations and eighty rounds of cartridges per man. The field officers of the 126th Regiment, at this time, were E. SHERRILL, Colonel of the Regiment, Major BAIRD, and acting Adjutant BARRAS. Lieutenant-Colo- nel BULL was detained (arranging his affairs) and did not reach the Regiment until after its surrender. At sunrise the Regiment marched to Bolivar, was halted, and then marched back to camp on Bolivar Heights, but ordered to be in readiness to move. At three in the afternoon orders were given to march, and the Regiment, conducted by Major HEWITT (32d Ohio Volunteers), marched rapidly through Harper's Ferry, across the pontoon bridge, up the Sandy Hook road, past MCGRATH's Battery till they reached the bridle- path along the ridge. It was an excessively hot day ; the way was very steep and difficult ; many strong men fell, victims of sunstroke or faintness. To guard the approach from Pleasant Valley by the Sandy Hook
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road, the two right Companies of the Regiment (A and F) were left at this point, and about half way up the slope to the "lookout " the next three Companies (D, I and C), under command of Captain P. D. PHILLIPS, of Company D, were stationed ; the left Companies under the special command of Colonel SHERRILL, along the ridge from the lookout to the breastworks and beyond them. The left Companies immediately became engaged with the enemy, who had gained the ridge by way of Solomon's gap, some distance north of the breastworks, and the skirmishing was so sharp that Companies C and I were moved up to the support of the left. Night put an end to the fighting; but to prevent a flank movement by the enemy, Company K was placed thirty rods down the slope on the left, the men lying on their arms all night.
In the morning, at daylight, KERSHAW's and BARKS- DALE's Brigades, who had ascended the mountain in the afternoon of the 12th, advanced in force. Our troops consisted of some Maryland Companies, a part of the 32d Ohio, seven Companies of the 126th, and, perhaps, some of the Garibaldi Guards, as the 39th New York were called. Sharp skirmishing continued for an hour or more, when the enemy was reinforced so as greatly to outnumber us. The Maryland troops gave way, but the detachments of the 32d Ohio and 126th New York stood firm and contested the ground stubbornly, until their left being flanked, and they, pressed upon by superior numbers, were ordered to fall back behind the abattis and breastworks. This they did rapidly, but in good order, facing about and firing as
*
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they went, and finally climbing over the slashing of timber, they formed behind the breastworks. General McLAWS (rebel) calls it "a very sharp and spirited engagement, through dense woods, over a very broken surface." Companies C and F were placed near the center, at the breastworks. Company D was ordered up from the slope, on the south of the lookout, to the left of C and F. Company A still guarded the Sandy Hook road. The right of Company G was deployed between the breastworks and the lookout, its left at the breastworks on the right. Half of Com- pany H, under Lieutenant REDFIELD, was deployed down the mountain, some forty rods, to the left of the breastworks, rather too far to be available in prevent- ing a flank movement, while its right, with Companies K, E and B, were posted at the breastworks, as well as a detachment of the 32d Ohio. There were quite enough men at these works to fight to advantage, and the other forces on the heights should have been held in reserve to relieve these, or else have been posted on the slope west of the breastworks to pre- vent a flank movement. But Lieutenant-Colonel Dow- NEY, with a small detachment of the 3d Maryland and of the 1st Maryland Cavalry, and Major HILDEBRAND, with a detachment of the 39th New York (Garibaldi Guards), ranged their commands in the rear of the left of the 126th ; not at all a post of danger for them- selves or threatening to the enemy, but greatly endan- gering our own troops in front of them, over whose heads they fired, oftentimes without sighting their pieces. After they had blown off the caps and singed
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the hair of some of the 126th, this "fire in the rear" was checked by some of the officers in front, who faced about and threatened to fire on the offenders if they did not cease. About seven o'clock, A. M., the enemy moved up and opened fire from beyond the abattis. For some time the fire was very heavy on both sides, and the enemy still kept beyond the abat- tis, but at length a movement to the left was observed among them, and their fire slackened a little. Colonel SHERRILL, who, from his exposed post on the breast- works, observed this, instantly ordered Captain PHIL- LIPS, who acted for the time as Major, to take two Companies and deploy them to the left and rear, and meet the enemy's flanking party. Captain PHILLIPS took his own Company, D, and Captain SCOTT's, C, from the breastwork, on the double-quick, and deployed them rapidly in a diagonal line down the mountain side just in time to meet a strong party of the enemy working their way through the woods and tangled vines .* Fighting imme-
* Major HILDEBRAND testified before the commission that, after the second fire, he saw great " confusion of the new Regiments, mostly the 126th ; they ran down in a very great haste." He probably saw the move- ment we have just described, and mistook it for flight.
By the way, if our forces "ran at the second fire" on Maryland Heights, is it not strange that the rebel accounts never allude to it? In McLAWS' Report, which is said by our officers to be very truthful and candid, he says : " The troops (rebel) who were engaged on Maryland Heights are entitled to special commendation, as they were laboriously employed for (parts of) two days and one night along the summit of the ridge, constantly working their way under fire during the day, and at night resting in position, &c." Now, as the 126th New York and the 32d Ohio were the only full Regi- ments on the heights, and as the enemy had two Brigades there under con- stant fire, is it not evident that the " running away" of the 126th is a fabri- cation ?
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diately commenced, but Companies C and D suc- ceeded in holding their position and completely foiling the enemy in their effort to turn the left flank. In this fight on the left, Captain SCOTT, of Company C, received a severe wound in the leg, and two men of Companies D and C were mortally and five seriously wounded. The fire which had slackened at the breastworks, raged again with great fury. Colonel SHERRILL, standing on the logs, encouraged his men and directed their fire, regardless of the expostulations of his officers. He was just indignantly replying to their suggestions of his personal danger, when a shot struck him in the face, tearing through both cheeks, knocking out several teeth and wound- ing the tongue so as to render him speechless. He was borne to the rear, but his Regiment only fought more desperately, as if to avenge his loss, and not a thought of retreat entered their minds. Yet, of the officers, Colonel FORD was not to be found, and his substitute, Major HEWITT, who, contrary to military rule, had been placed in command of superior officers, did not think it consistent with personal safety to approach the breastworks. The soldiers, however, inspirited by success, needed no command to main- tain their ground ; they felt that their position was strong; the enemy had only once attempted to advance beyond the abattis, and then had been repulsed ; the men, although they had been fight- ing since daylight, were still vigorous and gaining every moment in steadiness and self-possession, when a Lieutenant, who gave himself out as acting Aid to
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Colonel FORD, brought a verbal order to PHILLIPS to withdraw the troops in good order from the breast- works. PHILLIPS declined to give the order. It was not in writing, he did not know the bearer, and it seemed utterly unreasonable. The Lieutenant again gave the order to withdraw the men to the rear of the lookout, as MCGRATH'S Battery was about to shell the woods where they were. Captain PHILLIPS, being in command of the left, referred the order to Major BAIRD, whom he supposed to be on the right. The bearer in the meantime carried the order to the other troops, who immediately retired from their position, so that the 126th found themselves alone. They then reluctantly fell back to the rear of the lookout. Lieu- tenant LINCOLN says : "The rebels could be seen over (beyond) the abattis and breastworks in force; but as we were holding them in check at all points, it was a mystery to all why we should be ordered to fall back, which we did not do till the third order came." * As to withdrawing in good order, that is, in military order, the nature of the ground and the narrowness of the way rendered it impossible, especially as the wounded had to be carried in blankets by men walking in single file. But there was no "stampede" as a wit- ness called it, and no arms were thrown away. Cap- tain WHEELER, one of the last on the ground, says he saw but one fire arm that had been left, and on look- ing at that, he found the lock broken.+
* Letter of Lieutenant LINCOLN.
+ The Companies who were fighting down the hill on the left did not get the order to retire, and knew nothing of what had happened until, hearing the rebel commander giving orders at the breastworks, Lieutenant RICH-
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In the meantime a stand had been made south of the Lookout, by most of the Companies of the 126th New York, the 32d Ohio and parts of other Regi- ments, they being formed across the ridge and down the left side. A slight skirmish took place with little result. Colonel SAMMONS now arrived from Harper's Ferry with his own Regiment as a rein- forcement. They came up past MCGRATH's battery to the old house and spring, and were formed on the hill side connecting with the left on the hill. MCGRATH'S battery began throwing shell among the enemy at the breastworks. They, for some reason, did not pursue our troops. The probability is, that seeing our men withdrawn without apparent cause from their comparatively strong position at the breast- works, and having heard that batteries were con-
ARDSON, of Company D, went up to see what was 'going on, and found the works abandoned by our troops and in rebel hands. Seeing the enemy at the works, and two or three of the 126th helping a wounded comrade toward the lookout; he stepped from the path on the ridge back into the bushes, and a few shots were fired after him. He returned to his skirmishers, assembled them and hearing a cheer from the enemy as they advanced toward the lookout, took them by the diagonal road leading down to the old house and spring. They were joined by Lieutenant REDFIELD, of Company H, who, having been stationed down on the left, had not heard the order to retreat, and who had ascertained the state of affairs by going up toward the breastworks and finding them in the possession of the enemy. Not being able to rejoin their Regiment directly, these Lieutenants with their detachments, made their way to MCGRATH's battery, where they dis- covered many superior officers whom they had missed on the field. Here they found Colonels MILES and FORD, with Lieutenant-Colonel DOWNEY of the 3d Maryland, Major HUGO HILDEBRAND of the 39th New York, and his valiant companion, acting Adjutant BARRAS, of the 126th, who had been missing from his Regiment ever since the skirmish in the morning, and who excused his absence from his post to Colonels MILES and FORD, by assert- ing that his Regiment had all run away and that he had been vainly attempting to rally them !
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cealed in the woods on the mountain, they did not think it prudent to do so. Another reason was, that LEE, who had heard of FRANKLIN's advance toward South Mountain, had ordered McLAWS to send a large force to defend Crampton's pass.
The 126th being now under command of its line officers only, Colonel SHERRILL being wounded, their Major being absent, and their Adjutant (BARRAS) being invisible to the naked eye, held a consulta- tion as to who should lead them, and direct what should be done; and by common consent, acting Major PHILLIPS took command of the Regiment and formed them at the rear of the lookout; but at three o'clock, P. M., a peremptory order came to march back to their camping ground on Bolivar Heights .* Most of the guns in MCGRATH's battery were spiked and tumbled down the heights, one poor soldier being horribly mangled in the operation ; and thus this important position on which depended the safety of 11,000 men and a vast amount of mili- tary stores and provisions, was abandoned to the enemy.
As we stated (note, page 47), we have before us a large number of independent accounts of the fight- ing on Maryland Heights, written by line officers and enlisted men of the Regiment, without concert, and yet so agreeing in essential particulars as to prove their substantial truth. To make this evident,
* Lieutenant LINCOLN says : " Had an order been given to surrender to the enemy, we should not have been more surprised; for in abandoning that position, we saw plainly that everything was lost."
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we will here give brief extracts from several of them. Says Captain WINFIELD SCOTT of Company C, con- cerning the morning fight 100 rods north of the breastworks : "After the skirmishers, consisting of detachments of the 32d Ohio and 1st Maryland, and Company K of the 126th were driven in (by KER- SHAW's Brigade, very early in the morning), several Companies of the 126th were formed in line of bat- tle. I looked to the front, and within thirty rods of us the woods were filled with rebels, coming toward us and yelling like Indians. I passed up and down the line of my own command, and never since have seen men cooler, or exhibiting better spirit. When ordered to fall back behind the breastworks, it was done steadily, the men loading and then facing about and firing. * * The fire was kept up at
the breastworks for some time with great fury." After describing his being sent to the left to repel the enemy's flank movement, and his wound which obliged him to leave the field, he says: "As I left I saw several Companies of the 126th fighting without the least sign of confusion, and with great spirit. Colonel SHERRILL passed me, wounded in the mouth," &c. Says Sergeant FERGUSON of Company F: "My expe- rience since (of fighting) has convinced me that on said occasion, both officers and men fought bravely; and on receiving the order to abandon the works, they very reluctantly gave up the position and slowly retired." He concludes : "We reached our old camp about five P. M. the same day, fully convinced
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that we were bagged and about to be surrendered by a traitorous commander."*
Says another enlisted man of Company F, after an account of the posting of the men, substantially like the one in our description : "The conduct of Col- onel SHERRILL was beyond all praise. The attack was mainly on our left front, where we were in files of five or six, and firing rapidly. Every can- did man knows that the 126th did most of the fight- ing on Maryland Heights." (This is in a letter
written from Annapolis, about a week after the fight.) "We returned to our old position feeling disheartened that we were compelled to yield so strong a position," &c. Captain WHEELER, of Com- pany K, says of the men at the breastworks: "They were very cool, indeed, as a rule; dropping behind the breastworks to load, and then rising and firing coolly over the breastworks." Captain PHILLIPS, of Company D, writes :+ "We occupied Maryland Heights about six o'clock, the evening of the 12th of September. I was appointed acting Major of the
* We said to a brave young private of the 126th, who was in the war until he received a dreadful wound at the battle of the Wilderness, and whom we shall hear more of by and by : " What did you men think when you were ordered to leave the breastworks ?" " Why," said he, " we thought we hadn't ought to leave; we thought we were sold." Conversing with another, Corporal PECK, of Company D, he said: "I was on picket that morning and did not go up on the heights till afternoon, when being relieved, some of us begged to go up and have a hand in the fight. We never had been in one and thought we would like it. As we were going up we met our troops coming down, slowly and looking pretty sober. We asked them what they were coming down for? They said they were sure they didn't know. They were coming because they were ordered to."
+ We would here state that in writing our previous account, we did not make use of Captain P.'s letter ; therefore his statement corroborates that.
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Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel BULL being absent, and Major BAIRD acting Lieutenant-Colonel. * In the morning, as soon as it was light, the rebels opened a heavy skirmish fire on Colonel SHERRILL, a mile or more north of me." X * Captain P., after giving an account of joining Colonel S.'s forces with Com- pany D, goes on : Our forces "were posted behind a rude breastwork of logs, the right resting on the rocky, precipitous slope of the east side of the moun- tain. At the left of the breastwork was a narrow wagon road. The sides of the road, and a large por- tion of the top of the mountain, are thickly grown up to laurel bushes. In front of the breastworks was a slashing several rods in width. Our position was a good one. We could not be flanked on the right. To flank us on the left, the only open space was the wagon road, and the laurel bushes would impede their progress, giving us greatly the advantage. To have charged us in front would have been a hazardous undertaking for the rebels, the ground being covered with slashed timber. And when I think of it, I believe if our Regiment could have been relieved, as in doing guard duty, we could have held that posi- tion any length of time against infantry.
"On arriving at the breastworks, Colonel SHERRILL put me in command of the left wing, with orders to protect the left flank if it took every man from the works to do it. We had been fighting for an hour or two, when the enemy undertook to turn our left. I took Companies D and C and put them in position outside (at the left) of the breastworks, and drove 5
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back the enemy after a spirited engagement. In this affair several men of Companies D and C were wounded ; Captain SCOTT, severely. I reported to Colonel SHERRILL what had been done, and requested that the men might remain where I had placed them, as they could do as good execution where they were as if they were behind the works. There were as many men behind the works as could act to advan- tage. There had joined us two Companies of the 39th New York Volunteers, one Company 32d Ohio Volun- teers, and one dismounted Maryland cavalry. The Colonel said : 'Let them remain where they are.' * * We held the breastworks for some time after the Colo- nel was wounded, the men firing rapidly, behaving finely, and undoubtedly doing good execution. In the
afternoon, a 2d Lieutenant, who told me he was acting aid for Colonel FORD, ordered me to with- draw my Regiment in good order, and place them on the first level in the woods beyond the lookout, as MCGRATH'S Battery was going to shell the rebels. I told the Lieutenant I could not give the order; I was not in command of the Regiment, and furthermore that I did not know him. (It was a verbal order.) The commanding officer could not be found, and the shells from MCGRATH'S Battery coming among us, I then gave the order, * * urged hard to do it by the Aid; and the shells from our Battery convincing me of its genuineness. % * We had a narrow, rocky path ; were obliged to go in single file and carry our wounded. Our line was so extended it was impossible for one man to command the whole. I ordered the
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Captains to take command of their Companies, and get back the best way they could. The enemy's fire was severe on us as soon as we left the works. I got to the position ordered with about 300 men. Compa- nies A, K, and part of H, were not with us at the breastworks, they were guarding other approaches to the mountain. Then we had a large detail on picket on the Winchester road, and this with our sick and wounded, and camp guard, lessened our numbers.
* * * The officers that had got separated from us with their commands, i. e., those who had been engaged in repelling the flank movement, made a detour to the left, under cover of the woods, and could only get to us by going around and coming up by the road in our rear, which they did, and joined us a short time before we vacated the heights." * * "After a short time, the 32d Ohio (I think), com- manded by their Lieutenant-Colonel, marched past us and halted ; and said we were to support him. We
formed on his right.
Within a few moments, some
one in the rear commanded, 'Halt Battalion.' The Lieutenant-Colonel, Captain SHIMER, myself and some other officers went back to see what was wanted. We found Lieutenant BARRAS, with thirty or forty men, and a Major with a long gray beard. The Colonel inquired if he halted the Regiment. He said he did. That he had orders from Colonel FORD to form the 126th there where he was, to support the 32d Ohio. While there, fighting commenced with our command and the enemy. We hastened back to our men. But BARRAS and the Major (HEWITT), both being mounted, jumped
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