USA > New York > Bronx County > The Bronx and its people; a history, 1609-1927, Volume II > Part 3
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the very end, stuck to their jobs with the greatest courage and self- sacrifice. Indeed, some of them refused to surrender even when our. men were upon them, and were killed at their posts. It has been said that the conduct of our men in this battle was marked by confidence and determination. Perhaps to this should be added that some of them dis- played impatience in getting forward. This is illustrated by the fact that when enemy machine-gun nests were located there was a tendency with some of the attacking groups to abandon the deliberate methods for attacking such points, which they knew so well, and to resort to the quicker but much more dangerous method of rushing such points of op- position. Accordingly losses were voluntarily incurred by some of our groups which it is believed were avoidable."
The terrain afforded the enemy excellent observation and it was almost impossible for the attackers to conceal themselves. The 106th Infantry was commanded by Colonel William A. Taylor, whose conduct of the operations was marked by a great sense of responsibility. The regimental operations officer was Captain Arthur V. McDermott, who seemed throughout the action to bear a charmed life.
The 27th Division was relieved on September 2nd and 3rd by the 41st British Division. In this major operation it had acquitted itself well. The casualties of the 53rd Brigade in this battle were: killed, forty ; shell wounds, one hundred and twenty-six ; gunshot wounds, one hundred and fifty; gassed, thirty-three; total, three hundred and forty-nine. In this battle forty-seven German soldiers were taken prisoners. During the battle sixty-three machine-guns, eleven minnenwerfers, and one field- piece were captured, or at least this was all that was recorded. Much more was gained, but the division left the sector for the Beauquesne area immediately, and before all the captured material could be col- lected and reported. Just before the battle, John S. Sargent, the great portrait painter, visited General O'Ryan at headquarters, and became a member of "A" mess for days. He made a fine portrait of General O'Ryan while a guest of the 27th.
The new region to which the 27th Division was assigned embraced a part of the old area known as the Doullens area, where the division had been located with General Byng's 2d British Army, and in the new situation the 106th Infantry occupied the town of Doullens, in- cluding the citadel. It was intimated to the commander at this time that in the near future the division might be called upon to carry out a movement of great importance, which would require the employment of a "shock division." Later this became a mission in which the 27th and 30th Divisions jointly headed the great attack designed to break through the Hindenburg Line. Practice in battle tactics went on here, and on one occasion one of the most zealous young officers was First Lieutenant Franklin J. Jackson, who was killed.
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The British Army had made attacks on the Hindenburg Line, which had held, and Marshall Foch directed that a main attack be made on September 29th, and the troops were ordered to the forward area to take positions assigned them in the plan. A British division was re- lieved by the 30th American Division. All previous attacks on the Hindenburg Line had been repulsed. The British soldiers were ex- hausted and their losses had been great. On September 22d and 23d the 27th and 30th American Divisions began to arrive on the scene, and on succeeding days took over the positions held by the British troops. The 27th Division took over the sector held by the 74th and 18th British Divisions, fronting the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, and with the 106th Infantry Regiment in line faced the formidable out- works "which had given such remarkable and repeated demonstrations of invulnerability against attack." Major J. Leslie Kincaid was detailed to the 106th Infantry as a battalion commander, and led the battalion efficiently. The right battalion of the 106th was led by Major Gillet, and the left by Captain William E. Blaisdell, Major Kincaid leading the center. Captain Blaisdell was killed on September 29th in the main attack. Colonel William A. Taylor commanded the 106th.
The Hindenburg Line-The Hindenburg Line was originally or- ganized for defense toward the end of the year 1916, and work on it was continuous for a long time thereafter. The main defenses of the line in the tunnel sector consisted of three strong lines of trenches protected by an extraordinary mass of wire. The roof of the tunnel averaged fifty or sixty feet below the surface of the ground. In the construction of the tunnel shafts had been sunk through the ground to the roof of the tunnel to provide air. These shafts were about one hundred yards apart. The St. Quentin Canal, which had been dammed, was a part of the Hindenburg Line system, and it ran through a tunnel for 6,000 yards. Early in 1918 there were twenty-five barges in the main tunnel, and these were used by the Germans as billets for reserve troops. There were a number of chambers connected with the tow- path within the tunnel, used in the operation of the canal, some of these being for storage and others for electric power production. These chambers were supplemented by others built by the Germans when the defenses were under construction. Along the easterly side of the tunnel a number of approaches to the tunnel tow-path had been sunk through the ground, resembling dugout stairs, and they enabled troops to have access to and from the tunnel and the defilated ground imme- diately to the east of it. Passage ways had been excavated from the westerly side of the canal within the tunnel to the main line of resistance constructed in the ground above and a short distance westerly of the line of the tunnel. No bombardment, no matter how severe, could
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affect reserve troops stationed or billeted within the tunnel. The en- trances to the tunnel were blocked by heavily reinforced concrete walls defended by machine-guns. It was learned that there were at least fifteen underground galleries leading from the Gouy-Bellicourt road into the tunnel that would enable troops to enter or leave the tunnel unobserved. These entrances were camouflaged with brushwood. There were nine galleries leading from the tunnel toward Bellicourt and Bony. With the tunnel a safe haven for reserve troops it became possible to maintain such reserves in perfect security during the height of a battle close to the point where they would be needed for reinforcement or counter-attack, until required for such purposes, when they could be fed through covered ways into trenches on their immediate front. The block walls at the exits of the tunnel were built of thick ferro-concrete containing an upper chamber with a platform. The blocks were provided with slits for machine-guns to command the entrance, and were each equipped with a ventilating shaft containing an electric fan. On the easterly side of the tunnel and directly in rear of the strong point at Bony there was a quarry which had been organized for the accommoda- tion of at least a battalion of troops. This included a large gallery with three entrance shafts and three large rooms. Several dugouts had been constructed in the westerly face capable of holding a considerable num- ber of men. Bony was about midway between the northern and southern portals of the tunnel. With its stone buildings and its com- manding position it was ideal for organization as a field fortification to stiffen the line. Its fire commanded a wide front, while it afforded observation. And the main defense was connected with the outer system by numerous communicating trenches which took full advantage of the ground.
The whole, wrote General Monash, produced in fact a veritable fortress-not one, in the popular acceptance of the term, consisting of massive walls and battlements, which as was proved in the early days of the war at Liege and Namur can be speedily blown to pieces by modern heavy artillery, but one defying destruction by any powers of gunnery, and presenting the most formidable diffi- culties to the bravest of infantry.
The positions of the three battalions of the 106th Infantry have been suggested. In accordance with the program strong patrols were pushed out during the night of September 26th and the tape was laid as pres- cribed. Watches were synchronized, extra property stored and neces- sary supplies issued. Zero hour was fixed at 5.30 A. M. on September 27th. At 4.30 the troops were on the tape ready to advance. "While going over this battlefield last summer (1920)," writes General O'Ryan, "the writer found a piece of the start-line tape still stretched out where it was placed on the night of September 26th, the tape found stretched along the front of Benjamin Post. It was precisely where it was pres-
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cribed by orders to be placed. A twenty-yard strip of it was kept as a memento."
At zero hour the ninety-six heavy machine-guns of the 105th and 106th Machine-Gun Battalions began the barrage, each gun firing at the rate of two hundred shots per minute. "The output of these ninety- six machine-guns must have sounded like the buzzing of millions of wasps as they passed over the heads of the infantry lying on the start- line. At least this deluge of bullets would have sounded in such a manner except for the fact that at the same instant nine brigades of supporting British artillery flashed out the announcement that the barrage was falling." German prisoners taken in this attack reported that the combined artillery and machine-gun barrage was very de- moralizing to them, as a perfect rain of bullets and shrapnel, accom- panied by high explosive shells, kept them under cover.
"The 106th Infantry up to the time of the start had fared rather un- fortunately. They went into battle about 2,000 strong. They had sustained casualties during the taking over of the line and during the day preceding the attack, but these casualties, when one considers how formidable was the position they faced, and how aggressive and ceter- mined was the enemy's resistance, were not considerable. They were considerable, however, when one realizes the regiment's available num- bers for the task it was called upon to perform."
The details of this battle are infinite, and never will be assembled, for each participant saw something that no other realized. The ad- vance was smothered in smoke from the bombs, as far as visibility is concerned. It is said that the tanks were unsuccessful. The left bat- talion of the 106th was successful at The Knoll, and took many prisoners. But the enemy artillery retaliation on the 106th Infantry was heavy. The next message received was that the right and center battalions were on their objectives, but that heavy fighting was going on about Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, and bombing of these localities was continuous. An observer from the 4th Australian Division with the left battalion of the 106th Infantry reported one hundred and thirty prisoners coming in, and another Australian observer with the right battalion reported troops of the battalion on the ob- jective in trenches, but that bombing and hard fighting was still going on. Word was received near noon that the enemy had appeared in force in Guillemont Farm and to some extent in the trenches. Major Kincaid's . battalion occupied certain trenches, but Guillemont Farm had not been cleaned up at noon, although mopping detachments were trying to clear the situation. Soon after noon the left battalion, occupying The Knoll were heavily counter-attacked and driven back, taking up a line at Tombois Farm. Supporting artillery and machine-gun fire was brought to bear, the troops of the 106th left battalion counter-
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attacked and drove the enemy into a trench. And thus it went, counter- attack and repeat, and the situation was not clear early in the afternoon. Heavy fighting was continuous, but the situation remained obscure.
"It became obvious that in addition to numerous counter-attacks by both sides there were being carried on throughout the acres of the enemy's complicated system more or less continuous combats between small detachments of the 106th Infantry and enemy detachments, which had come out from cover after the attacking waves had passed over, or which had been fed into such positions aided by covered ways and the heavy smoke which obscured the field."
Reports in the early morning were to the effect that The Knoll was again in American possession, as were Guillemont Farm and Quenne- mont Farm, but that in all of these places pockets of the enemy re- mained and were still to be dealt with. There were many casualties in the advance to the objective, which sadly thinned the line, and it seems that The Knoll was taken three times by the left battalion of the 106th Infantry, aided by companies of the 105th, and later by the remaining companies of the 3d Battalion of the latter regiment. But the survivors of the leading elements gained the objective along the entire front. Groups which gained the objective line held on with the greatest tenacity against great odds. In some cases on the left, where fighting was heaviest, some of the groups were surrounded, bombed into submis- siveness, and taken prisoners. Other groups counter-attacked enemy groups, destroying them, or where possible, taking prisoners. The objective line, which was attained on the morning of September 27th, was not, however, consolidated, held and made good throughout its length. "The situation along the front out to the objective line might be likened to an inferno, dotted with opposing groups of fiercely con- tending men. Some of these groups were in the remains of trenches. Some were in concrete pits. Others fought from scattered shell holes." The front originally to be covered, 3,500 yards, made the leading waves of men very thin, and heavy casualties made gaps which could not, perhaps, be filled up by men of succeeding waves and from mopping- up parties as well, and smoke added to the confusion.
"The regiment in its forward movement was traveling through such a torrent of machine-gun bullets, shrapnel and shell fragments that the losses were sufficient to practically obliterate some of the mopping-up detachments and in other cases to reduce their combat power to a minimum. These circumstances in themselves would explain the failure of some of the mopping parties to cover the area assigned them. The regiment was attacking what was probably the most formidable field fortification ever constructed, and which had successfully resisted all previous attempts for its capture."
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On September 28th the survivors of the 106th Infantry were informed that they were to be given no opportunity for rest and recuperation, but were to be organized as a provisional battalion to aid in mopping-up for the 107th Infantry on the occasion of the attack of September 29th. There was so little left of the 106th in the way of effective men that it was necessary to form this battalion as a provisional unit constituted of the effective survivors. So important was the coming mission of this unit that the Division Commander felt called upon to supervise personally the preparation for its organization. He found Colonel Taylor with the work in hand. The prospect at first looked most un- promising. Scores of men of the 106th were lying about apparently exhausted. Many of them were in a stupor of sleep. Others, suffering from temporary shell shock and strain, apparently could not sleep and were comparing their experiences with other survivors. All were muddy and unkempt-looking after their terrible ordeal, which had afforded no opportunity for anything but fighting. It was obviously time for rather summary action, and Colonel Taylor was directed per- sonally, and with the aid of such officers as were immediately available, to assemble the men with the least possible delay so that the Division Commander might talk to them. This was done. Within ten minutes there were perhaps one hundred and fifty enlisted men standing about the Division Commander. They presented an appearance that would have appealed to the sympathy and indulgence of almost any heart. They were silent men. But in spite of their apparent exhaustion the faces of most of them, for the first few moments at least, wore looks of inquiry mixed with surprise. Indignation would be too strong a term, nevertheless the officers keenly sensed that these men felt they had done all men should be called upon to do, and that they suspected that some additional and impossible demand was now to be made upon them. They were all brought sharply to attention, and then ordered to relax and listen. The psychological effect of their response to the command for attention was noticeable, while the direction to relax must have appealed to them. In a few words they were told of the results of their attack, of the disorganization they had created in the enemy's defenses, of the numbers of the enemy they had slain, of the prisoners and war material captured, of the enemy points of resistance that still existed, of the vital importance to the 4th Army of the coming attack, of the imperative need for thorough mopping-up behind the advance of the 54th Brigade, of the lack of troops for this purpose, and of the necessity of calling upon the survivors of the 106th Infantry for another supreme effort. The faces of the men were watched while the harangue was being delivered. Their bloodshot eyes showed respect and attention, but not an appreciation of the reasonableness of any further demands upon them, until the Division Commander added :
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"And another thing, men, you must not forget that scattered about in the fields around The Knoll, Guillemont Farm, and Quennemont Farm, are numbers of your pals still lying there wounded. You don't propose to abandon them, do you? I think not; not even to the will- ingness of the 54th Brigade to look after them. You are going to get them yourselves. One other thing. If I know the 106th Infantry they will do even more than that. They will mop up in such a manner that their work will leave nothing to be desired by the comrades lost in the attack of yesterday." This brought a responsive spirit, the provi- sional battalion was organized, equipped and supplied, and under com- mand of Major Gillet reported for duty the next morning.
The morning of September 28th found the 54th Brigade in the line occupying the trenches from which the 106th and 105th Infantry Regi- ments had launched their attack of the 27th, with patrols working forward in an effort to connect up with combat groups of the 106th at their front. These patrols from the moment they left the protection of their front-line trenches were immediately under fire from the enemy groups. The progress of this battle, as of all other engagements in which the 27th participated, is detailed at great length by General O'Ryan in his "Story of the 27th Division." It is full of technical detail of great interest to technical persons, and is brightened by much matter of interest to all. The messages that came from the front sent by different observers of course conflicted as to details, but the advance was steady. Many acts of heroism later won distinctive marks. It is apparent that the Hindenburg Line never would have been captured without these American soldiers. After the battle several British officers of wide experience gave it as their opinion that the success of the thrust was the result not only of the discipline and skill of the troops that headed the attack, but also of their willingness and ability to bear heavy losses with unimpaired morale. They referred further to the fact that troops with long experience in war would have recog- nized the magnitude of the task imposed upon them, and that their tendency would be to shrink from suffering losses which very easily they could persuade themselves would be useless. The 107th Infantry soldiers during preparations for their attack reported that soldiers of the adjoining British divisions had told them that they were to attempt the impossible, and that the only result would be heavy losses. These direful prophecies had no effect upon the Americans, whose confidence and morale were at the highest pitch.
The losses of the 107th Infantry in this attack were very great. Eleven officers and three hundred and thirty-two men were killed; thirty-four enlisted men died of wounds; fifteen officers and seven hundred and twenty-one enlisted men were wounded; fifty-three enlisted men were
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gassed ; and seven were missing. The provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry, commanded by Major Gillet, reached its battle position before the zero hour as mopping-up units for the 3d Battalion of the 107th Infantry. In the fierce fighting which took place in the advance some of these detachments became merged with platoons of the battalion in front. Others in the heavy smoke diverged to the right and followed the left battalion of the 108th Infantry. One of the latter groups was commanded by Sergeant Joseph A. Cook, of Company F, 106th In- fantry, who had reached the objective of September 27th and survived that experience. On this occasion, after most of his platoon had been killed or wounded, the sergeant found himself in a trench of the main Hindenburg Line. As the smoke lifted his party came under machine- gun fire from a concrete emplacement north of them. An attempt to bomb this position from the trench failed. Their rifle fire seemed in- effective. Thereupon the sergeant, while the remainder of his detach- ment kept the emplacement under fire, left the trench and jumping from shell hole to shell hole gained one within bombing distance of the enemy post. From this point he threw four bombs into the pit. Advancing cautiously he found two enemy soldiers dying and two others badly wounded. Enemy soldiers who may have been survivors, with others who had occupied adjoining positions, ran off toward Bony, and as the sergeant expressed it, "made some fine targets for the rest of our men." Sergeant Cook's exploit was but one of numerous cases of the kind illustrating great courage and initiative.
The position entered and secured by Sergeant Cook was probably the most advanced in the main Hindenburg Line defenses held by the Americans at the time. Considering the reduced numbers composing the mopping-up groups of the 106th Infantry Battalion, the heavy casualties they suffered, and the fatigue under which they labored as a result of their former fighting, they accomplished remarkable results. "Wherever these detachments found themselves in the smoke they fought and bombed enemy groups with the greatest determination and gallantry. Dead soldiers of their units were found at formidable points in and about Guillemont Farm in close proximity to enemy dead where they had fallen in combat with the latter." The losses of this battalion were one officer and eleven enlisted men killed, four enlisted men gas- sed, and eight enlisted men missing.
The breaking of the Hindenburg Line is credited in the records to the 4th British Army, but it was the work of the American units, the 27th and 30th divisions, that made the feat possible. On October 1st the 27th and 30th divisions retired for rest and reorganization close behind the forward areas, but out of shell fire. Supporting troops of the 4th Army pushed through the break in the Hindenburg Line and
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took advantage of the great disorganization of the German troops. The enemy continued to withdraw, fighting desperately on the way. An Alsatian prisoner captured stated that roads and points in the back areas, as well as buildings and bridges, were being mined and prepared for demolition to retard pursuit. But the pursuing army was success- ful, taking many prisoners as it advanced. The enemy had been com- pelled to withdraw along the entire front between Lens and Armen- tières. On October 5th, however, a warning order was received that the 2d American Corps would prepare to relieve the Australian Corps in the line, the 30th Division to take over the front line, with the 27th in reserve, the latter to move about October 9th. Active operations began. The 30th Division advanced from place to place, taking much territory, and on October 10th gained the westerly outskirts of Vaux Andigny, La Haie Menneresse, and St. Souplet. Strong resistance was met from the westerly bank of the La Selle River, which was supported by heavy machine-gun fire from the high embankment on the easterly side of the river.
General O'Ryan writes :
The conduct of officers and men of the division throughout the trying period of La Selle River operations was magnificent. Always there was loyal response to the demands made upon them, and at times and toward the end of the operations it must have seemed to the men of the infantry regiments particularly that they were being pushed toward the limit of human endurance. On the morning of the relief the Division Commander and one or two of the Staff saw the survivors of the 54th Brigade go through St. Souplet in their march to the rear. Some of the men were apparently asleep as they walked. They were covered with mud and and many of them were bleeding from cuts and minor injuries. At first glance they seemed to be in a semi-stupor, but everywhere individual men, upon seeing the inspecting party, made a supreme effort, if only by a glance, to indicate that their spirit still survived. It is natural for every commander of troops that have behaved well in war to feel a pride in the conduct and record of men he has commanded under the extraordinary and trying conditions of active operations. Nevertheless, making due allowances for this natural feeling, it is the deliberate opinion of the writer that no general officer in war commanded more intelligent, determined, better disciplined and loyal military organizations than those which made up the 27th Division during the period of the World War.
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