Four years in the saddle. History of the First Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Cavalry. War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, Part 5

Author: Curry, W. L. (William Leontes), b. 1839. comp. cn
Publication date: 1898
Publisher: Columbus, O., Champlin Printing Co.
Number of Pages: 980


USA > Ohio > Four years in the saddle. History of the First Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Cavalry. War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 > Part 5


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ments sufficient for the repulse of our raw troops."


"Our forces, as they had arrived on the afternoon of the fifth, at the intersection of the Griersford (Lick Creek) and Ridge Roads, from Corinth to Pittsburg, less than two miles from the Shiloh meeting-house, were formed into three lines of battle; the first, under General Hardee, extended from near Owl Creek, on the left, to near Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of less than three miles, and somewhat oblique to the Federal front line of encampments, being separated from it, on the right, by about one and a half miles, and on the left, about two miles. General Hardee's command not being sufficiently strong to oc- cupy the whole front, it was extended on the right by Gladden's brigade, of General Bragg's corps, and his artillery was formed immediately in his rear, on the main Pittsburg road. His cav- alry protected and supported his flanks. The second line, about five hundred yards in rear of the first, was composed of the rest of General Bragg's troops, arranged in the same order. General Polk's corps, formed in column of brigades, deployed on the left of the Pittsburg road, between the latter and Owl Creek. The front of the column was about eight hundred yards in rear of the center of General Bragg's left wing, and each brigade was followed immediately by its battery."


"General Polk's cavalry supported and protected his left flank. Breckenridge's command occupied a corresponding posi- tion behind General Bragg's right wing, between the Pittsburg road and Lick Creek. His cavalry protected and supported his right flank. The two latter commands constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines of battle by being deployed, when required on the right and left of the Pittsburg road, or otherwise, according to exigencies."


"Our pickets had been thrown out well in advance of our first line of battle, not far from the enemy's position, without seeing or discovering any of his pickets or outposts. Such an oversight on the part of the Federal commanders is really unac- countable, unless they chose to overlook that important maxim · of war: 'Never despise an enemy, however weak and insignifi- cant he may appear.' "


"So near to each other were the opposing forces, that, hear- ing a loud beating of drums about the hour of tattoo, and believ- ing it proceeded from our lines, General Beauregard immediately dispatched a staff officer with orders to suppress such thought- less and imprudent sounds. The staff officer returned shortly afterwards and reported that the noise General Beauregard had heard, and was desirous of quieting, came not from our troops, but from the enemy's encampment in our front. Later in the evening, a Federal Assistant Surgeon and his orderly, riding out on some night excursion, crossed our picket lines and were captured. They were speechless with astonishment when


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brought to Generals Johnston and Beauregard, at beholding so large a force within striking distance of their own camps, where all was now silent and repose, and where none suspected the approaching storm. From them we learned that General Grant had returned for the night to Savannah."


"Before 5 o'clock A. M. on the sixth of April, General Hardee's pickets, driving in those of General Prentiss, encoun- tered some companies of the Federal advance guard, and a desul- tory firing began."


"Notwithstanding the bold movements of the Confederate cavalry on the previous evening, and the noise of the conflict since dawn, General Sherman remained under the belief that no more than a strong demonstration was intended, until nearly eight o'clock, when, seeing the Confederate bayonets moving in the woods beyond his front, he 'became satisfied, for the first time, that the enemy designed a determined attack' on the entire Federal camp."


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Battle of Pittsburg Landing.


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Grant in his Memoirs has this to say of Buell and the Army of Ohio and the battle of Shiloh:


"On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and met Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they Jay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. This meeting between General Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat, used to run between the landing and Savannah. It was brief and related especially to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. I saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regi- ments, he even threatened them with shells from the gun-boats near by, but it was all to no effect. I have no doubt that this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. Before any of Buell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had ceased. There was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. As his troops arrived in the dusk, General Buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill, where they fired briskly for some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury.


"Victory was assured when Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. I was glad however to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. During the night of the sixth the remainder


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of Nelson's division, Buell's army, crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up the river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the seventh, Buell commanding them in person. We had now become the attacking party, the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat.


"The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been intrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after reassuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. "The admissions of the highest Confederate officers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of the victory for them absurd. The victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It was then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio both participated. But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the sixth and held it at bay until near night; the night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson's division."


The following extracts from General W. T. Sherman's Memoirs will be of interest:


"I always acted on the supposition that we were an invading enemy; that our purpose was to move forward in force, make a lodgment on tactics of Fort Donelson, by separating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and on the Mississippi River. We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so and because such a course would have made our raw men timid. At a later period of the war, we could have rendered this position impregnable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and it may be it is well we did not. But thus far we had not positively detected the presence of infantry, for cavalry regiments generally had two guns along, and I supposed the guns that opened on us on the evening of Friday, April 4, belonged to the cavalry that was hovering along our whole front. On Saturday, April 5, the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe they designed anything but strong demonstration. On Sunday morning early, the sixth inst., the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division. About 8 A. M. I saw the glistening bayo- nets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on


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our whole camp. The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to our front, throwing shells into our camp. Here I saw for the first time, April 7, the well ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less dis- ciplined men. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, and behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister upon any column of troops that advanced upon the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second brigade (then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Colonel Stuart being wounded) to form on its right, and my fourth brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterwards found to be Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division.


"I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit when I think it is due, and censure where I think it is merited. I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great centre of this field of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's and Breckenridge's divi- sions. Probably no other battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army was taken by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our tents, bayoneted the men in their beds, that General Grant was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in a measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell, Nelson and others, who had reached the steam- boat landing from the east, just before night-fall of the sixth, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed and beaten. General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me. About an hour afterward, just before dark, General Buell himself rode up to where I was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his staff. I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me a good many significant inquiries, matters and things generally. By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning, and our


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then positions; I also explained to him that my right then covered the bridge over Lick Creek by which we had all day been expecting Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left, and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the landing and had not seen our men, of whose exist- ence in fact he seemed to doubt. Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men, could cross over in the night, and be ready for next day's battle. I argued that with these reinforce- ments we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust me and repeatedly said he did not like the looks of things, espe- cially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our great disaster. Buell did cross that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field; thus gaining the battle decisively. The enemy having forced the centre line to fall back nearly half way from their camps to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. The point was guarded by the gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Given and Shirk com- manding, with four twenty-one pounder Parrott guns, and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep, but impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops were stationed here except necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at this moment the advance of Major-General Buell's column and part of the division of General Nelson's arrived. the two Generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, and the enemy soon driven back. During all of that day we fought, and night found us a mile to the rear of our camp, which was in possession of the enemy. The next day we regained the grounds steadily and about.4.P. M. I was again on horse-back near our old camp. The tents were still standing, though riddled with bullets. At the picket rope in front lay two of my horses dead. The dead bodies of men in blue and gray lay around thick, side by side, and scraps of paper showed what was a fact, that Beauregard, Breckenridge and Bragg, old personal friends, had slept the night before in my camp, and had carried away my scant bedding."


1


CO. H.


CO. A.


ČO. B.


Ç. A. Webber.


Corp. Samuel Robertson1.


Q. M. Serg't. R. Barton.


CO. F.


CO. B.


CO. F,


Tazwell Hizey.


Corp. M. B. Kennedy.


Corp. P. R. Egolph.


CO. E.


Serg't. T. V. Harper.


CO. K.


D. M. Robbins.


CO. H.


Corp. Wm. Schwartz.


From Pittsburg Landing to Corinth.


April and May, 1862.


After the battle of Pittsburg Landing the army was reor- ganized and the regiment was attached to the 7th Division, composed of the following organizations.


Seventh Division (First Division, Army of the Ohio.) Brigadier Geo. H. Thomas.


First Brigade.


17th Ohio, 12th Kentucky, 31st Ohio, 38th Ohio.


Second Brigade. 4th Kentucky, 10th Kentucky, 10th Indiana, 14th Ohio. Third Brigade. 2nd Minnesota, 9th Ohio, 35th Ohio, 18th U. S.


Artillery. 1st Michigan, Battery D, 1st Ohio, 4th U. S. (1 battery). Cavalry. 1st Ohio.


The movement of the army from Pittsburg Landing com- menced at once and during the siege of Corinth the regiment was on duty almost continuously picketing or scouting until


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Corinth was evacuated by the enemy on the night of May 29.


The country between the landing and Corinth, twenty miles distant, was miserable, and usually the farms were small, build- ings poor, and the water was very bad, as the streams were small, well water bitter, and in some parts of the country the only water for use was from ponds and swamps. The timber was generally small and scrubby, with a few acres cleared around the houses, and the whole country presented a general forsaken and forlorn appearance, as the people had nearly all abandoned their homes.


The heavy siege guns were dragged through the mud by oxen, as many as ten yoke were hitched to one gun, and the progress on the march was very slow, as in many places cor- duroy bridges had to be built across the swamps and low ground, and until about the tenth of May the whole country was a sea of mud, and for some days the army would be at a standstill, as the roads were impassable. The regiment had a great deal of picket duty to do, and that too, in front of the infantry, and it was a very hard, dangerous service, as we were at times in such close proximity to the enemy that the pickets could not be changed during the night, so they were compelled to stand on post from dark till daylight.


Some nights there would be a great deal of firing on the picket lines, and it was not an unusual occurrence for the reserve to be called to horse and mount a half dozen times during the night.


As there was so much timber, it was a very hard place for cavalry to operate, and the reserve would lay in line all night holding their horses ready to mount at a moment's notice. One instance is recalled of an alarm on the picket line one even- ing when a battalion of the regiment was on picket not far from the Driver House. The reserve was stationed at the forks in a road and the videttes were thrown out on the roads a few hundred yards in advance of the reserve. It was after sunset, the shadows had begun to grow long, the relief had just been posted, and everything was as quiet as if there was not an armed enemy within ten miles.


The reserve had their horses unbridled and feed sacks out, and some of the men were making coffee, little thinking of the foe in the thicket.


All at once bang, bang cracked the carbines out on the picket line, there was a "mounting in hot haste" and the reserve was soon mounted, and drawn up in line at an advance carbine. Hot coffee was spilled, and there was a general hurry and excite- ment all along the lines, until Scotty went out to the front and made reconnoissance among the pickets. The firing soon ceased and Scotty reported all "quiet in front," and said as he rode back to the reserve that he was "momentarily expecting a volley


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from them as they had their carbines at an advance, before he started to the front," but he was happily disappointed.


The reserve lay in line all night holding their horses, and there were several alarms and some picket firing, but this is only one instance of many similar ones that happened almost every night on some part of the line.


During the siege of Corinth, General A. J. Smith, an officer of the regular army, was made chief of cavalry, and this was the first movement of the cavalry in this department, as a sep- arate and independent organization, and after a careful inspec- tion by the chief, several expeditions were planned and executed by the cavalry entirely independent of the infantry arm of the service.


The cavalry regiments were still attached to and camped with the different infantry divisions, but were concentrated when any independent movement of the cavalry was contem- plated.


Our first reconnoissance in force was on the fifteenth of April, in which we had a skirmish and a few of our men wounded, and again on the eighteenth the rebels made a reconnoissance and we were called out and lay in line of battle all day, but no fighting. On the thirteenth of May there was another strong demonstration by the cavalry and a brisk skirmish, and on the seventeenth of May all the cavalry of the army was concentrated and made a raid on the extreme right of the army, burned a railroad bridge and had a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry with but little loss. This was the first raid in which the regiment participated, and was the largest body of cavalry that had ever marched together in this department.


From the tenth of April until the evacuation of Corinth the regiment was on duty almost constantly, either on picket or scouting, and while we had many skirmishes, the losses were very small in action, but from sicknesses it was very heavy. On account of the bad water many of the men were taken sick with camp fever, and while the death rate was not so large in the regiment, yet many of the men became unfit for service -- were sent to hospitals, and large numbers of them drifted back home, and by the time the army entered Corinth, June 1, the strength of the regiment was reduced at least one-half.


Many men and officers had been detailed for escort duty with General Thomas, General T. W. Sherman, General Fry, General Shoef and others, and it seemed that we had but a skeleton of the thousand sabers with which we marched out of Camp Chase only six months before. Almost every regiment in that army had the same experience, and it is safe to say that there was no two months during the balance of the war that so many men were placed hors de combat in the regiment as dur- ing the months of April and May, 1862.


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Among those of the many who died on the campaign was Lieutenant John M. Rennick, of Company M, who died of disease May 28. He was the first officer of the regiment who died, and he was universally respected as a gentleman of high character and an excellent officer.


On the night of May 29 the Confederate army evacuated Corinth, and the first convincing evidence we had of that fact was about six o'clock on the morning of the thirtieth by hearing the heavy explosions from the powder magazines blown up by the retreating army.


We were called to horse and, mounting, moved rapidly to the left toward Farmington.


Passing through that village we moved out on the Dan- ville road and soon struck the rear guard of the rebel army, which we attacked vigorously, and they were soon retreating rapidly. About noon we halted, and after a brief rest passed to the right and commenced pushing the rear guard on another road, had a skirmish and kept picking up prisoners all the after- noon, and lay on our arms all night and did not unsaddle our horses.


All day Saturday, the thirty-first, we kept feeling the en- emy's lines on two or three different roads, taking some pris- oners, and found the enemy making stronger resistance, but drove them steadily all day.


Late in the evening they burned a bridge across a small stream and masked a battery on the other side, and as our advance reached the bank just at dark the battery opened up with grape and cannister and the first volley killed several men and wounded many more.


As it had now become dark, we fell back out of the range of the guns and lay on our arms in line of battle, holding our horses the second night. Sunday morning, June 1, our line advanced, and one of our batteries opened up on the position of the masked battery at the bridge and soon routed them. A bridge was hastily constructed across the stream and we were soon in hot pursuit, and during the day took a large number of prisoners. On the second we had several skirmishes with the rear guard, and on the third the regiment was detached and made a reconnoissance to Ripley, and at Blackland had a sharp engagement, charging the enemy, wounding and killing several, taking a number of prisoners, a large lot of small arms, wagons and mules.


On the fourth Captain Pattin, with Companies D and L, was on outpost duty near Booneville with about fifty men when a large force of rebel cavalry attacked him, and after a severe fight the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss, the loss in the First being ten men wounded.


The regiment was specially mentioned for gallantry in these


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two fights by General Rosecrans and General Gordon Granger in their reports hereto attached.


(Series I, Volume 10, Part 1, Pages 710, 711, 712, 713.) .


Extract from report of W. S. Rosecrans, Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,


Headquarters Army of Mississippi, June 28, 1862.


About S P. M. a messenger came to me from the front with information from Brigadier-General A. J. Smith, and thus I ascertained that the cavalry was in advance on our road, and that it had overtaken a rebel force up the Tuscumbia four miles to the front, was fighting, and in some danger of losing part of a battery.


The rebel rear guard fled from a small battery they had constructed 150 yards north of the bridge, and, crossing, fired and destroyed the bridge. Bisell's engineers cut away the tim- ber felled to obstruct the road, and, with the sharp shooters, `occupied the ground during the night. General Smith not hav- ing been placed under my orders, I gave him the infantry asked for and went into bivouac with the remaining troops at 11 P. M.


A squadron of cavalry, supported by a regiment of infantry and one section of artillery, took the right-hand fork of that same road forward to a point on the bluff overlooking the bottom of Twenty Mile Creek and drove in the enemy's cavalry pickets, and saw a column of infantry on the march and filing eastwardly for one hour. At the same time General Smith sent a cavalry reconnoissance toward Carrollville, on the right of the railroad, and drove in their cavalry pickets and infantry at Twenty Mile Creek. Another, by Crockett's encountered their pickets near Brownlett's Spring, while the First Ohio Cavalry went to Black- land, a single company charging eighty rebel cavalry and driving them from the place.


Colonel Smith deserves special mention for a reconnoissance which he made with his cavalry - the First Ohio - in the direc- tion of Blackland.




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