USA > Ohio > Four years in the saddle. History of the First Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Cavalry. War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 > Part 26
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(calling him by name, which I have now forgotten) "on General Roddy's staff; do you know him?" It flashed through my mind that possibly he might have a brother on the staff and possibly he might not. At the same time I knew that while the staff did not know all the line, that every line officer ought to know the staff, and it would not do for me to say that I did not know the brother of this fellow, if there really was such a man on Roddy's staff. And so I thought I would take the poet Horace's advice and go "in medias res" or, as Tom Watson more vigor- ously puts it, take "the middle of the road," and answer in such a non-committal manner as to let me out in case I was wrong. I said: "Yes, suh, I think I have heard of such a man as that being on General Roddy's staff; but as I told you before, suh, I have been down on the Coosa and would not be certain; but I think I have heard of his name being on the staff, suh." Well, I must have gotten it right; he must have been on the staff. He then asked one question of me that called for an abrupt ending of the conversation, and as I could not answer it, I simply had to bluff it out. He said: "Does he look like me, suh?" This was further than I could go; this was a little red-headed wasp that put this question to me: the other might have been a black- haired Southern giant, and so, as the only thing to do, I called him with a bluff, and said: "Does he look like you, suh? Do you set yourselves up as models of Southern beauty that a Con- federate officer should have nothing else to do except to see which one of you looks the most like the other? Good day, suh; your questions are getting d-d impertinent." And I turned my horse and walked away. I am not unduly nervous, and I certainly was not then, a boy of twenty-two, vigorous and healthy; but I can say that for every step that I took it seemed as if I felt a bullet in my back. When I had gotten about forty feet distant, I determined I could run the gauntlet if necessary, and take the chances. I turned in my saddle; they were talking vigorously together and they were still suspicious, but uncer- tain. I called out "Good day, gentlemen; I hope you are satis- fied," and rode off on a gallop.
It did not seem much to me then; but relating the story now, it seems as if every nerve was on edge while I am telling it.
On the eighth two of my men, Thos. R. Kennard, of Com- pany I, First Ohio, and John Gotts, Corporal of Company E, Sev- enth Ohio, rode up to a house where there was a knot of rebels, made some inquiries, and started to go away. They had to go to some bars to get out on the road again; as they nearly reached these bars, some six or seven of the rebels dashed in front of them, and they had to fight their way out. This they did with the utmost gallantry and courage, both of them escaping with- out surrendering, although Kennard was shot through the breast and Gotts through the face.
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I have endeavored to relate briefly a few of the circumstances attending our expedition. I have only given a few of the most prominent of these. It is more than thirty years since, and without memoranda of any sort only those occurrences which were most dramatic and striking can be remembered and told. For the men under my command there was a constant and con- tinuous strain; there was the hazard of detection as spies; there was necessary the keen wit ever alert to have a ready answer when interrogated; there was the consciousness that we must keep in mind the character of speech of these men with whom we were mingling and be ready at all times to imitate it, and if all else failed our hands must be ready to reach our revolvers and fight to the death. Not alone was the strain mental, but our physical endurance was tested to the utmost. Marching without rations through a country impoverished by war, it was almost impossible to secure anything to eat, even if we had taken the time to do so. I did not eat a mouthful from noon of the third until the afternoon of the sixth and not more than , four or five of my men were more fortunate. Our situation was constantly so perilous that I never thought of food or of hunger until that time. Some of my men got a couple of hours sleep the first night out and a couple of hours the next night while we were waiting for daybreak to enter Greensboro, but personally I did not close my eyes the first two nights nor until after midnight of the third, when I slept about two hours before commencing the fourth day's operations. While the men under my command did not actually effect the capture of Davis, the Congress of the United States thought that their services were more meritorious on account of the information furnished, as well as more dangerous and hazardous than that of the column that did actually effect the capture of Davis. There was at the time a reward offered of $100,000 for his capture. Of this neither myself nor the men under me had any knowledge at the time, and we had no mercenary motive in attempting the hazards of this expedition.
After the war the Fourth Michigan and the First Wisconsin became involved before the Congress in a contest over this re- ward; and then for the first time the evidence of General Wilson and General Alexander, which I append hereto as a part of the records of that time, showing the part that myself and my men had performed in that important service; and the chair- man of the committee on claims wrote me for a detail of my men, which it was almost impossible for me to give fully, but which I gave in part; and without ever presenting any claim on our part, the Fortieth Congress, at its second session, report- ing upon the capture of Davis, placed the service of myself and men in importance before that of either Pritchard or Harnden. It placed General Wilson first, myself and men second, and
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Colonel Pritchard and Colonel Harnden equally third, and awarded to each of the four officers, Wilson, Yeoman, Harnden and Pritchard, $3,000 apiece. I append herewith extracts from the report of the committee, which is No. 60 of the second session of the Fortieth Congress. The same facts, with the exception of the recommendation of Congress, appear in the dispatches of General Wilson and General Alexander, and in the Forty-ninth Volume, Part I of the official record of the war of the rebellion, pages
I have thought it best to submit these official reports in connection with this brief history of the part my men bore in the capture of Jefferson Davis, together with a portion of an article by General Wilson in the February number of the Century for 1890, from which I have already quoted, and they are annexed as part of this article.
General Wilson 'Reports as Follows.
Brevet Brigadier-General A. J. Alexander, with the second brigade of Upton's division, having reached Atlanta in advance of the division, was directed by General Winslow to scout the country to the northward as far as Dalton, or until he should meet the troops under General Steedman in that region. On beginning his march from Macon, General Alexander was authorized to detach an officer and twenty picked men, disguised as rebel soldiers, for the purpose of trying to obtain definite information of Davis' movements. This party was placed under the command of Lieutenant Joseph A. O. Yeoman, First Ohio Cavalry, and at the time acting as Inspector-General of the bri- gade. After a rapid march toward the upper cross- · ings of the Savannah River in Northeastern Georgia, Lieutenant Yeoman's detachment met and joined Davis' party, escorted by Dibrell's and Ferguson's divisions of cavalry, probably under Wheeler in person, and continued with them for several days, watching for an opportunity to seize and carry off the rebel chief. He was frustrated by the vigilance of the rebel escort. At Wash- ington, Georgia, the rebel authorities must have heard that Atlanta was occupied by our troops, and that they could not pass that point without a fight. They halted and for some time acted with irresolution in regard to their future course. The cavalry force which had remained true to Davis, estimated at five brigades and probably numbering two thousand men, now became mutinous and declined to go any farther. They were disbanded and partially paid off in coin, which had been brought to that point in wagons. Lieutenant Yeoman lost sight of Davis at this time, but dividing his party into three or four detach- ments, sought again to obtain definite information of his move- ments, but for twenty-four hours was unsuccessful. Persevering
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in his efforts, he became convinced that Davis had relinquished his idea of going into Alabama, and would probably try to reach the Gulf or South Atlantic Coast and escape by sea. Couriers were sent with this information to General Alexander, and by him duly transmitted to me at Macon. * *
* With the view of intercepting him in this attempt, I directed the crossings of the Ocmulgee river to be watched with renewed vigilance all the way from the neighborhood of Atlanta to Hawkinsville, and on the evening of May 6, I directed Brigadier-General Crox- ton to select the best regiment in his division and to send it under its best officer, with orders to march eastward via Jeffer- sonville to Dublin on the Oconee river. * General Crox- ton selected for this purpose the First Wisconsin Cavalry, com- manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harnden, an officer of spirit, experience, and resolution. * * From the foregoing narrative it will be seen that the first perfectly reliable infor- mation in regard to the movements of Davis was that sent in by Lieutenant Joseph A. O. Yeoman, of General Alexander's staff. (Official Record of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XLIX, Pages 372-3-4-9.)
. General Alexander Reports as Follows.
Shortly after the armistice between Generals Sherman and Johnson I was ordered to send one regiment of my brigade to Atlanta, rapidly to apprehend Davis, who was reported moving in that direction with an escort of cavalry. I accordingly sent the First Ohio Cavalry, Colonel B. B. Eggleston commanding. A few days after I was ordered to move to the same point with the remainder of my brigade. Previous to this movement I obtained permission from the Major-General commanding the corps to send an officer and twenty men, disguised in rebel clothing to meet Davis, watch and if possible capture him. This delicate operation I intrusted to Lieutenant Joseph A. O. Yeo- man, a dashing young officer of the First Ohio Cavalry, of great intelligence and coolness, and who was at that time acting as Inspector-General for my brigade. Lieutenant Yeoman moved rapidly to Northeastern Georgia, where he met and joined Davis' escort, consisting of Dibrell's division of cavalry. He marched with them two or three days, but could not get an opportunity of seizing on the person of Davis on account of the close watch on every one who approached his person. At Washington, Georgia (I think), the forces under Dibrell heard that. Atlanta was occupied by our troops, and that they could not pass that point without a fight, accordingly disbanded during the night, and sought their homes in small parties. Lieutenant Yeoman scattered his men among the various bands to try and get some trace of Davis, but for twenty-four hours was unsuccessful. He
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finally found that he had abandoned the idea of going into Alabama, and was making south to leave the country. Lieuten- ant Yeoman kept the command at Atlanta advised of all of his movements and the commanding officer advised the Major-Gen- eral commanding the troops by telegraph. *
* I trust Lieutenant Yeoman will receive some recognition of his services, as he was the only officer who really risked his life; and I believe the information furnished by him caused the Major-General commanding to send out the party that made the arrest. (Of- ficial Records of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XLIX, Pages 382-3.)
General Wilson, in February "Century," 1890.
Yeoman and his followers marched rapidly towards the up- per crossings of the Savannah River, entered South Carolina, and by diligent but cautious inquiry and much hard riding found and joined the party they were looking for, without attracting unusual attention themselves. The country was full of dis- banded Confederate soldiers all more or less demoralized and going home. Discipline was at an end, and every man of them was looking out for himself. The condition of affairs facilitated the operations of Yeoman, and encouraged him to believe that he might find an opportunity to seize and carry off the rebel chief; but the vigilance and devotion of the escort rendered it impossible to put his daring plan into effect, though it did not prevent his sending couriers into the nearest Federal picket post to report the movements of the party he was with. The information thus obtained was promptly transmitted to Gen- erals Alexander and Upton, and by them to me. At Washington, Georgia, there was much confusion, growing out of the further disbanding which was rendered necessary by the proximity of our forces, and Yeoman lost sight of Davis for about twenty. four hours, during which time he divided his party into three or four squads, and sought again to obtain definite information of the Confederate chieftain's movements and plans. Persever- ing in his efforts he learned enough to convince him that Davis had relinquished all hopes of getting through the country to the westward, and would most probably try to reach the South Atlantic or Gulf Coast and escape by sea. This it will be remem- bered was the plan which Pollard, the historian of the Lost Cause, says was deliberately adopted many weeks before Lee's catastrophe. Relying upon this information Yeoman sent in couriers to make it known, and as soon as it reached him Alex- ander repeated it to me by telegraph, which was now completely
in our possession. * On the afternoon of May 6, immedi- ately after receiving the intelligence from Yeoman, I sent for General Croxton, commanding the First (McCook's) Division,
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and directed him to select his best regiment in his division, and send it forthwith, under its best officer, eastward by the little town of Jeffersonville to Dublin on the Oconee River, with orders to march with the greatest possible speed, scouting the country well to the northward of his route, leaving detachments at all important cross-roads and keeping a sharp lookout for all rebel parties, whether large or small, that might be passing through this region. It was hoped by this means that the route pursued by Davis might be intercepted and his movements discovered, in which event the commanding officer was instructed to follow wherever it might lead, until the fugitive should be overtaken and captured.
Report No. 60, Second Session Fortieth Congress, is as fol- lows: ,
In review it appears that the first and most important ser- vice was that of planning the capture, disposition of troops, · and the special instruction to subordinate officers which resulted in the success of the enterprise. That this duty was performed in a skilful manner by Major-General Wilson is not doubted. That he made no claim for a share of the reward does not, in the opinion of the committee, lessen his merits or the value of his services as a man and an officer. The service of next importance is regarded as that of Captain Yeoman, of the First Ohio Cavalry, and his detachment of scouts and spies, who made the first discovery and gave the first information which led to the capture. The march of this officer was almost unexampled for celerity and self-denial, even for mounted soldiers. No appli- cation was made in his behalf, and the narrative of his march is in reply to the inquiry addressed him by the chairman of this committee.
As to the remaining question between the two cavalry regi- ments, the committee unanimously agree that they be regarded alike and that the commanding officers be awarded equal shares with General Wilson and Captain Yeoman for equally meri- torious services, and that the amount of each be fixed at the sum of $3,000. In thus arbitrarily recommending this sum for the four principal officers, it is admitted that all rules but that of equity and justice are set aside, but it is regarded as not too small, and it is insisted that the officers' share should not be large. In this respect the naval rule would do injustice between the officers mentioned while their services are regarded as so nearly equal.
To all the officers and men present of both cavalry regiments and the detachment of Captain Yeoman, it is recommended that the remainder, $SS,000, be distributed according to the grade of each in the military service at the time of the capture.
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Charge of the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry at the Battle of Stone's River, Tennessee, December 31, 1862, (Sketched on the Ground a few Days after the Battle, by N. Fin- egan, Company D.
The ground will be recognized by every member of the regi- ment who participated in the charge or who may have exam- ined the ground afterwards. The house used as a Confederate hospital is on the left, with the infantry battle line and battery in the distance, and is very realistic and life-like.
The charging columns have just met in the shock, and are shown in the noise, confusion and struggle of the melee that follows, and in which the revolver and saber play a prom- inent part.
The artist has avoided that great error, so usual in pictures, representing cavalry charges of straight lines, horses' heads all erect and troopers all in the same position in their saddles, which looks well on paper, but is far from being true to life. What adds so much to the value of the picture is the fact that it was drawn on the ground only a few days after the battle under the direction of some of the officers of the regiment.
. It represents the true cavalry melee in which horse and rider are in all kinds of positions in the supreme moment of the cav- alryman's highest ambition.
Cavalry Raids.
A cavalry* officer of the U. S. Army defines a cavalry raid, in a military sense, "to be an incursion or irruption of mounted troops into the theater of war, occupied by or under control of the enemy."
One of the main duties of cavalry in time of war is to make raids in the rear of the enemy's main army.
These raids, when successful, always add to the efficiency and raises the morale of the cavalry arm of the service, and *Capt. A. E. Wood, 4th U. S. Cavalry.
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gives the forces engaged confidence for any expedition, however hazardous it may seem.
In fact, the cavalryman is always in his element when on reconnoissance or raid, teeming with dash and adventure.
While cavalry raids have been in vogue more or less from the earliest times of which we have any history of the cavalry service, yet in no prior war was it practiced to the extent that . it was during the war of the rebellion.
There is no kind of service that so develops the skill of the officers and the endurance and intelligence of the soldier, as the cavalry raid. From the time he cuts loose from the main army until the object of the raid is accomplished, the · commander must depend ou his own resources, as he has noth- ing to draw from, and his command is being constantly weakened by contact with the enemy. His men are being killed and wounded, his horses are exhausted or killed by hard marching or by the bullets of the enemy, his ammunition is being rapidly consumed, his rations eaten up, and there is a continuous destruc- tion of his force.
The object of the raid is to destroy the enemy's commun- ication by burning bridges, filling up tunnels and railroad cuts with rocks and timber, cutting telegraph wires, burning ties, heating and destroying rails, burning and destroying army sup- plies, capturing railroad and bridge guards, and creating general consternation and havoc in rear of the enemy's lines. As a raiding expedition must carry all of their ammunition from the start, they have no resources from which to draw, should their ammunition become exhausted. Therefore they usually endeavored to avoid all large bodies of the enemy, excepting those in their immediate front who are endeavoring to repel the expedition from striking some point on a railroad or depot of supplies. They capture all prisoners that come in their line of march, but they are usually all paroled, as the command moves so rapidly, often marching fifty and sixty miles a day, that prisoners cannot be guarded, mounted, and if on foot, could not march the distance required; besides, all the good mounts captured are needed for the dismounted troopers of the com- mand, as many horses become exhausted, while others are killed or wounded by the enemy.
When prisoners are taken on such raids, they are taken to the commanding officer and questioned very persistently as to their commands, strength, name of commanding officer, and any other information that may be of interest or benefit to the commander.
But the good soldier, when taken prisoner, is either such a "knownothing" or liar, that the officer interrogating gets but little satisfaction regarding the command to which he belongs. The writer has a very distinct recollection of having been cap.
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tured by General Armstrong's division of rebel cavalry, and was volunteering some information to a squad of rebel soldiers about the strength of our army. A Surgeon, who was one of the listeners and who no doubt thought the information as to the resources of the North would be somewhat discouraging to the rank and file, very promptly called me a liar, to shut my d-d Yankee mouth, to all of which I most gracefully complied.
No rule can be adopted for the time and place for raids, but the commander must be governed by the development of the campaign. If he sees an opportunity that he may think desirable to draw the enemy's cavalry away from his front, before making an attack in force, if he has the cavalry to spare from his own army, a raid may be made in the enemy's rear, or if he fears the enemy will receive reinforcements, he may attempt to cut his communication. All these matters must be governed by circumstances, and the commander always con- siders carefully all the surroundings and whether or not the sacrifice will justify sending out the expedition.
General Wheeler, "Little Joe," the great cavalry leader of the Confederate army of Tennessee, started on his raid in the rear of Rosecrans' army in Chattanooga, ten days after the battle of Chickamauga. He crossed the Tennessee River at Cot- ton Port, fifty miles above Chattanooga, on the first day of October, 1863, with two divisions of cavalry. His object was to destroy the railroad in the rear of the Army of the Cumber- land, thus compelling Rosecrans' army, then living on very short rations, to evacuate Chattanooga and retreat back to Nashville, as he had but one line of railroad to supply his army from Louisville, Ky. The rebel army had possession of the railroad from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, south of the Tennessee River, and at that date all supplies were hauled by wagon trains from Stevenson and Bridgeport over the mountains and through the Sequatchie Valley to Chattanooga. It was a slender thread, and the Confederate commander was quick to see his oppor- tunity.
The Second Cavalry Division, under General George Crook, was guarding the river from Chattanooga to Cotton Port, on the alert for the anticipated cavalry raid. Crooks' division was stretched out in a thin line, and Wheeler, with his whole com- mand concentrated, met with feeble opposition from the bat- talion of the First Ohio Cavalry stationed at the ford. Wheeler marched rapidly down the valley and by the time Crook had his command concentrated, Wheeler was about a day in advance. He swept down the valley with his bold riders, and in the Sequatchie Valley, near Anderson's cross-roads, he attacked one of our wagon trains, loaded with ammunition and rations, headed for Chattanooga, burned three hundred wagons, destroyed
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everything, shot the mules down in the harness, and captured the drivers and train-men.
He then marched rapidly toward McMinnville, and at the foot of the mountain Crook's division attacked his rear guard and pushed him rapidly through McMinnville, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, Farmington, Pulaski and forced him on the run across the Tennessee River at Lamb's Ferry, October 9.
Nine days after Wheeler crossed the river with such con- fidence and audacity he was driven across the river with a loss of fully two thousand men, six pieces of artillery, hundreds of horses, and small arms. His men were very badly demoralized and the raid was a complete failure, excepting the destruction of the wagon train in the valley, a few supplies, and taking a few prisoners at, McMinnville. He did not have time to destroy either railroads or supplies after Crook's gallant division of dashing troopers struck him near McMinnville.
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